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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines how new European Union (EU) member states manage 
and implement European Cohesion Policy (CP). It assess the administrative and 
political factors that might explain the variation in the financial absorption of 
Structural Funds (SF), with a specific focus on two homogeneous cases from Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEECs). Whilst there is a dense literature on the potential socio-
economic impact of CP in the EU, less attention has been paid to the factors affecting 
CP and SF governance at the national domestic level. Questions of financial 
absorption, delivery effectiveness and quality of the spending remain open and are 
puzzling for both academics and practitioners. Subsequently, one of the main aims of 
this thesis has been to provide an in-depth investigation of, on the one hand, the 
structural administrative capacity employed by states to manage this policy and, on 
the on the other hand, the political factors and dynamics that influence its delivery of 
SF in new member states. The study carries out an archaeology of the capacity of the 
specialised institutions involved in the different stages of the absorption process with 
the general aim of explaining some of the determinants of absorption performance, 
particularly in the countries’ assessed. It proposes an absorption capacity model in 
order to assess these claims and the original empirical evidence collected.  
 
The thesis fills in several empirical and theoretical lacunae in knowledge. Empirically, 
the study draws on multiple comparative case studies from Bulgaria and Romania, two 
problematic yet diverging cases in terms of absorption performance, during the 2007-
2013 implementation period. These countries’ first experience in managing and 
implementing SF provides empirically rich insights. Theoretically, this thesis offers a 
more nuanced account of the governance of CP and SF in CEECs. It builds and refines 
the concept of administrative capacity as well as several political factors (stability, 
support and clientelism) in order to examine the complexity and problematic issues 
surrounding SF absorption. Insights on CP governance, administrative capacity-
building and the impact of politicisation at the national and local level are outlined and 
discussed. 
 
The main argument put forward in this thesis is that the variation in absorption 
performance is generated by the interplay between administrative and political 
conditions. In other words, the way in which administrative and political factors have 
interacted has shaped the ability of the two countries to govern EU Cohesion Policy 
and influenced their performance in absorbing EU funding. This argument is 
developed in line with several key findings. First, administrative capacity is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for countries to deliver effectively CP. Second, political 
conditions can facilitate or hinder the development of national administrative 
capacities and have often influenced the different stages of the absorption policy 
process. The thesis highlights the need to critically reflect on the overall dynamics 
between structural administrative arrangements and domestic political conditions, in 
order to advance our understanding of how EU policies are governed and implemented 
at the national level. Finally, the thesis formulates several recommendations, for the 
different stakeholders involved, on how to facilitate the delivery of SF in order to 
improve cohesion and development in Europe. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Cohesion Policy in old and new Europe 
 
Cohesion Policy (CP) is one of the main development and investment tools the 
European Union (EU) uses in order to address economic and social inequalities 
between regions in Europe. It is one of the flagship policies of the EU and has received 
considerable attention from supranational to local levels of government. Given that it 
mobilizes several key administrative and political stakeholders (e.g. EU institutions, 
central governments, local authorities, civil society representatives) the policy has 
been evaluated as one of the most advanced political instruments used by the EU 
(Piattoni and Polverari 2016). However, CP remains one of the most contested 
European policies in both economic and political terms (Marks 1996; Baun and Marek 
2014). In recent decades, CP has evolved from a side-payment to one of the largest 
development instruments around the world, boasting one third of the multi-annual 
European Union budget (Allen 2000; Bachtler, Mendez and Wishlade 2013). 
 
CP allows payments, mainly under the form of Structural Funds (SF), from richer to 
poorer countries in order for the latter to accommodate to the different parts of the EU 
integration process (Marks 1996; Allen 2000). From a normative point of view, the 
redistribution principles behind the policy reflect a “tangible expression of solidarity” 
between EU member states (Tsoukalis 1997, 187). The Italian Mezzogiorno, Greek 
islands or Landers from Eastern Germany have all benefited from funding that 
allegedly improved the socio-economic conditions and the quality of life of their 
citizens. Arguably, the lack of such a policy may make the EU more irrelevant as an 
economic and political project. In addition, the incorporation of Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEECs) in the European Community presumed “far-reaching 
changes in the nature and the implementation of key EU policies” (Begg 1998, 11). 
Successive waves of EU Enlargement have sparked new debates on inter-regional 
disparities and how Structural Funds might be used to address them (Bachtler, 
Downes, and Gorzelak 2000). Regions from CEECs lag behind their Western 
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counterparts in social and economic terms.1 As a result, the fact that lesser developed 
regions have joined the European Union club has been a point of concern for older 
member states, such as Greece or Spain, which sought to remain net beneficiaries of 
CP funding.2 As can be seen from Figure 1, during 2007-2013, considerable amounts 
of SF were allocated to countries from the area including Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Romania, whilst Spain, Italy and Greece have equally benefited, though 
to a lesser extent, from the EU budget allocated to this policy area.  
 
Figure 1: Structural Funds financial allocations (billion EUR) (2007-2013)  
 
Source: European Commission 2013, available at https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/ (Retrieved in 
June 2015) 
 
The EU enlargement process has challenged the management and implementation of 
CP. 3 The quality of institutions, or generally speaking the quality of governance and 
                                                             
1 There are numerous reasons, not addressed in this thesis, for why this is the case but they can 
broadly relate to different historical legacies, patterns of socio-economic development or political 
circumstances. 
2 For a detailed discussion on this see Chapter 7 of Bachtler, Mendez, and Wishlade 2013.  
3 Management and implementation are two terms frequently used throughout this thesis in the 
general sense of the delivery of Structural Funds at the national level. Moreover, these represent two 
distinct stages of the SF absorption policy process (e.g. implementation of projects by final 
beneficiaries). 
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in CEECs, has widely been seen as a key barrier for the implementation of external 
development policies (Barca et al. 2012; Charron et al. 2014).  
 
Figure 2: Absorption rates of European Structural Funds EU-28 (2007-2014) 
 
 
Source: European Commission 2013, available at https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/ 
(Retrieved in June 2015) 
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(Paraskevopoulos and Leonardi 2004). For instance, similar conditions found in the 
latter countries were well documented for CEECs, namely problems of “fledgling 
democracies…weak economies, large agricultural sectors and problems with 
corruption and/or clientelism” (Dudek 2005, 31). Despite these worries, as evidence 
from the most recent multi-annual financial period attests (Figure 2), there has been 
a great deal of variation across and within countries with regard to obtaining and 
spending Structural Funds. The performance of CEECs in managing and 
implementing SF has varied considerably with, for instance, countries like Lithuania, 
Estonia or Poland being top performers and having “compared favourably with the 
EU-15” (Bachtler et al. 2013a, 18). This seems to have been the case for both the 2004-
2007 / 2007-2013 period, which led some to argue that in fact many CEECs 
outperformed Western and more experienced older member states (Tosun 2014).  
 
1.2 Structural Funds absorption performance in CEECs - 
empirical puzzle and research questions 
 
The enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe has provided new challenges 
and opportunities to examine the domestic processes and the mechanisms used to 
deliver CP. Major questions are still open on the factors that influence the extensive 
variation in the performance of the policy between and within countries from CEECs 
(Ferry 2013). In addition, evidence on the impact of CP and its ability to strengthen 
processes of socio-economic convergence in the area are fairly mixed.4 Nevertheless, 
the links between the capacity of countries to manage external aid and the potential 
effectiveness is not fully recognised. In recent years, as can be seen in Figure 3 there 
has been a great deal of variation across Europe, and specifically between Central and 
Eastern European countries, in terms of final absorption rates. From the start of 2007 
to the end of 2014, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland have been forerunners whilst 
Slovakia and Romania have been among the lowest performers in terms of SF 
absorption.5  
 
 
 
                                                             
4 Final data is not yet available and would still require a thorough independent assessment in order to 
evaluate the socio-economic impact of the 2007-2013 period. 
5 Given that Croatia joined in 2013 it arguably had less time to absorb SF for 2007-2013.  
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Figure 3: Structural Funds absorption rates in CEECs (2007-2014) 
 
Source: Author’s creation based on European Commission 2015, available at 
https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/ (Retrieved in June 2015) 
 
Figure 4: Structural Funds absorption rates in Bulgaria and Romania (% EC payments) 
 
Source: Author’s creation based on data from the Bulgarian and Romanian government 
Structural Funds portals (data accurate for end of December 2015, retrieved in August 2016). 
 
Since their EU accession in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania have had access to a large 
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could use such funding directly through public institutions or facilitate access to the 
different societal stakeholders for projects that would address regional disparities, 
boost economic competitiveness of SMEs, training and skills development or social 
care. However, throughout the examined period, there has also been a wide degree of 
variation even between and within Bulgaria and Romania in terms of SF absorption. 
Despite the political, administrative and socio-economic similarities that developed 
between the two countries after the fall of communism, striking differences developed 
between the two countries in terms of their absorption performance, in particular 
starting with 2010-2011.   
 
In light of this brief introduction, the main research questions that have been 
addressed in this study have been the following:  
1) What explains the variation in absorption performance between and within 
Bulgaria and Romania during 2007-2013?  
2) How can administrative capacity and political factors explain this variation in 
absorption capacity and performance? 
3) What does the capacity and performance of Bulgaria and Romania in managing 
Structural Funds say about their overall ability to integrate in the European 
Union?  
4) What do the findings imply for the governance of Cohesion Policy and Structural 
Funds in Central and Eastern Europe? 
 
Explaining the variation in absorption performance between and within Bulgaria has 
been one of the main puzzles and the one of the main questions driving this study. The 
second research question is more theoretical in nature and relates to the main 
hypothesized factors and their influence on the domestic management and 
implementation of CP. The third and fourth research questions, discussed more 
extensively in the concluding section of this thesis, seek to draw out some of the 
normative and policy related implications of CP governance in Bulgaria and Romania 
and for CEECs as a whole. In order to explore these questions, this thesis proposes an 
analytical framework (“absorption capacity model”) which maps out the main factors 
and specific indicators that would help evaluate the domestic ability of countries to 
handle EU external aid. These are drawn in relation to the main findings and debates 
in the literature of CP delivery and are assessed in line with several working 
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assumptions/hypotheses. Different strands of primarily qualitative evidence were 
rigorously used in multiple case studies in order to assess these assumptions and to 
construct the overall arguments proposed in this thesis.  
 
This study operates and distinguishes between several key concepts: absorption 
performance, administrative capacity, political factors and absorption policy process. 
First, what is referred to as “absorption performance” represents here the temporal 
evolution of financial absorption in a given EU member state.6 For this research, the 
final absorption rate, namely the percentage of payments reimbursed by the European 
Commission (EC) to a member state at a given point in time, is taken into account as 
the indicator of performance and represents the study’s main dependent variable.7 
Second, administrative capacity is defined as the institutional, bureaucratic and 
human resources capacity of institutions, and all other affiliated stakeholders, to 
engage in the absorption policy process at the national, regional and local level. Third, 
political factors are widely defined as the way in which political actors and processes 
could facilitate or hinder the capacity and absorption performance of a country in 
managing and implementing EU Cohesion Policy and Structural Funds. Finally, the 
absorption policy process refers to the classical policy cycle stages through which the 
policy is being delivered: (a) programming; (b) management; (c) project preparation 
and selection; (d) implementation; (e) financial management; (f) monitoring and 
reporting; (g) evaluation (Molle 2007; EIPA 2008; Bachtler et al. 2013a). As opposed 
to other studies, this thesis has not developed any specific indicators to assess these 
policy stages.8 
 
All in all, this thesis analyses the general patterns of governance of Cohesion Policy 
and the factors that affect its delivery at the national level. The big question remains 
                                                             
6 There are several other meanings of absorption in the literature. For instance, some differentiate 
between “technical absorption” as the “ability to spend funds on time and in line with procedures” and 
“structural absorption” namely “the ability to use funds in a strategic, development-oriented way” 
(Hausner 2007 quoted in Ferry 2013b). 
7 As a standard practice, national governments report on a monthly basis absorption rates using three 
different formats: contracted (the total amount of SF contracted by an Operational Programme), 
payments to beneficiaries (the total amount of SF sent to final beneficiaries for implementing 
projects), reimbursement claims sent to EC (the total amount of SF for which reimbursement claims 
have been submitted to the EC) and payments received from the EC (the total amount of SF which 
have been reimbursed to member states by the EC). The latter is taken into account and reported in 
this study as the final absorption rate of a country at a given point in time.  
8 Further details on this approach are provided in section 2.1.2. 
 8 
 
whether or not countries from the area, and in particular the ones evaluated, have had 
the ability to manage and implement this policy and what might explain the obstacles 
which developed on the ground. A brief survey of some of the explanations advanced 
in the literature are presented in the following, in order to underline the gap that this 
research seeks to fill in, before outlining the main arguments put forward in this thesis.  
1.3 Explanations and gap in the literature  
 
CP is probably one of the most evaluated contemporary public policies. The impact of 
SF transfers has raised considerable interest among academics interested in economic, 
political or regional developments. For instance, regarding the latter, some have 
examined the impact that the policy has had on the recreation of regions in Western 
(Anderson 1990; Keating 2004) or in Central and Eastern Europe (Brusis 2002; Marek 
and Baun 2002; Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon 2004). Others have been interested in the 
political nature and implications of the policy for multi-level governance (Hooghe and 
Marks 2001; Bache 2008; Baun and Marek 2014) or on the development of regional 
authority and local democracy (Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2010; Loughlin, 
Hendriks, and Lidström 2012).  
 
From an empirical point of view, in the last decades several specialised debates have 
emerged with regard to the performance and management of the policy. On the one 
hand, several studies have scrutinized the performance of the policy in terms of the 
impact and effectiveness that Structural Funds might have for socio-economic 
development. Scholarly work carried out mainly by economists or regional 
geographers has analysed whether or not funds lead to processes of “convergence” and 
contribute to reducing regional disparities (Reiner 1999; Ederveen, Groot, and Nahuis 
2002; Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger 2005; Bradley, Untiedt, and Mitze 2007; Bouvet and 
Dall’erba 2010). Several of these studies have been critical of the lack of impact of this 
funding (Boldrin and Canova 2001; Ederveen, Groot, and Nahuis 2006), stressing that 
the returns from SF investments were not significant given, for instance, the excessive 
focus on infrastructure development (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi 2004). As a result, 
recent reforms have sparked new debates with respect to the quality of spending and 
the concentration of these resources (Barca 2009; Barca, McCann, and Rodríguez-
Pose 2012; McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2012; Mendez 2013; McCann 2015). 
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On the other hand, several authors have examined the governance, and more 
specifically the institutions in place at the central or regional level used for managing 
and implementing Structural Funds (Smyrl 1997; Leonardi 2005; Bachtler and 
Mendez 2007; Milio 2007a). Such studies have sought to explain the way in which 
funds are governed and or the ability of different stakeholders to engage and influence 
the implementation of the policy. By examining the capacity of domestic institutions 
to manage and implement the policy, this thesis falls into the latter category.  
 
The use and implementation of the policy has generated considerable scholarly 
interest in old and new member states alike. Several interesting case studies have been 
written on the way in which Cohesion Policy has been managed in older member states 
such as Italy (Leonardi 2005; Milio 2007; Milio 2008), Ireland (Laffan 1996; Adshead 
2013), Greece (Andreou 2006; Chardas 2012) or Spain (De la Fuente et al. 1995, 
Morata and Munoz, 1996; Batterbury 2002; Dudek 2005). In addition, the 
management and implementation of the policy in CEECs has sparked a new wave of 
interest in the implementation performance of the policy (Bachtler and McMaster 
2008; Baun and Marek 2008; Zaman and Georgescu 2009; Dabrowski 2012; Ferry 
and McMaster 2013; Hristova 2013; Surubaru 2016a). 
 
Several wide contextual problems have been identified by the literature on the 
implementation of EU funds in the new Europe. Firstly, there have been difficulties in 
enforcing regional reforms or in negotiating the specific requirements attached to 
European regional policy (Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon 2004; Glenn 2004; C. O’Dwyer 
2006). Secondly, an often developed argument in the literature was that CEECs might 
require extensive periods of time and resources to develop their ability to manage SF 
(Bailey and De Propris 2002; Bachtler and McMaster 2008; Dabrowski 2012; Bachtler 
et al. 2013a). Thirdly, Eastern Enlargement has raised additional concerns on the 
domestic challenges faced by CP implementation. Given the novelty of the policy, there 
were no specific models for managing Structural Funds in CEECs (O’Dwyer 2006). 
However, in light of the 2004-07 and 2007-13 experiences different national models 
of SF absorption are now emerging. For instance, the Polish “absorption model” has 
often been emphasized as successful given the extensive role of regional authorities 
and their engagement in SF management and implementation (Churski 2008; 
Dabrowski 2008; Mihăilescu 2012a).  
 10 
 
 
From a theoretical point of view, most academic debates structured around Cohesion 
Policy and EU funding seem to have been influenced by only a few theoretical angles. 
First, since early 1990s, many scholars have approached Cohesion Policy almost 
exclusively from an Europeanisation or Multi-Level Governance vantage point, being 
interested in how the policy has facilitated such processes at the domestic level (Marks 
1993; 1996; Hooghe et al. 1996; Bache and Flinders 2004; Bache and Andreou 2013). 
Scholars adopting these approaches have been particularly interested in examining the 
specific changes that new member states face in relation to processes of 
Europeanisation that might be triggered by CP at the domestic level (Bailey and De 
Propris 2002; Paraskevopoulos and Leonardi 2004; Baun and Marek 2008; 
Scherpereel 2010; Bache et al. 2011a). For instance, Marks was interested in how 
distinct areas of political power (national vs. supranational) could influence the 
different aspects of the policy-making process surrounding the policy (1996, 389). 
Whilst such strands of the literature have been insightful in explaining the potential 
impact that the policy has on domestic institutional settings, they tended to develop 
sparse knowledge on what accounts for the variation in SF absorption between or 
within countries and/or regions. 
 
Second, it is believed that macro-economic developments could affect the overall levels 
of domestic SF absorption. For instance, looking at data from the 1989-1993 
implementation period, Tsoukalis argued that often the failure of countries in 
spending EU money was firstly, “the result of an unwillingness by national 
governments to come up with matching sums” (1997, 205). In other words, the 
inability or lack of willingness of states to co-finance projects has been an obstacle for 
CP implementation (Boeckhout et al. 2002; Horvat 2004; Ferry and McMaster 
2013b).  
 
Third, the domestic structures necessary for the management of the policy proved 
highly complex (Smyrl 1997; Milio 2007a). In each country, the policy is incorporated 
in domestic institutional environments each with their own specific context and 
configuration (Batterbury 2002; Lang 2003; Chardas 2012; Barca et al. 2012). In this 
respect, differences in performance could be explained by the incompatibility between 
CP and domestic policy models (Lang 2003) or the differences in policy paradigms 
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(Bull and Baudner 2004). Structural Funds may presume a public policy model often 
incompatible with established local policy instruments. Therefore, in order to use 
these funds, countries may have to undergo “endogenous paradigmatic changes” 
(Lang 2003). However, changes to domestic formal institutions may prove difficult 
and could be subject to issues of path-dependency or tensions between European 
requirements and domestic implementation costs: 
‘Which costs the actors expect and how high they estimate them to be, is a 
question of their assessment of the compatibility between the new requirement 
of the Structural Funds regulation and domestic policy: the less the 
contradiction between the European set of institutions and the ideas, interests, 
power constellations, and resource distributions that are linked to them on the 
one hand and the respective national set of institutions on the other, the lower 
are the costs of implementation’ (Lang 2003, 160). 
 
In a similar vein, others have underlined that the “learning capacity” of older member 
states (Paraskevopoulos 2001; Paraskevopoulos and Leonardi 2004; Leonardi 2005) 
and new member states (Palne Kovacs 2016) may be problematic. Such explanations 
tended to draw inspiration from debates on the importance of social capital (Putnam 
et al. 1993; Milio 2007a). Therefore, some states would require longer periods of time 
in order to adapt and learn their way through the complexity of CP. Processes of policy 
learning would also entail the need for countries to adapt to the requirements of the 
EU public policy environment. Some have contended that policy learning, and the 
adaptation to the policy models built-in Structural Funds, may require a considerable 
amount of time (Bailey and De Propris 2002). Moreover, the policy model developed 
in Brussels may contradict or enter into a “conflict with domestic policies and polities” 
(Lang 2003) or be affected by different regional or national political circumstances 
(Marks 1996). Such perspectives would generally posit that the contradictions between 
European and national institutions, practices and general policy paradigms would 
generate problems in terms of SF absorption and implementation.  
 
Fourth, many authors have emphasized that variations in the administrative capacity 
of countries and regions affect the overall implementation of the policy (Boeckhout et 
al. 2002; Kalman 2002; Molle 2007; Milio 2007a; Bachtler et al. 2013). The 
development of regional and national institutional capabilities has been problematic 
for new member states from Central and Eastern Europe (Bailey and De Propris 2002; 
Bachtler and McMaster 2008; Ferry 2013). Batterbury (2002) linked the variation in 
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administrative capacity to local conditions, asserting that overcoming these represents 
one of the biggest challenge for SF implementation. Others stressed that the 
performance of CP as a whole should only be evaluated by taking into account the 
implementation style of each member state (Dotti 2013, 602). Overall, the specific 
literature on EU funds has underlined that administrative, state or governmental 
capacity is a core explanatory variable for the absorption of EU funding (Milio 2007; 
Bachtler et al. 2013; Tosun 2014). 
  
Fifth, an increasing strand of the literature seems to suggest that domestic quality of 
government / quality of governance may affect the ability of countries to effectively 
deal with external aid. Recently, it has been asserted that regional governance, defined 
as “the level of corruption, rule of law and effectiveness of public bureaucracy”, may 
further facilitate a weak performance in CP implementation (Charron et al. 2014, 2). 
In other words, countries with weak domestic governance would find it more difficult 
to absorb or use EU funding or to promote objectives of socio-economic convergence. 
Equally, issues of governmental transparency could also affect CP management and 
implementation (Ederveen, Groot, and Nahuis 2006; Bouvet and Dall’erba 2010; 
Nicholas Charron, Dijkstra, and Lapuente 2014). Moreover, rent-seeking behaviour 
and corruption are seen some of the factors further contributing to variations in SF 
absorption and regional development (Farole, Rodríguez-Pose, and Storper 2011; 
Barca, McCann, and Rodríguez-Pose 2012; Rodríguez-Pose 2013; Fazekas et al. 2013; 
Dimulescu, Pop, and Doroftei 2013). 
 
Finally, several notable studies have been written on the implementation of CP and 
the absorption of SF in Bulgaria and Romania. On Bulgaria several academic studies 
have looked at the role of pre-accession funds (Kamenova 1999; Minkova 2004) and 
more specifically at some of the main deficiencies faced by authorities in Sofia when 
managing SF (Marinov 2011; Tsachevsky 2012; Hristova 2013; Bloom and Petrova 
2013; Paliova and Lybek 2014), whilst others have scrutinised issues of regional 
development and the impact of CP in the country (Monastiriotis 2008; Nikolova 2008; 
Yanakiev 2010). On Romania there has been an increasing interest in the topic at the 
local level with several studies being written on some of the determinants of SF 
absorption and problems emerging on the ground (Oprescu et al. 2005; Marin 2006; 
Susanu 2008; Benedek and Horvath 2008; Cace et al. 2009; Zaman and Georgescu 
 13 
 
2009; Berica 2010; Hunya 2011; Zaman and Cristea 2011; Jaliu and Radulescu 2013; 
Pop and Radu 2013; Patenaude 2014). Specific studies have looked at the impact of 
corruption (Badea 2012; Dimulescu, Pop, and Doroftei 2013a) or the role of CP for 
regional development (Dobre 2010).9 However, very few have tried to scrutinise the 
performance of the two countries in a comparative manner (Becker 2007; Alexandru 
et al. 2013; Surubaru 2016a). 
 
Having reviewed some of the potential theoretical explanations for weak performance 
in CP absorption and/or implementation, several gaps in the literature can be noted, 
as well as the specific approach of this thesis. First and foremost, there are several 
important theoretical gaps in the literature. This study chose to focus on the 
importance of administrative capacity and political factors for CP governance. Despite 
recent advancements, the concept of administrative capacity still lacks proper 
theoretical specification. Furthermore, although it is assumed that political 
developments might play an important role, it is not clear, for instance, how the quality 
of governance manifests and concretely affects the way in which countries handle 
external aid. In this respect, there is little or specific knowledge and evidence on how 
administrative and political arrangements influence CP delivery. Second, several 
empirical gaps can be noted. Firstly, there is still a small number of studies on the 
2007-2013 period, particular with reference to CEECs. Secondly, in spite of the 
increasing number of studies on Bulgaria and Romania, most of the cited studies lack 
any adequate theoretical frameworks for explaining the variation in absorption 
performance and the evolution of CP management and implementation in the two 
countries. Lastly, more comparative studies are needed in order to assess similarities 
and differences in terms of CP delivery in CEECs and in the EU-28 as a whole. 
 
With regard to the adopted approach, it first must be stressed that this study does not 
address directly the way in which the policy has potentially initiated domestic changes 
triggered by processes of Europeanisation or how it might facilitate multi-level 
governance developments in the countries under examination. Arguably, the strong 
                                                             
9 In addition, several NGOs and think-tanks have written reports that have informed debates on CP 
and SF in both countries. Most notable for Bulgaria (Vincellette and Vassileva 2006; Marinov and 
Garnizov 2006; Stefanov et al. 2010; Bulgarian Coalition for the Sustainable use of EU funds 2010; 
Open Society Institute 2011) and for Romania (CeRe 2010; IPP 2011, 2012; SAR 2011, 2013; Europuls 
2013).  
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interest of many scholars to isolate the effects of the policy on domestic institutions or 
practices has potentially weakened theoretical developments for understanding the 
internal mechanisms that can explain to issues of weak absorption performance. 
Second, this research has focused in more depth on the mechanisms of delivery and 
the governance of the policy at the national level. This is done by broadly exploring the 
formal and informal dimension of CP governance. In line with findings from the 
literature it was hypothesized that administrative capacity has a strong impact on the 
ability of states to manage and implement CP. Moreover, it was expected that political 
factors might influence issues of capacity and absorption performance. In this respect, 
the study sought to track the influence of administrative and political variables on the 
absorption performance of the two countries examined during 2007-2013, also 
seeking to verify the intersectionality between these two independent factors. As a 
result, one of the aims of this thesis has been to specify how this interaction has 
facilitated, or hindered, the development of an overall state capacity for EU SF, in 
order to explain why countries reach an often divergent level of financial absorption. 
The next section outlines the thesis’ structure.  
1.4 Thesis structure  
 
Following on from the introduction, Chapter 2 introduces the formal and informal 
theoretical conditions assessed in this thesis. The first section of the chapter reviews 
the concept of administrative capacity and how it has been utilised in wider literature 
and in relation to CP. The second section outlines and discusses several political 
factors (stability, support and clientelism) and how they have been approached in the 
wider literature and in relation to CP. This is followed by a discussion of the EU factor 
and its potential role and influence for domestic CP implementation. The chapter ends 
by summarising the main theoretical expectations and by proposing an analytical 
framework (absorption capacity model) in order to assess the former and to evaluate 
the empirical evidence.  
 
Chapter 3 outlines the main research philosophy, strategy and methodological tools 
adopted in order to provide an answer to this thesis’ research questions. It discusses 
the main elements of the research design, the choice of the case studies and the levels 
of empirical analysis undertaken in the thesis. Insights and the steps for evidence 
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collection and the methods used to analyse it are equally outlined. Last but not least, 
the section reflects on some of the methodological limitations of the study.  
 
Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter of the thesis. It contextualizes the evolution 
and developments of CP management and implementation in Sofia and Bucharest. 
The chapter first introduces some brief information on the use of pre-accession 
funding in the two countries and its potential impact for CP delivery. It then continues 
with insights from the adoption of the countries’ Operational Programmes and the 
development of national management and control systems. The third and fourth 
sections of the chapter discuss some of the recurring broader findings on national 
administrative capacity and political developments in relation to CP, whilst the fifth 
zooms in on the role and influence of the EU. The chapter ends by re-emphasizing the 
links between administrative and political factors. 
 
These links are further assessed in the thematic case studies of this thesis: Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6. These extend on the management and implementation of two 
Operational Programmes in each country: Human Resources Development and 
Regional Development. The chapters outline the specific features of these OPs and 
how administrative capacity and political factors affected their financial absorption 
evolution during 2007-2013. The concluding section of both chapters present an 
assessment of these OPs and the potential explanations for diverging levels of 
absorption performance found in the Human Resources OPs, as well as the similarity 
of conditions found in the Regional Development OPs. 
 
Chapter 7 departs from the structure and logic of the previous thematic case studies. 
It represents the last empirical chapter and is divided in two main sections which 
produce an analysis of two distinct stages of the absorption policy process. The chapter 
takes into account the role and influence of other stakeholders. First, it analyses the 
evaluation/selection stages of SF funded projects. Second, it looks at the recurrent 
issues in the allocation of public procurement tenders for SF funded projects. The 
chapter is a case in point for the arguments made in this thesis, namely that the 
challenges faced that emerged during these stages resulted from the interaction 
between administrative capacity deficiencies and political factors. 
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The thesis then, finally, turns to Chapter 8 which is divided in three separate sections. 
The first section (8.1) summarizes and discusses the main findings of this thesis. This 
is done by first reflecting on the insights from the main case studies, whilst section 
8.1.3 discusses the findings against the initial working assumption/hypotheses. The 
second section (8.2) discusses the theoretical implications of the findings, first and 
foremost for the literature on CP and SF management and implementation, as well as 
in line with the wider relevant literature. Last but not least, the third section (8.3) 
prompts a more normative and applied discussion of the thesis’ findings and 
formulates several recommendations for national, CEECs and EU policy-makers and 
stakeholders. The thesis ends with several final conclusions, acknowledging some of 
its limitations and suggesting other significant avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2: The governance of EU Cohesion Policy - 
administrative capacity and political factors. 
Theoretical insights and analytical framework 
 
 
As the European Union’s internal development policy, CP and its affiliated SF are, as 
rightly pointed by some, “ubiquitous” to the EU integration project (Baun and Marek 
2014). Through its mechanisms and principles the policy seems to promote a specific 
type of governance. Despite this, as pointed out by others, the policy has been one of 
the most misunderstood areas of European decision-making (Bomberg and Peterson 
1999 quoted in Bachtler, Mendez and Wishlade 2013). Successive waves of reform 
have added complex layers of governance and new policy principles and tools to CP. 
For instance, the 1988 reforms have had deep implications for the governance of the 
policy and set the wide parameters for its alleged modernisation (Bachtler and 
Gorzelak 2007; Bachtler, Mendez, and Wishlade 2013). Some scholars have claimed 
that those reforms allowed for the development of new policy instruments and modes 
of governance (Marks 1993; 1996). Several core principles embedded in the policy 
(concentration, programming, additionality and partnership) have enhanced the role 
of the Commission, whilst the partnership principle prompted the development of a 
wider framework of cooperation between European, national, regional and local 
stakeholders (Hooghe et al. 1996).  
 
Following such developments, EU integration scholars have been keen to make the 
link between the policy and a new “governance” turn in social sciences (Rhodes 1996; 
Peters and Pierre 1998). CP fuelled some of the leading theoretical debates within EU 
integration between intergovernmentalists (Moravcsik 1993) and proponents of multi-
level governance (Marks 1993; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Bache and Flinders 2004). 
The intricacies of the policy, and the fact that it allegedly strengthened the role of the 
European Commission and that of sub-national authorities, were the first to inspire 
the development of the latter concept (Marks 1992). More recently, Cohesion Policy 
was described as a: 
“…meta-governance tool for horizontal policy coordination and integration, 
[that] involves all levels of government, from the EU to local, alongside 
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stakeholders from the private and third sectors in multi-level governance 
partnerships” (Bachtler, Mendez, and Wishlade 2013, 11). 
 
Multi-level governance provided a theoretical template for assessing CP 
implementation in Western (Marks 1996; Ansell, Parsons, and Darden 1997; Hooghe 
and Marks 2001; Bache and Flinders 2004; Bache 2008) or South and Eastern Europe 
(Bache and Andreou 2013). Furthermore, MLG related analyses have combined with 
insights from the Europeanisation literature. As theorized, several consequences 
would be generated from the adaptation pressure triggered by European norms, 
procedures or policy paradigms - “which are first defined and consolidated in the 
making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, 
identities, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli 2000, 4). It was widely 
claimed for instance, that due to the adaptation pressures triggered by 
Europeanization processes, old “policy paradigms” were dismantled across member 
states as to make way for new ones, in the area of regional policy (Bull and Baudner 
2004). For instance, much of the literature examining the role of the “partnership 
principle” focused on how it might elicit, or not, processes of Europeanisation and 
multi-level governance at the domestic level (Dabrowski 2013; Cartwright and Batory 
2012; Bache 2008; Bache and Flinders 2004; Hooghe et al. 1996).  
 
Although highly relevant for explaining development in EU integration, it is argued 
here that the above theoretical debates offer few explanations for understanding cross-
national variation in SF absorption. This thesis acknowledges the relevance of these 
theoretical debates, yet it seeks to transcend them by suggesting different analytical 
tools that could, in part, explain the general conditions that affect CP in new member 
states, particularly from CEECs. An alternative avenue of inquiry would be to account 
for the formal and informal conditions that influence the management and 
implementation of the policy on the ground. Several other authors have recently 
operated with a similar distinction between formal and informal dimensions of CP 
governance (Leonardi 2005; Piattoni 2006; Barca 2009). Distinguishing between the 
formal and informal conditions that influence the implementation of the policy might 
be useful for investigating why the policy is better managed in some countries as 
opposed to others. In this respect, the interaction between formal and informal 
conditions might help explain some of the differences in capacity and performance 
which arise between and within member states.  
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This chapter introduces two core conditions and the main concepts underpinning 
them: administrative capacity and political factors. These have laid the basis for this 
thesis’ analytical framework. Drawing on different specialized literatures, the chapter 
proposes an absorption capacity model (analytical framework) which aims to probe 
the different factors that could affect SF absorption. The analytical model sets out the 
broad theoretical parameters for collecting the evidence and for the empirical analysis 
carried out in this study. Apart from distinguishing between formal and informal 
aspects of governance the following sections are structured as follows. Each presents 
insights which incorporate several distinct components: (a) wider theoretical debates 
surrounding the main concepts or in relation to scholarly insights from CEECs or the 
implementation of other EU policies; (b) specific insights from the scholarship 
examining EU Cohesion Policy, and often with reference to knowledge on CP 
governance in CEECs. The main theoretical and working assumptions are summarised 
in the final section of this chapter.  
2.1 Administrative capacity and formal conditions for 
governance  
  
In political science, public administration, development or European Union studies 
there are several established research agendas which focus on “administrative 
capacity” or its alternate forms “state capacity” or “governmental capacity”.10 From the 
outset, it must be underlined that the wide meaning of the term renders it difficult to 
a common definition11 (Addison 2009; Hanson and Sigman 2013). Moreover, 
capacity- or institution-building have in recent decades become a buzzword for 
practitioners of international development and has been much present on the political 
and discursive agenda of international institutions such as the World Bank, the OECD 
                                                             
10 Addison (2009, 1) noted that the following terms have often been used interchangeably: 
‘Bureaucratic capacity’, ‘public sector capacity’, ‘government capacity’, ‘institutional capacity’, 
‘executive capacity’ and ‘organisational capacity’. The author noted that “in earlier literature 
‘capability’ is used interchangeably with ‘capacity’.” (Ibid).  
11 In this study, the view taken on administrative capacity is similar to state capacity or governmental 
capacity but is conceptualised in terms of the formal administrative capacity of the state (but different 
from political governance) to manage and implement Cohesion Policy. 
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or the European Commission, particularly in relation to developing or transition 
countries.12 
 
Administrative capacity is linked to the ability of states to exert their functions. 
Deciphering the role of the state vis-à-vis society has rejuvenated the study of 
comparative government and political systems and comparative political science 
(Almond and Powell 1966; Mann 1984; Skocpol, Evans, and Rueschemeyer 1985). 
State capacity could be widely seen as the ability of the administrative apparatus of the 
state to translate political decisions into practice, to develop institutional or 
bureaucratic practices or to ultimately allow the state to act as a mediator between 
different parts of society.  
  
Administrative capacity has been presented as an element enabling processes of 
governance (Jayasuriya 2005 quoted in Painter and Pierre 2005). Others have argued 
that administrative is a necessary condition to tackle challenges of globalisation 
(Farazmand 2009). Recently, other authors have linked administrative capacity to the 
problem solving abilities of states and specifically to different capacities: delivery, 
coordination, regulatory and analytical (Lodge and Wegrich 2014). Moreover, in the 
literature examining the politics of international development, state or administrative 
capacity have been seen as pre-conditions for an effective aid delivery (Leftwich 1993; 
Doornbos 2001; Grindle 2004). Nevertheless, authors have been critical of the 
orthodoxies promoted by international institutions when referring to the term 
(Leftwich 1994; Weiss 2000). 
  
For public policy scholars, administrative capacity might relate to the ability of state 
bureaucracies to implement public policies ( Peters and Pierre 2003). Therefore, the 
absence of administrative or state capacity might be seen as an obstacle for policy 
implementation (Pressman and Wildavski 1973; Goggin et al. 1990). Other authors 
have linked the concept of capacity to issues of governmental and management 
performance. Drawing on federal data on policy implementation in the United States, 
Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue (2003) emphasized on the importance of effective 
management as a driver for capacity and governmental performance.  
                                                             
12 To a large extent these concepts have been amplified by new debates in public administration such 
as “New Public Management”. It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss this here.     
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In Central and Eastern Europe, the dysfunctional administrative cultures and the lack 
of independence of civil servants have been issues widely discussed with respect to 
state capacity (Verheijen 1999; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Dimitrova 
2010). Post-communist legacies have weakened the ability of states to develop 
“Weberian” or meritocratic systems of recruitment for civil servants (Dimitrov, Goetz, 
and Wollmann 2006; Goetz and Wollmann 2001). One of the main challenge has 
related to the transformation of highly centralized state apparatus into a flexible and 
modern public administration (Verheijen 1999, 2007; Goetz 2001; Meyer-Sahling 
2004; Dimitrova 2005). Against this background, states have had to gradually rebuild 
their state capacities. States had to be reinvented “because Marxist regimes left behind 
badly damaged public institutions, dysfunctional state structures, and bureaucratic 
apparatuses bereft of administrative capacity” (Holmes 1996 quoted in Ganev 2013, 
37). Reforms aiming to modernize public administration were seen by national and 
international actors such as the EU as one of the “key requirements for the 
consolidation of democratic regimes” (Goetz 2001, 1033; Meyer-Sahling 2004).13 
 
In the context of enlargement to the East, national governments had to develop their 
ability to manage future EU regulatory and policy related instruments. Building 
institutional and administrative capacity emerged as an important formal and 
discursive pre-requisite of the accession process, tied to the Copenhagen criteria 
(Dimitrova 2002; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2004; Hughes et al. 2004). 
Administrative capacity was underpinned in the negotiations process and used to 
benchmark the preparedness of Central and Eastern European countries (Dimitrova 
2002, 178). However, authors have signalled the difficulty faced by EU policy-makers 
in defining the concept (Grabbe 2001; Dimitrova 2002). For instance, Heidbreder 
(2011) noted that EU institutions have had a limited impact in shaping administrative 
capacities in new member states. Moreover, a specific set of studies found that 
administrative capacity was a necessary, but not always sufficient condition for 
compliance with EU law (Zubek 2005; Hille and Knill 2006; Falkner and Treib 2008; 
Dimitrova and Toshkov 2009).  
                                                             
13 The argument goes the other way around as well. Based on a dataset of 122 countries, Carbone and 
Memoli (2015) argued that processes of democratisation contribute towards the consolidation of 
administrative capacity.  
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All in all, the majority of authors interested in state, institutional or administrative 
capacity would tend to agree that the concept has a strong degree of explanatory power 
attached to it (Addison 2009, 9). The presence or absence of administrative capacity 
might have important consequences for public policy processes and for policy delivery. 
The focus will now turn to how the concept has been addressed in the increasingly 
specialised literature regarding EU Cohesion Policy.  
  
2.1.1 Administrative capacity and Cohesion Policy 
 
In recent years there has been a surge of studies looking at administrative and 
governmental capacity as one of the most relevant variables affecting the ability of 
states to manage and implement Cohesion Policy and the Structural Funds affiliated 
to it (Batterbury 2002; Horvat and Maier 2004; Sumpíková, Pavel, and Klazar 2004; 
Leonardi 2005; Milio 2007; Molle 2007; Baun and Marek 2008; Benedek and Horvath 
2008; Chardas 2011; Antonopoulos 2013; Bachtler, Mendez, and Oraže 2013; 
Smeriglio et al. 2015; Surubaru 2016a). 
 
Moreover, starting with early 2000’s, the issue of administrative capacity, in relation 
to European funding has equally emerged on the agenda of practitioners. The term 
was often defined practically by different consultancies and with little consideration to 
different theoretical debates (Smeriglio et al. 2015). For instance, one of the early 
definitions of administrative capacity saw it as “the set of functional conditions that 
allow governments to elaborate, manage and implement programmes with better 
performance” (Jaenicke 2001, 4). In addition, another influential study published by 
the Netherlands Economic Institute (Boeckhout et al. 2002) has had a long lasting 
influence on how administrative capacity is operationalised by EU policy-makers 
(Boijmans 2013). Boeckhout et al. define absorption capacity as “the extent to which a 
Member State is able to fully spend the allocated financial resources from the 
Structural Funds in an effective and efficient way” (2002, 2). They measured 
“absorption capacity” through three distinct dimensions:   
(a) Macro-economic absorption capacity: “defined and measured in terms of 
GDP”;      
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(b) Financial absorption capacity: “the ability to co-finance EU-supported 
programmes and projects, to plan and guarantee these national contributions 
in multi-annual budgets, and to collect these contributions from several 
partners (public and private), interested in a programme or project”  
(c) Administrative capacity: “[the] ability and skills of central, regional and 
local authorities to prepare acceptable plans, programmes, and projects in due 
time, to decide on programmes and projects, to arrange co-ordination among 
the principal partners, to cope with the vast amount of administrative and 
reporting work required by the [European] Commission, and to finance and 
supervise implementation properly, avoiding fraud as far as possible” (2002, 
2).  
 
Boeckhout et al. 2002 developed a grid which combined various indicators of 
administrative capacity in relation to stages of the policy cycle affiliated to the 
absorption of EU funds. Another influential study was published by the Austrian 
Institute for Spatial Planning (OIR 2003). The study evaluated several factors that 
would affect the implementation systems of European funds: namely the (1) 
institutional actors involved and the implementation process; (2) the context of each 
country (political, socio-economic, legal, cultural; centralized/decentralized systems) 
and finally (3) the rules, procedures and technical systems (tools of implementation). 
Moreover, the study posited that the territorial configurations of states and the 
characteristics of implementation specific to each country must be taken into account.  
 
A strong degree of academic interest in administrative capacity and EU funds has 
emerged around the same period. For Sumpikova et al. “capacity is critically 
influenced not only by the ability of the applicants to prepare projects, but also by the 
whole system of implementation, monitoring and auditing, prohibiting in-effective 
use, or even misuse of funds" (2003, 1). Horvat defined administrative capacity as “the 
capability of the public authorities on various administrative levels within the country 
to adequately prepare, execute and monitor programmes subsidised through EU 
structural policy” (2004, 7). Leonardi has examined administrative capacity in terms 
of the overall “efficiency and effectiveness of the administration to deal with the 
policies” (2005, 30). The author linked ADM with the formal ability of states to deal 
with the policy. Using the latter perspective, Milio (2007a) has examined the variation 
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of administrative capacity for regional performance implementation of Cohesion 
Policy in two Italian regions. She defined the concept as “the ability of the institutions 
to fully and effectively carry out their duties and responsibilities” (2007a, 40). She 
operationalised the concept in relation to four core components: (1) Management; (2) 
Programming; (3) Monitoring and (4) Evaluation.  
  
Molle (2007) asserted that administrative/absorption capacity was a weak dimension 
of different member states. He offered a holistic view of the mechanisms behind CP 
and in relation to six different stages that define the policy. Moreover, the author 
examined three determinants of institutional capacity: structure, human resources, 
systems and tools and functioning. He connects these determinants to several core 
practical dimensions behind the policy: creating institutions, building partnerships, 
programming actions, managing implementation, monitoring progress and auditing 
operations (Ibid).  
   
In a paper comparing the developments of the public administration, in the eight 
CEECs that gained EU membership in 2004, Verheijen divided ADM into three 
dimensions: policy, people and systems (E-government) (2006, XII). These were 
operationalised through different indicators, including a notable component, namely 
the relationship between political and administrative actors (see Table 1 for the 
specific indicators). 
 
Evaluating administrative capacity in Greece, Chardas (2012) examined the 
interactive capacities of the state to implement EU regional policy. The author 
distinguished between internal - administrative capacities, understood as ideal 
Weberian bureaucracy and external - interactive capacities, seen as the interaction 
between state and society and the embeddedness of states and society and the 
interdependence between the two (2012, 12-13). Furthermore, Antonopoulos defined 
the concept as the “possession of all those resources, structures and systems that 
enable a public organisation to perform its required functions in a sustainable way” 
(2013, 71). He then operationalized it as resources, structures and systems in order to 
investigate how pre-accession assistance affected the development of administrative 
capacity in Croatia.  
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One of the most recent comprehensive studies using the term, differentiated between 
administrative performance and administrative capacity when examining eight 
Central and Eastern European countries (2004-08) (Bachtler et al. 2013a). They 
define administrative performance as the: “the extent to which systems are “fit for 
purpose” in fulfilling the regulatory, strategic and financial requirements of policy 
programme management and implementation” (2013, 3). Secondly, they 
operationalized administrative capacity as the “organizational structures, adequacy 
and quality of human resources and administrative adaptability” employed by states 
in the process of EU funds implementation (2013, 14). 
 
Table 1 summarizes some of the above key contributions to the theoretical on 
administrative capacity and EU funds. Despite strong commonalities there is still a 
lack of consensus on what administrative or absorption capacity entails. This makes it 
difficult to establish a common theoretical basis for investigating the potential 
mechanisms that may lead to a weak capacity, or in relation to policy implementation. 
Overall, some have raised concerns on the “overstretch” of ADM in relation to EU 
funds (Marinov 2011, 16-17). Others have criticised the lack of specificity of European 
policy-makers for defining administrative capacity or the lack of specific measures for 
ADM development which perpetuate problems for EU funds management (Milio 
2007a; Bachtler et al. 2013; Petzold et al. 2015). It is argued that there is still 
considerable room for improving how administrative capacity is operationalised and 
analysed in both theoretical and methodological terms. Drawing again on the 
specialised literature, the following section proposes the operational definition of 
administrative capacity used in this thesis.  
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Table 1: Conceptualisations of administrative capacity for EU Cohesion Policy and Structural Funds in the literature 
Authors / date Administrative / 
absorption capacity: 
main elements  
Specific indicators 
Boeckhout et al. 
2002 
-Design: Structure, 
Human Resources, 
Systems & Tools 
-Functioning   
The main elements were examined via the following policy stages:  
(1) Management; (2) Programming; (3) Implementation; (4) Evaluation & Monitoring; (5) Financial 
management & Control 
OIR 2003 -Actors  
-Context 
-Rules, procedures and 
technical support  
Actors 
1. The Commission; 2. National Government; 3. Regional / Federal Government; 4. Monitoring 
Committees; 5. Managing Authorities; 6. Paying Authorities; 7. Implementing Bodies; 8. Beneficiaries; 9. 
Social Partners; 10. External Experts  
Context 
11. Political Context; 12. Socio-Economic context; 13. Administrative Structures; 14. Institutional 
Structures; 15. Forms of Intervention; 16. Future of EU – Enlargement 
Rules, procedures and technical support 
17. Measures to implement EU Regulations and Procedures; 18. Programming; 19. Management 
Procedures; 20. Control Systems and Procedures; 21. Development and use of monitoring system; 22. 
Development and use of evaluation system; 23. Assessment and Selection of Projects; 24. Financial 
Procedures; 25. Partnership; 26. Coordination; 27. Measures to ensure Information and Publicity; 28. 
Relationships between MA and Implementing Bodies; 29. Technical Assistance; 30. Other monitoring 
activities of programme implementation 
Sumpikova et al. 
2003 
-Supply side  
-Demand side  
Supply side (reproduces Boeckhout et al. 2002): 
-Macro-economic conditions 
-Ability to co-finance 
-Administrative capacity  
Demand side: 
-Ability to develop projects by applicants  
Horvat 2004 Reproduces and adapts elements and main indicators from Boeckhout et al. 2002: 
-Macro-economic absorption capacity 
-Administrative absorption capacity  
-Financial absorption capacity   
Milio 2007a -Management 
-Programming 
-Monitoring  
(1) Management: Clarity in the definition of the role / Coordination and cooperation between 
departments; (2) Programming: Programme design: Swot Analysis / Programme approval: time lapse 
between the beginning of the CSF and the approval of the Regional Operational Programme;  
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-Evaluation  (3) Monitoring: Introduction of a system of indicators and monitoring procedures responding to 
national/European agreed standards / Guaranteeing the availability of financial, physical and procedural 
data; (4) Evaluation: Production of Evaluation reports / Integration of evaluation method and culture into 
the system. 
Molle 2007 -Structure 
-Human resources 
-Systems & Tools 
-Functioning 
-All the main elements of the “delivery systems” are examined through several policy stages: 
(1) Creating institutions;  
(2) Building partnerships;  
(3) Programming actions; 
(4) Managing implementation  
(5) Monitoring progress 
(6) Auditing operations 
Verheijen 2007 -Policy 
-People  
-Systems 
-Policy: (1) Performance management; (2) Strategic Planning; (3) Policy coordination systems; 
-People: (4) Human resources legislation; (5) Human resources horizontal management; (6) Politico-
administrative relations; (7) Incentives  
-Systems: (8) E-government  
Chardas 2011 -Internal state capacities  
-Interactive state 
capacities 
In principle:  
-Administrative capacities relate to internal state capacities  
-Synergy between state and society relate to interactive state capacities  
Antonopolous 2013 -Resources  
-Structures 
-Systems 
-Resources: (1) Human resources and skills; (2) Financial Resources; 
-Structures: (3) Purpose-built agencies; (4) Institutions; (5) IT / E-government 
-Systems: (6) Financial management and control; (7) Monitoring information system; (8) Procurement 
and contracting; (9) Project selection; (10) Audit systems; (11) Evaluation 
Bachtler et al. 2013 -Administrative 
Performance 
-Administrative  
Capacity  
-Administrative performance is operationalised in relation to several policy stages: 1) Programming 
(organization of programming / programme documents / negotiation and approval); 2) Project 
preparation and selection (project generation / project appraisal / commitment of funds); 3) Financial 
management (processing of payment claims / financial (de)commitment / financial management and 
control); 4) Monitoring and reporting (system of indicators and monitoring procedures / availability of 
financial, physical and procedural data); 5) Evaluation (Evaluation reports / Evaluation methods and 
culture); 
-Administrative capacity is operationalised through three core components: 1) Organizational 
structures (allocation of competences and responsibilities [of the institutions involved in the process] / 
coordination and cooperation among ministries and implementing bodies / organizational stability); 2) 
Human resources (availability and suitably qualified staff / human resources management); 3) 
Administrative adaptability (establishment and adaptability of procedures and tools).  
Source: Author’s creation 
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2.1.2 Defining and operationalising administrative capacity in 
this study 
 
This study envisions administrative capacity as the interaction between institutions, 
procedures and human resources. In order to conceptualise ADM CAP, the study 
combines insights from the above specialised literature. Administrative capacity is 
defined here as the institutional, bureaucratic and human resources capacity of 
institutions, and all other affiliated stakeholders, to engage in the absorption policy 
process and to contribute towards Cohesion Policy management and implementation 
at the national, regional and local level. Moreover, territorial capacity is envisioned as 
an intervening factors and relates to the deployment and variation of administrative 
capacity at different sub-national levels (regional and local).  
 
As opposed to the operationalisation advanced by Boeckhout et al. (2002), Milio 
(2007a) and Bachtler et al. (2013a), this thesis does not mix administrative capacity 
factors with the main stages of the absorption policy process. Arguably, embedding 
administrative capacity in the different stages of the absorption policy process might 
affect the way in which the former is assessed. It is therefore assumed here that 
administrative capacity must be examined separate from the main operational stages 
of the absorption process (policy cycle): (a) programming; (b) management; (c) project 
preparation and selection; (d) implementation; (e) financial management; (f) 
monitoring and reporting; (g) evaluation (Molle 2007; EIPA 2008; Bachtler et al. 
2013a). The merits of this approach is that it might allow for a clearer distinction 
between the administrative capacity of institutions and their ability to engage in the 
different policy stages enumerated above.14 Arguably, this is approach might allow a 
more thorough assessment of the independent factors analysed (administrative and 
political) on the absorption policy process and ideally in relation to absorption 
performance. To sum up, administrative capacity can be regarded as the formal 
administrative and technical capability of a country to implement European policies. 
Therefore, it is first hypothesized that administrative capacity is one of the main 
abilities required by states in order to reach a reasonable degree of SF absorption 
performance. The remainder of the chapter outlines the various elements of 
                                                             
14 From a methodological point of view, it might be necessary to disentangle capacity from the policy 
process in order to avoid the potential for these to become endogenous to one another.  
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administrative capacity, including operational indicators and the specific working 
assumptions, on administrative capacity, assessed in this thesis.  
 
Institutional capacity  
Institutional capacity is the first dimension of administrative capacity conceptualised 
in this thesis. The main question underpinning it was whether or not countries had the 
necessary institutions in order to manage and implement European CP. The objective 
was to empirically capture the degree to which central, regional and local level 
institutional actors have had the necessary institutional capacity to manage the 
process of absorption. Institutional capacity is operationalised through three distinct 
indicators: institutional design, institutional coordination and institutional 
accountability. Before detailing these dimensions, a brief review of the wider literature 
on institutions and the importance of institutional capacity for Cohesion policy in 
CEECs is presented in the following.  
  
Institutions are examined by different and competing theoretical debates. Some have 
widely defined them “as systems of established and prevalent social rules that 
structure social interactions” (Hodgson 2006, 2). Adherents of neo-institutionalism 
seem them as the “enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in 
structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover 
of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations 
of individuals and changing external circumstances” (March and Olsen 2006, 3). In 
short, institutions are generally seen as systems of rules and practices ingrained in 
public bodies. In different disciplines, from institutional economics to regional 
development, it is more and more acknowledged that poor institutions and/or poor 
institutional configurations might affect processes of socio-economic development 
(North 1990; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Rodríguez-Pose 2013).  
 
Institutional capacity remains a key issue of concern for countries in CEECs (Bachtler 
and McMaster 2008; Baun and Marek 2008; Wostner 2008; Ferry 2013; Ferry and 
Mc Master 2013b). Drawing on evidence from the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovenia, Bailey and De Propris concluded that in the process of 
institutional capacity development, “assistance has largely focused on the national 
level, leading in some cases to over-institutionalisation, with relatively little achieved 
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at the regional level” (2002, 320). Recent evidence, from south-east and central and 
Eastern Europe, validated such claims pointing out that central governments were the 
main beneficiary of institutional capacity development from the use of Structural 
Funds (Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon 2004; Bache and Andreou 2013). In line with the 
literature, the design, coordination and accountability of institutions managing 
processes of EU funds absorption are chosen as the main dimensions of institutional 
capacity.  
 
Firstly, institutional design represents the institutional model adopted by each country 
in order to manage and implement Cohesion Policy. In other words, institutional 
design has to do with the overall institutional architecture put in place, as well as the 
functional relationship between the bodies involved in the absorption process. The 
way in which competences and responsibilities have been allocated between 
institutions has sparked strong interest among the researchers interested in this area 
(Boeckhout 2002; Milio 2007a; Vant 2012; Bachtler et al. 2013). Each country might 
adopt its own institutional model with implications for the development of 
institutional capacity. More specifically, institutional design could relate to (a) the 
establishment of management and control systems for EU funds and the challenges 
that emerged at this stage; (b) the extent to which the institutional model (e.g. 
centralised/decentralised/semi-centralised) adopted was functional and (c) efficiency 
of institutions involved in the absorption process.  
 
Secondly, institutional coordination represents the way in which the institutional 
bodies involved in the process coordinate and communicate with each other. Poor 
coordination among and within institutional bodies has been a common place for post-
communist states (Kalman 2002; Verheijen 2007; Dimitrova and Toshkov 2009). For 
instance, Dimitrov et al. (2006) revealed that administrative bodies from the area 
faced significant obstacles when developing a coordination capacity. Moreover, CP 
implementation has produced problems of over-institutionalisation, with many 
authorities having “blurred and overlapping responsibilities” (Bailey and De Propris 
2002, 319). Specifically, poor inter-ministerial coordination seems to have been a 
problem for CP delivery in countries like Hungary or the Czech Republic (Horvath 
2008; Marek and Baun 2008). For this study the aim was to see the extent to which 
institutional bodies have benefited from a good level of coordination and 
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communication. The assumption was that the way in which the main managing and 
control institutions15 coordinate and communicate, within and between each other, 
matters for the development of institutional capacity. Therefore, understanding 
problems related to coordination might be a relevant avenue for inquiry.  
 
Finally, institutional accountability could relate to the responsibility, transparency or 
general openness of institutions, in this case those involved in the absorption 
processes surrounding the delivery of EU external funding. Accountability has often 
been seen as a crucial concept for understanding the relationship between different 
layers of authority (Evans and Rauch 1999; Hille and Knill 2006). There have been 
varied theoretical debates about the meaning of accountability which are briefly 
discussed in the following.  
 
In its original sense, accountability has been defined as the process in which an 
authority “is called to account for its actions” (Jones 1992 via Mulgan 2000, 555).  
Moreover, accountability can refer to a “framework for the exercise of state power” in 
which public bodies “need to justify their actions” (Oliver 1991 via Harlow 2002). The 
political science / public administration literatures have since expanded the meaning 
and use of the term in order to refer to accountability as – responsibility, 
responsiveness, control and dialogue (Mulgan 2000). Finally, Bovens (2010) 
distinguishes between accountability as a normative behaviour, a virtue of public 
agents, and accountability as a mechanism through which the latter are held to 
account. 
 
At the policy level, accountability has often been intertwined with various normative 
principles and ideas. Rothstein has pointed out that many international institutions 
refer to accountability (along the rule of law, an efficient public sector or tackling 
corruption) as a tenet for democratic and economic development (2012, 143). In this 
respect, many international organisations have promoted accountability as part of a 
philosophy of “good governance” and as an “ultimate principle for the new age of 
governance” (Fisher 2004, 495). Elsewhere, in Central and Eastern Europe, 
                                                             
15 The most important institutions included in the implementation systems for CP funding are: Central 
Coordination Units, Managing Authorities, Intermediate Bodies, Audit Authorities, Payment and 
Certification Authority and other public bodies involved in EU funds absorption processes (e.g. Public 
Procurement Agencies, Anti-Fraud Departments). 
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accountability  has been described as one of the weakest features of post-communist 
polities (Morlino 2004). Given differences in political systems and traditions, it was 
asserted that accountability might be difficult to conceptualise outside the framework 
of Western liberal democracies (Fisher 2004, 496).16 The EU’s enlargement towards 
Central and Eastern Europe saw the EU institutions adopt “accountability” as a wider 
principle, part of the Copenhagen accession criteria, alongside the rule of law and 
human rights. In this regard, an almost causal relationship was posited between 
“accountability” and the ability of administrative or judicial institutions, on the 
ground, to strengthen their capacity and overall functionality (Dimitrova and Pridham 
2004, 97). Accountability has recently been revived in relation to European Union 
studies (Bovens 2007). Some authors have specifically discussed the concept in 
relation to the legitimacy or the democratic deficit facing EU institutions (Harlow 
2002).More in line with the focus of this thesis, there has been an interest in the 
relationship between accountability and Cohesion Policy delivery and implementation 
(Batterbury 2006; Mairate 2006; Polverari 2015; Damen-Koedjik 2016).  
 
In this study, the choice has been made to theorise accountability as the ability of 
relevant public institutions to operate in a transparent (normative dimension) and a 
responsive manner (process related dimension). The main reason underpinning this 
choice relates to the potential link between the accountability of the institutions 
engaged in processes of EU funds absorption and their capacity to implement CP. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, a two dimensional definition of accountability 
has been adopted namely as: transparency and communication. First, transparency is 
regarded as one of the new elements of accountability (Fisher 2004). In theory, one 
would expect that institutions that are more transparent are also more accountable 
and potentially have a higher degree of capacity. The reverse could equally apply, 
whereas transparency might not necessarily add any value to the ability of these 
institutions to deal with external EU aid. In fact, transparency could be enforced in a 
rather mechanical manner by institutional agents, in this case only to comply with 
requirements of European regulations and principles. Allegedly, this could bear 
negative effects on the overall implementation of the policy. Second, it is the more an 
                                                             
16 For instance, there have been discussions on the lack of a linguistic equivalent of the word 
“accountability” in other countries apart from those of the English speaking world (Mulgan 2000, 555). 
This is the case in countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, which makes it difficult to translate and 
operationalise the term in a political or administrative manner.  
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institution is responsive and communicates with its core public the more this increases 
its levels of accountability. This is operationalised by examining the extent to which 
managing institutions have been responsive to the queries addressed to them by EU 
funds beneficiaries, which overall represent their main “clients”.17 Therefore, the 
specific focus of this inquiry relates to examining the degree to which accountability 
might be a constitutive element of the overall institutional capacity of the relevant 
public bodies implementing external funding. 
 
Overall, the analytical aim regarding institutional capacity was to capture and explain 
the idiosyncrasies of the design, coordination and accountability of the managing 
institutions and whether or not that has any effects on the overall absorption capacity 
and performance of countries. Based on the above, it was hypothesized that H1: 
Institutional mis-coordination and non-accountability have a negative impact on 
administrative capacity and on absorption performance. Therefore, it was expected 
that institutional capacity plays an essential role for the absorption of EU funding. 
 
 
Bureaucratic capacity  
Bureaucratic capacity can be regarded as the second component of administrative 
capacity within this study. Bureaucratic related capacity is widely defined here as the 
degree to which a country has the legal, procedural and technical infrastructure to 
manage European Union financial aid. One of the primary objectives was to capture 
and explain the presence and adequacy of legal, procedural and bureaucratic tools 
used for managing and implementing the policy.  
  
The bureaucratic capacity of countries was seen a key driver for the implementation of 
the acquis communitaire. For instance, Hille and Knill (2006) conclude that it is the 
bureaucratic capacity of administrations, and not so much the existence of political 
veto players, that is crucial for “the functioning and the quality of the domestic 
bureaucracy constitute crucial preconditions for effective alignment with EU policy 
requirements” (2006, 549). Similarly, Knill and Tosun (2009) found further evidence 
                                                             
17 It must be acknowledged that the two dimensions of accountability, narrowly defined in this context 
as transparency and communication, might not be sufficient to account for accountability in the original 
sense of the concept. 
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to suggest that bureaucratic capacities play a determinant role in a successful 
transposition of EU directives into national law.   
  
Post-communist public administrations are notoriously highly “bureaucratic” 
(Verheijen 1999; Eriksen 2007). This might relate to the legacy of the recent past and 
the control exerted by the communist party on the administration (Goetz 2001; 
Bouckaert 2009). Many post-communist administrations were affected by rigid and 
bureaucratic procedures validated through rubber stamping paperwork (Verheijen 
1999; Agh 2003). The working environment surrounding public bureaucracies is often 
perceived by the public as less productive or less inclined towards creative solutions 
(Marinov 2011). Moreover, the trajectories of administrative reforms, in the area, may 
have yielded different results in terms of bureaucratic capacity (Bouckaert, Nakrošis, 
and Nemec 2011).   
 
One of the long lasting discussions regarding Cohesion Policy is the need to further 
simplify the number of cumbersome administrative procedures affiliated to it (Ferry 
2013). The policy has been often criticised for producing extremely dense procedures 
that lead to a “Byzantine plethora of bureaucratic actions” (Chardas 2012, 232). Even 
in allegedly established public administrations such, in Germany, there has been 
evidence of “rubber-stamping” in local and regional authorities’ in relation to the 
policy” (Thielemann 2000, 22). Furthermore, in Lithuania, “administrative overload” 
was seen as one of the main issues surrounding the policy (Nakrosis 2008, 8). It is 
postulated here that the legal and procedural infrastructure used by the institutions 
involved in the process matters. Yet, it is often unclear how to measure and assess this 
capacity. Boeckhout et al. (2002) examine systems and tools by accounting for whether 
or not the managing institutions had guidelines and manuals, computerised 
monitoring systems and the existence of accounting systems. Bachtler et al. (2013) 
emphasized the need for countries to have adaptable procedures for the management 
of the policy.  
 
Bureaucratic capacity is structured here along several components: legal rules and 
administrative procedures, use of electronic systems and instruments and the use of 
project methodologies. Firstly, in terms of legal rules and administrative procedures if 
a country has the adequate legislation, administrative procedures and documents in 
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place one can expect it to have a higher degree of administrative capacity and 
absorption performance. Legislation has also been a problematic area in old member 
states such as Italy and Greece (Milio 2007a; Chardas 2011). There are two areas that 
are taken into account in this sub-component: (a) whether countries have the adequate 
legal and procedural means to manage and implement Cohesion Policy this includes 
specialised legislation, general administrative templates, specialised documents (e.g. 
Applicants’ guides); (b) whether legislation, and most importantly, procedures were 
stable and/or uniform across Operational Programmes. It is assumed that frequent 
changes of legislation and procedures would damage the ability of countries to manage 
funding.  
 
Secondly, the use of electronic systems and e-government tools has often been seen as 
a sign of significant administrative capacity (Verheijen 2007; Milio 2007a). In this 
respect, examining whether or not managing institutions have used such systems is 
crucial to evaluate their ability to simplify procedures and to potentially improve 
processes of implementation. This includes the use of central electronic systems for 
data and information management. Therefore, a higher use of electronic systems may, 
or may not, influence the degree of administrative capacity in an administration. 
Potential specific indicators here represent the number or whether or not project 
applications have been made using electronic means, as well as the perception of 
administrators and beneficiaries on the functionality of such systems.   
   
Thirdly, the use of specific methodologies for project management may enhance or not 
the overall administrative capacity of countries. The aim here is to see if managing 
institutions have internalized several European practices in terms of management and 
whether or not that has improved their day-to-day work.  
   
In addition to the above, bureaucratic capacity may be assessed in relation to several 
stages of the absorption process: (a) the evaluation and selection of project and (b) the 
countries’ public procurement systems. Several studies, as well as practitioners raised 
the issue regarding the dysfunctionalities affecting these two stages of the policy 
process (Fazekas et al. 2013; Dimulescu et al. 2013; Boijmans 2013).  
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Overall, it was generally expected that H2: The higher the number of administrative 
and legislative procedures a country has the lower the administrative capacity of a 
country will be. The overarching assumption behind the latter hypothesis was that a 
higher density of legislation and procedures could reflect a dysfunctional bureaucratic 
capacity for the management and implementation of EU Structural Funds.  
  
Human resources capacity 
Human resources capacity represents the third component of administrative capacity. 
This is defined here as the degree to which the management and control institutions 
have had the necessary human resources for the absorption process. More specifically, 
the aim was to assess the extent to which employees of these institutions have had the 
adequate expertise, training and incentives to carry out their duties. In addition, it is 
argued here, that in order to understand the human resources capacity of a country 
one must equally examine the input of non-official actors such as EU funds 
beneficiaries and/or of consultants. 
 
Human resources capacity is often acknowledged as a key dimension of administrative 
capacity. Human resources usually relates to the ability of civil servants working in 
state institutions. The civil service plays an important role for processes of capacity-
building (Mentz 1997). Moreover the competency of management has also been 
scrutinized in relation to public bureaucracies (Lodge and Hood 2003). In essence, 
human “agents” are tasked with carrying out the administrative processes required for 
translating EU legislation and policies from the EU level and into the national context 
(Featherstone and Radaelli 2003). Moreover, Falkner et al. (2004) found that 
administrative shortcomings in compliance with EU law were often caused by 
insufficient financial and personnel related resources.  
 
In post-communist polities, the reform of the civil service has been a highly 
problematic area (Verheijen 1999; Dimitrova 2005; Meyer-Sahling 2011). During the 
communist era, the formation, selection, placement and promotion of civil servants 
was much under the control of the communist party. This rendered bureaucrats highly 
“subordinated to party bureaucracy” and established the “predominance of the 
principle of loyalty to the political leadership” (Verheijen 1999). Therefore, the idea of 
civil servants acting as mediators between government and society was very much 
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alien to communist ideology (Ibid.). Studies demonstrated that civil servants from 
Central and Eastern European countries are often not satisfied with the quality of their 
employment and with the way in which “change” ensues in their organisations (Dragoş 
and Neamţu 2007; Lee 2009).  
 
The literature on Cohesion Policy established human resources as an important 
component for administrative capacity (Molle 2007; Milio 2007a; Antonopoulos 2013; 
Bachtler et al. 2013a). The stability of staff and staff turnover might affect the 
development of this capacity (Boeckhout et al. 2002; Milio 2007a). Moreover, 
different staffing arrangements and the issue of financial remuneration were reported 
to have an impact on the functioning of institutions managing EU funding (Bachtler 
and McMaster 2008; Scherpereel 2010). In addition, apart from experienced and 
financially motivated staff, the latter institutions also require “the capacity to carry out 
[strategic] programming”, “independent evaluation expertise” and “accounting and 
auditing” skills (Boeckhout et al. 2002, 27).  
 
Assuming that human resources matter, this dimension has been conceptualised here 
along two main lines. The first relates to the capacity of employees working in 
managing and control institutions and was assessed by looking at: (a) the number of 
staff employed and overall ratio in relation to the number of EU-funded projects 
managed; (b) the quality of expertise of staff; (c) training and professional 
development - investigate whether or not staff have received adequate levels of 
training and if this has enabled them to carry out their duties (Boeckhout et al. 2002; 
OIR 2003) and finally (d) whether or not staff have benefited from financial (e.g. 
salaries, bonuses) and professional incentives (e.g. opportunity for career 
development/assessment). If incentives are low, then one would expect staff to be less 
compelled in fulfilling their tasks. 
 
The second human resources capacity dimension takes into account the external 
stakeholders involved in the different stages of the absorption process. Structural 
Funds implementation imply an interaction between a variety of state and non-
governmental actors (Batterbury 2002; Lang 2003; Cartwright and Batory 2012). 
Beneficiaries, consultancies or civil society actors are involved in the programming 
and implementation stage of the projects. Studies that examine the overall 
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administrative capacity of states for EU funds delivery have mainly focused on the 
capacity of official administrators. In addition, this study has sought to explore the 
influence of different external stakeholders as to understand their input into 
administrative capacity and absorption processes. This was done by first examining 
the role of beneficiaries, the main non-official actors involved in absorption. Several 
policy processes revolve around them and therefore these have the ability to influence 
the performance of countries in this area. Secondly, this study sought to take into 
account the role of local consultancies for EU funds absorption. These are private 
actors that provide assistance and services to beneficiaries (public or private) and 
whose input may have a positive or a negative impact on administrative capacity and 
on performance as a whole.  
 
In most public administration systems, human resources are considered to be one of 
the most important components of state capacity. Equally, it is posited here that 
without qualified and incentivised employees it may be difficult to speak of a 
functional administrative capacity. Therefore, it was widely expected that problems 
regarding human resources might impair the overall capacity of countries to manage 
EU external aid. Overall, it can be hypothesized that H3: There is a positive link 
between the expertise and incentives of administrators to manage Structural Funds. 
The higher the two are the higher the absorption performance of a country will be.  
 
Territorial capacity  
A strong academic interest has developed recently on new regionalism and how 
political processes unfold at the sub-national level (Keating 1998; Loughlin 2001; 
Keating 2013) and the degree of regional authority found within different member 
states (Hooghe et al. 2010). Cohesion Policy and the implementation of Structural 
Funds have equally been informed by debates on multi-level governance (Marks 1992; 
1993; 1996; Hooghe and Marks 1996; Bache and Flinders 2005). Moreover, the idea 
of “Europe of regions” and regional empowerment are much linked to the territorial 
management of CP (Anderson 1990; Hooghe and Keating 1994; Marks 1996). 
 
Central and Eastern European countries are well-known for highly centralized states, 
another strong legacy of centrally planned economies. The centralisation of power may 
have affected the development of genuine regional policies in Central and Eastern 
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European countries (EPRC and Metis 2009, 35; Ferry and McMaster 2013b, 1519). 
Against this backdrop, in many countries NUTS 2 regions were created mainly for 
statistical and administrative purposes and did not receive legal prerogatives to 
manage European funding instruments. Polish or Hungarian NUTS 2 regions were 
among the only exceptions having resorted to authentic territorial re-organizations 
and a redistribution of power (Hughes et al. 2004; Kovacs 2009). Such changes have 
sparked discussions on the potential impact of Europeanisation in the area (Bruszt 
2008; Dobre 2010; Scherpereel 2010). Much space has been dedicated in the literature 
to discuss how prerogatives for EU funds management have been distributed between 
central and regional governments (Bailey and De Propris 2002) and whether they 
contribute to processes of regionalisation in CEECs (Marek and Baun 2002; Brusis 
2002; O’Dwyer 2006; Scherpereel 2010). 
 
Territorial capacity is generally defined here as the degree to which regional and local 
level institutional structures and stakeholders have contributed towards the 
management and implementation of European Structural Funds.18 This might be a 
relevant endogenous intervening factor. Territorial capacity is structured along three 
core components. Firstly, the extent to which the country makes use of a centralised 
or a decentralised approach in public policy implementation may matter for the overall 
performance in dealing with Cohesion Policy. Cohesion Policy is an area where the 
principle of subsidiarity applies (Begg 2008). On the basis of this principle, central 
and local governments may have full autonomy in managing the absorption process. 
Bähr (2008) underlined that Structural Funds are generally more effective in countries 
where a higher degree of decentralisation is present. It has, moreover, been argued 
that one of the main reasons for Poland’s successful implementation of EU funds had 
to do with the decentralized model of management that meant each region was 
empowered to manage its own Operational Programmes (Mihăilescu 2012a; Ferry and 
McMaster 2013b). Thus, the choice between the two may have an effect on absorption 
performance.  
 
Secondly, domestic territorial configurations are important, and they could influence 
the overall capacity of countries to manage and implement the funding. For instance, 
                                                             
18 Territorial capacity is conceptualised as part of administrative capacity but is largely seen as an 
intervening variable in the overall analytical framework of this study. 
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Batterbury claimed that centrally designed policies may not take into account 
“institutional strengths in a locality” (2002, 862). In addition, some have recently 
argued that the quality of regional governments matters and that the policymaking 
abilities of such governments, and wider issues of governance, may affect the 
implementation and effective use of European funds (Dudek 2005; Charron et al. 
2014). Different territorial configurations could be examined by looking at the 
relationship between central government and the different governmental tiers used 
for EU funds implementation.  
 
Finally, it may be that expertise at the regional and local level is inferior to that of 
expertise amassed at central levels of government. Authors have noted that European 
policies in general, and Cohesion Policy specifically, may strengthen the upper 
echelons of national governments (Benz and Eberlein 1999; Goetz 2001; Buzogány and 
Korkut 2013). In countries such as the United Kingdom it was found that governments 
acted as “extended gatekeepers” in all stages of the process when implementing 
Cohesion Policy (Bache 1998). Similarly, Bailey and De Propris (2002) have found 
evidence to suggest that governments in CEECs tended to limit the participation of 
sub-national actors in the processes behind EU regional policy. With all this, other 
authors have shown that regions in Central and Eastern European countries have 
benefited from EU funds for the development of their, albeit incipient, capacity 
(Dobre, 2012; Bachtler et al., 2013; Ferry and McMaster, 2013). Overall, one might 
expect that poor levels of capacity, knowledge or expertise at the local level of 
implementation would obstruct the management and implementation of the policy.  
 
Given the above discussions, territorial capacity could be examined as the input of 
regional and local level administrative capacity and their positive or negative impact 
on a country’s absorption capacity and performance. Capturing the role of these 
different levels of management and implementation could provide a worthwhile 
avenue for investigation. All in all, it can be hypothesized that H4a: A higher level of 
decentralisation has a positive impact on the absorption capacity and performance 
of a country. Moreover, one can also expect that H4b: A country with low amounts of 
expertise at the local and regional level of management would have a lower 
absorption capacity and performance.  
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2.2 Political factors and informal conditions for 
governance 
 
Whilst administrative capacity represents a formal requirement for governing 
European funds at the domestic level, one of the main claims of this thesis is that in 
order to capture the intricacies of EU funds implementation one should examine some 
of the informal dimensions of governance. In doing so, this thesis draws more 
generally on the literature concerning the impact of political factors and their influence 
within the public administration and post-communist polities. One of the main 
questions motivating this study was the extent to which political factors could mediate 
the management and implementation of EU CP and Structural Funds within new 
member states? To generate several working assumptions, the current section first 
outlines the wider debates regarding the impact of political factors on public 
administration and policy delivery. Without understanding the political dimension, it 
may be difficult to grasp problems emerging in policy delivery.  
 
Firstly, a wide distinction has been made between politics as the “expression of the will 
of the state” and administration “as the execution of that will” (Goodnow 1914, 22). 
This distinction might hold considerable explanatory power for the implementation of 
public policies. There have been long standing theoretical debates with regard to the 
dichotomy between politics and administration (Waldo 2006; Svara 1998; Svara 2001; 
Overeem 2005). Some have sought to capture and explain the politics within 
bureaucracies (Peters 2009) and how the relationship between administrators and 
political representatives shapes the development of public administrations (Peters and 
Pierre 2004). Others have been interested in how political processes shape the ability 
of countries to adopt public reforms (Verheijen 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). 
Finally, others have been interested in how politicians shape the technical and policy-
making capacity of countries for managing SF (Milio 2007a).     
 
Secondly, politico-administrative relations have often been examined in relation to the 
conceptual lens provided by “politicisation” and the impact that political forces might 
have on institutional and public administrative settings. Some have argued that 
recently there has been an increase in politicisation within Western industrialised 
countries enabling politicians to re-establish control over public bureaucracies 
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(Mulgan 1998; Peters 2009). Guy Peters has argued that politicisation can “undermine 
the civil service as an institution” as well as “governance processes” (2013, 20). A 
notable definition of politicisation posits a relationship between civil servants and 
politicians and defines it as “the substitution of political criteria for merit-based 
criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members 
of the public service” (Peters and Pierre 2004, 2). Political involvement in the work of 
civil servants has been constant presence in most public administrations from the 
area. Against this background, the term could denote the arbitrary appointments of 
staff or more subtly, shaping the preferences of those civil servants and bending their 
will to new political priorities, applying political criteria in the evaluation of their work, 
or simply keeping the bureaucracy under democratic control (Peters and Pierre 2004, 
2-4). There is substantial evidence of civil service politicisation across Europe from 
Greece (Chardas 2011) to Slovakia (Beblavy, Sicakova-Beblava, and Ondrusova 2012). 
At the opposite end the spectrum, terms like “neutrality”, “expertise” or “impartiality” 
have been used as antonyms to such this process and potential determinants for issues 
related to quality of government (Mulgan 1998; Peters 2013; Rothstein and Teorell 
2008).  
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, politico-administrative relations have aroused great 
interest among scholars working developments of public administrations and the civil 
service, in particular following the fall of communist regimes (Verheijen 2001; 
Dimitrova 2002; Meyer-Sahling 2011; Fink-Hafner 2014). Moreover, it is widely 
asserted that there is widespread phenomenon of political corruption, patronage and 
clientelism (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006; Kopecký and Spirova 2011; Volintiru 2015) and a 
general “culture of informality” (Eriksen 2007; Dimitrova 2010) affecting public 
bodies and their ability to implement public policies in the area. Moreover, public 
authorities have at times been weak and subject to the phenomenon of “state capture” 
and the clash between different vested interests (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 
2000; Barnes 2007; Ganev 2007). Against this backdrop, some have argued that states 
have been politicised by actors seeking to profit from the distribution of public goods, 
a condition that might have been facilitated by weak political competition and 
inefficient political oppositions (Grzymala-Busse 2003; Vachudova 2005; O’Dwyer 
2006). Therefore, within Central and Eastern European countries, one cannot take for 
granted the impact that the political element, or specific processes of politicisation, 
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might have on policy implementation. Domestic political developments might be even 
more relevant in the context of growing discrepancies between pre- and post-accession 
developments and the alleged democratic backsliding and rise of “illiberalism” in 
countries from the area (Merkel 2004; Sedelmeier 2014; Iusmen 2015).  
 
In the study of the European Union, researchers have often contended that Brussels 
based institutions have developed informal avenues for policy-making development 
(Christiansen and Piattoni 2003). Governance may be more informal “when 
participation in the decision-making process is not yet or cannot be codified and 
publicly enforced” (Ibid. 6). Moreover, given that EU policies and legislation are 
primarily implemented at the level of member states, domestic political developments 
and/or actors could constrain levels of compliance or policy delivery (Hille and Knill 
2006; Dimitrova 2010). For instance, Dimitrova and Toshkov (2009) found that 
political salience and diverging political preferences could delay or cause substantive 
trouble in complying with EU legislation. In addition, those interested in processes of 
Eastern enlargement would claim that EU conditionality had produced mixed effects 
and limited possibilities to “lock-in” pre-accession reforms (Dimitrova 2010; Meyer-
Sahling 2011; Sedelmeier 2014). Moreover, after accession, it was feared that countries 
from the area would experience high levels of re-politicisation (Spendzharova and 
Vachudova 2012; Tănăsoiu 2012; Ganev 2013). Similarly, drawing on evidence from 
Hungary and Slovenia, authors have argued that, following accession, the coordination 
of EU policies has been subject to domestic politicisation (Batory 2012; Fink-Hafner 
2014). 
 
In parallel to the above, in other disciplines ranging from institutional economics to 
development studies, the importance of quality of governance/government arguments 
has gained considerable ground in recent years (Evans and Rauch 1999; Pierre and 
Peters 2004; Rothstein and Teorell 2008). Whilst some have used the concept of “good 
governance” in a more normative fashion (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009), 
others have been more critical of the neo-liberal tenets ingrained in it (Weiss 2000; 
Demmers, Fernández Jilberto, and Hogenboom 2004). Finally, others have argued 
that corruption or the abuse of public office and particularistic allocations of funding 
is a core issue correlated with levels of domestic governance (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015; 
Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016).  
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On the one hand, political factors could have a positive impact for policy development 
and implementation. On the other hand, the negative effects of the political on public 
policy delivery cannot be easily disregarded or disentangled. In line with theoretical 
and practical knowledge, it was generally expected that political conditions would play 
a significant role in explaining differences in absorption performance between EU 
member states. Before outlining the specific working assumptions, the following 
section discusses how political factors have been treated in the specialised literature 
on CP.   
  
2.2.1 Political factors and Cohesion Policy 
 
Documenting the influence that domestic political factors might have on public policy 
development and implementation, more generally, is often neglected when analysing 
the implementation of EU policies. With the exception of several notable studies (Baun 
and Marek 2008; Milio 2008; Bachtler and McMaster 2008; Scherpereel 2010; Dotti 
2014; Surubaru 2016a), the role of political factors has usually been under-theorised 
in relation to EU Cohesion Policy implementation. Few studies have embarked on a 
comprehensive review of how such factors could specifically facilitate or hinder the 
capacity and performance of Structural Funds absorption. As such, this is one of the 
areas to which this thesis makes an important empirical and theoretical contribution.  
  
In general, it is recognized that socio-economic and local political conditions might 
affect the implementation of the policy (Smyrl 1997; Batterbury 2002; Dudek 2005; 
Baun and Marek 2008; Barca et al. 2012; Bachtler et al. 2013). For instance, examining 
EU regional policy in Greece, Chardas argued that administrative and absorption 
capacities are “inevitably linked with the socio-economic and political environment in 
which the policy is implemented” (2011, 59). In recent years, some specific discussions 
have developed on different political factors.  
 
Firstly, several authors have argued that informal dimensions of governance might 
influence the implementation of Cohesion Policy (Smyrl 1997; Smyrl and Piattoni 
2003; Leonardi 2005; Piattoni 2006). For instance, Leonardi underlined that the shift 
from a formal to an informal status may mean that Cohesion Policy can be “captured 
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by organised interests, informal groups or political leaders” (2005, 5). This may affect 
its overall delivery and the objectives the policy might achieve on the ground. More 
specifically, Milio posited a strong relationship between political factors and 
administrative capacity:  
“(a) political interference can increase deficiencies in management at the level 
of Managing Authorities; (b) high governmental instability accounts for poor 
programming and (c) political accountability affects monitoring and evaluation 
practices.” (2007a, 44). 
 
Secondly, more and more studies now assert that there is a strong link between the 
quality of government/governance and the success of EU funds’ investments and their 
delivery of at the national level (Milio 2007a; Barca et al. 2012; Bachtler et al. 2013; 
Hagemann 2014; Charron et al. 2014; Tosun 2014; Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo 
2015). Several studies found a positive correlation between the effectiveness of 
Cohesion Policy expenditure and the quality of government / governance found in 
different European countries and regions (Filippetti and Reggi 2012; Charron et al. 
2013; Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo 2015; Smeriglio et al. 2015; Charron 2016; 
Surubaru 2016a). Consistent strong links have been underlined between the returns 
on EU funds’ investments and the quality of government at the national, regional or 
local level. Based on the above, quality of government/governance have become 
appealing explanations for differences in absorption of EU structural funds for both 
academics, as well as practitioners (Boijmans 2013; EC 2014). Drawing on evidence 
from Romania, Zaman and Georgescu underlined that the:  
“…high efficiency of structural funds is conditioned by the quality of governance 
in general and of public administration institutions in particular. But their 
inability to remove or minimize corruption makes the economic and social 
benefits obtained from the use of structural funds rather modest” (2009, 140).  
 
Such perspectives generally imply that “good governance”, or its absence, can affect a 
country’s ability to manage EU funding. However, given the normative biases 
embedded in the definitions of the term “good governance” (Weiss 2000; Rothstein 
and Teorell 2008), as well as the complex set of factors affecting EU funds delivery, it 
might be difficult to verify such a causal link. Instead, one could examine more 
thoroughly the extent to which (and more importantly how) political conditions 
facilitate or hinder the absorption of EU funding.  
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Thirdly, a consistent stream of literature has been interested in how European 
Cohesion funds have been distributed and whether they achieve objectives of 
convergence, pointing to political behaviour as a source of disruption in the 
implementation of the policy (Ederveen, Groot, and Nahuis 2006; Kemmerling and 
Bodenstein 2006; Bouvet and Dall’erba 2010; Bodenstein and Kemmerling 2011; Dotti 
2013; Dotti 2015). Some authors sought to reopen the debate on “how political factors 
affect the distribution of regional funds” and more importantly on “how regions decide 
to use and allocate SF” (Dotti 2013, 612). Others found that the “political situation 
within a country and a region and the relations between various layers of governance 
influence the allocation process” (Bouvet and Dall’erba 2010, 501). Based on analyses 
of the distribution of the funding these have argued that although political factors do 
not affect economic outcomes they do have an impact on the way in which the policy 
has been implemented (Dotti 2015).  
 
Following the enlargement towards Eastern European, many expected that political 
factors would play an increasingly important role in the implementation of the policy 
and, equally, for “determining the regional policy implementation systems” (Ferry and 
McMaster 2013b). For instance, political factors have played a role in the absorption 
of SF in countries like Hungary, Poland or Slovakia during 2004-2006 (Baun and 
Marek 2008; EPRC and Metis 2009; Scherpereel 2010). At the same time, some 
evidence from south-eastern Europe tended to show that politicised administrations, 
a lack of political will and internal political conflicts could affect the domestic impact 
of the policy (Bache et al. 2011b). Increasingly, authors acknowledge that politicisation 
might be another relevant factor which influences the delivery of the policy 
(Scherpereel 2010; Bachtler et al. 2013; Hagemann 2014; Surubaru 2017).  
 
All in all, we do know that political factors or the quality of government might have 
some impact on the implementation of EU external aid. However, we lack an in-depth 
understanding of the mechanisms through which political actors might seek to 
influence this delivery and how this manifests concretely in countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe. This is an area where, arguably, what has generally been referred to 
as the quality of government, is considerably weaker as compared to Western states 
(Charron et al. 2014). However, the quality of governance/government is often too 
broadly operationalised which might not allow for an in-depth understanding of how 
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political interference can affect the delivery of CP and the work of specialised bodies 
responsible for EU financial aid. Further empirical evidence is required in order to 
specify these connections and to illustrate how they function in practice. As result, it 
is argued here that more research is needed to assess how political factors mediate, if 
at all, the delivery and absorption of EU funds.  
    
2.2.2 Defining and operationalising political factors in this study 
 
Drawing on the above theoretical debates, this sub-section theorises several political 
conditions that might hinder or facilitate the management and implementation of EU 
Cohesion Policy and Structural Funds at the domestic national level. This is done by 
conceptualising three distinct political factors and by examining their potential for 
influencing the absorption of EU funds, in addition to the already defined formal 
governance factors relating to administrative capacity. Similarly to Milio (2007a), this 
study maintains a separation between the political and the administrative dimension 
of EU funds governance. It is assumed that by examining elements of political 
interference, in both administrative capacity and for the absorption of funds, it might 
possible to understand much more the conditions under which Cohesion Policy is 
managed and implemented in new member states.  
 
Overall, it is postulated that political factors could mediate the capacity of countries 
and their overall performance in absorbing EU Cohesion Policy. In line with findings 
from previous studies, it is expected that the political might play a significant role in 
explaining differences for dealing with Structural Funds (Smyrl 1997; Milio 2007a; 
Bachtler and McMaster 2008; Scherpereel 2010). The political is broken down into 
three main factors: political stability, political support and political clientelism. These 
dimensions take into account the possibility for both a positive and a negative input. 
The remainder of the section describes the components in line with the literature and 
how they were operationalised for evidence collection and analysis.  
 
Political stability 
Political stability is the first component of politicisation. This is defined as the degree 
of stability of a country’s central and local institutions and the extent to which stability, 
or instability, might impact the overall absorption processes affiliated to European 
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Cohesion Policy. The first aim was to understand how political changes might affect 
the development of administrative capacity. The second purpose is to analyse whether 
or not processes of political patronage has manifested within managing and control 
institutions and how has this affected the capacity and performance of countries to 
deal with these funds. Political stability was, therefore, examined through two main 
indicators: (a) political stability in terms of political change of Governments, including 
governmental reshuffles; and (b) political appointments or dismissals of senior and 
operational staff working in the institutions responsible for EU funding and how that 
has affected the work of the institutions.  
 
First, comparative politics scholars have often highlighted that governmental stability 
is a key pre-requisite for a functional democratic system (Keman 2002). Political 
instability and confrontational politics are long standing features of post-communist 
political environments. Most countries in the area have been subject to “political 
volatility” and “coalitional politics”, factors which could affect the delivery of regional 
policy (O’Dwyer 2006). The specialised literature on Cohesion Policy stresses that 
political stability is an important variable for understanding why certain countries or 
regions might perform better than others in spending EU funds (Leonardi 2005; 
O’Dwyer 2006; Milio 2008). On the one hand, political and/or frequent institutional 
changes may influence the programming and strategic management of EU funds 
(Milio 2007a; EPRC and Metis 2009). On the other hand, political (in)stability might 
affect the quality of the absorption process (Milio 2008; Dellmuth and Stoffel 2012; 
Dotti 2013). Most of these studies also point to the importance of governmental 
stability and its impact the systems used for SF delivery across Europe.  
 
Second, political patronage might be essential in order to understand the functioning 
of the administration as a whole, and specifically of these latter systems. In essence, 
patronage can be seen as the control that politicians seek to exert over representatives 
of the administration, as well as instruments for rewarding personal and 
organisational loyalty. Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova (2012, 4) define patronage as “the 
power of parties to appoint people to positions in public and semi-public life”. Party 
patronage and the politicisation of civil service appointments has been thoroughly 
documented in Central and Eastern European administrations (Verheijen 1999; 
Grzymala-Busse 2003; Meyer-Sahling 2004; Ganev 2007; Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova 
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2012). Moreover, the “concept of a professional and apolitical public service was slow 
in gaining acceptance around a region where for decades politics pervaded every 
decision throughout society, not just in the administrative realms” (OECD Sigma 
report 1994, 17).  
  
Few authors have examined issues of patronage and political appointments with 
regard to European Union funding. Milio (2007a, 65) defines political interference as 
“the restrictive or disruptive and invasive action of the political towards the 
administrative sphere”. Batterbury (2002, 873) found that clientelistic appointments 
of administrators “eroded effective institutional capacity” in the Italian region of 
Sardinia. Furthermore, Chardas (2011) and Antonopolous (2013) found similar 
evidence with regard to the politicisation of civil service and technical staff working in 
the institutions managing EU funds, in Greece and in Croatia respectively.  
 
All in all, it is expected that political changes and patronage might affect the 
functioning of institutions responsible for Cohesion Policy. In other words, it can be 
hypothesized that H5: The higher the level of political instability and patronage the 
more likely countries will have a weak capacity for managing EU funds.  
 
Political support 
In order to function institutions might require certain levels of political commitment. 
Political support is the second political condition envisioned to have an impact on the 
ability of countries to absorb EU funding. This is defined and operationalised, first, as 
the degree to which political representatives provide political support to operational 
actors and, second, the extent to which they can articulate political visions and 
formulate spending priorities for EU funds in light of public scrutiny. The direction of 
influence for political support might be thus seen as more positive rather than 
negative.  
 
Several scholars have referred to for instance to the creative power of political elites 
for a functional administration (Peters and Pierre 2004). Moreover, political 
leadership and entrepreneurship have been stressed as bearing an important weight 
on political and administrative processes in Western political systems (’t Hart 2014; 
Rhodes and ’t Hart 2014). In CEECs, higher levels of political commitment correlated 
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with functional administrative bodies (Verheijen 2007). Leftwhich (1993) underlined 
that domestic political commitment was a key driver for the design and 
implementation of development aid programmes. Therefore, varied levels of political 
support and leadership might play an important role in the governance of EU funding.  
 
Firstly, political support could be assessed as the extent to which political actors 
offered their support and assisted administrators responsible with the management 
and implementation processes for EU funds. Smyrl and Piattoni were keen to point 
out that the creative force of politics can contribute to more effective institutions which 
might enhance the implementation of Cohesion Policy (2003, 134-136). In Italy, some 
political leaders (from different regional governments) were more responsive than 
others in relation to the opportunities provided by EU funds (Leonardi et al. 1987 
quoted in Milio 2007a, 63). In Central and Eastern Europe, some identified 
weaknesses in political commitment (Bachtler and McMaster 2008) or a lack of 
political steer (Ferry 2013) as factors affecting the management of EU funds. Similar 
findings were reinforced by recent evaluations of the delivery systems used to 
implement CP in the EU-8 countries:  
“Overall, it appears that influence and positive effects [of Cohesion Policy] have 
been strongest where driven by committed elites or policy entrepreneurs, where 
political commitment to change was high (e.g. because of contextual domestic 
reform agendas) and/or where the status and weight of Cohesion policy 
(especially relative to other domestic policies) were high” (EPRC and Metis 
2009, 6) 
  
Secondly, political support might be examined by looking at the way in which 
politicians articulate political visions and formulate spending priorities sometimes in 
line with public scrutiny. In public administrations, political support has been key 
driver for developing strategies (Matheson, Scanlan, and Tanner 1997) or ensuring 
trajectories for public management reform (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). In the 
literature on Cohesion Policy, authors now posit that European funds have been 
politicised in relation to the public and that they are used for the agendas of different 
regional or national politicians (Dudek 2005). Cohesion Policy is used at “arm’s length 
by elected politicians” (Olsson 2003, 291). For instance, issues of co-financing were 
politicized given that certain projects were used to fulfil certain political preferences 
as opposed to others (Ibid.). On the other hand, abolishing such funding schemes, 
particularly in southern or central and eastern European countries, would potentially 
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“lead to serious political problems in particularly sensitive regions” (Kemmerling and 
Bodenstein 2006, 388). Politicians are responsive to the opinion of the public on the 
subject and problems with implementing EU funding could jeopardize their careers.  
 
In addition, political entrepreneurship was often seen as a defining feature of the 
American political system (Dahl 2005) or as a catalyst for the European integration 
process (Moravcsik 1998). With regard to CP, Marc Smyrl found that regions where 
political leaders acted as entrepreneurs where the most successful in dealing with 
external assistance. This related to pragmatic reasons given that: “political leaders 
gave public priority and invested administrative and political resources to European 
programs in the hope of reaping future political gain” (1997, 288-289). On the other 
hand, the author found that in regions where political leaders were “disengaged”, 
“absent” or had different priorities other than CP implementation, there were 
problems with the administration of the external aid. Similar evidence was uncovered 
by Milio in the Italian region of Basilicata where, as opposed to Sicily, the political class 
developed a “healthy alliance” with administrators in the hope that EU funds would 
help restructure the economy of the region (2007a, 235). Overall, it can be 
hypothesized that H6: The higher the level of support from politicians to 
administrators and the higher their commitment to use EU funds it is more likely that 
a country will have a higher rate of absorption and a more strategic approach 
towards the implementation of the funds.  
 
  
Political clientelism 
Clientelism is the final political factor examined in this thesis. If political support 
might have a more positive value attached to it, political clientelism clearly seeks to 
capture any negative effects. Scholars of comparative politics have mainly examined 
clientelism as a dyadic relationship and as an exchange between patrons and clients 
(Piattoni 2001; Hopkin 2006; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Politicians would seek 
to act as patrons providing to local clients different benefits (material or symbolic) in 
exchange for votes or other forms of support (Stokes 2009). However, a third party is 
considered to pay for such informal agreements namely: “the state – whose public 
resources are plundered by patrons” and actions which might “repeatedly thwart 
competition and distort public decision-making” (Christiansen and Piattoni 2003, 16). 
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The distribution of public budgets has provided a major source for clientelistic 
practices with many political representatives seeking to divert public resources to fund 
political activities or to increase their personal wealth. Clientelism would then mean 
that various political and economic parties are affiliated to “pre-established groups 
who may have a common interest in exploiting some available pool of public resources 
and keep the outsiders out” (Ibid.). Countries in southern and central and Eastern 
Europe have often experienced high levels of public funds embezzlement and issues of 
corruption. Political parties have often acted as vehicles for clientelism. In addition, 
the literature on “state capture” points to the formation of different, often divergent 
interest groups that could seek to gain from rent-seeking practices or from different 
forms of cronyism as a preferential distribution of prerogatives and/or positions of 
power to acquaintances or family ties (Hellman 1998; Grzymala-Busse 2003; Barnes 
2007; Ganev 2013).  
 
For the purpose of this study, political clientelism is widely defined as the degree to 
which national or local political cartels interfere in the absorption process or seek to 
profit from the allocation of Structural Funds. One would expect that such networks 
or different “interest cartels” might seek to capture EU funds (Dimitrova 2010; Ganev 
2013; Tănăsoiu 2012) and would endanger the regularity and the correctness of EU 
funds spending. Several studies for instance have explored the issue of corruption in 
relation to EU funding in Central and Eastern Europe (Fazekas et al. 2013; Dimulescu 
et al. 2013). These verified the extent to which the funding has been attribute in a 
particularistic (Mungiu-Pippidi and Kukutschka 2015) rather than an impartial 
manner (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). This study seeks to examine more widely the 
impact of clientelism on the management and implementation of Cohesion Policy and, 
as such, corruption is embedded within this wider factor. Political clientelism is 
evaluated by looking at the degree of: (a) potential political influence in the 
distribution of the funds affiliated to Cohesion Policy; and whether or not there is any 
evidence that (b) national and local political clienteles might have benefited from the 
allocation of EU funds within the country.  
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Firstly, from its early inception, the European Regional Development Fund19 (ERDF) 
sparked debates on its potential to trigger “pork-barrel” politics (Wallace 1977). Recent 
studies have explored the question of political influence in the distribution of 
European Structural Funds (Ederveen, Groot, and Nahuis 2006; Beugelsdijk and 
Eijffinger 2005; Kemmerling and Bodenstein 2006; Bouvet and Dall’erba 2010; 
Bodenstein and Kemmerling 2011; Dellmuth and Stoffel 2012; Dotti 2013). Relying 
mostly on quantitative methods, several of the above studies have investigated the 
relationships between the Structural Funds allocations and political factors (e.g. 
electoral interest or political bargaining). The evidence was, however, rather mixed. 
For instance, Kemmerling and Bodenstein claimed that “party politics matters in 
regions that are eligible for funding” they also did not find a relationship between “the 
distribution of Structural Funds and partisan politics” (2006, 388). Eastern 
enlargements has potentially increased situations of political interference in the 
allocation of Structural Funds (Scherpereel 2010; Bodenstein and Kemmerling 2011). 
Based on a dataset of Latvian regions and Bulgarian municipalities, Bloom and 
Petrova (2013) found that “domestic ‘pork-barrel’ politics determine which regions are 
awarded regional aid” and that regional aid benefits wealthier municipalities and those 
that have a certain political affiliation. Despite this, more in depth qualitative case 
studies are needed to flesh out these potential relationships and to understand what 
would motivate national or local politicians to interfere in the allocation and 
distribution of EU funds, and ultimately whether or not this has any impact on the 
countries’ absorption performance.  
 
Secondly, political clientelism could be examined in terms of whether or not some 
political forces may have benefited more than others from the distribution of funds, 
again through different mechanisms of political favouritism or a particularistic 
allocation of EU-funded contracts (Fazekas et al. 2013; Mungiu-Pippidi and 
Kukutscha 2015). There is strong evidence that political clientelism affected Cohesion 
Policy implementation in countries like Italy, Spain or Greece, at both the micro- and 
macro-level. At the micro-level, Batterbury examined clientelistic ties among SMEs 
from Galicia and Sardinia. Both cases “demonstrate the importance of clientelistic 
socio-cultural structures for institutional performance and the particular contextually 
                                                             
19 This Structural Fund was established in 1974 at the pressure of the British government, prior to its 
accession (for more on this see Wallace 1977 and Bachtler, Mendez and Wishlade 2013). 
 54 
 
determined regions” (2002, 869). More specifically, in Sardinia certain “favoured” 
SMEs tended to benefit from a large number of measures of support pointing to a 
“clientelistic policy capture” (ibid.). Similarly, Dudek (2005) has argued that socio-
economic and historical legacies could explain the variation in the clientelistic use of 
EU funds between the two Spanish regions. At a more macro-level, Charron (2013) has 
argued that a low level of state capacity is associated with issues of political favouritism 
and clientelism. Based on an analysis of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, 
Fazekas (2014) found evidence of a particularistic allocation of public procurement 
contracts financed from EU funds, enabling him to argue that these can increase levels 
of grand corruption within countries from the area.  
 
To conclude, Structural Funds might be indeed an appealing source for different 
clientelistic networks. The question is whether or not this affects the final financial 
absorption of EU funds in the area. It was expected that political clientelism might 
negatively affect the implementation of external assistance offered through Cohesion 
Policy. Hence, it was hypothesized that H7: The existence of political clienteles, and 
their involvement in the distribution of EU funds, will affect the capacity and overall 
absorption performance of countries. 
 
2.3 EU role and influence 
 
In addition to the above factors, this thesis departed from the assumption that we must 
understand the role played by the European Union institutions in national processes 
regarding the absorption of Structural Funds. Via the shared-management principle 
embedded in Cohesion Policy, the EU retains a considerable technical and political 
role in the implementation of Structural Funds at the national level. Its influence can 
span from domestic administrative capacity-building to different interventions in the 
absorption process. This might affect the performance of countries in absorbing EU 
funding in both a positive and a negative manner. The EU factor is widely defined here 
as the degree to which Brussels based institutions affected the domestic processes 
surrounding the absorption of Structural Funds. As previously outlined, many studies 
have examined EU Cohesion Policy specifically in relation to issues of multi-level 
governance and Europeanisation (Bailey and De Propris 2002; Paraskevopoulos and 
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Leonardi 2004; Baun and Marek 2008; Scherpereel 2010; Bache 2010). By contrast, 
this study does not specifically scrutinise the potential effects of CP on domestic 
polities or institutions but more how Brussels might, in its own right, affect the 
domestic governance of the policy in the countries examined. As a result, the EU is 
conceptualised as an intervening factor (distinct from the set of political factors). More 
specifically, it is argued that the European Commission can play a technical and 
political role in domestic processes of absorption.  
 
Firstly, from a technical point of view, one can examine the way in which Brussels has 
provided technical assistance to countries in order to manage EU funds. Moreover, the 
EC is highly influential in the design of the overall architecture as well as in devising 
the institutional and procedural blueprints used by member states for the 
management and implementation of Cohesion Policy.20 Several authors have 
demonstrated that the EC is an influential actor in relation to CP precisely because it 
retains the ability to shape the strategic programming of the funding and its 
institutional blueprint (Marks 1996; Molle 2007). The EC plays a fundamental role in 
establishing the multi-annual financial programmes and budget negotiations for 
Structural Funds (Bachtler, Mendez, and Wishlade 2013). The question which arises 
is whether or not the EC facilitates or hinders the administrative capacity development 
and subsequently the absorption performance of member states? Different studies 
point that the EC played an extensive role in providing technical assistance to regions 
or by detaching its own experts to assist with the management of the funding (Smyrl 
1997; Milio 2007a). However, the agency of the EC seems to be largely neglected in 
analyses regarding financial absorption in Central and Eastern European countries 
(Bachtler et al. 2013). In this study, the technical influence exerted by Brussels is 
examined as the extent to which EU institutions have had an impact on the capacity of 
national administrators to manage and implement the policy.    
 
Secondly, the implementation of Cohesion Policy might have strong political 
repercussions at the national level. CP is largely a redistributive policy and in this 
respect cutting funds might become a high level political point of discussion between 
                                                             
20 As a consequence, the European Regulations have been fairly prescriptive in terms of how national 
institutions should look like, leading to the development of institutional templates and procedures 
embodied particularly in the model of Managing Authorities. 
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national capitals and Brussels. The 1988 reforms of Cohesion Policy did trigger the 
debates on multi-level governance and the potential development of a supranational 
system of governance which would by-pass central governments (Marks 1992, 1993; 
Bache 1998). However, the 1993 and 2000 waves of CP reform have raised questions 
on the “re-nationalistation” of the policy and a potential weakening of Brussels powers 
(for a wider discussion see Bachtler, Mendez, and Wishlade 2013, 24–26). Moreover, 
it was sometimes suggested that the Commission should retain more control over 
policy implementation in order to prevent national irregularities or acts of corruption 
(Marks 1996, 398). Moreover, auditing is one of the main instruments through which 
the EU institutions can maintain control over the regularity of EU funds spending on 
the ground. However, Mendez and Bachtler (2011) concluded that excessive auditing 
has increased demands on member states and generated a further bureaucratisation 
of CP which, in turn, has led to problems in terms of its implementation. The overall 
issue of auditing and policy simplification have in recent years become a highly topical 
and political issue (Barca, McCann, and Rodríguez-Pose 2012; McCann and Ortega-
Argilés 2012).  
 
It may be difficult to assess the level of political influence of EU institutions on 
domestic absorption processes. Two proxy indicators are suggested in order to capture 
this relationship. First, the number and type of interventions of the Commission at the 
national level of policy implementation, looking at evidence on the interruption and 
suspension of funds in member states. As opposed to regular technical irregularities, 
the interruption and suspension of payments entails a political dimension given that 
this may be widely discussed in national media. Second, and in a similar fashion, the 
level of financial corrections applied by Brussels to countries for irregular use of 
funding can be deemed as an EU political intervention given that it requires approval 
in the EC College of Commissioners and because it may trigger a backlash from 
member states, which would seek to avoid giving back funding. In light of the above, 
it can be hypothesized that H8: The more the EU intervenes in the absorption process 
of a country and the more it imposes financial sanctions the more likely that a 
country will have a poor absorption performance. 
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2.4 The absorption capacity model: bridging the formal and 
informal governance of Cohesion Policy  
 
Both academics and policy-makers have increasingly relied on the concept of 
administrative capacity in order to explain the achievements and performance of 
member states with regard to EU funds absorption. However, concepts such as 
administrative capacity or governance, including its political aspects, seem to have 
been used almost interchangeably. This thesis argues that there is need to bridge 
formal and informal dimensions of CP governance. In this respect it sought to further 
elucidate the main concepts for the empirical analysis.  
 
Prior to summarizing the main expectations, several gaps in the literature need to be 
briefly outlined. First, as shown by the ample evidence which transpired in recent 
years, many countries have experienced difficulties in building the necessary 
administrative capacity for EU funds management (Milio 2007a; Chardas 2011; 
Bachtler et al. 2013). One would expect administrative capacity to be a problematic 
dimension of CP governance in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite this, countries 
from the area do have some consistent experience in dealing with pre-accession 
funding and the EU-2008 member states amassed some experience in managing 
Structural Funds (during 2004-2006). Domestic institutions have also been to a 
certain extent reformed prior to accession, and have gone transposed the EU acquis 
communautaire, into national law. So far, evidence from the area is rather mixed in 
terms of the countries’ records in both compliance with EU law (Falkner and Treib 
2008; Dimitrova and Toshkov 2009; Toshkov 2009) or in terms of EU funds 
absorption (Bachtler and McMaster 2008; Ferry and McMaster 2013a; Tosun 2014; 
Bachtler, Mendez, and Oraže 2013). What’s more, there are still few comparative in-
depth studies on the domestic factors that affect the ability of countries from the area 
to absorb EU funding (Ferry 2013).  
 
Second, it has been difficult for academics to isolate and explain what determines 
administrative/absorption capacity and how to best operationalise these concepts.21 
There are several deficiencies in previous conceptualisations of administrative and/or 
                                                             
21 For a similar claim on administrative capacity see Addison (2009, 4).  
 58 
 
absorption capacity (Boeckhout 2002; OIR 2003; Sumpikova et al. 2003; Horvat 
2004; Milio 2007; Bachtler et al. 2013). Previous definitions acknowledge too little the 
specificity of institutional, administrative and financial capacities that exist in Central 
and Eastern European member states. In line with some key claims advanced in the 
literature (Batterbury 2002; Lang 2003; Dudek 2005), it is assumed here that in order 
to understand issues of administrative capacity it is necessary to take into account 
much more the political, social and economic contexts that shape public 
administrations in the countries under study. In a similar vein, administrative capacity 
development in CEECs took place against institutional legacies of the recent 
communist past (e.g. weak and unreformed public administrations or extensive issues 
of corruption). This is where the leverage of informal political factors may come into 
play and arguably they could enrich our understanding of EU policy delivery 
(Dimitrova 2010; Sedelmeier 2011) and more specifically vis-à-vis the management of 
external aid. Thirdly, previous definitions fail to capture the role of external 
stakeholders or whether or not the assistance provided by Brussels facilitated or 
hindered on the ground implementation. It is well-known that prior to accession the 
EU has engaged in processes of institution-building within member states aided by 
conditionality mechanisms (Grabbe 2001; Dimitrova 2005; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005). However, others have argued that the conditionality for the 
regional policy chapter of the acquis had an ambiguous and inconsistent influence on 
developments in the area (Hughes et al. 2004; O’Dwyer 2006).  
 
To address these issues this study introduces an absorption capacity analytical 
framework. The framework is based on the assumption that both formal 
(administrative capacity) and informal (political) conditions influence the absorption 
of EU funding. The different dimensions of the analytical framework (outlined in 
Figure 5) combine different administrative and political conditions. The overall 
operational concepts used are reiterated in the following. First, absorption 
performance (or financial absorption) of Cohesion Policy Structural Funds constitutes 
the main dependent variable of this study. It represents the temporal evolution of 
financial absorption in a given EU member state and is the end result or output of, on 
the one hand, of a certain degree of absorption capacity of public authorities and how 
this manifests during the different stages of the absorption policy cycle. Simply put, 
absorption performance can be seen as the degree to which a member state, in line 
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with its own capacity reaches a certain degree of performance in absorbing SF. This 
performance could be measured through various indicators: e.g. contraction of 
funding, intermediary or final payments transferred from the EU to member states as 
a result of a correct fulfilment of CP commitments. Financial absorption is measured 
here in terms of the final absorption rates (%) achieved by countries during a given 
period (e.g. 2007-2013), namely the percentage of payments reimbursed by the 
European Commission (EC) to a member state at a given point in time 
 
The absorption capacity of a country might influence the low or high degrees of 
financial absorption. Absorption capacity is used here only as an umbrella term in 
order to bring together the formal and informal components of CP delivery 
(administrative and political). It assumes that there is an interaction between 
administrative and political factors. As the main independent variables, these are 
broken down and operationalised through several indicators (Table 3). These were the 
main indicators used for collecting and assessing the empirical evidence.  
 
Finally, what is referred to here as the absorption policy process are essentially the 
classic stages of the public policy cycle (Anderson 1975). For EU Cohesion Policy these 
consist in several formalised operational stages in public institutions, and partly 
project applicants and final EU funds beneficiaries, are engaged: programming, 
management, selection, implementation, financial management, monitoring, and 
evaluation (Molle 2007; EIPA 2008; Bachtler et al 2013a). The absorption 
performance of countries regarding SF can be affected by specific bottlenecks arising 
in each of these stages. Empirically, the role of administrative and political factors on 
the absorption policy process is assessed more in depth drawing on evidence from two 
selected stages: a) the evaluation and selection of projects and b) the procurement 
phase part of the implementation of EU-funded projects.  
 
Overall, this thesis aimed to evaluate the extent to which this model and the interplay 
between administrative and political factors might explain the variation in absorption 
attained by countries from CEECs, and specifically, between and within its two main 
case studies: Bulgaria and Romania. A theoretical relationship is therefore posited 
between the capacity (administrative and political) of states and their level of 
performance (absorption rates) in absorbing EU funds. It is expected that a higher 
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absorption capacity would generate a higher absorption performance. Three specific 
assumptions guided the empirical inquiry: (a) a high level of administrative capacity 
could lead to a higher degree of absorption performance; (b) political factors influence 
might have an impact on the absorption performance achieved by a country.22 Finally, 
it was assumed that (c) the interaction between administrative capacity and political 
factors could affect a country’s absorption performance. Specifying how this 
interaction takes place in practice has been one of the main objectives of this thesis.   
 
Figure 5: Dimensions of analytical framework 
 
Source: Author’s creation using NVIVO 10 
 
 
                                                             
22 In line with previous studies, it was expected that political factors could play a mediating role for 
absorption performance (Smyrl 1997; Milio 2007a; Bachtler and McMaster 2008). 
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Lastly, table 2 brings together all the initial working assumptions that were verified 
empirically. The desk and fieldwork research has generated a substantial amount of 
evidence relevant for assessing these assumptions, and in line with the indicators 
included in the absorption capacity analytical model (Table 3). 
  
Table 2: Overall hypotheses / working assumptions  
  
ADM1  H1: Institutional mis-coordination and non-accountability have a 
negative impact on administrative capacity and on absorption 
performance. 
ADM2 H2: The higher the number of administrative and legislative 
procedures a country has the lower the administrative capacity of a 
country will be. 
ADM3 H3: There is a positive link between the expertise and incentives of 
administrators to manage Structural Funds. The higher the two are 
the higher the absorption performance of a country will be. 
TER  H4a: A higher level of decentralisation has a positive impact on the 
absorption capacity and performance of a country.  
H4b: A country with low amounts of expertise at the local and 
regional level of management would have a lower absorption 
capacity and performance. 
POL1 H5: The higher the level of political instability and patronage the more 
likely countries will have a weak capacity for managing EU funds. 
POL2 H6: The higher the level of support from politicians to administrators 
and the higher their commitment to use EU funds it is more likely that 
a country will have a higher rate of absorption and a more strategic 
approach towards the implementation of the funds. 
POL3 H7: The existence of political clienteles, and their involvement in the 
distribution of EU funds, will affect the capacity and overall 
absorption performance of countries. 
EU  H8: The more the EU intervenes in the absorption process of a country 
and the more it imposes financial sanctions the more likely that a 
country will have a poor absorption performance. 
Source: Author’s creation. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the general research design and methodology used to empirically 
assess the above claims and the countries absorption performance. It details issues of 
case selection, the different levels of empirical analysis observed and how the evidence 
was collected and analysed. 
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Table 3: Absorption capacity model – operational dimensions of analytical framework 
Core Variables Core indicators 
I Administrative capacity (ADM) 
Institutional Capacity 
(ADM1)  
(1) Institutional design:  
(1a) Establishment of management and control systems; 
(1b) Functionality of the institutional model;  
(1c) Efficiency of institutions involved in the process;  
(2) Institutional coordination: coordination and communication among managing and control institutions and other relevant 
bodies; 
(3) Institutional accountability: 
(3a) Institutional transparency; 
(3b) Institutional communication. 
Bureaucratic Capacity  
(ADM2) 
(1) Legal rules and administrative procedures: 
(1a) Existence of adequate legislation, procedures and administrative documents;  
(1b) Stability and uniformity of legislation and procedures; 
(2) Electronic systems: use of electronic systems for applications and projects management; functionality of central electronic 
systems for data management.  
(3) Methodologies and project management tools: use of methodologies and project management tools;  
(4) Public Procurement systems: functionality and problems related to public procurement;  
(5) Selection and Monitoring procedures: functionality and problems related to (5a) Selection of projects; (5b) Monitoring and 
verification of the implementation of projects;  
Human Resources 
Capacity (ADM3) 
(1) Human resources capacity of employees in Managing and Control institutions: 
(1a) Staff numbers and ratio; 
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(1b) Quality of expertise;  
(1c) Training and professional development;  
(1d) Incentives: financial and professional; 
(2) Role of external stakeholders 
(2a) role of beneficiaries;  
(2b) role of consultancies; 
II Political factors (POL) 
Political Stability  
(POL1) 
(1) Political changes of Government (including governmental reshuffles) and their impact on EU funds management and 
implementation 
(2) Political appointments/dismissals of staff working in managing and control institutions 
Political Support  
(POL 2) 
(1) Political support, leadership and guidance provided to EU funds administrators  
(2) Political priority and visions for spending EU funds in light of public scrutiny 
Political Clientelism  
(POL 3) 
(1) Political influence in the selection and distribution of EU-funded projects  
(2) Political clienteles / favouritism in the implementation of EU-funded project 
III Intervening factors 
Territorial Capacity  
(TER) 
(1) Centralisation / Decentralisation  
(2) Domestic territorial configurations: governmental tiers employed in the management of EU funds. 
(3) Expertise of staff at the regional / local level   
EU role and influence  
(EU) 
(1) Technical: support and guidance from European Commission to national administrators 
(2) Political: EU interventions in the national absorption process 
Source: Author.  
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Chapter 3: Research design and 
methodology 
 
 
Using the concepts of administrative capacity and political factors, and drawing on the 
existent knowledge regarding their influence, this study aimed to capture and explain 
differences in financial absorption performance between and within the countries 
examined. The concepts were developed in line with the literature and were used to 
operationalise several indicators in order to assess the empirical material. The 
potential relationship between administrative capacity and political factors was at the 
core of the thesis and the overall aim being that of probing how the interaction between 
the two factors could explain differences in absorption performance. Similarly to other 
inquiries which examined this dynamic (Milio 2007a; Chardas 2011), this study 
focused on the potential impact that the political factor might have had on 
administrative capacity developments and on the different stages of the absorption 
policy process. This chapter outlines the main research philosophy, strategy and 
methodology adopted in order to provide an answer to this thesis’ research questions. 
It presents the main elements of the research process, argues the choice of the case 
studies and underlines the different levels of the empirical analysis. Moreover, it 
presents insights from the fieldwork, the type of evidence collected and the methods 
used to analyse it. The last section of the chapter reflects on some of the main 
methodological limitations of this study.   
 
3.1 Research philosophy  
 
Studying institutions and the processes taking place within these often entails various 
trade-offs. A research paradigm shapes the principles and tools for understanding and 
explaining the relationship between theories and observations. Against this 
background, this section outlines and discusses the main research philosophy 
elements that have guided this thesis, including various ontological and 
epistemological considerations. This is done in order to justify the link between these 
principles and the wider research strategy, sources and methods used, on the one 
hand, and the overall findings and arguments advanced, on the other hand. Ontology 
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relates to the state of being and how to see and experience the nature of reality. 
Specifically, in social sciences, this relates to what we study and how this relates to 
reality (Della Porta and Keating 2008). In terms of political analysis, the term refers 
to “identities, individuals, social collectivities, states, regimes, systems or some 
combination of the above” and the assumptions we have about the “reality of each as 
ontological entities” (Hay 2011, 461). There are several paradigms relating to ontology 
which are theorised in several ways and which often match the different 
epistemological postulates. Three main positions can be briefly outlined: objectivism, 
constructionism and pragmatism. Objectivism postulates that “social phenomena and 
their meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors” (Bryman 2012, 
33). By contrast, constructionism asserts that “social phenomena and their meanings 
are continually being accomplished by social actors” (Ibid.). Therefore, whilst 
objectivists argue that there is an objective reality that can be captured through 
research, constructionists tend to argue that this reality is constructed by social actors 
who ascribe meaning to it. A middle-ground position would be that of pragmatism 
which posits that multiple realities are possible (Saunders et al. 2012).  
Epistemology relates to “how we know things” and ultimately to how we can produce 
knowledge about reality (Della Porta and Keating 2008, 22).  In social sciences one of 
the main debates has been whether or not knowledge can be produced in a fashion 
similar to natural sciences. Extensive discussions have been taking place between two 
main schools of thought: positivism and interpretivism/constructivism (both of which 
can be linked to objectivist and subjectivist ontologies). Positivism generally assumes 
that knowledge can be produced in an objective fashion by testing theories in relation 
to empirical observations (Bryman 2012, 28). It seeks to replicate natural science and 
establish causal laws (Della Porta and Keating 2008, 23). By contrast, interpretivism 
assumes that knowledge is subjective in nature or that people and institutions are 
“fundamentally different” from the subject matter of natural sciences (Bryman 2012, 
28). In this sense, its aim is to understand subjective knowledge and the context in 
which the various entities operate (Della Porta and Keating 2008, 23). Finally, 
pragmatists argue that knowledge and truth should not be based on “strict dualism 
between the mind and the reality completely independent of mind” (Creswell 2003, 
14). Consequently, pragmatists stress that various epistemological positions can be 
mixed or used within a single research framework in order to best answer the 
questions asked (Saunders et al. 2012). Pragmatists would therefore argue that 
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knowledge is often rooted in different contexts and that researchers need to have the 
freedom to combine various methods and techniques in order to best account for their 
research problem (Creswell 2003, 13). 
In light of the above, several points can be made on the research philosophy and 
approach adopted in this thesis. Firstly, it is assumed that reality can be both objective 
and subjective. In this respect, the thesis adheres to a pragmatic ontological viewpoint 
which affirms that several realities can co-exist. For instance, political stability as a 
factor, and its subsequent reality, can be assessed both in objective and subjective 
terms. The number of years a government has been in place could provide an objective 
assessment this, yet the perceptions of the actors involved on various aspects of the 
latter can differ and allow for a different understanding of what that reality meant in 
practice. Secondly, knowledge can be produced using a mix of objective/positivist and 
subjective/interpretivist theories and research tools. Again, from an epistemological 
viewpoint, this thesis has tended to adopt a pragmatic approach in order to provide 
answers to the mainly problem driven questions it has formulated. Whereas, much of 
the literature outlines the significance of political factors for implementing EU aid 
around Member States it is not clear how these factors manifest and how they matter. 
In this respect, the subjective viewpoints of institutional and societal actors could 
contribute towards a more grounded understanding of the politics of EU funding.  
Several other points are made in the following in order to make a link between the 
above ontological/epistemological considerations and the specific choices made in 
terms of research design and methodology. First, reflecting the largely pragmatic 
position adopted in this thesis, the research approach has had an abductive dimension 
attached to it. For instance, the first wave of fieldwork reinforced and provided new 
assumptions that were then empirically examined in subsequent waves. Several 
theoretical assumptions about the realities of EU funds implementation in different 
contexts were drawn from the literature. These were then partly analysed with 
qualitative knowledge generated by the two main cases analysed. This partly presumed 
engaging in a process of iteration (Heritier 2008, 65). In effect, knowledge was 
produced by juxtaposing both objective data and subjective understandings with 
regard to the main problems affecting the institutions dealing with EU aid at the 
domestic national level. In addition, the logic driving this approach has been that of 
formulating a potential explanation fit for the empirical puzzle (Creswell 2003). 
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Second, from an epistemological point of view, this thesis adhered to the principle of 
a unified logic of inference in social sciences (King et al. 1994; Collier and Brady 2004). 
This assumes that both qualitative and quantitative methods can produce knowledge 
of similar quality if they follow common standards. This includes, for instance, finding 
ways to multiply the observable implications of theory in small-n research (King et al. 
1994). For this research, this was done by comparatively examining the same factors 
throughout several case studies, whilst trying to keep under control and understand 
the context of each case study. Conclusions were then formulated with regard to the 
inter-relationship of factors and how these differed throughout the different contexts 
examined. Third, new waves of qualitative research methodologists underline the 
potential for finding regular patterns in qualitative evidence, using theory informed 
assumptions, and are concerned with issues of validity and reliability (Miles and 
Huberman 1994; Bazeley 2009). Triangulating various sources of evidences made it 
possible to obtain a balance between objective and subjective dimensions of 
knowledge and reality. Such an approach enabled a more systematic understanding of 
the dynamics taking place within these institutions and the interplay between 
administrative and political factors. 
Overall, the view taken in this research is that both objective and subjective ontologies 
and epistemologies, as well as their affiliated research methodologies, can be 
complementary to one another. Describing and explaining an institutional eco-system, 
how it functions and the relationships between its constituent actors can only be 
accounted for by combining objective knowledge as well as subjective meanings of 
reality. This is even more the case in a context in which the influence of political 
factors, an important aspect studied in this thesis, could not be easily captured using 
objective data. Several tensions did arise from adhering to a more pragmatic research 
paradigm. These ranged from the analytical framework (which would unjustly be 
framed as positivistic) to the type of, mainly qualitative, evidence sources used. 
Finally, it is recognized that knowledge can be influenced by the scholar when carrying 
out the analysis (Della Porta and Keating 2008, 23). Nevertheless, potential limits and 
uncertainties are reported in the last section of this chapter and in the conclusions. It 
must be also stressed that claims about causality or any overarching principles driving 
the absorption of EU funds were absent. Instead, the focus has been on examining the 
relationship between formal and informal conditions affecting the governance of EU 
funding in the selected from countries from Central and Eastern Europe. As a 
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consequence, new knowledge has been generated from two new and different contexts 
on the inter-relationship between these conditions. The following sections provide 
more details on the specific research steps undertaken in this thesis.  
 
3.2 Research strategy, case studies and levels of analysis 
 
Examining the problem driven and empirical puzzle of Structural Funds absorption 
variation in Central and Eastern Europe, the choice made in this study was to examine 
two homogeneous cases. As a result, two outlier yet highly similar cases were selected: 
Bulgaria and Romania. Following the fall of the communist regime, both countries 
experienced similar problems ranging from political instability and corruption to 
unreformed public administrations. Recent historical and institutional developments 
in the two countries were influenced by their common and tied-in path towards EU 
membership. Several more specific reasons underpinned the selection of these cases. 
Firstly, the choice generated by the main research question was to undertake an in-
depth analysis of the variation in absorption capacity and performance between and 
within the two countries. Secondly, there are very few theoretically driven empirical 
studies assessing the management and implementation of EU Cohesion Policy in the 
two countries. This was one of the main empirical gaps addressed by this study. 
Thirdly, the main rationale was to identify the specific patterns of EU funds 
governance within the two countries and how could these be explained by the 
analytical framework proposed. Fourthly, one of the advantages of selecting the two 
main cases of Bulgaria and Romania was that the units of analysis were almost 
completely homogeneous, given the strong similarities regarding the strategic and 
institutional frameworks used to manage and implement EU funding in the two 
countries. Finally, the empirical knowledge derived from the two case studies could 
partly contribute to the general understanding, and towards generating testable 
hypotheses, relevant for the governance of CP in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
In terms of research design, this thesis has combined a comparative framework with a 
case study research design. First, Bulgaria and Romania fall into a “Most Similar 
Systems Design” (MSSD) category as opposed to a Most Different Systems Design 
(MDSD) (Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Lijphart, 1971). Given the puzzling variation 
between the two cases, the selection of these cases on the dependent variable 
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(absorption performance) was made in order to control for the relatively similar 
context present in both countries and to understand what might explain differences 
within and between them. The aim has been to assess the historical evolution and 
development of absorption capacity and these countries’ financial absorption 
performance. Second, the case studies complemented the approach provided by the 
comparative method. Several embedded case studies were used (Yin 2003, 46; Gerring 
2007). Choosing the two main cases meant that a systematic comparison with 
equivalent levels of information could be undertaken (Pennings et al. 1999, 15). More 
specifically, the wider macro-level case studies (Bulgaria and Romania) were 
disaggregated in different levels of analysis in order to increase the observable 
implications of the theory (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 115). Outlined in Table 4 
the different dimensions of the empirical analysis where evaluated in line with the 
proposed analytical framework.  
 
Table 4: Empirical levels of analysis 
Levels of empirical 
analysis 
Bulgaria 
 
Romania 
 
Central and 
regional 
(macro-level)  
 
-Central Government level (Sofia) 
-South-West (Yugozapaden) & 
North-Centre (Severen Tsentralen) 
(NUTS 2) 
-Central Government level 
(Bucharest) 
-Bucharest-Ilfov & North-East 
(NUTS 2) 
 
Operational 
Programmes 
(meso-level) 
 
-Human Resources  
-Regional Development 
-Human Resources  
-Regional Development  
Absorption policy 
stages  
(micro-level) 
 
-Evaluation and selection of projects  
-Public Procurement 
-Evaluation and selection of 
projects  
-Public Procurement 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
Broadly, the first related to a macro-level for which evidence was gathered and 
examined from central level governments, as well as from two distinct NUTS regions 
from the two countries: South-West (Yugozapaden) and North-Centre (Severen 
Tsentralen) for Bulgaria and Bucharest-Ilfov and North-East for Romania. Second, 
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and more consistently, evidence was gathered and analysed in relation to two meso-
level case studies, looking at two distinctly thematic Operational Programmes. On the 
one hand, the Human Resources Operational Programme (OPHR) is a programme 
funded from the European Social Fund (ESF) which addresses a wide range of 
beneficiaries. OPHR was selected on the basis of the strong differences in financial 
absorption performance between the two countries during most of 2007-2013. On the 
other hand, the Regional Development Operational Programme (OPREG) funded 
from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) targeted in particular public 
authorities. This programme was selected given the similarity in financial absorption 
performance between the two countries during most of 2007-2013. Finally, two micro-
level instances were included in the empirical analysis. These are two distinct stages 
of the absorption policy process: (a) the evaluation and selection of projects from 
Structural Funds and (b) the public procurement stage of Structural Funds 
implementation. These were more dynamic instances which apart from the 
responsible national institutions, engaged several other stakeholders (e.g. EU funds 
applicants and final beneficiaries, procurement bodies etc.). The two stages were 
selected in light of preliminary evidence indicating a high level of deficiencies.  
 
The rationale behind the above empirical strategy was twofold. Firstly, its main 
purpose was to identify and describe the specific role of administrative capacity and 
political factors within the macro, meso- and micro-levels of analysis. Secondly, the 
analytical aim was to understand how the interaction between administrative and 
political factors could manifest in these varied empirical instances. For instance, the 
contrasts between and within the two Operational Programmes examined has allowed 
for a wider reflection on how administrative capacity and political factors shape the 
ability of countries to use EU Cohesion Policy. All in all, the strategy enabled a strong 
comparative basis for the collection and analysis of the evidence, steps which are 
detailed in the following.  
 
3.3 Evidence sources and fieldwork 
 
This study was based on several primary and secondary sources of evidence. During 
the research, several primary and secondary sources (reports and studies) were 
published and addressed the visible problems that the two countries faced in terms of 
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EU funds management and implementation. This study adopted a predominantly 
qualitative approach for the collection and analysis of its evidence. In terms of timing, 
the study focused on the 2007-2013 financial execution period for Cohesion Policy. 
However, data on financial absorption and the general implementation of Operational 
Programmes was analysed for the period until the end of December 2014 and even to 
June 2015. This was the case given that the implementation of Structural Funds is 
usually subject to a two-year extension period. This means that contracted EU-funded 
projects could still be implemented during two years following the official end of, what 
is known as, a programming period. During these final implementation years’, public 
authorities are predominantly engaged in the management of the funding, although 
some of them started to shift their focus towards the 2014-2020 implementation 
period. At the same time, it must be mentioned that financial absorption rates are the 
product of a timely evolution and that, at the time of this research being finished, the 
final absorption rates for the 2007-2013 were not yet publicly available. This, however, 
did not have an impact on the final analysis, which was temporally limited. 
 
In the initial stages of the research process, a thorough analysis of European and 
national primary documents has been conducted (Table 5). At the same time, the desk 
research entailed a compilation of evidence from several other secondary sources such 
as applied evaluations, civil society reports and other relevant sources. In addition, 
newspaper articles were included in two databases which were developed and updated 
during the research period. These included several newspaper entries on EU funds 
management and implementation in Bulgaria and Romania. Overall, these documents 
constituted the empirical foundations of the inquiry.  
 
Fieldwork was a highly productive period for the research. The primary original 
empirical evidence was collected under the form of qualitative semi-structured elite 
interviews (see Annex A for the full list of interviews). Interviews were partly 
anonymised, and interviewees were assigned a specific code name which reveals only 
some information on their function and affiliation. During the first stages of fieldwork, 
a purposive sampling technique (Silverman 2005, 129) was used in order to reach key 
policy-makers, administrators and experts dealing with EU funds. These were 
complemented by “snow ball” techniques, namely asking those interviewed to 
recommend other key interviewees. In order to improve the reliability of the evidence 
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collected, interviews were held in different geographical and thematic levels of 
implementation. The diversity, experience and positions of interviewees (e.g. 
Directors, policy officers), the thematic focus (e.g. different Operational Programmes) 
and the different locations where fieldwork was conducted out (e.g. central level 
Government / local administrations) contribute to a rich evidence base (see Table 6 
for different categories of interviewees). Arguably, the diversity backgrounds and 
positions of interviewees produced a clearer identification of the most common 
problems, and of the more specific issues, associated with SF absorption within and 
between the two countries. 
  
Table 5: Primary, secondary and original sources of evidence 
 Bulgaria/Romania European Union 
Primary 
documentary  
sources  
-National primary legislation; 
-National Strategic Reference Frameworks; 
-Operational Programmes (main 
programming documents);  
-Annual Implementation Reports; 
-National Strategic Reports on progress 
regarding the implementation of EU funds 
(2009; 2013); 
-Monitoring Committee minutes;  
-Audit Authority annual reports;  
-Parliamentary interpellations / Parliament 
reports on EU funds; 
-European Regulations; 
-European Strategic Reports on 
progress regarding the implementation 
of EU funds (2009, 2013); 
-European Commission Directorate 
Generals Annual Activity Reports (DG 
Regio; DG Employment); 
-Internal European Commission audit 
reports (Freedom of Information 
Request) 
-European Court of Auditors reports;  
 
Secondary 
documentary 
sources  
-Ex-ante / intermediate / ex-post 
evaluations of Operational Programmes;  
-Expert Evaluation Network reports; 
-World Bank reports; 
-Civil Society reports and policy papers; 
-Ex-ante/ Intermediate / ex-post 
evaluations;  
-Specific studies carried out for the EU 
Commission; 
-Specific studies carried out for the EU 
Parliament; 
Newspaper 
articles 
-National / local press coverage of EU 
funds (various sources) 
-Europa Press Releases database 
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Original sources of evidence  
  Bulgaria Romania Brussels Overall 
Total 
number of 
interviews 
25 34 10 69 
Total 
number of 
interviewees 
36 42 12 89 
No. of formal 
interviews 
22 29 8 59 
No. of 
informal 
interviews 
3 5 2 10 
Source: Author’s creation 
 
The fieldwork included four distinct waves. The first interviews were carried out in 
Brussels, in October 2013, with the aim of piloting questions and obtaining an external 
perspective, mainly from EU officials working on country units, on SF in Bulgaria and 
Romania. The second, and most consistent, part of the fieldwork was carried out 
between March - June 2014, period which was equally divided and spent between 
Romania (March-April) and Bulgaria (April-June). Considerable time was spent at the 
central level in Bucharest and Sofia whilst efforts were made to reach local 
interviewees such as regional administrators or EU funds beneficiaries. The third wave 
of interviews was carried out in Brussels in October 2014 and it aimed to verify some 
of the insights that emerged from the two countries. Finally, a fourth wave of fieldwork 
was carried out only in Romania, in July 2015, interviewing administrators and 
experts working on specific areas for which additional insights could not be gathered 
during the first wave (e.g. public procurement). 
 
In order to establish a concrete and replicable chain of evidence, this study consistently 
used a data collection protocol (Yin 2003, 38–39). Standardised interview questions 
were addressed to a diverse range of stakeholders working on EU funds management 
and implementation at the local, national and European level. Considerable efforts 
were made to follow the interview guide and protocol, and during most interviews, 
approximately 80% of the same questions were asked. Some remaining 20% of 
questions were tailored in relation to the specific expertise of the interviewee (e.g. 
audit or thematic Operational Programme) before each interview. In Brussels and in 
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Bulgaria interviews were carried out in English whilst in Romania they were carried 
out in Romanian, using a verbatim translation of the interview guide. Out of a total of 
69 interviews, 27 were officially recorded following the express consent of 
interviewees. Extensive notes were taken during the non-recorded interviews and were 
completed and transcribed usually on the same day. Finally, the opinions of interviews 
could be cross-checked given that, in most cases, there was no connection between 
interviewees. This increased the possibility to verify the accuracy of the different 
perceptions and statements made. Moreover, a distinction was made between formal 
and informal interviews, with the latter being usually much shorter and not in line with 
the data collection protocol. Interviews lasted on average 90 minutes, whilst informal 
interviews were shorter - 15-30 minutes. Overall, it was possible to obtain a relatively 
representative range of views from the different elites involved in EU funds 
management and implementation at the domestic level (see Annex A for a full list of 
interviews).  
 
Table 6: Number of interviewees per categories and functions  
Interviewee categories  
(interview guide code) 
Bulgaria  
 
Romania  
 
A1 / A10 – High ranking officials and political 
representatives national and local (e.g. MPs, Mayors) 
3  5  
 
A2 – Central Coordination Units/Ministry of 
European Funds 
A3 – Managing Authorities 
A5 – Monitoring Committees 
11  
 
14  
 
A4 – Audit Authority & Certifying and Payment 
Authority & Other external / control bodies (e.g. Public 
Procurement Agency) 
5  
  
7  
 
A8 / A9 – Intermediate Bodies and Regional 
Development Bodies / Agencies  
2 6  
 
A6 / A12 – National and local experts  10  7  
A7 / A11 – National and local EU funds beneficiaries 
(public and private)  
6 3 
European Union institutions – Brussels  
European Commission - DG Regio:  1 Head of Unit, 4 Policy Officers, 1 Former Head of 
Unit 
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European Commission - DG Employment:  2 Heads of Unit, 1 Head of Sector 
European Commission - OLAF:  2 Heads of Unit 
Permanent Representation:  1 Head of Sector 
Source: Author’s creation 
 
In parallel to the semi-structured interviews, a questionnaire has been used to collect 
data from interviewees in Bulgaria and Romania. The questionnaire mirrored the 
interview guide almost completely and aimed to obtain a quantifiable version of 
answers. A copy of the questions used in the questionnaire/interview guide can be 
found in Annex B. Before soliciting a detailed answer, interviewees were asked 
questions in line with several close-ended options. If questions were left unanswered 
they were not included in the database. Furthermore, in situations in which more than 
one interviewee was present, the questionnaire was completed by the leading 
interviewee. The questionnaire data (N = 46) was recorded in a separate database and 
was completed by 22 Bulgarian and 24 Romanian interviewees. These were processed 
with Microsoft Excel and SPSS 22 and used to generate several descriptive figures, 
mainly in order to obtain a first impression on the potential similarities and 
differences in perceptions between representatives from both countries. No 
authoritative claims were drawn from the questionnaire data given that it was not 
representative of the overall population studied. All the above constituted the primary 
and secondary sources of evidence based on which the empirical analysis was carried 
out.  
 
3.4 Evidence analysis and methods 
  
Before underlining the different steps undertaken in analysing the evidence collected, 
several more general points regarding the research process require some emphasis. 
The analytical strategy unfolded in a three-step process. Firstly, given the puzzling 
variation between the two countries the selection of the two macro-level cases was 
made on the dependent variable (absorption performance). There was a temporal 
variation of absorption performance with strong similarities during 2007-2010 
between the two countries and an increased differentiation during 2011-2014.  
Secondly, the specific focus of the analysis was on understanding the evolution of the 
main independent factors (administrative capacity and political) and how they could 
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potentially influence the variation in financial absorption performance. Prior to the 
fieldwork, the main concepts were broken down into several indicators (analytical 
framework - Table 3, Chapter 2.4) which were then used to collect and carry out a 
systematic comparison of the empirical material.  
 
The qualitative analysis followed several steps. First, a content analysis of the main 
primary and secondary documentary sources was undertaken. This produced an 
overview of some of the key problems, as acknowledged in official documents or as 
emphasised by third actors in studies/evaluations, on setting up and using EU funding 
in the two countries. Second, several steps were undertaken in order to systematically 
organize and analyse the interview data. Firstly, interviews were transcribed, and 
memos were added to each in order to capture first reflections on their content. 
Following a case by case analysis of the interviews, a decision was taken to systematize 
the interview data using a qualitative database. The main advantages for using the 
software were twofold. It organised the interview data and made it more retrievable 
for analytical purposes. It could improve issues of reliability given that the interviews 
were stored into a dataset which could be verified by other researchers. Secondly, 
interviews were processed with qualitative data analysis software: NVIVO 10. From a 
total of 89 interviewees, 66 were classified in the database as cases (units of 
observation). These observations were selected based on the completeness and 
comprehensiveness of the material (in particular the number of questions answered 
per interviewee). Moreover, interview data could also be arranged in terms of 
questions or themes. The decision then taken was to code the data starting from the 
questions, rather than the cases, in order to identify some of the relevant perceived 
problems for each factors and specific operational indicator.  
 
The coding process meant to “capture a datum’s primary content and essence” 
(Saldana 2013, 4). It sought to condense, interpret and identify re-occurring patterns 
(Miles et al. 2014, 73) and to report on various thematic regularities found in the 
qualitative evidence (Bazeley 2009). This was done both manually and using the 
software (NVIVO10). For the latter, coding meant that different parts of the interview 
data (sentences/paragraphs) were included into a pre-defined or a new node (code) in 
the NVIVO database. A coding protocol was developed and included several categories 
used to code the qualitative interviews. First, an initial protocol structured the data 
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into the formal main factors (e.g. ADM1_Institutional_Capacity; POL2_Political 
Support) and their operational indicators.23 Second, several analytical codes were 
created in order to characterise some parts of the data which emerged from the 
interviews. For instance, when interviewees described the importance or absence of 
institutional centralisation / political leadership the information was included in new 
codes that reflected either a descriptive or a more analytical situation.24 Finally, the 
interview data was also coded for the different empirical levels of analysis: Operational 
Programmes (e.g. Operational Programme Human Resources – OPHR) and the 
Absorption Process (e.g. Evaluation and Selection of funds – ADM_SEL). Therefore, 
all relevant information regarding these categories were included in these nodes. A 
total of 14 master codes, 30 formal codes (the main indicators from the analytical 
framework) and 247 other emerging secondary codes (descriptive or analytical) were 
generated during the coding process. 
 
At the end of the process, a computer assisted qualitative software analysis on the 
potential inter-relationships between the different codes was carried out using the 
different techniques offered by the software (please see Annex C for the results of 
qualitative software analysis). In short, this allowed for a quantification of the coding 
and a general exploration of the relationships between the different codes. Different 
levels of exploration were undertaken and core codes (parent nodes) were analysed by 
aggregating the coding data present in the secondary codes (child nodes). These are 
non-inferential methods of analysing the co-occurrence of the different words/codes 
for the variables selected.  Outputs of the analysis present the different degrees of 
correlation between the different codes and the potential rates of association between 
them based on simple coefficients. Pearson correlation coefficients were used in 
analysing the correlations between the codes.25 It must be stressed that the quality of 
the correlations drawn between these factors, using the qualitative software analysis, 
were rather limited. However, the results were useful in order to supplement the main 
qualitative analysis and the insights from the case studies. 
 
                                                             
23  Examples: a) ADM1_Institutional_Capacity > INS_DESIGN_FUNCTION;  
b) POL2_Political_Support > POL_Management_Support. 
24 Examples: a) ADM1_Institutional Capacity > INS_DESIGN_FUNCTION > Institutional 
Centralization; b) POL2_Political Support > POL_Management_Support > Political leadership.  
25 The most significant correlations (> 0.5) are included and discussed in Annex C. 
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Overall, the interview evidence was examined using a mix between a case-oriented and 
a variable-oriented strategy (Miles et al. 2014, 101-102). In order to improve the 
validity of the qualitative findings, several sources of evidence were triangulated (Flick 
2009, 444). Key qualitative data findings were synthesized by corroborating 
information from the primary and secondary sources (Denzin 2001). During the 
empirical analysis, problems signalled in official and secondary documents on EU 
funds were matched with statements from interviews. Interviews were in essence used 
in order to gain a rich understanding and insight on those problems. Similarly to most 
qualitative research, the interview data could in essence provide a snapshot of the 
perceptions of those interviewed and is in essence an already processed interpretation 
of facts. Therefore, disentangling facts from perceptions could be difficult. This was 
addressed by triangulating key findings from the data with official and secondary 
sources. For instance, many official sources emphasized on the problems regarding 
public procurement and the irregularities emerging from these at the level of project 
implementations. More in-depth insights were then retrieved from the interviews in 
order to understand the potential administrative and political issues affecting for 
instance the area of public procurement. Juxtaposing insights from official documents 
with qualitative insights proved a useful avenue for strengthening the validity of the 
findings.   
 
Table 7: Final analysis categories 
 Administrative 
Capacity 
Political 
factors 
Overall absorption 
performance 
Administrative 
capacity 
High / Medium / 
Low 
 Very Strong / Significant / 
Moderate / Weak  
Political factors
  
 Positive /Neutral 
/Negative 
 
Source: Author’s creation.  
 
Finally, the key analytical scope of the empirical analysis has been to scrutinise the 
interaction between administrative capacity and political factors and how could this 
affect, and potentially explain, issues of financial absorption within and between the 
two countries. To achieve this, the analysis sought to qualify the general dynamics and 
the direction of influence of administrative and political factors. This was done at the 
end of each case study. Administrative capacity was assessed as high, medium or low. 
Political factors were assessed by pointing to their positive or negative influence (Table 
7) for the Operational Programmes examined. The overall absorption performance 
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was examined in line with the financial absorption rates of the different Operational 
Programmes and the problems identified during the policy stages and were scrutinised 
as: Very high / Significant / Moderate / Weak. 
 
Specific conclusions were drawn at the end of each case study. The findings were then 
verified in line with theoretical expectations and the specific literature on EU funds 
delivery, in CEECs or the wider literature on EU policy implementation. It was then 
possible to draw more general conclusions on the importance of formal and informal 
conditions and how they could influence the evolution of the financial absorption 
between the two countries. It was against this background, and in line the wider 
hypotheses and initial assumptions (which are assessed extensively in section 8.1.3), 
that the analysis was carried out.  
 
3.5 Methodological limitations of the study  
 
The question of variation in the absorption of EU Structural Funds and the 
implementation of Cohesion Policy within national member states has been addressed 
by researchers using both quantitative and qualitative research tools. To answer the 
main research questions, this study adopted a comparative in-depth case study 
analysis of Bulgaria and Romania and the specific problems they faced in the 
management and implementation of Cohesion Policy. To a certain extent these were 
both outlier and deviant cases (Mahoney and Goertz 2006) in relation to all other EU-
28 member states. Moreover, the two cases were clearly under-researched in the 
literature on CP delivery. The puzzling differences between the two cases provided a 
relevant basis of inquiry. For most of the financial period 2007-2013, Bulgaria had a 
medium to high absorption performance, whilst Romania had one of the lowest, if 
compared to average and in relation to other countries from the region (and especially 
if compared to countries like Lithuania, Estonia and Poland). 
 
There were several trade-offs and methodological limitations that resulted from the 
case selection and research strategy. The first main trade-off was between the 
“breadth” and the “depth” of the analysis, with a clear leaning towards the latter. The 
focus on depth meant that issues of parsimony arose with regard to the analytical 
framework. These were, however, partially addressed in the conclusions, where the 
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most relevant factors are discussed including the two countries, potentially for 
countries from the region as well as on the general governance and delivery of CP.  
 
Second, tensions between validity and reliability appear in studies using qualitative 
methodologies (Denzin 2001). In order to tackle some of these issues, findings were 
discussed with key informants in the area of EU funds management and were 
presented, in several occasions, to academics and policy-makers working on this policy 
area. Moreover, dealing with issues of endogeneity (King et al. 1994, 184-188) and the 
separation between the potential “causes” and “consequences” of the explanatory 
factors (administrative capacity and political factors) was one specific issue that arose 
during the research process. To deal with this, other empirical and theoretical 
uncertainties were reported in concluding sections.  
 
Third, the possibility to discern between the causal mechanisms that generated a 
certain amount of financial absorption within and between these countries were 
limited. As a result, and from an analytical point of view, the focus of this study has 
been on qualifying the formal and informal administrative and political conditions and 
how these could influence the variation in absorption performance. Verifying these 
conditions, and the potential inter-relationships between them, against a strong base 
of qualitative evidence was a useful in order to reflect on the overall significance of the 
factors. Moreover, it was then necessary to isolate the potential effects of political from 
administrative capacity factors. In light of the fact that few primary sources touched 
upon the influence of political factors, the qualitative interviews proved a suitable way 
to gather and reflect on the specific role of political elements.  
 
Last but not least, the thesis has strived in particular for internally valid findings 
plausible for the cases under review. This limited the ability of the study to fully claim 
that its conclusions can be generalizable to the EU-28 member states. However, many 
of these did corroborate insights from several other studies that focused on Cohesion 
Policy governance, and in particular from CEECs. These are addressed more 
extensively in the concluding section. However, it must be stressed that the overall, 
the absorption capacity model did provide an adequate framework to examine issues 
of absorption capacity and performance. The framework could be replicated in other 
cases, particularly where there is already some specific evidence about the influence of 
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political factors on processes of external aid management, and more particularly in 
countries from South and Central and Eastern Europe. The study now proceeds with 
its first empirical chapter which contextualizes administrative capacity and political 
developments relevant for Cohesion Policy and Structural Funds implementation in 
Bulgaria and Romania.    
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Chapter 4: Structural Funds in Bulgaria 
and Romania after accession – historical 
evolution and contextual background 
 
4. Introduction   
 
Prior to their accession into the European Union, Bulgaria and Romania had little 
experience with European structural and regional policy.26 This chapter contextualizes 
the evolution of Cohesion Policy management and implementation in Sofia and 
Bucharest. It surveys the development of administrative capacity and, moreover, the 
general role played by political factors for SF absorption. The analysis is focused on 
the more macro- central-level of government and discusses the evidence in relation to 
the main indicators present in the absorption capacity model. The chapters is followed 
by two distinct and more detailed case studies which examine the management of two 
Operational Programmes: Human Resources Development and Regional 
Development. In light of the findings, this chapter stresses that although 
administrative capacity has been vital component for financial absorption, by itself, it 
is not sufficient to explain the evolution and variation in the general performance of 
the countries studied.  
 
The following chapter draws on the main documentary and interview evidence, as well 
as on some insights from the qualitative software analysis (Annex C). It progresses as 
follows. It first introduces the situation in both Bulgaria and Romania before they 
became member states, and assesses the pre-accession legacies and their impact on 
the early years of CP implementation. It then moves on and presents elements of the 
adoption of Operational Programmes and the accreditation of the management and 
control systems in the two countries. It continues by outlining some of the main 
findings with regard to administrative capacity elements (institutional, bureaucratic, 
human resources and territorial) and political elements (stability, support, 
clientelism), and details the specific role played by the EU in the domestic absorption 
                                                             
26 This was potentially reflected in the long and cumbersome negotiation period for the chapter 21 
(Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments) of the acquis communitaire in both 
countries (Glenn 2004, 13-16). 
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process. Finally, the chapter reflects on these macro-level developments and facilitates 
the transition towards the thematic case studies. 
4.1 European funds during the pre-accession period  
  
Prior to joining the European Union, Bulgaria and Romania benefited financially from 
three main pre-accession instruments: Special Accession Programme for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (SAPARD), Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-
Accession (ISPA) and Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their 
Economies (PHARE). From these, PHARE was one of the most used instruments for 
strengthening the capacity of state institutions to cope with the demanding absorption 
of EU legislation at the domestic level and with other processes regarding accession. 
Through these instruments, the EU provided technical assistance to national 
authorities for public administration and management reforms, and indirectly for 
fighting corruption and promoting the development of civil society.27 It was generally 
hoped that by using expertise exchanges between European public administration 
officials and by providing technical assistance to national institutions, member states 
would be prepared for the obligations of membership, and particularly for the 
management and implementation of Structural Funds. Institution- and capacity-
building was a key priority addressed via pre-accession funding although their impact 
for these purposes was deemed limited (Ecotec 2006). Others were critical of the 
potential impact that pre-accession measures had on public administration reforms 
(Dimitrova 2002) or if they would contribute towards preparing member states for 
Structural Funds (Bailey and De Propris 2004).  
 
During 1999 and 2006, Bulgaria and Romania received €1.2 billion and respectively 
€2.5 billion from the PHARE cash-pot (MWH Consortium 2007, 3). In managing 
these funds, the two countries faced considerable challenges: “weak administrative 
capacity, staff fluctuations, unreformed public administration and political 
interferences in the work of the administration” (Ibid). These were among some of the 
key problems which persisted during the first implementation period for European 
Structural Funds. Despite this, the pre-accession proved important for the 
                                                             
27 For a summary of PHARE objectives see the following: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/33a2_en.htm#4  (accessed January 2017). 
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development of at least an incipient level of capacity within public authorities. In both 
countries, several key institutions and procedures did develop, as early as 1998, and 
most importantly during the accession process. Bulgarian authorities, for instance, 
reported that they did rely on pre-accession funding for establishing the organisational 
and procedural systems that would be later on used for the implementation of 
Operational Programmes, training of staff that would work in Managing Authorities 
and Intermediate Bodies and for the establishment of the Unified Management 
Information System (Council of Ministers of Bulgaria - Improvement of Coordination 
Mechanisms 2006, 4-5). They also used the funds for developing a capacity for 
reporting, monitoring and controlling purposes whilst they equally sought to 
strengthen their ability to carry out financial management and controls and to deal 
with public procurement and on the spot verifications (Ibid.).  
 
Several elements differentiated pre-accession funds from Structural Funds. Firstly, 
during the pre-accession period the European Commission was involved directly in 
the financial management and control of the funding. It carried out extensive ex-ante 
controls from its Delegations in Sofia and Bucharest whilst national institutions 
functioned mainly as implementing bodies. Dozens of detached European 
Commission experts aided national officers with the selection of projects and approval 
for instance of public procurement procedures (MWH 2003). The Delegations ensured 
a strong of level of supervision also by controlling the tendering process (Director in 
Romanian Ministry of EU funds #1; Director in Bulgarian Audit Authority). Overall, 
the Delegations sustained a conditionality driven environment which monitored and 
enforced the extent to which procedures, regarding pre-accession funding, were 
respected by the national authorities. Secondly, the volume of pre-accession funding 
instruments was eight to ten times lower than that of the Structural Funds these 
countries received for the 2007-2013 programming period. In this respect, some 
interviewees argued that pre-accession rules were easier to deal with (Bulgarian 
Expert #1; Bulgarian Municipality EU funds Director #2) or that advance and interim 
payments for projects were more generous (Romanian Auditor #1).  
 
Thirdly, the design and functioning of institutions managing EU funding changed after 
accession. In Bulgaria, the implementation of the PHARE instrument was carried out 
by the National Authorizing Officer and the National Aid Coordinator, both 
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coordinated by Deputy Ministers in the Ministry of Finance. The National Fund, part 
of the same ministry, was in charge with financial management (Bulgarian AA report, 
2008, 2). Several PHARE Implementing Agencies, present in different sectoral 
Ministries (e.g. Labour, Economy, and Regional Development), covered the 
operational and technical aspects of implementation.28  
 
Table 8: Institutional architecture for PHARE funds in Bulgaria and Romania 
 
 
Joint 
Monitoring 
Committees 
(Thematic 
Committees) 
European Commission Delegation European 
Court of 
Auditors 
Coordination: 
-National Fund Directorate / 
National Authorizing Officers 
(Ministries of Finance) 
Financial/Procurement: 
-Central Funds and Contracting 
Unit (CFCU / OPCP) 
 
 
 
National 
Audit 
Offices 
Operational: 
-Programme Authorizing Officer; 
-Implementing Agencies;  
-Units for Programme 
Implementation (Sectoral 
Ministries) 
Payment certification: 
-National Fund (Bulgaria) 
-Payment Authority (Romania) 
 
 
Programme Officers / Project Officers  
Beneficiaries / Contractors 
Source: Adapted from the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Bulgaria, retrieved from 
http://www.minfin.bg/en/page/73 (accessed January 2017). 
 
In Romania, coordination was ensured by the National Authorizing Officer, part of the 
Ministry of Finance, and the National Aid Coordinator, function designated to the 
Ministry of European Integration in 2002.29 Several Implementing Authorities were 
present mainly in the Ministries of Labour, Regional Development and Education. 
However, the bulk of the work was carried out by thematic Units for Programme 
Implementations (UIP). Central Funds and Contracting Unit (CFCU in Bulgaria / 
OPCP in Romania) was entrusted with ex-ante controls and preparing public tenders 
and technical documentation (Operational Programme Technical Assistance Bulgaria 
                                                             
28 More information on pre-accession institutional settings was retrieved from: 
http://www.minfin.bg/en/page/82 (accessed January 2017). 
29 Following Decision no. 869 of 16 August 2002 on Perfecting the activities of the PHARE Units for 
Programme Implementation, retrieved from the Romanian Parliament official website: 
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=37539 (accessed January 2017). 
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2007, 76). Table 8 outlines the basic institutional architecture for the management of 
PHARE funds.   
 
In addition, the Payment Authority was in both countries in charge with the financial 
certification of the expenditure and it guaranteed the legality of the spending towards 
the European Commission. One other important aspect of the pre-accession 
institutional scheme, which disappeared after 2007, was that a “Project Officer” was 
responsible for a project and maintained the interface between the authorities and 
final beneficiaries (EC Head of Sector #1; Head of Romanian North-East Intermediate 
Body). The overall process was audited by the European Court of Auditors and the 
National Audit Offices. The state of implementation was regularly discussed in Joint 
Monitoring Committees which brought together representatives from all the 
institutions involved.  
 
As will be argued in the different case studies, the extent to which expertise was 
transferred from one institution to another proved vital for administrative capacity 
development.30 For instance, some of the above institutions would contribute to the 
proto-structures for the future Managing Authorities and Intermediate Bodies. 
Although some capacity and expertise clearly emerge during the pre-accession period, 
some reports underlined this was in general ignored or weakened by the frequent 
waves of staff turnover (Romanian AA report, 2010 436). Other interviewees argued 
that this expertise was not fit for the specific management of Structural Funds (Former 
Director in Romanian Managing Authority #2; Bulgarian Expert #1) or was 
insufficiently used (EC Head of Sector #1; Director in Romanian Ministry of EU funds 
#1; Bulgarian Expert #2). Structural Funds had their own specific rationale which was 
difficult to internalize, according to interviewees in both countries to adapt to these 
changes:  
“The transition was difficult because of procedures and the practical guides. 
These were different than the procurement law used for instance until then. 
There was the need to develop national procedures and to ensure the shift of 
responsibility from EC to national level. The major change was the strategic 
approach of Structural Funds which needed to achieve objectives. PHARE was 
                                                             
30 The aggregated questionnaire responses for respondents in both countries (N=46) pointed that 
41.3% agreed that capacity has been partially developed during the pre-accession period. Answers 
were more mixed with regard to whether or not the transition from pre- to post-accession funding was 
difficult with 15.2% answering affirmatively and 23.9% answering partially yes. 
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more an instrument to develop capacity, it was a matter of competitive grant 
giving.” (Head of Unit in Bulgarian Managing Authority #2) 
 
Moreover, confusion emerged among staff and both administrators and project 
beneficiaries were still operating in a “Phare” style logic (EC Head of Sector #1). 
Structural Funds required new structures, procedures and newly trained staff. 
Although capacity building measures were taken during the pre-accession period, as 
compared to the 2004 EU entrants, Bulgaria and Romania did not benefit from a first 
a transitory period (2004-2007) during which they could accommodate to Structural 
Funds. As a result, and in light of the administrations being underprepared, the two 
countries faced considerable weaknesses during the first years of the 2007-2013 
implementation period. Moreover, there were specific dysfunctionalities in adopting 
the Operational Programmes and in obtaining the accreditation for the management 
and control systems required to deal with the funding. These wide developments 
characterised the first years of implementation.  
4.2 The adoption of Operational Programmes and the 
development of management and control systems  
 
The 2007-2013 implementation period can be divided in several distinct temporal 
areas. First, negotiations were carried out between the European Commission and the 
member states on the adoption of National Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRF). 
These were the main strategic documents which outlined the general framework that 
included the specific vision, priorities and thematic programmes used for Cohesion 
Policy implementation and for the spending of Structural Funds. The NSRFs were 
developed in consultation with a wider range of national and local stakeholders and in 
line with the CPs principle of partnership. Moreover, priorities were designed in line 
with National Development Plans (NDP) and the Community Strategic Guidelines 
(CSG). Both Bulgarian and Romanian NSRF were adopted in June 2007 (Council of 
Ministers of Bulgaria 2010; Government of Romania 2010). Drawing on these, seven 
similar Operational Programmes (OPs) were then developed in both countries. These 
operationalised the wider objectives into thematic roadmaps funded from the different 
Structural Funds based on which thematic calls for proposals were launched and 
individual projects were selected. In both countries, there were seven core OPs: 
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Transport, Environment, Regional Development, Economic Competitiveness, 
Technical Assistance, Human Resources Development, and Administrative Capacity.  
 
Table 9: Structural Funds absorption rates evolution in Bulgaria and Romania (%) (2007-
2015) (December 2015) 
 Bulgaria – Total allocation: 8 billion31  
(1050 € /capita) 
Romania – Total allocation: 19.6 
billion  
(900 €/capita) 
Years  Contracted 
ratio 
Payment 
ratio to 
beneficiaries 
Final 
payments 
from EC 
Contracted 
ratio 
Payment 
ratio to 
beneficiaries  
Final 
payments 
from EC 
2007 - - - - - - 
2008 - - - - - - 
2009  19.77 2.54 2.11 26 3.1 2.5 
2010 36.91 10.09 10.20 66 8.9 3.5 
2011 65.82 18.77 18.83 74 15.08 5.55 
2012 100.28 35 26.66 77.5 21.85 11.47 
2013 112.54 53.98 49.46 93.30 36.47 26.49 
2014 115.58 76.48 65.45 105.96 52.56 44.89 
2015 106.8 95.30 85.24 110.59 74.31 58.86 
Source: Author’s creation based on data provided by the Bulgarian Government available at: 
http://www.eufunds.bg and by the Romanian Government at: http://www.fonduri-ue.ro/ 
(accessed January 2017). 
 
Most OPs were officially approved by the European Commission throughout 2007 and 
in early 2008. Nevertheless, these delays stalled the general absorption process, as 
illustrated in Table 9, in particular during the first years of implementation. 
 
Second, in parallel to strategic and programming related developments, national 
authorities had to undergo a process of compliance assessment and the national 
management and control systems had to receive accreditation from the EU. The 
former had to demonstrate that they possess: “the programme management capacity, 
national financial control procedures and the pre-requisites for a functional public 
procurement system” (EC 2006a, 5). Moreover, in order to gain the independence 
                                                             
31 The Bulgarian total allocation includes: EU structural and cohesion funds amounting to 6.6 billion 
and national co-financing amounting to 1.4 billion. As opposed the Romanian allocation, 19.2 billion 
only includes the funds allocated by the EU. The total amount of co-financing allocated by the 
Romanian state for CP was not publicly specified. 
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necessary to manage pre-accession funding instruments, managing bodies had to 
apply for a Decentralized Implementation System (DIS) or an Extended Decentralized 
Implementation System (EDIS) status. Bulgarian and Romanian PHARE and ISPA 
managing structures obtained EDIS certification in the summer/autumn of 2007. 
Operating with EDIS standards was seen as an opportunity to gain invaluable 
experience in managing Structural Funds (Nikolova 2008). Moreover, the certification 
was highly regarded by local officials and was seen as a sign of system maturity that 
would help with the shift towards Structural Funds (Former Director of Romanian 
Managing Authority #2).  
 
The strategic approach adopted in the two countries was that each Operational 
Programme would develop its own system. These changes were in line with the “shared 
management” principle governing Structural Funds. This entailed a transfer of 
responsibilities from the European Commission towards the member states (Cace et 
al. 2010). Under the principle, it was the responsibility of national authorities to design 
functional and effective systems. Moreover, in line with Council Regulation No. 
1083/2006, the main legal framework for EU Structural Funds for 2007-2013, 
member states had to officially develop their own management and control systems 
for the funding.32 EU guidelines were in place on the set-up of these systems and the 
compliance assessment was a standardised and legally binding exercise for all Member 
States:  
“Before the submission of the first interim application for payment or at the 
latest within twelve months of the approval of each operational programme, the 
Member States shall submit to the Commission a description of the systems, 
covering in particular the organisation and procedures of: (a) the managing and 
certifying authorities and intermediate bodies; (b) the audit authority and any 
other bodies carrying out audits under its responsibility.” (EC Guidance Note 
on the Compliance Assessment Exercise 2006, 1) 
 
In short, Member States had to provide information to the EU authorities on the 
intended systems, and how they would fulfil several functions – e.g. (a) management 
functions (b) procedures (selection, verification, eligibility rules, public procurement 
and state aid); (c) audit trails and (d) how they plan to deal with irregularities and 
                                                             
32 These are defined as: “The systems put in place to manage and control the assistance granted under 
the Structural Funds that is administered by the Member States. They should ensure the sound 
financial management of the Structural Funds and provide adequate assurance of the correctness, 
regularity and eligibility of the expenditure declarations presented to the Commission” (ECA 2012, 5). 
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recoveries of payments (EC 2012a Annex I, 71-72). In addition, a Certifying Authority 
had to ensure the certification of expenditure, accounting and recoveries (Ibid.). 
Finally, the control function was granted to National Audit Authorities which had to 
be independent and comply with international auditing standards. Audit Authorities 
sent annual control reports to the Commission that would present an overall opinion, 
on the functionality of the management and control system of the Managing bodies, 
based on system and operational audits carried out throughout the year. Added to this, 
each Operational Programme did set up a Monitoring Committee which was chaired 
by the relevant Managing Authority and composed of different stakeholders, which 
would take decisions on and monitor the fulfilment of the objectives of each OP. Last 
but not least, national authorities were required to have a functional information 
system, capable of gathering reliable financial and statistical information on the 
implementation of the 2007-2013 programmes (Regulation 1828/2006 Annex XII, 
114-118).33   
 
Setting up the management and control systems proved to be a difficult task in both 
countries. It was a resource consuming process and national authorities found it 
difficult to provide satisfactory evidence to the EC. The accreditation of the 
management and control systems took place in 2008-2009, several months after the 
official strategic documents were officially approved. According to interviewees, the 
compliance assessment exercise triggered many delays in the implementation of OPs 
and the start of contracting and implementation of individual projects (Director in 
Romanian Audit Authority #1; EC Head of Sector #1). Moreover, an extensive amount 
of time was required for the domestic systems and procedures to develop and become 
functional within the administration (Director in Bulgarian Audit Authority; EC Head 
of Unit #2). All these meant that EU funds reimbursement processes could not be 
easily initiated (Orban 2013, 186). Moreover, this provided an indication of the 
potential lack of readiness of the institutional structures which were involved in the 
absorption process, although this was a characteristic for many other countries from 
and beyond the area (Baun and Marek 2008; EPRC and Metis 2009). 
                                                             
33 All these bodies had to comply with articles 58-62 of Council Regulation 1083/2006. 
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4.3 Administrative capacity developments and Structural 
Funds in Bulgaria and Romania  
 
In parallel with the adoption of the Operational Programmes and the accreditation of 
national management and control systems for EU funding, during the first few years 
Bulgaria and Romania where developing the necessary administrative capacity to 
manage CP and Structural Funds. The issue of institution and capacity building was 
on the countries’ governmental agenda for several years. However, during 2011-12, it 
was clear for the different stakeholders involved in the absorption of EU Structural 
Funds that administrative capacity shortcomings, from both the authorities and the 
beneficiaries’ side, required considerable attention (EC 2010, 5; OSI 2011; IPP 2011; 
EC Hahn letter 2012). Governments were very much aware of these needs and 
emphasized them in the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF): “internal 
coordination and departmental separation of responsibilities; setting up new 
administrative structures at central, district and local level entirely involved in the 
management of EU funds; human resources management policies and relevant 
training; improving project design; good quality technical specifications and tender 
documentation; co-financing; increased efforts in planning and effective 
management” (NSRF BG 2006, 53-57). Similarly, a few years earlier, the Romanian 
Government outlined some of the areas where difficulties were encountered, namely 
in terms of: administrative capacity, planning and programming, task delegation, 
technical assistance, staff turnover, preparation of beneficiaries, project 
implementation and management and control (Romanian NSRF 2007, 78-79). As will 
be outlined in the following, contextualising and developing these capacities, within 
the domestic administration, proved extremely problematic.  
 
In July 2008, one year and a half after accession, Bulgaria did not find itself in a 
favourable position. Authorities in Sofia were severely criticized for EU funds 
mismanagement and allegations of fraud and corruption (Spendzharova and 
Vachudova 2012; Surubaru 2016a). It was ordered to pay back approximately 200 
million EUR from the money it spent during the pre-accession period (EUobserver, 22 
November 2008). An EC report read that the “high level corruption and organised 
crime exacerbates these problems of general weakness in administrative and judicial 
capacity” (EC 2008a, 10). The events in 2008 came as a shock to the political 
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establishment and proved to be an important turning point for the Bulgarian 
authorities. After these, to Bulgarian government adopted several measures that 
sought to facilitate and improve levels of control for the implementation of EU 
funding. Some of these politically backed measures, starting with the Stanishev and 
continued by the Borisov government, would enable the development of more 
functional management and control systems. As part of these measures the systems 
and procedures of Bulgarian Managing Authorities were enhanced (EC Head of Unit 
#2) along with the control systems of the Bulgarian Audit Authority (Bulgarian 
Auditor #1).  
 
Romania, on the other hand, was much more praised for the way it managed its pre-
accession instruments. Despite this it also faced considerable criticism regarding 
potential issues of corruption and politicisation (BBC 23 July 2008). Following several 
in-depth European audits, several core problems were revealed, during 2010-2011, 
with regard to the functioning of the recently approved management and control 
systems (Former Romanian EU Affairs Minister; Romanian Director in Audit 
Authority #1). Moreover, during the same period several Operational Programmes 
were suspended, after extremely high error rates were found following external audits 
(Pop 2012; Dimulescu et. al. 2013). Following these, a formal set of measures known 
as the “Plan for Priority Measures for consolidating the absorption capacity of 
Structural and Cohesion Funds” (PMP) was agreed between the European 
Commission and the then Boc Government. The plan sought to strengthen seven 
different areas:  
(a) Project management cycles for Operational Programmes;  
(b) Financial management of Operational Programmes and projects;  
(c) Public procurement;  
(d) Audit and control activities;  
(e) The influence of external institutions and procedures over the evaluation, 
contracting and implementation of projects;  
(f) Ensuring adequate administrative capacity for the institutions responsible 
for implementing Operational Programmes;  
(g) The capacity and responsibility of beneficiaries.  
(Romanian Ministry of European Funds, 5 April 2012) 
 
These measures provide a valuable assessment of the most problematic areas where 
measures were necessary in order to address shortcomings in the management and 
implementation of the funding. Following pressure from Brussels, both the Bulgarian 
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and Romanian Government sought to address more comprehensively their problems 
concerning administrative capacity and the absorption of SF. Apart from some of the 
above contextual differences, an important variation developed within and between 
the two countries with regard to the management and implementation of funding. 
These reflected not only changes in institutional settings, but also political choices and 
the level of commitment invested in them. The following sections will discuss these 
developments in more detail, outlining some of the similarities and differences found 
with regard to the administrative capacity of the two countries.  
 
Institutional capacity 
 
During their first years of existence, the Managing and Control institutions responsible 
for EU Structural Funds underwent both a development and a learning process. The 
institutions responsible for the management of EU funding evolved and changed in 
line with the needs and political preferences. Institutional capacity was examined in 
this study by looking at issues of institutional design, coordination and accountability 
for the management of EU Structural Funds.  
 
First, in terms of institutional design, for the 2007-2013 implementation, Bulgaria 
adopted a rather centralized management system, in which the Central Coordination 
Unit, initially part of the Ministry of Finance and later incorporated in the Council of 
Ministers, would ensure the horizontal coordination of the funding and assist the 
Managing Authorities. Romania initially opted for a semi-centralized system where, 
during its first years, the Authority for Coordination of Structural Instruments (ACIS), 
situated in the Ministry of Finance, contributed to the activity of the different 
Managing Authorities. In both countries, each Operational Programme had its own 
Managing Authority, included in different thematic line Ministries in accordance with 
their sectoral expertise. MAs were assisted at the central and/or regional level by 
different specialized bodies - Intermediate Bodies (IBs). In parallel, as part of the 
certification and control functions two other key institutions developed. The Certifying 
Authorities (CAs) were part of the Ministries of Finance and were responsible for 
verifying and certifying payments made to beneficiaries and for the reimbursement 
claims sent to the European Commission. The Romanian Certifying Authority, for 
instance, was designated through Government Ordinance 457/2008 and had to ensure 
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all accounting related matters, pre-financing, intermediate and final payments 
regarding the programme (Romanian Audit Authority report 2009, 372). Lastly, the 
Audit Authorities (AAs), part of the National Audit Courts, were in charge with 
auditing projects and ensuring the functionality of management and control systems. 
They oversaw the legality and regularity of the expenditure made with EU funding 
(Romanian AA report 2010). These institutional arrangements are briefly sketched 
below.  
 
Figure 6: Institutional design for Structural Funds (2007-2013) 
 
 
Source: Author’s creation, using NVIVO 10 
 
It took both countries several years to establish functional institutional systems for the 
management of EU funds. Several important aspects resulted from the analysis in 
terms of institutional design. The Bulgarian centralized approach seemed to provide 
more stability to the system as compared to the Romanian one. The Bulgarian Central 
Coordination Unit (CCU) acted since the beginning as the main institutional 
coordinator for the national EU funds absorption process. The CCU grew under the 
mandate of Meglena Plugchieva (2008-2009) and was included in the Council of 
Ministers secretariat (Council of Ministers of Bulgaria 2009, 23). The CCUs role was 
strengthened under the mandate of Tomislav Donchev (2010-2013) who used it as his 
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main administrative secretariat. Donchev adopted several key measures that 
substantially improved different aspects of the national management and 
coordination process.34 
 
By contrast, the Romanian Central Coordination Unit (ACIS), part of the Ministry of 
Finance between 2007 and 2011, suffered from a lack of institutional and political 
legitimacy. Following the adoption of the Priority Measure Plan (PMP), a process of 
institutional centralisation developed with the ACIS being moved under the authority 
of the Prime Minister (Romanian Parliamentary Interpellation Pâslaru, 11.05.2011). 
Moreover, following formal suggestions from Brussels (and interestingly enough 
following the institutional model adopted in Bulgaria), a Romanian Ministry of 
European Affairs (MAEur) was established in the fall of 2011. Several months’ later 
part of it transformed into the Ministry of European Funds (MFE) and was entrusted 
the national coordination for EU funds (Government of Romania 2013, 6). The MFE 
initiated a process of institutional centralisation for the management of EU funds 
which culminated in several Managing Authorities being incorporated into its 
structure.35 Nevertheless, the frequent institutional changes, and the deficiencies in 
the architecture of the management and control systems used for EU funds, were 
particularly problematic for the absorption process in Romania (DG Regio AAR 2011, 
6). 
 
Inter- and intra-ministerial coordination between the bodies managing EU funds was 
highly deficient in the first years of implementation (Nikolova 2008; Susanu 2008; 
Zaman and Georgescu 2009; Bloom and Petrova 2013). Several interviewees stressed 
that a lack of cooperation between the different MAs and the negative impact that this 
had on dealing, for instance, with joint central level EU-funded projects (Bulgarian 
Expert #1; Romanian MA Programme Evaluation Officer #1). At the same time, the 
high number of Intermediate Bodies (IBs), 32 in Romania36, as compared to only 11 in 
                                                             
34 Bulgarian Structural Funds Portal, Press Release 1 September 2011, [Tomislav Donchev: For the 
past year and a half the absorption rate of EU funds has increased five times], available at: 
https://www.eufunds.bg/en/eufunds/item/7082 (accessed December 2016). 
35 Mediafax.ro, 26 February 2014, [The Ministry of European Funds takes over the Managing 
Authorities for POSDRU (Human Resources) and POS CCE (Economic Competitiveness) ], available 
at: http://www.mediafax.ro/economic/ministerul-fondurilor-europene-preia-autoritatile-de-
management-pentru-posdru-si-pos-cce-12155260 (accessed December 2016). 
36 In December 2013, several Romanian IBs were active: 
-8 for Environment OP (Regional NUTS II level – Eight Environmental Agencies)  
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Bulgaria37, made coordination a particularly difficult task (Government of Romania 
2013, 44). The lack of coordination between often lead to differences in interpretation 
or application of procedures, which resulted in the mismanagement of the funds and 
in conflicting levels of authority (Romanian Expert #1). Moreover, conflicts were noted 
between different MAs and IBs (e.g. Romanian Human Resources and Economic 
Competitiveness; Bulgarian Human Resources and Environment). However, some 
Bulgarian interviewees suggested that institutional conflicts were addressed earlier in 
the process (Bulgarian EU funds consultant #1; Bulgarian Certifying Authority 
Representative #1). In Romania, however, serious tensions were present throughout 
the implementation period between the Managing Authorities and the Audit Authority 
and were generated by disagreements on issues of financial corrections. As a result, a 
high degree of mistrust developed between several Romanian Managing Authorities 
and the Audit Authority, questioning the latter’s’ legitimacy (Director General of 
Romanian Ministry #1; Bulgarian Auditor #1; Former Director of Romanian Managing 
Authority #2). AA representatives stressed that it was their role to ensure the 
functionality of the management and control systems and the correctness of the 
spending, despite this meaning that it antagonized other institutions (Romanian 
Director in Audit Authority #1). 
 
Finally, with regard to institutional accountability, one of the potential side effects 
stemming from the lack of experience was the lack institutional openness and 
communication. Severe issues of transparency did affect the different Operational 
Programmes and Managing Authorities and the general relationship between the 
different stakeholders involved with EU funds (Zaman and Georgescu 2009, 11; SAR 
2011; Hristova 2012). During the first years of implementation, Managing Authorities 
                                                             
-9 for Regional OP (Regional NUTS II level – Eight Regional Development Agencies plus one Central 
level – Tourism Agency) 
-11 for Human Resources OP (Eight Regional NUTS II level offices plus three Central level – Ministry 
of Education, Centre for National Development of Professional and Technical Teaching and the 
National Employment Agency) 
-4 for the Economic Competitiveness (Central level: Ministry of Economy for SMEs; Ministry of 
Education for Research; Ministry of Communications and Technology for ICT; Ministry of Economy 
for Energy Efficiency) 
37 In December 2013, several Bulgarian IBs were active:  
-1 for Environment OP (Central level: Agency)  
-6 for Regional OP (Regional NUTS II level, legally they were Departments of the MA) 
-3 IBs for Human Resources OP (Central level: Ministry of  Education, Social Protection Agency and 
Employment Agency) 
-1 IB for Economic Competitiveness OP (Central level: Department for Technology, Development and 
Innovation). 
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and Intermediate Bodies seemed completely opaque and were not very transparent in 
relation to beneficiaries (Bulgarian EU funds consultant #1; Romanian Civil Society 
Leader #1). These institutions also adjusted to situations arising from the ground and 
managed to develop a style of communication and interaction with their main clients, 
namely EU funds beneficiaries. Several interviewees underlined that a gradual shift 
took place with many of these bodies improving their records in terms of transparency 
and communication in recent years (Bulgarian Municipality EU funds Director #2; 
State Secretary in Romanian Ministry of EU funds). 
 
Overall, at the central governmental level, issue of institutional design (ADM1a) were 
particularly important and provided a potential advantage to the Bulgarian 
authorities. The institutional set-up adopted by authorities in Sofia seems to have been 
more functional, and the Central Coordination Unit, played an important role in the 
coordination process of the different authorities involved in the absorption process. 
By contrast, the Romanian institutional design was highly intricate and changed 
several times which added to the overall complexity and delays in managing the funds. 
Moreover, the Romanian (ACIS) was relatively ineffective during the first years of EU 
funds implementation and the numerous conflicts between the Audit Authority and 
Managing Authorities contributed to various other issues. Institutional coordination 
and accountability remained problematic in both countries, although some progress 
has been noted on these dimensions, by both national and EU representatives, in the 
last few years (Council of Ministers of Bulgaria 2013; DG Regio AAR 2014). Other more 
specific issues concerning institutional capacity will be discussed within the thematic 
case studies.  
 
Bureaucratic capacity 
 
The development and evolution of the different institutions was important for the 
absorption process and for the general management of the funding. However, the 
general legislation, rules and specific procedures animated those institutions and 
provided the link between how funds were managed at the central level and how they 
were implemented at the local level. In this respect, rules and procedures represent 
the linchpin between the different actors during the process. Bureaucratic capacity is 
broadly understood here as the degree to which member states have the necessary 
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bureaucratic, procedural and legal capacity to manage the absorption process. Data 
has been gathered in this thesis with regard to the existence and stability of legislation, 
procedures and administrative templates by managing bodies, the use of project 
management methodologies and electronic management systems, and the complexity 
and administrative burdens of two particular stages of the absorption process: the 
selection of projects and the verification / monitoring of their implementation.    
 
In parallel to developing an institutional architecture for the management of funds, 
specific legal rules and procedures had to be crafted for the implementation of 
Operational Programmes. These included primary legislation38 or secondary 
legislation (e.g. public procurement law), eligibility rules and the different frameworks 
regarding calls for proposals, applicants’ guides, application or financial 
reimbursement forms. Several problems arose with regard to these rules and which 
latter on had an impact on the implementation of the funds. In general, there were 
problems with the coherence of the legislation due its frequent changes (KPMG 
OPHR-RO Interim Evaluation 2011, 232). One example came from Bulgaria where, 
after 2010, there was a need to update the primary legislation (e.g. Decision of the 
Council of Ministers of Bulgaria No 965/ 16.12.2005) on the establishment of the 
Central Coordination Unit, Managing Authorities and Intermediate Bodies that were 
used to manage the funds at the national level. Although a legislative project had been 
discussed for over two years it failed to go through the Council of Ministers and the 
Parliament, when the government changed in 2013. Interviewees pointed to political 
reasons behind the failure of this legislative project (Former Director of Bulgarian 
Managing Authority #2). In essence, as pointed out in several sources achieving a 
harmonized set of rules was a highly difficult task (Council of Ministers of Bulgaria 
2009, 26-28; Government of Romania 2010, 70). These were explained by one official 
in the following manner: “The short circuit occurred at the level of interpreting 
national legislation, which should have run in parallel and support with the 
implementation of funds” (Director General of Romanian Ministry #1).  
 
 
                                                             
38 Legislation in both countries was highly dense and subject to continuous changes throughout the 
2007-2013 implementation period. An overview of legislation can be accessed for Bulgaria here: 
https://www.eufunds.bg/normativna-baza-2/natzionalno-zakonodatelstvo and for Romania here: 
http://www.fonduri-ue.ro/legislatie-nationala#asistență-nerambursabilă (accessed January 2016).   
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Second, there were many gaps in terms of secondary legislation for different sectors 
(e.g. environment, transport, social policy) in which EU funds could be used. For 
instance, in Romania the lack of legislation for social enterprises made it difficult for 
human resources funding schemes to be implemented (Romanian Civil Society Leader 
#2; Romanian EU funds consultant #3). Moreover, operational rules and documents 
for accessing funding schemes (e.g. applicant’s guides, application forms) were 
developed at the central level, with little input from potential beneficiaries, despite 
formal proceedings on the application of the EU’s partnership principle, which entails 
extensive consultations on the above with various stakeholders (Romanian Expert #1; 
Head of Unit of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). Finally, implementing horizontal 
rules (e.g. equal opportunities) was also a difficult task for these administrations 
(Zaman and Cristea 2011). An extremely high number of implementation instructions 
and corrigenda modified day-to-day rules used for EU-funded projects. This generated 
a “changing the rules during the game” phenomena in which measures that sought to 
correct breaches in the system led to many other unforeseen situations (Romanian 
Civil Society Leader #1; Romanian EU Funds Consultant #3). Overall, it seems that 
authorities in Sofia were much faster in starting to introduce standardised 
administrative documents and templates (Council of Ministers of Bulgaria 2009, 26). 
 
Third, by 2009-2010, many of the EU-funded projects under contract had to organise 
different tender procedures. As will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 7, public 
procurement was a highly problematic area in both countries, and the source of most 
irregularities regarding EU funding implementation (CSD 2009; IPP 2014). 
Procurement legislation was changed very often and several Bulgarian and Romanian 
beneficiaries and stakeholders criticised these developments (Bulgarian Consultant 
EU Funds #1; Bulgarian Municipality EU funds Director #1; Director in Romanian 
Ministry of EU funds #1). However, Bulgarian authorities may have profited from the 
fact that they also could use “the most economically advantageous offer” awarding 
criteria for tender contracts, whereas Romanian Contracting Authorities were mainly 
limited to the “lowest price” principle, which had a strong negative effect on carrying 
out procurement procedures. 
 
In addition, and in line with EU regulations for Structural Funds, each country 
required a functional information systems for the management of EU funds. From the 
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evidence gathered, it seems that these systems were much more functional in Bulgaria 
(UMIS) than in Romania (SMIS). The Romanian SMIS was criticised by several 
stakeholders for being highly deficient in reporting data, fragmented and generated 
numerous errors (EC Policy Officer for administrative capacity #1; Romanian MA 
Programme Evaluation Officer #2). With regard to the use of project management 
methodologies, it was up to the different Managing Authorities / Intermediate Bodies 
to develop more specific methodologies, although general procedure manuals were 
provided from Central Coordination Units. Moreover, on the ground 68.2% Bulgarian 
respondents of the questionnaire acknowledged that they use such methodologies 
whilst only 29.2% Romanian respondents argued they do so. Using such project 
management tools could have a positive impact for structuring the different 
management functions and practices within these institutions.  
 
One final aspect analysed was the level of bureaucratic control exerted by the 
managing bodies in relation to EU funds beneficiaries. A high level of administrative 
burden characterised the first years of implementation and had a negative impact for 
the overall absorption process. Beneficiaries frequently complained about the 
excessive and burdensome rules and procedures they dealt with in order to access and 
implement EU-funded projects (Berica, 2010; Hristova Kurzydlowski, 2013; Jaliu and 
Radulescu, 2013). All institutions involved in the process were often criticized for 
enforcing a cycle of administrative over-controls which were extremely demanding, 
especially in terms of reporting and on the ground verifications (KPMG et al. 2011, 13). 
What is more, the focus on the process meant that authorities tended to “gold plate” 
namely to “put in place a number of intricate [procurement] regulations, rules and 
procedures of a more restrictive and demanding nature than those contained in 
relevant EU financial regulations” (KPMG et al. 2011, 72). As explained by several 
interviewees, one major consequence from this tendency to over-regulate was that 
authorities paid much more attention to administrative processes and developed a 
potential “tick box” culture, which diminished considerably the focus on the results of 
projects (Bulgarian Head of Unit of Managing Authority #1; Romanian EU funds 
Consultant #2; Romanian Civil Society Leader #1). The fact that national bodies 
enforced higher levels of control, by applying stricter measures of control, than those 
required from the EU level, reflected the lack of experience of the different national 
bodies involved in managing EU funding, as well as the poor levels of trust between 
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the different stakeholders involved in the process. Furthermore, the frequent changes 
of rules and procedures and the tendency to over-regulate and maintain a high level of 
controls had a strong impact on the capacity of all the different actors involved in EU 
funds management, as well as on the human resources capacity of managing and 
control institutions.   
 
Human resources capacity 
 
Human resources are an essential component, possibly the most constitutive, for the 
administrative capacity required by these countries’ to manage and implement EU 
funding. Human resources capacity was widely examined in this study as the degree 
to which the institutions possess the necessary relevant HR (numbers; specialization; 
training and incentives) to manage the absorption process. At the same time, it refers 
to the influence that different external actors’ (EU funds beneficiaries / consultants) 
have exerted on the process. In terms of staff numbers, in 2014, from the data gathered 
there were approximately 1200 employees working in managing and control 
institutions in Bulgaria and approximately 2800 in Romania (Table 10). Moreover, by 
December 2014, there were approximately six thousand private and public EU funds 
beneficiaries in Bulgaria and nine thousand in Romania respectively.  
 
Developing, perfecting and retaining staff working in EU funds management bodies 
proved to be an intricate task. Firstly, the shift from pre-accession to post-accession 
has been particularly problematic in ensuring a stable HR basis. Prior to accession, no 
concrete calculations were made on the number of administrators required to manage 
the different Operational Programmes. By 2010, different official reports emphasized 
that most managing bodies, as well as beneficiaries, did not allocate sufficient staff to 
handle workloads (EC Strategic Report 2010). Staff turnover proved to be one of the 
major determinants of system instability. Two big waves of staff turnover affected the 
institutions. The first occurred in 2006-2007 when many of the experts working on 
EU funds in the two countries transferred to Brussels to work for different EU 
institutions (EC Head of Sector #1). The second took place in 2009-2011 and when 
many staff that accumulated expertise in managing institutions chose to work in the 
private sector mainly on consultancy. As a result of the austerity policies pursued by 
the Romanian Boc government, there were budgetary cuts that applied also to staff 
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working on the management of EU funding. According to some, this had strong 
consequences for the motivation of staff working in the system (Romanian MA 
Programme Evaluation Officer #2; Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2).  
 
Table 10: Estimated number of staff working on Structural Funds in Bulgaria/Romania 
(2007-2013)  
 Bulgaria Romania 
Monitoring 
Committees  
7 Monitoring Committees (1 per OP) 
with 25-50 appointed members  
 
7 Monitoring Committees (1 per OP) with 
25-50 appointed members 
Central 
Coordination 
Units 
Bulgarian Central Coordination Unit 
(Council of Ministers): 60  
Ministry of European Funds: 291 
 
Managing 
Authorities 
(MA) 
 
MA Transport: 45 
MA Environment: 56 
MA Regional Development:  60 
MA Economic Competitiveness: 160 
MA Human Resources: 120 
MA Administrative Capacity: 44 
MA Technical Assistance: 18 
 
MA Transport: 106 
MA Environment: 140 
MA Regional Development: 182 
MA Economic Competitiveness: 105 
MA Human Resources: 69 
MA Administrative Capacity: 77 
MA Technical Assistance: 20 
Intermediate 
Bodies (IB) 
 
-1 central IB for Environment OP: 76 
-6 regional IBs for Regional 
Development OP: 90 
-1 central IB for Economic 
Competitiveness OP: 78 
-3 central IBs for Human Resources OP: 
a) Social Protection Agency IB:  60 
b) Employment Agency IB: 100  
c) Education Ministry IB: 100 
 
-8 regional IBs for OP Environment: 129 
-IBs for Regional Development OP: 
a) 8 Regional Development Agencies: 400  
b) 1 central IB (Tourism): 36  
-IBs for Economic Competitiveness OP:  
a) 8 Regional Development Agencies: 160   
b) 3 central IBs: 153 
-IBs for Human Resources OP: 
a) 8 regional IBs: 325 
b) 3 central IBs: 212 
Certifying 
Authority 
60 82 
Audit Authority 50 220 
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Public 
Procurement 
Agency 
75 96 
Total staff 1192 (approx. 1200) 2803 (approx. 2800) 
 
 
Number of final beneficiaries and projects 
Beneficiaries 5889 8887 
Total no. of 
projects 
contracted  
9441 15211 
Source: Author’s creation and Surubaru 2016a, Appendix C. Table based on data collected by 
the author. Staff numbers are accurate for Bulgaria for June 2014 and for September 2014 in 
Romania’s case. Additional staffing data was provided by the Romanian Ministry of European 
Funds. The table does not include staff working on cross-border cooperation programmes. The 
data on the number of beneficiaries and projects is accurate for December 2014 and was 
retrieved for Bulgaria from: http://umispublic.government.bg and for Romania from: 
http://data.gov.ro/dataset/informatii-derulare-fonduri-europene-smis  
 
 
In addition, a recent comparative report that examined staff wages and fluctuations in 
Managing bodies dealing with the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 
Europe, noted that Romania had a much higher rate of staff turnover than Bulgaria 
and could reach as high as 47% for the Romanian Economic Competitiveness OP 
(Metis 2014, 59-61). Moreover, Bulgarian authorities seem to have had a higher 
efficiency of staff to projects ratio in the different Operational Programmes examined, 
namely allocating more staff per number of project than in Romania. 
 
 
Second, the quality and expertise of staff might have been conducive to a higher 
capacity for both management and control bodies, as well as for other actors such as 
beneficiaries. In general, the quality of staff was perceived as more important than 
staff numbers (EC Head of Unit #1; Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority 
#2). In general, interviewees characterized the expertise of their colleagues as being 
mainly reasonable or good. There were some interesting differences signalled in the 
questionnaire. For instance, 63.6% Bulgarian respondents argued that the quality of 
staff working in managing and control institutions was good, whereas 41.7% of 
Romanian respondents argued the same. Nevertheless, different other external 
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stakeholders interviewed were more critical of the expertise of EU funds 
administrators (Bulgarian Expert #1; Romanian Expert #2).  
 
Training was essential for expertise formation.39 Most official reports illustrate the 
importance and the number of training sessions undertaken for staff working in 
managing and control institutions and for beneficiaries situated at both the central 
and local level (Council of Ministers of Bulgaria 2009, 17; Bulgarian Parliament 2011, 
17; Government of Romania 2013, 104). Many irregularities were down to staff with 
insufficient expertise and from a lack of training and adequate working conditions 
(Constantin 2006; Vant 2012). In several instances, both staff and beneficiaries 
interviewed criticised the quality of the training offered describing it as inadequate 
and excessively focused on soft skills (Romanian MA Programme Evaluation Officer 
#2; Bulgarian EU funds consultant #1; Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). 
Furthermore, it was difficult for institutions to hire staff that would fit the diverse 
range of functions required (e.g. programming, verification or evaluation) or the areas 
of specialty required (legal, financial and technical). This meant that a consistent 
amount of staff had to be trained on the job (EC Head of Sector #1; Director of 
Romanian Managing Authority #2). There have been instances in which the technical 
expertise required for many projects has been hard to find due to structural factors 
such as for the limited pool of, for instance, engineers in the environmental (Bulgarian 
expert #1) or in the transport sector (Romanian MA Programme Evaluation Officer 
#3). All these added a great deal of pressure on the work of managing and control 
bodies, particularly during the first years of implementation.  
 
With regard to financial and professional incentives, the evidence gathered indicated 
several specific issues. Firstly, salary rates and costs for staff also seemed to be much 
higher in Bulgaria than in Romania (Metis 2014, 32). Secondly, during the first few 
years of implementation there were many discrepancies between the managing and 
control institutions at both the central and local level. At the central level, there were 
strong differences between the Managing Authorities / Intermediate Bodies and 
between the Certifying and Audit Authority as well as in relation to the regular staff of 
                                                             
39 There were some notable differences in this area with half of Bulgarian questionnaire respondents 
considered they received sufficient training whilst only a quarter of Romanian respondents stating the 
same.  
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the host ministries.40 Second, there were strong differences in terms of salaries 
between and within the Managing Authorities and Intermediate Bodies. This was the 
case given that salaries were tied to the salary base of the ministry in which these 
bodies were based. The discrepancies between these salary bases, as well as the 25% 
salary cuts implemented by the Boc Government, had an extremely negative impact 
on staff motivation (Georgescu 2008; Surubaru 2016a). Finally, technical assistance 
funds were used better, and faster, by the Bulgarian authorities. By contrast, at the end 
of 2012, the Romanian authorities only managed to use 22.3% of their allocated 
technical assistance funding (Romanian AA report 2012, 387). These funds are 
generally used for capacity building mainly by the official institutions involved in the 
process and were used to pay salaries for staff working on EU funds in Bulgaria. For 
several years, Romanian authorities mainly used these funds for salary top-ups and 
bonuses. Several measures were adopted by the newly formed Romanian Ministry of 
European Affairs starting with 2013 and following a political decision in 2014, salaries 
and payments for staff working on EU funds were standardised.41 
 
Similar problems could be identified at the local level. For instance, due to legal 
restrictions in place, beneficiaries working in City Halls could only be paid a limited or 
a capped amount of funding for their work on EU-funded projects (Romanian 
Parliamentary Interpellation Odon, 19.06.2013; Sofia Municipality EU funds Expert 
#1; Bulgarian Municipality EU funds Director #2; Former Director of Romanian 
Intermediate Body #1). As bluntly emphasized by one interviewee: “How can you 
expect someone at the city hall in Dorohoi (Northern Romania) that earns 150 EUR a 
month to sign a 5 million EUR contract?” (Director in Romanian Audit Authority #1). 
Low salaries were pointed out as a major source of frustration, leading to poor results 
in implementation, particularly from public beneficiaries (Romanian EU funds public 
beneficiary #1; Sofia Municipality EU funds expert #1). All these generated problems 
of motivation among central or local public beneficiaries and challenged their 
                                                             
40 As explained elsewhere (Surubaru 2016b), there were several problems generated by the general 
administrative embeddedness of managing and control institutions and their link with their hosts. 
One general issue was that there were tensions between regular staff working in those ministries and 
the EU funding staff, whose remuneration was much higher (Bulgarian AA report 2008, 20).   
41 Agerpres.ro, 03 November 2014, [Brussels: Commissioner Creţu and minister Teodorovici 
announce changes to the operational programme Technical Assistance 2007-2013], available at: 
http://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2014/11/03/bruxelles-comisarul-cretu-si-ministrul-teodorovici-
anunta-modificari-in-programul-operational-asistenta-tehnica-2007-2013-20-18-23 (accessed 
September 2015). 
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commitment and willingness to be accountable in the use of EU funding, facilitating 
illicit practices and conflicts of interest. 
 
The role of two other stakeholders (consultancies and beneficiaries), often neglected 
in analyses of administrative capacity, proved very significant in particular with regard 
to the implementation of Structural Funds. Firstly, a significant number of 
consultancies emerged after 2006-2007 providing services relating to EU-funded 
projects. This sector peaked in size around 2010-2011 and profited from the project 
applicants’ and beneficiaries’ needs. There were many accounts of the negative role 
played by consultancies. For instance, consultants lacked capacity themselves and did 
not have the ability to properly guide clients, in particular on procedures regarding 
public procurement (PwC 2016 – Romania country profile, 182). Other consultants 
were in fact ill prepared and often encouraged illegal means to obtain funding, made 
use of “copy-pasted project templates” or acted as intermediaries between funding 
applicants and corrupt officials or politicians (Bulgarian Academic #1, Bulgarian Head 
of Unit of Managing Authority #1; Romanian EU funds consultant #1). Nevertheless, 
several more professional consultancies emerged which made a rather more positive 
contribution to the absorption process (Bulgarian EU funds consultant #1; Romanian 
EU funds consultant #1).   
 
Secondly, beneficiaries had an important say for the general financial absorption 
performance of a country. They were the primary users of funds and could destabilize 
the general absorption process (as will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 7). 
Beneficiaries were either public (ministries, city halls, schools, hospitals) or private. 
During the first years SF implementation, different categories of beneficiaries suffered 
from a chronic lack of administrative capacity, especially in small and medium-sized 
municipalities or in local NGOs (Bulgarian Parliament 2011; Expert Evaluation 
Network Romania 2012).42 Moreover, it was recognized that beneficiaries were among 
the most neglected in capacity development exercises and that, for instance, PHARE 
funds had a limited effect on the development of capacity within the ranks of potential 
                                                             
42 For instance, an UNDP evaluation found important contrasts between the levels of expertise of 
municipalities in Bulgaria. In 2006, only 40% of municipalities had trained staff in the area of 
Structural Funds (Marinov and Garnizov 2006, 5). Moreover, the weakest or underprepared local 
actors tended to be municipalities with a population below ten thousand, which make for 38% of the 
total number of Bulgarian municipalities (2006, 22). 
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beneficiaries (EC 2006b). In addition, many beneficiaries lacked the necessary 
financial capacity or specialized expertise to deal, for example, with specialised areas 
such as public procurement (Representative of the Bulgarian National Association of 
Municipalities). Most audit and annual implementation reports, as well as several 
interviewees, noted that technical assistance funds were used to improve the capacity 
of beneficiaries (Bulgarian Technical Assistance MA expert #1; State Secretary in 
Romanian Ministry of EU funds). Nevertheless, strengthening the ability of 
beneficiaries to deal with EU funding was a long and difficult process. Moreover, the 
relationship between beneficiaries and public authorities seems to have evolved, 
following a few difficult years of cooperation. The way in which administrative capacity 
developed at the territorial level was an important step in this direction, equally 
relevant for both the authorities and EU funds beneficiaries.  
 
Territorial capacity 
 
The issue of territoriality in national and European politics has been a long standing 
subject of debate. In implementing EU policies, each country is influenced by its own 
territorial configurations and regional governance traditions. Equally, these can have 
important practical consequences for the governance of EU funding. In this study, 
territorial capacity was broadly defined as the degree to which regional / local 
structures and actors have the capacity and are involved in the different stages of the 
absorption process. Evidence was gathered on the possible effects of decentralization 
/ centralization and on the different governmental tiers and their ability to cope with 
the requirements of the absorption process. Before outlining some of the main 
contextual findings, some background information on the two countries is presented 
in the following. 
Both Bulgaria and Romania are unitary and highly centralized states, in which sub-
national autonomy is moderate to low (Loughlin, Hendriks, and Lidström 2012) and 
regional authority is rather limited (Hooghe et al. 2010, 262-266). Bulgaria is divided 
in 28 districts (Oblasti) which contain 264 municipalities (Obshtini) (NUTS 3 level) 
and 5047 villages and communes (Bulgarian Census 201143; Nikolova 2011). Romania 
is divided in 41 counties (Judeţe) (NUTS 3 level) and the capital city of Bucharest, as 
                                                             
43 Data available at: http://www.nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Census2011final_en.pdf (accessed 
January 2017). 
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well as 320 cities and towns and 2856 communes and 12955 villages (Dobre 2011, 
695). Local administrations have only some limited competences with regard to local 
property management, infrastructure and transport, healthcare, education and 
culture (Nikolova 2011; Dobre 2011). With all this, most local authorities are 
dependent on state budget transfers and, for instance, in Romania only 22.7% of local 
communes were considered to be financially independent (Expert Forum 2014, 35). 
Furthermore, prior to accession most local administrative and territorial units lacked 
the necessary expertise and resources to access and manage EU funding (Marin 2006; 
Marinov and Garnizov 2006; Vincellete and Vassileva 2006).   
 
Since 1989, different processes of decentralisation have been initiated albeit these 
were rather rhetorical and limited in scope, with most policy areas being subject to 
firm control from Sofia and Bucharest. However, during the pre-accession, in line with 
territorial developments taking place at the EU level, several NUTS 2 regions were 
designed for both countries. The Bulgarian Regional Development Act 1999 enshrined 
six different NUTS 2 regions: Severozapaden (North-West), Severen tsentralen 
(Centre-North), Severoiztochen (North-East), Yugoiztochen (South-East), 
Yugozapeden (South-West), Yuzhen tsentralen (South-Centre). Similarly, in 1998, 
Romania developed eight development regions: Nord-Vest (North-West), Centru 
(Centre), Nord-Est (North-East), Sud-Est (South-East), Sud-Muntenia (South-
Muntenia), Bucureşti-Ilfov (Bucharest-Ilfov), Sud-Vest Oltenia (South-West Oltenia), 
Vest (West). During the 2007-2013 implementation period, all Bulgarian and 
Romanian NUTS 2 regions were qualified as “convergence regions”, namely as areas 
with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita less than 75% of the EU average. 
Unlike Polish NUTS II regions, which were created on the basis of significant regional 
reforms, Bulgarian and Romanian regions were only “artificially created” and mainly 
for policy and statistical purposes (O’Dwyer 2006; Yanakiev 2010; Dobre 2011; 
Mihăilescu 2012). Moreover, there are strong internal development discrepancies 
between the regions of the two countries and inter-regional disparities have 
accelerated since accession, in particular if compared to capital regions which became 
the main economic development areas, attracting and retaining human and financial 
capital.  
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It was against this background, of mainly weak regional and local level authorities, that 
Structural Funds were implemented during 2007-2013. There were, however, some 
significant differences that can be noted between the two countries, with an impact on 
the way in which the funds were managed. First, there were some notable differences 
with regard to the governmental tiers engaged in the management of the funding. In 
general, both countries possess different deconcentrated administrations which 
represent the Government at the local level and monitor the implementation of 
centrally designed strategies and policies. The governors of the Bulgarian Oblasti and 
the Prefects of Romanian Counties are appointed by the central government and 
emulate the French prefectural model (Nikolova 2011, 669; Dobre 2011, 696). 
Nevertheless, in Romania, County Councils are politically independent bodies directly 
elected at the local level. They represent a separate level of political and administrative 
authority, in addition to the deconcentrated central government bodies present at the 
local level. In this respect, Bulgarian authorities employed a two tier approach in the 
management of the funding. Managing bodies from Sofia interacted directly with local 
municipalities, some of the biggest funding beneficiaries and by-passed the 28 
regional administrations (Oblasti). Thus, the latter had no formal say in the 
management of the funding and where rarely involved in the process. By contrast, the 
management and implementation of Structural Funds was a more intricate process for 
the Romanian authorities. This was complicated by the involvement of the 41 county 
councils which apart from being EU funds beneficiaries could seldom be involved 
institutionally in the implementation process. Formally, County Councils are part of 
the Regional Development Councils and must contribute to the political and 
institutional mechanisms that oversee inter-regional disparities reduction (Dobre 
2011, 700). Finally, Romanian County Councils had an important supervisory role 
being able to politically control the work of the Regional Development Agencies. 
Politically strong County Council leaders could often act as veto players in the 
distribution of regionally significant EU-funded projects (Romanian MP #1; 
Romanian EU funds consultant #1). Overall, the additional political and 
administrative layer present in Romania did complicate the coordination process and 
had important implications for the technical management of the funding.  
 
Second, and in line with the above points, the centralized Bulgarian model seemed to 
fit the institutional and bureaucratic capacity of the different institutions involved in 
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EU funds management. As will be seen from the different thematic case studies, the 
strong linkage between Sofia based ministries and their territorial and regional 
branches was beneficial for the management of the funding and for ensuring an 
adequate level of capacity and control of local level authorities. By contrast, the initial 
Romanian semi-centralised model and the multitude of different institutions involved 
at the central and territorial level allowed for fragmented and confounding layers of 
management which were detrimental to general coordination. Bulgarian interviewees 
argued that decentralization could lead to potential problems, especially given that 
municipalities relied heavily on the capacity of central level Ministries (Head of Unit 
of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). In Romania, given the stronger historical 
precedent, in Romania several administrators seemed to be more in favour of a higher 
degree of regional autonomy as to avoid the overlapping levels of authority (Director 
General in Romanian Ministry #1; Head of North-East Intermediate Body). During 
the 2007-2013 period, several debates emerged in Romania on the potential 
regionalisation of the country. Against this background, the issue of regionalization 
has climbed up high on the agenda and most Romanian politicians seemed to argue 
that a higher degree of decentralization would increase the level of EU funds 
absorption.44 With all this, numerous civil society groups criticized the design of the 
reforms and signalled that the creation of an additional tier of government may prove 
inefficient and would develop further opportunities for corruption at the regional and 
local level (IPP 2013; SAR 2013; Romanian Expert #2). The Romanian regionalisation 
project stalled in January 2014, after the Romanian Constitutional Court argued that 
it required further constitutional amendments in order to pass. The episode illustrated 
well how the issue of EU funding tended to be used in and how it influenced internal 
political debates.   
 
Finally, several things are worth noting with regard to the potential discrepancies 
between the capacity and expertise of central and regional/local staff. Similarly to 
central institutions, most local and regional administrators went through a strong 
learning process during the first phase of Structural Funds implementation. 
Nevertheless, from the qualitative evidence gathered, it seems that despite some 
                                                             
44 Business24.ro, 28 October 2013, [Regionalisation. Dragnea adopts a different approach but loses 
again the essential – political clientelism] http://www.diacaf.com/stiri/economic/regionalizare-
dragnea-vine-cu-o-noua-abordare-dar-ii_854031.html (accessed January 2017). 
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differences, there were no fundamental gaps in terms of capacity and expertise 
between central and regional/local administrators. Moreover, these gaps narrowed 
during the implementation period and some even argued that local staff had more “on 
the ground” experience and a rather more intimate understanding of the problems 
faced by the different EU funds beneficiaries (EC Head of Unit #2; Permanent 
Representation #1; Bulgarian Certifying Authority Representative #1; Deputy Director 
of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2). Some argued that regional and local 
administrators possessed, in fact, a higher degree of expertise (Bulgarian Expert #4; 
Romanian Expert #2). One such example was provided by the Romanian Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs). Established in 1998, together with the development 
regions, these structures had the opportunity to develop strong degrees of 
administrative capacity allegedly given their independence from political interference 
and their strong human resources and development training policies (Director in 
Romanian North-East RDA). RDAs contributed extensively towards developing the 
capacity of local level project applicants and beneficiaries (World Bank 2013; EC Head 
of Unit #1). Nevertheless, the formal prerogatives of these structures were limited to 
the delegated tasks they received based on their contracts as Intermediate Bodies for 
the Regional OP, and later on, for the Economic Competitiveness OP.  
 
One final interesting aspect which can be noted relates the support provided to 
potential and final beneficiaries by different associative structures, such as the 
National Association of Municipalities in the Republic of Bulgaria (NAMRB) or the 
Romanian National Union of County Councils / Romanian Municipalities Association. 
For instance, NAMRB often acted as a dialogue broker between local municipalities 
and national authorities, outlining the different obstacles faced by the former and 
seeking to develop ways as to increase the capacity of different lagging municipalities 
(Representative of the Bulgarian National Association of Municipalities). These 
structures managed to highlight the different bottlenecks encountered locally and 
proved beneficial in establishing a link between the authorities and the different 
stakeholders. However, they also tended to reinforce the relationship of dependency 
between local authorities and central governments. Overall, as discussed above, 
territorial capacity was influenced not only by structural configurations (governmental 
tiers / centralisation) but equally by various political developments which are 
discussed more substantially in the following.  
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4.4 Political developments and Structural Funds in 
Bulgaria and Romania 
 
One of the main claims advanced and verified in this thesis related to the extent to 
which domestic political governance have influenced the management and 
implementation of Structural Funds. Within the wider literature on Cohesion Policy, 
the politics of EU funds management is side-lined or neglected, with few authors 
addressing it more directly (Milio 2008; Bachtler and McMaster 2008; Hagemann 
2014; Surubaru 2016). Political factors could provide a viable explanations for the 
developments taking place in both countries with regard to the absorption of 
Structural Funds. The empirical analysis, at both the general and thematic case study 
level, has revealed the extensive influence that political agents have in relation to both 
administrative capacity and the processes surrounding the absorption of EU funding. 
On the ground, many interviewees have suggested that the political is pervasive in the 
institutional environment relevant for EU funds and that politicians have the ability to 
influence, in both a positive and a negative manner, this environment and the different 
stages of the absorption process. Therefore, one of the main aims of this study has been 
to tease out the importance played by various political agents and processes in order 
to understand their impact on the absorption of Structural Funds within the two 
countries.  
 
Whilst administrative capacity elements can be regarded as rather more formal 
conditions for the management of EU funding, often assessed and validated by 
external actors such as the European Commission, domestic political factors can be 
regarded as informal conditions that facilitate, or hinder, the absorption of Structural 
Funds. Understanding how political developments could shape or mediate 
administrative capacity building or interfere with the different stages of the absorption 
process was, therefore, crucial in order to provide a pertinent answer to the question 
of how and what addressed in this study. Three distinct political factors have been 
analysed: political stability, political support and political clientelism. Several specific 
indicators were developed in order to collect and assess the evidence with regard to 
the potential influence of these factors. This sub-section provides a wider overview of 
some of the main political developments and their implications for the absorption of 
Structural Funds in Bulgaria and Romania.  
 113 
 
Political stability  
 
Political stability has been significant pre-condition for both administrative capacity 
development and, more generally, for continuity in the daily processes surrounding 
the absorption of Structural Funds. Political stability was signalled, in both official 
reports and evaluations, as well as by interviewees on the ground as an important 
condition for a functional absorption process.45 Frequent governmental alterations are 
a common feature of post-communist countries, equally valid for countries like 
Bulgaria and Romania. Between the start of January 2007 (the date of EU accession) 
and December 2015 (the official end date for the 2007-2013 implementation period), 
there were four different cabinets in Bulgaria and five different cabinets in Romania.46 
Following various internal political changes, these executives faced several reshuffles 
(approximately six in Bulgaria and eleven to twelve in Romania47). In practice this 
entailed replacing ministers or establishing, merging or abolishing different 
institutional ministries. Overall, there was a strong association between higher degrees 
of governmental stability and a potential increase in the absorption of Structural 
Funds. The four years of the Boyko Borisov cabinet (2009-2013) and the three years 
of the Ponta cabinet (2012-2015) were periods during which the absorption rate of the 
two countries increased. However, given that the absorption cycle requires several 
years for contracting and implementing projects before funding could be officially 
reimbursed from Brussels, the measures undertaken by preceding cabinets (e.g. 
Stanishev in Bulgaria and Boc in Romania) have equally contributed to this late 
increase in EU funds financial absorption. 
 
In general, governmental alternation and major political changes were detrimental to 
the absorption process and, more specifically, for administrative capacity 
                                                             
45 78.3% questionnaire respondents stressed that political stability is important for the absorption of 
EU SF. 
46 Bulgaria’s cabinets were the following: Stanishev I-II (2005-09), Borisov I (2009-13), Oresharski 
(2013-14), Borisov II-IV (2014-2016) and two interim governments (Raykov March – May 2013; 
Bliznashki August – November 2014). Romania’s cabinets were the following: Tăriceanu I-III 
(December 2004 – December 2008); Boc I-IV (December 2008 – February 2012), Ungureanu 
(February - April 2012), Ponta I-V (May 2012 – November 2015), Cioloş I-II (November 2015 –
January 2017) and three interim and temporary governments (Boc October – December 2009; 
Predoiu February 2012; Oprea June-July 2015).       
47 Assessed based on the number of Cabinets compiled above and with additional data retrieved from 
the Party Systems and Government Observatory project, available at: http://whogoverns.eu/cabinets/ 
(accessed January 2017).  
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development, in particular. Several official documents explicitly acknowledged the 
impact of “excessive politicisation” on the governance of EU funding (Government of 
Romania 2014, 127) and the impact it had on staff turnover (DG Regio AAR 2010, 18). 
Moreover, the lack of a civil servant law “hampered capacity-building within local 
administrations since high turnover of staff impacts negatively on the strategic 
decision-making process” (DG Regio AAR annexes 2013, 49). In line with established 
practices in the public administration of different countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe, the newly elected political leadership often imposed changes of senior or 
middle management staff working in the different central Ministries / Governmental 
Agencies. At the central management level, such patronage driven changes could affect 
the senior management and, sometimes, even the operational staff working in the 
different Managing Authorities / Intermediate Bodies responsible for EU funds 
management: 
“Yes, political stability is important. Because when we change the governments 
there are periods with interim governments when nothing happens. Another 
problem is that most of the time, when the Government changes, the 
management changes.” (Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2) 
  
However, these changes varied substantially from one institution to another (see Table 
11 for an overview), and were in fact an important determinant or hindrance for a 
programmes performance. Apart from Deputy Ministers (Bulgaria) and State 
Secretaries (in Romania) which are explicit political functions, Director Generals 
and/or the Deputy Directors working in these institutions were often subject to 
political appointments or dismissals. Very often, General Directors of MAs / IBs were 
replaced following wide ranging governmental changes, notably when new 
governments entered office (e.g. Stanishev / Boc / Borisov / Ponta / Oresharski) 
(Surubaru 2017).  
 
Several mechanisms enabled these processes of patronage driven politicisation which 
affected managerial and operational staff working within these institutions. First, 
managerial staff was often brought in through a temporary / contractual basis, which 
enhanced the leverage that politicians could have on these appointments (Romanian 
Expert #1; Bulgarian Expert #2). 
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Table 11: Management changes of Operational Programmes in Bulgaria and Romania  
Operational Programmes  Secretary of State / 
Deputy Ministers 
(Heads of Monitoring 
Committees)  
General Directors  
(Managing 
Authority) 
Transport BG (2007-2014) 4 3 
Transport RO (2010-2015) 5 4 
Environment BG (2008-2015) 5 4 
Environment RO - - 
Regional Development BG  
(2007-2014) 
3 4 
Regional Development RO  
(2007-2014) 
4 3 
Economic Competitiveness BG - - 
Economic Competitiveness RO 
(2007-2015) 
7 5 
Technical Assistance  
BG (2010-2015) 
- 2 
Technical Assistance RO 
(2007-2014) 
5 2 
Human Resources Development 
BG (2007-2015) 
6 
 
6 
Human Resources Development 
RO (2007-2015) 
- 8 
Administrative Capacity BG  
(2007-2015) 
6 3 
Administrative Capacity RO  
(2007-2015) 
- 2 
Source: Author’s creation and Surubaru 2017, Appendix I  
 
Second, in order to keep their posts or to advance in their career some sought to adapt 
and informally swear allegiances to different political masters (Deputy Director of 
Bulgarian Managing Authority #2; Head of Unit Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). 
In return, some politicians seemed to believe that by having well placed appointments 
within these institutions they could exert a certain level of control on the management 
of the funding (Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2; Bulgarian Academic #1; 
Romanian Expert #1; Former Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2). Third, 
EU Commission officials have persistently insisted that political changes should not 
affect the staffing policies of these institutions involved and have often warned against 
political interferences in the management of the bodies handling EU funding: 
“We cannot accept to change the Heads of MA’s every time there is a change of 
government, and sometimes it goes even to the Heads of Units. We cannot 
accept that. This is the political dimension. The Commissioner says that all the 
time. In more stable democracies we don’t see that. We don’t see that except in 
Central and Eastern Europe.” (EC Policy Officer for administrative capacity #1) 
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Despite these warnings, it was still a recurrent practice for MA / IB Directors or Heads 
of Units to be appointed in light of their political affiliation, and not as much as a 
reflection of their expertise or skill set (Bulgarian EU funds consultant #1; Bulgarian 
Expert #2; Romanian Expert #1). Moreover, politically embedding Managing 
Authorities in different Ministries meant that these institutions were subject to the 
influence of the political minister and his or her ambitions. Inter-ministerial 
coordination was subject to disputes and fragmentation, as well as to different inter- 
or intra-ministerial political turf wars (Bulgarian Intermediate Body Representative 
#1; Permanent Representation #1). It could be that political interference in the 
appointment of Management staff diminished, also as a consequence of the fact that 
“politicians realized that without the people that have the institutional memory it will 
be very difficult for them to deploy their political priorities in the future” (EC Head of 
Unit #2).48 In this respect, staff retention and institutional memory were two key 
aspects that were influenced by political mismanagement and patronage related 
practices. As will be seen this manifested differently from one Operational Programme 
to another, with important consequences for their performance.   
 
Apart from the central governmental level, the effects of political instability on EU 
funds management and implementation were felt at the local implementation level. 
For instance, when new mayors were elected, in municipalities or rural communes, 
they either changed the project management teams or scrapped the implementation 
roadmaps and the measures taken by their political predecessors due to differences or 
out of pure political vanity (Bulgarian Funds coordinator for South-West region #1; 
Romanian Cross-Border Cooperation Programme #1). Such measures had dramatic 
consequences for the quality and timely of local EU-funded projects. Moreover, they 
could trigger different conflicts between local authorities and central managing bodies, 
given the reluctance of new mayors to assume the contractual obligations of EU-
funded projects (Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2; Head of Unit in 
Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). Such developments are examined more specifically 
within the different thematic case studies. Nevertheless, it can be underlined that 
                                                             
48 Several interviewees pointed out that the politicisation of staff in the MAs / IBs was present in both 
countries. However, this tended to manifest more pre-eminently and had deeper implications for the 
management of EU funding much more in Romania than in Bulgaria (EC policy officer for 
administrative capacity #1; EC Policy Officer #1; EC Head of Unit #2; Former Romanian EU Affairs 
Minister).  
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political stability was an important condition for an effective management and 
implementation of EU funding, as were the different developments regarding political 
support. 
 
Political support 
 
Political support, will or commitment have been seen as key elements for 
understanding the different facets of policy making and implementation in post-
communist polities. In this thesis, political support was widely assessed in two ways. 
First, evidence was collected on the degree to which political representatives could 
provide the political support necessary to institutional and administrative actors on 
day-to-day operational actions regarding the absorption of EU funds. Second, it 
related to the degree to which political representatives could articulate visions and 
formulate spending priorities for EU funding in light of public scrutiny. Given the lack 
of primary evidence on political input, qualitative interviews were used to examine 
evidence of cooperation between administrative and political actors, as well as to 
assess the levels of support received by managing and control institutions from the 
later. Moreover, the interview data was equally used to understand the extent to which 
politicians have, or have not, provided sufficient political feedback and strategic 
support to the administration on their daily activities regarding the absorption of EU 
funds.  
 
The evidence gathered pointed to various ways in which the dimension of political 
support could affect the absorption process. First and foremost, political will could 
systematically affect the institutional management of the funding. Ministries were not 
able to function well without a degree of political will and direction. In fact, several 
reports denounced the lack of “political steering” from the authorities on the 
management of the funding (DG Regio AAR 2010, 13; Government of Romania 2014). 
This could be characteristic of highly centralised post-communist polities where civil 
servants cannot act in the absence of political guidance. Managing Authorities / 
Intermediate Bodies were, thus, politically embedded institutions and were dependent 
on political support for internal actions and for solving daily technical problems. One 
interviewee extract clearly captured this:   
 118 
 
“The biggest issue is that the MA’s are dependent on the Ministry structure and 
on the political level. The Deputy Ministers are involved too much in the 
process, even at the operational level / projects level. This hurts the internal 
coherence of MA’s. They always expect informal input and political leadership.” 
(Bulgarian Expert #4) 
 
Being embedded in an environment which runs on political orders did affect the ability 
of these institutions to act independently. However, there were various examples 
(which will be specifically addressed in the thematic case studies) of Managing 
Authorities where a degree of positive political coordination, coupled with technical 
expertise and institutional and human resources stability, facilitated a rather 
successful absorption of EU funding. Moreover, in both countries, interviewees did 
stress that it is the role of politicians to understand the problems they face and to 
provide them with political support (e.g. unblocking issues pending at the level of 
Ministries) or to craft legal measures in order to tackle the problems that arose from 
the different stages of the absorption process (Director of Romanian Managing 
Authority #2; Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2; Former EC Head 
of Unit #1).  
  
Second, in terms of political leadership, in Bulgaria, three high level politicians have 
been associated with the central management and coordination of EU funds. From 
April 2008 to July 2009, Meglena Plugchieva was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister 
overseeing EU funds on behalf of the Socialist government of Sergei Stanishev.49 She 
was given the portfolio also in a bid to solve the serious corruption problems uncovered 
by Brussels investigators for pre-accession funding (EC 2008a). According to some 
interviewees, she was an active politician who initiated reforms of the institutional 
landscape for EU funds management (EC Policy Officer for administrative capacity 
#1). From March 2010 to March 2013, Tomislav Donchev was appointed as Minister 
without portfolio in charge with EU funds by the GERB government lead by Borisov 
He was a former civil society activist and ex-mayor of a medium sized Bulgarian 
municipality which was particularly successful in attracting EU-funded projects. He 
followed in his predecessors’ footsteps and took extensive measures in order to 
improve the management and control systems used for the management of SF. During 
                                                             
49 Novinite.com, 22 April 2008, Who is Who: Meglena Plugchieva, available at: 
http://www.novinite.com/articles/92482/WHO+IS+WHO%3A+Meglena+Plugchieva (accessed 
January 2017). 
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his tenure several measures were adopted aiming at reducing burdensome 
bureaucratic procedures and improving the implementation of EU-funded projects 
(Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #1; Bulgarian Mayor #1). His tenure resumed at the 
end of 2014, when he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in charge with EU funds 
and economic policy in the Borisov II government. Finally, from May 2013 to August 
2014, Zinaida Zlatanova took over the EU funds portfolio and acted as Deputy Prime 
Minister in the Oresharski government. Her mandate was double given that she was 
responsible also for the Ministry of Justice. Some commentators argued that the two 
roles (EU funds and Justice) were difficult to combine and, consequently, noted a 
diminished focus on EU funds management at the political level (Bulgarian Head of 
Unit in Managing Authority #1; Bulgarian Expert #1; Bulgarian Expert #3).  
 
In Romania, from early 2007 until September 2011, the political coordination of 
Structural Funds was ensured by a State Secretary based in the Ministry of Public 
Finance (Government of Romania 2009). He or she headed the Authority for the 
Coordination of Structural Instruments (ACIS) the main Central Coordination Unit 
overseeing the management of the funding. However, in the absence of a fully backed 
political minister, the coordination of EU funds only by a State Secretary was seen as 
weak (Former Romanian EU Affairs Minister; Counsellor in Romanian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs; Permanent Representation #1). As recommended by officials in 
Brussels, and by merging ACIS with the Department of European Affairs (DAE) from 
the Central Government Secretariat, the Ministry of European Affairs was created as 
a national political and administrative coordinator for EU funds in September 2011 
(DG Regio AAR 2011, 40). The new Ministry, led by the ex-European Commissioner, 
Leonard Orban, had two main functions: to deal with European affairs and to 
coordinate the management of European funds. However, without a clear political 
mandate, Orban did not obtain strong political backing and could not scrutinize the 
work of Managing Authorities based in other more powerful political ministries 
(Permanent Representation #1; Former Romanian EU Affairs Minister). In other 
words, although the Ministry of European Affairs (MAEur) was created, it lacked the 
political weight necessary to undertake concrete actions, an issue the minister 
acknowledged several times in public.50 Despite all this, Orban was still able to initiate 
                                                             
50 Agerpres.ro, 19 December 2012 [Leonard Orban – the most important thing to avoid a new political 
crisis in Bucharest – Interview], available at: http://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2012/12/19/leonard-
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several reforms, mainly carried out during the Ponta I Government (May – December 
2012). Starting from December 2012 to March 2015, a former adviser of the Prime 
Minister and former director in the Audit Authority, Eugen Teodorovici was assigned 
the newly created full portfolio for the Ministry of European Funds. With full political 
support from the Prime Minister, Teodorovici promoted a more centralized approach 
and undertook several measures that addressed shortcomings related to mechanisms 
for payments towards beneficiaries, issues of public procurement and the use of 
technical assistance (Romanian EU funds consultant #1; State Secretary in Romanian 
Ministry of European Funds). Although these measures were adopted rather late in 
the implementation of EU funding for 2007-2013, together with the effects of the 
previously assumed PMP, they had a significant impact on improving the absorption 
of EU funding. Finally, from March to November 2015, Marius Nica ensured the 
political management of the increasingly centralised Ministry of European Funds 
(process which was consolidated by the technocratic government of Dacian Cioloş 
during 2016 by incorporating most Managing Authorities/Intermediate Bodies within 
the ministry). Overall, in both Bulgaria and Romania, the three-year tenure of 
Donchev and Teodorovici were seen as periods when important reforms were adopted, 
animated also by the background and political agency of the ministers (Bulgarian Civil 
Society Leader #3; Romanian EU funds consultant #1).  
 
Third, political support seemed to be valuable if it materialized in a high degree of 
political commitment. By making EU funds absorption a top level political priority, 
governments in both countries were more likely to accelerate the financial absorption 
of SF, also due to the political and administrative resources mobilised to achieve this. 
This was very much the case under the Borisov / Ponta governments, especially in light 
of the fact that EU funds became a salient political topic, very much used during and 
outside electoral campaigns (Spendzharova and Vachudova 2012; Bloom and Petrova 
2013; Paliova and Lybek 2014; Surubaru 2016a). Moreover, without the direct support 
of the Prime Minister, Ministers dealing with the EU funds portfolio could not take 
decisive action to improve the absorption of EU funds (Former Romanian Minister; 
Former EC Head of Unit #1) or to strengthen the general administrative capacity 
required (Counsellor in Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; EC Head of Unit #2). 
                                                             
orban-cel-mai-important-lucru-pentru-ce-e-sa-se-evite-o-noua-criza-politica-la-bucuresti-interviu--
09-11-04 (accessed January 2017). 
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Other times, governments seemed to mobilize only to avoid the loss of funding, due to 
financial decommitments after closing the financial implementation period (Council 
of Ministers of Bulgaria 2013; Government of Romania 2013, 121). Several stressed 
that governments tended to adopt fire-fighting techniques rather than seeking to 
prevent problematic situations (Director in Romanian Ministry of EU funds #1; EC 
Head of Sector #1; EC Head of Unit #2). Overall, making absorption a top political 
priority could ensure a higher degree of political commitment and the potential means 
to address the institutional and procedural gaps found in the management and 
implementation of the funding.  
 
Apart from the above, it is worth highlighting that some Bulgarian Deputy Ministers 
played an important role in the political coordination of the funding within the 
different Managing Authorities. Many of them have had a technocratic and 
professional background and were aware of the problems in the system (Former EC 
Head of Unit #1; Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #1; Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #3). 
By contrast, the situation in Romania was rather different often characterised by a 
highly divisive political environment and by inter- and intra-ministerial rivalries (DG 
Regio AAR 2010; KPMG et al. 2011; Director in Romanian Ministry of EU Funds #1). 
Diverging political interests and the lack of unity on these issues were detrimental to 
institutional, methodological and strategic coordination and for the control of EU 
funding, in particular, during the first years of implementation (EC Head of Unit #1; 
Romanian Expert #1; Romanian EU funds monitoring officer #1).  
 
Finally, politicians were generally unable to provide feedback or strategic support to 
EU funds administrators. During the first years of implementation, the unofficial 
political view was that funds should be distributed following an “absorption for all” 
approach which emphasized on the idea of attributing contracts as fast as possible, 
and often irrespective of the quality or capacity of beneficiaries. As stressed by several 
interviewees part of these strategic problems were political in nature and these were 
given that many politicians did not understand how Structural Funds work or did not 
have the necessary political aides that would inform them on this (Director General of 
Romanian Ministry #1; Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2; Former 
Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2; Director of Bulgarian Managing 
Authority #1). For instance, several Structural Funded projects did not fit any strategic 
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objectives and were the result of different central or local political ambitions. 
Throughout 2007-2013 there were several examples of useless projects presented by 
the media (e.g. parks in rural areas or football pitches on slopes). With all this, political 
support was necessary for large infrastructure projects, and seemed to have functioned 
much more in Bulgaria’s case (e.g. Sofia Metro, Trakia highway) (Council of Ministers 
of Bulgaria 2013). Several interviewees corroborated this stressing that such projects 
were largely implemented following a strong political push by the GERB government, 
also as to strengthen their public image as good administrators of EU funds (Bulgarian 
EU funds coordinator for South-West region #1; Bulgarian Expert #1; Head of Unit in 
Bulgarian Central Coordination Unit #1). In addition, ensuring state or private co-
financing for projects was very difficult, before but especially during the financial crisis 
(Constantin 2006; CeRe 2010; Expert Evaluation Network Bulgaria 2012, 4). Different 
governmental initiatives (e.g. FLAG in Bulgaria) were noted as crucial political 
measures undertaken for facilitating the absorption of EU funding (Bulgarian Mayor 
#1; Representative of the Bulgarian National Association of Municipalities). All in all, 
political support proved to be an important factor without which it would be difficult 
to explain the capacity and performance achieved by the two countries in managing 
and implementing EU funding.  
 
Political clientelism 
 
If political support entailed a largely positive dimension, issues of political clientelism 
would fall in the opposite category. This study examined political clienteles as the 
degree to which national or local political groups or “interest cartels” could interfere 
and profit from the absorption and distribution of Structural Funds. To this aim, 
evidence was collected against two qualitative indicators: the influence that political 
actors may exert on the distribution of European Structural Funds51 and whether or 
not certain central or local level political stakeholders were favoured or benefited, 
much more than others, from the distribution of Structural Funds52. Several studies 
and civil society reports did highlight throughout the 2007-2013 implementation 
                                                             
51 25% of Romanian questionnaire respondents and 27.3% of Bulgarian respondents considered that 
“yes” there was political influence in the distribution of Structural Funds in the country, and 37.5% 
Romanian respondents and 22.7% respondents answered “partially yes” to this question.  
52 25% of Romanian questionnaire respondents and 13.6% of Bulgarian respondents considered that 
some political actors benefited more than others from the distribution of Structural Funds, whilst 
33.3% Romanian and 31.8% Bulgarian respondents answered with “partially yes” to this question. 
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period that corruption is an important determinant and could account for the multiple 
problems faced by the two countries in this area (CSD 2009; IPP 2012; Spendzharova 
and Vachudova 2012; Badea 2012; Ganev 2013; SAR 2013; Dimulescu et al. 2013). 
However, it must be noted that clientelism and the impact of corruption on EU funds 
management and implementation is particularly difficult to assess. Chapter 7 looked 
at these issues more in-depth and examined the potential for clientelism in two stages 
of the EU funds absorption process: the evaluation/selection of EU-funded projects 
and the allocation of public procurement contracts. Preliminary evidence pointed to 
these areas as being particularly vulnerable to political interference. A significant 
source of hard evidence on corruption and EU funds could be the level of irregularities, 
especially fraudulent related ones, and the level of financial corrections reported on an 
annual basis by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (OLAF 2014) (Table 12).  
 
Table 12: Cohesion Policy irregularities and financial corrections in CEECs 
 
Number of 
irregularities in 
Cohesion Policy 
funded 
projects 
(2007-2013) 
Number of 
irregularities 
reported as 
fraudulent in 
Cohesion Policy 
funded projects 
(2007-2013) 
Financial 
corrections / 
million EUR 
(2012-2014) 
Bulgaria 492 34 110 
Czech Republic 3190 108 266 
Estonia 296 13 12 
Hungary 892 60 191 
Lithuania 464 11 18 
Latvia 285 79 41 
Poland 3793 228 422 
Romania 1263 139 47753 
Slovenia 188 25 30 
Slovakia 1023 94 267 
CEECs average 1188 79 183 
Source: Author’s creation based on OLAF 2014, Annex III and Surubaru 2017, Table 1 
                                                             
53 According to various official and non-official sources the level of financial irregularities in Romania 
reached between 800 million (IPP 2015) and 1 billion EUR (Finantare.ro 20 March 2015 [Romania 
pays 1 billion EUR worth of financial corrections for EU-funded projects], available at: 
http://www.finantare.ro/romania-plateste-1-miliard-de-euro-corectii-financiare-pentru-proiectele-
europene.html (accessed January 2017).  
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In Romania’s case, irregularities were above average, and moreover, the high level of 
financial corrections constituted additional evidence for the problems arising in the 
different projects, partly due to corrupt behaviour or funds mismanagement. This was 
even more puzzling if we compare the higher degree of success of anti-corruption 
measures taken in Romania, as opposed to Bulgaria, and as reported in the European 
Commission in its annual Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification (CVM) reports. 
The differences between the two countries could be due to various levels of reporting. 
Others would stress that Romanian judicial authorities were stronger in identifying 
and prosecuting corruption within EU-funded projects. Nevertheless, when looking at 
different descriptive data this doesn’t seem to be the case. Both the anti-fraud 
departments in Romania (DLAF) and Bulgaria (AFKOS) cooperated with OLAF on 
potential fraudulent cases regarding EU-funded projects. 
 
In Bulgaria, in 2014, there were 444 trial proceedings regarding EU funds abuse from 
which 120 indictments were sent to a court of law and 4 were convicted and sanctioned 
(AFKOS AAR 2014, 27). In Romania, during the same year, 1495 cases involving EU 
funds abuse were handled by the Romanian Anti-Corruption Department (DNA) from 
which 149 were sent to court and 52 were finalized (DNA AAR 2014, 51). These cases 
included all types of EU funding (also rural development and agricultural payments). 
For example, during the same year, on Cohesion Policy related OPs, several Bulgarian 
projects were affected by potential fraud: Environment (10), Regional Development 
(9), Competitiveness (6), Human Resources (2), and Administrative Capacity (2) 
(AFKOS AAR 2014, 26). In Romania, these were: Human Resources (25), 
Competitiveness (20), Regional Development (12) and Transport (4) (DLAF AAR 
2014, 42).54  
 
In addition to the above figures, throughout 2007-2013, there were several specific 
developments with regard to general politicisation of EU funds and how political 
clienteles could, or could not, affect the management and distribution of EU funding. 
First, the absorption of EU funding became a politicised topic at both national and 
local levels of government. At the national level, debates on the absorption of funds 
were often used as a political tool. The Bulgarian GERB party of Boyko Borisov (2009) 
                                                             
54 These figures reveal that fraudulent cases were proportionally addressed in both countries and that 
it is difficult to claim that Romania would be better in addressing fraudulent cases than Bulgaria. 
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and the Romanian Social Liberal Union (USL) (2012) used the argument of weak 
absorption rates of the incumbent governments as political weapons during 
campaigning. Political conflicts, surrounding the absorption of Structural Funds, 
remained a constant theme in both countries. Highlighting an increase in the 
absorption of funding was also used politically, in order to gain votes, despite the fact 
that these achievements were often as a result of work spanning several governments. 
Locally, politicians saw the political benefits of implementing EU-funded projects and 
often used them for electoral purposes. For instance, in Bulgaria, there were accounts 
of strategically misused projects which served for the campaign of mayors that sought 
re-election (EC Policy Officer Bulgarian Unit #1) or that often projects were 
strategically misused for the same purpose:  
 “The mayor of a municipality decides to fix the roof for one school, puts in new 
windows for another school and paints the classroom in another school. This is 
because the mayor wants to get the support of all the three schools and villages 
telling them that: “Look, I fixed your school!”. Support is not focused. Thus, 
they didn’t renovate sustainably any of the schools.” (Bulgarian Funds 
coordinator for South-West region #1) 
 
Several interviewees did point that SF inherently attracted political interest and that 
their distribution was by its nature a political exercise (Former Romanian EU Affairs 
Minister; Deputy Head of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). As long as they required 
an overall political responsibility and oversight, EU funds were subject to strong 
domestic political interests. 
 
Second, there were higher degrees of controls associated with EU funding. The high 
level of controls and audits build in the management and control of the funding did 
produce some effects, and arguably managed to keep at bay the different political 
interests that developed around the allocation of these funds. For instance, some 
Romanian interviewees argued that the design of EU funding systems did not allow 
for a politicised distribution of funding (Director General in Romanian Ministry #1; 
Romanian Director in Audit Authority #1). Moreover, the high levels of controls could 
partly explain some of the different blockages faced by the different Operational 
Programmes. As such there was a constant pressure to improve the management and 
control systems of these programmes as to control for any conflicts of interest and 
politicised distribution of funding (Dimulescu et al. 2013; Surubaru 2016a). 
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Third, and despite the above, there were several accounts of political favouritism. This 
could manifest in different ways. In Bulgaria, there were many indications that mayors 
from political parties affiliated to the government obtained different favours by 
contrast to those that were in opposition (Bulgarian Expert #4; Head of Unit of 
Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). Moreover, some perceived that mayors from 
opposition parties tended to receive more controls from Managing Authorities 
(Bulgarian Expert #4; Former EC Head of Unit #1). Similarly, in Romania, some 
pointed that mayors from the ruling party were granted special attention and benefited 
from fast track reimbursements (Romanian EU funds consultant #2; Romanian 
Expert #2). This often took place given the favourable context in which the interaction 
between political ministers and mayors was seen as something normal in both 
countries. Thus, some argued that well positioned mayors could benefit from higher 
leniency in terms of controls (Bulgarian Academic #1; Bulgarian Municipality EU 
funds Director #1; Sofia Municipality EU funds Expert #1). In light of their political 
ties and connections, mayors from both countries could ask for support from ministers 
with different consequences for the implementation process.  
 
Fourth, there were strong indications that local politicians tried to profit from the 
distribution of funds by awarding public procurement contracts to their own 
“opportunity networks” (Romanian EU funds consultant #2; Bulgarian Expert #1; 
Bulgarian Funds coordinator for South-West region#1; Romanian Expert #1; 
Romanian MEP #2). This was characterized as the main way in which funds can get 
politicised:  
“It’s also about politicisation. At the local level everyone knows everyone. Of 
course, a head of the County Council has his own clients and from there the 
control is lost. This happens particularly with the ERDF [funds]” (EC Head of 
Sector #1).  
 
A later section of this thesis will provide more in-depth examples in this respect. 
However, problems which appeared with public procurement tendering constituted a 
pattern of behaviour which manifested across all Operational Programmes. Some of 
the interviewees went as far to argue that “fixed” or collusive bidding occurred in 80% 
of all cases (Bulgarian Expert #4). Clientelistic practices could create a “feeding chain” 
in which tender contracts, in municipalities, were given to certain business in return 
of bribes from 10 to 30 percent of the value of project (Bulgarian Investigative 
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Journalist; Former EC Head of Unit #1; Head of Unit in Bulgarian Managing Authority 
#1; Romanian EU funds consultant #1). Irrespective of these accounts, it is difficult to 
capture with hard evidence whether or not this was a systematic practice, or they 
tended to be isolated cases.55 Moreover, there was not enough data made public and 
people willing to act as whistle-blowers had to follow intricate and often discouraging 
procedures through judicial courts (Bulgarian Auditor #1; OLAF representative #2).  
 
Overall, corruption and political clientelism in local and central administrations was a 
real threat to the management of European funding. Throughout 2007-2013, 
Structural Funds have come under considerable political focus. In this respect, despite 
the technicalities behind the absorption of EU funding, it can be argued that in both 
countries the issue of SF has become a fairly political with high stakes for different 
stakeholders. Moreover, issues of political interference could affect administrative 
capacity development within the bodies responsible for the funding, but most 
importantly it had an impact on the different stages of the absorption process, with 
various implications for the performance of several Operational Programmes, which 
will be discussed more in depth in the case studies. 
4.5 EU role and influence in the domestic absorption 
process 
 
The European Union plays an extremely significant role in the domestic absorption 
processes of funding. This is the case given its formal responsibility for Cohesion Policy 
implementation, under the “shared management” principle, which requires 
widespread dialogue and cooperation between EU and national authorities. The EU’s 
role is in line with the EU Regulations which provide the legal background for 
Structural Funds use (Council Regulation No. 1083/2006). For the purpose of this 
thesis, the EU factor was examined as the degree to which the European Union shaped 
the internal and external configurations for Cohesion Policy governance in Bulgaria 
and Romania. Evidence was collected on the extent to which national authorities  
received sufficient technical assistance from EU institutions for the absorption of SF. 
                                                             
55 For instance, one auditor argued that it would be difficult to draw any conclusions about the 
politicisation of project without any consistent evidence (Director in Bulgarian Audit Authority). 
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Moreover, the formal and informal reasons for the interruption or suspension of 
payments towards national authorities was equally examined.  
  
Abiding to the principle of “shared management” meant that member states had to 
assume the responsibility for the implementation of their allocated European funding. 
However, the Commission did retain full final financial responsibility and remained, 
together with other institutions such as the European Court of Auditors, the final 
guardian of the spending. EU institutions did play a direct role in the overall domestic 
process of absorption, first in light of the overall technical expertise provided and 
second, given the political influence it had on its members. Nevertheless, the 
governance of EU funding in the two countries must also be understood in the context 
of fading conditionality and a relatively weaker position that Brussels had in these 
countries after accession (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010; Tănăsoiu 2012; Iusmen 2015).  
 
Indirectly, the EU’s economic governance principles, in particular the excessive deficit 
procedure clause of the Stability and Growth Pact (SCP) (which imposes a limit on 
budget deficits to 3% of GDP) might have had an adverse effect on the co-financing 
capacity of both Bulgaria and Romania. This was likely the case during the first few 
years of Structural Funds implementation (e.g. 2007-2011) which overlapped with the 
recent financial crisis and with a period of national fiscal restraint, during which 
different austerity programmes decreased levels of public investment.   
 
Brussels could exert a high level of informal influence and it played an important 
technical role underling different requirements and solutions for administrative 
capacity building at the national level. This could often develop before and during 
formal Monitoring Committees which supervised the implementation of the different 
national Operational Programmes and where developments were assessed on a bi-
annual basis. Given their lack of experience, these countries benefited from the 
informal advice and guidance provided by EU institutions. Most representatives of 
national managing and control bodies have pointed out that they had a good 
relationship with EU officials and that they did benefited from their technical support. 
The majority of Bulgarian interviewees have pointed out the positive role played by the 
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European Commission for the management and the implementation of the funds.56 
Similarly, a majority of Romanian interviewees highlighted that the input of the 
Commission was beneficial for EU funds absorption.57 Apart from this, there were two 
other mechanisms Brussels could use to influence the domestic absorption process 
and institutional developments in the two countries.  
 
First, audit missions were the main tools through which European officials could 
identify irregularities in spending and gaps in domestic management system. 
Commission auditors could issue recommendations and initiate corrective actions in 
order to address domestic deficiencies and irregularities in the use of the funding (ECA 
2012, 46). The first substantial EU audits were carried out by the Commission in 
2010/2011. These were critical in identifying a first set of problems and in constraining 
national authorities to adopt measures that would address irregularities in public 
procurement, enhance the capacity of central and local level institutions or improve 
system and operational audits (EC audit report Bulgaria 15-19 November 2010, 4-5; 
EC audit report Romania 27 July 2011). For instance, the 2010/2011 audit missions 
were seen as a turning point for the functioning of the Romanian system (Former 
Romanian EU Affairs Minister; Director in Romanian Ministry of EU Funds #1). There 
was formal pressure on national authorities to comply with the recommendations of 
the auditors. Nonetheless, these recommendations were not always fully implemented 
(EC Head of Sector #1). With all this, as a result of audits and pressure from Brussels, 
the two countries did strengthen their management and control systems. 
Second, the European Commission has the formal authority to interrupt, pre-suspend 
or suspend payments to different Operational Programmes, or parts of them, if they 
were deemed as affected by serious errors (for more than 2% of the expenditure 
audited) or by potential mismanagement and fraud.58 Usually an interruption of 
                                                             
56 Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #1; Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #3; Bulgarian Expert #2; 
Bulgarian Intermediate Body Representative #1; Former Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority 
#2; Head of Unit in Bulgarian Central Coordination Unit #1. 
57 Director in Romanian Audit Authority #1; Director in Romanian Ministry of European funds #1; 
Director in Romanian North-East Regional Development Agency; Head of Romanian North-East 
Intermediate Body; Representative of Romanian Certifying Authority; Romanian Civil Society Leader 
#1; Romanian EU funds monitoring officer #1; Romanian MA Programme Evaluations Officer #2; 
Romanian MA Programme Evaluations Officer #3. 
58 EU regulation 1083/2006 reads that payments can be interrupted for a maximum period of six 
months whenever (a) “there is evidence to suggest a significant deficiency in the functioning of the 
management and control systems” and (b) “expenditure in a certified statement of expenditure is 
linked to a serious irregularity which has not been corrected” (Article 91). 
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payments was a first signal that funds may be suspended, in light of stronger evidence. 
When funding was suspended, payments towards beneficiaries were blocked and 
domestic Managing Authorities entered a “crisis mode” (Former Director of Romanian 
Managing Authority #2; Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1; Director of 
Romanian Managing Authority #2). This puts extreme pressure on national 
authorities to adopt corrective actions in order to remedy the various deficiencies 
found. Authorities had to demonstrate to the Commission that they were capable of 
ensuring the correctness and regularity of the spending. During 2007-2014, Bulgarian 
programmes were interrupted and suspended six times whilst Romanian programmes 
around ten different times. Moreover, during 2010-2012, Romania had payments to 
five different OPs59 suspended, almost concomitantly, with strong consequences for 
its financial absorption (Dimulescu et al. 2013; Surubaru 2016a).   
 
The interruption and suspension of funding was an important driver for domestic 
improvements. However, these also had different other implications. First, the 
implementation of projects was often delayed, and countries found it difficult to pay 
EU beneficiaries in the absence of reimbursements from the Commission. This had 
some consequences for the regularity and patterns of financial absorption, although 
starting from 2012/2013, both Bulgarian and Romanian governments sought to avoid 
situations of financial blockages. Second, it did act as a deterrent for further national 
mismanagement of funding and it had a potentially positive effect on improving rates 
of compliance with EU funding rules and regulations among national authorities, as 
well as public beneficiaries (Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1; Director in 
Romanian Audit Authority #1). Nevertheless, the suspension of funding also 
amounted to a political clash between EU and national authorities. For instance, 
several Bulgarian interviewees argued that their government should have been more 
critical of Brussels political position on the suspension of different Operational 
Programmes (Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1; Former Director of 
Bulgarian Managing Authority #2; Director in Bulgarian Audit Authority). Third, it 
was claimed that Bulgarian officials were better in reaching a consensus before 
submitting a common position towards the Commission, whilst Romanian 
representatives were unable to do so (Bulgarian Director of Audit Authority #1; 
                                                             
59 Transport, Environment, Regional, Human Resources and Economic Competitiveness. 
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Director General of Romanian Ministry #1; Director in Romanian Ministry of EU 
Funds #1). Moreover, some argued that rather than seeking to fulfil its audit 
recommendations to solve the issue of EU funds interruption, Romania often tried to 
resort to political solutions which often exacerbated problems (EC Policy Officer 
Bulgarian Unit #1). 
 
Apart from the above, the role played by EU institutions (in particular the 
Commission) was criticized by national administrators on several grounds.60 First and 
foremost, when legislation was harmonised differences of interpretation emerged in 
particular with regard to public procurement, between the Commission and national 
authorities. Given these differences, the Commission was criticized for applying 
financial corrections without a substantial basis and which damaged the position of 
domestic Managing Authorities in relation to beneficiaries (Director of Romanian 
Managing Authority #1; Director in Bulgarian Audit Authority). The However, 
Commission representatives claimed that many of these misunderstandings 
originated from the inadequate transposition of the EU public procurement directive 
(2004/18/EC) by national authorities (DG Regio AAR 2013; PwC and Ecorys 2013). 
In addition, some were critical that financial corrections applied retroactively, in the 
context in which national authorities validated those procurement procedures that 
were latter deemed problematic (Romanian EU funds beneficiary #1; Bulgarian Expert 
#1; Bulgarian Municipality EU funds director #2; Romanian MA Programme 
Evaluation Officer #2). The fact that European authorities often invalidated those 
procedures created additional problems for the functionality of the system as well as 
for the functioning of the national audit authorities and certifying and payment 
authorities (Director in Bulgarian Audit Authority; Representative of Bulgarian Public 
Procurement Agency). It was feared that problems in managing authorities were also 
due to shallow controls from national audit bodies (Former Director of Romanian 
Managing Authority #2). In response to potential criticism from Brussels, national 
Audit Authorities stepped up their efforts and added more controls or stricter rules in 
an already dense procedural environment. This affected both EU funds administrators 
                                                             
60 As a contextual development, the Commission might have been impressed with the progress 
achieved by the two countries during the pre-accession period and with the ability of the authorities to 
quantitatively transpose into national law parts of the acquis communitaire. However, after accession, 
some noted a shift in attitude from the Commission, which became more critical and less indulgent, 
especially given the problems that surfaced on the management of EU funding (Romanian Expert #1; 
Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #1). 
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and beneficiaries and added further constraints to the already overstretched 
administrative capacity of these actors.  
 
Second, there were some accounts of an, often political attitude, from the European 
Commission’s side towards national authorities. For instance, in 2013, the 
Commission suspended the Bulgarian Environment Operational Programme due to 
problems regarding procurement contracts given to municipalities for water 
management facilities. Some of the reasons related to a potentially politicised 
allocation of funding towards certain municipalities (Former EC Head of Unit #1; EC 
Policy Officer Bulgarian Unit #1; Bulgarian EU funds consultant #1). However, some 
argued that, in addition to the above, there were also political differences between the 
Barroso II Commission and the socialist government of Plamen Oresharski (Former 
Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2; Bulgarian Auditor #1).  
 
Third, there was a general feeling among several interviewees that Brussels applies a 
differential treatment between old and new member states whenever problems 
emerged with regard to EU funding. Given the experience of other countries (e.g. Italy 
or Greece) as well as the issues that emerged on the ground in terms of 
implementation, the European Commission had an uncompromising attitude towards 
the two countries. It was perceived that Bulgaria and Romania received more extensive 
controls which often lead to a sentiment of frustration at the national level (Bulgarian 
Certifying Authority Representative #2; Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1; 
Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1; OLAF representative #1). 
Moreover, several Romanian interviewees stressed that EU officials were often 
susceptible to negative influences from misleading reports published in different 
Romanian media outlets (Head of Romanian North-East Intermediate Body; Project 
Officer in Romanian North-East Intermediate Body #1; Romanian EU funds 
monitoring officer #1). Coupled with a general distance between Brussels and national 
capitals this could affect daily communication between the different actors involved 
(EC Policy Officer Bulgarian Unit #2).  
 
Last but not least, the EU’s competences and ability to intervene at the national level 
to deal with issues related to EU funds was also limited (Former Romanian European 
Affairs Minister; OLAF representative #1; EC Policy Officer for administrative capacity 
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#1). This was particularly the case given the increasingly Eurosceptic sentiments, 
which developed after the start of the recent financial crisis, or due to the European 
Parliament’s push for more subsidiarity and addressing the EU’s democratic deficit 
(OLAF representative #1). Moreover, EU commissioners and officials were often 
under immense pressure, from the national political level, when EU funding was 
blocked or suspended in Brussels (EC Policy Officer for administrative capacity #1; 
OLAF representative #2; Former EC Head of Unit #1). Therefore, the relationship 
between Brussels and national capitals was not bound only by dry technical details and 
legal obligations, but was highly political and dynamic in nature. This made the 
management and implementation of CP an area where supranational and 
intergovernmental political and administrative forces clashed. Both levels were, 
however, to a great extent accountable for weak levels of absorption or for the misuse 
or low impact of the funding. Given this, there was often a strong trade-off between 
the EU’s ability and willingness to assist member states and the administrative and 
political capacity and performance, of the latter, in governing Cohesion Policy. 
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4. Conclusions  
 
The above section has examined several contextual and substantive developments that 
took place in Bulgaria and Romania during 2007-2013 with regard to the management 
and implementation of SF. Such administrative and political developments were 
crucial for the ability of the two countries, and the subsequent performance, in dealing 
with CP. First, administrative capacity was a clear building block necessary for the 
management and implementation of EU SF in the two countries. For instance, the 
institutional designs and bureaucratic procedures, their quality or clarity, could affect 
the work of the managing and control institutions found in both countries. The 
analysis also re-emphasized the importance of human resources and the multiple 
stakeholders involved in the absorption process. Administrative capacity 
shortcomings inherited from the pre-accession period, combined with the challenges 
of setting up the management and control systems for SF, as well as a lack of strategic 
culture within the public administration contributed to the weak development of the 
various administrative capacities: institutional, bureaucratic and human resources. 
With all this, administrative capacity factors were not sufficient by themselves to 
explain some of the differences of financial absorption performance attained within 
and between the two countries across time.  
 
Second, wider governance related issue played a key role in both Bulgaria and 
Romania. Specifically, political factors could mediate the development of different 
administrative capacity elements, and as will be seen in the case studies, they could 
affect different stages of the absorption process. Therefore, it can be argued that 
political elements had a strong impact on the evolution of SF financial absorption. 
Prior to 2007, both countries had acquired some experience in managing EU pre-
accession funding (PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD). However, following accession there 
was a gradual transfer towards using SF. For this, the countries had to establish new 
and functional institutional systems, adopt relevant legislation and varied 
administrative rules and documents, and develop the expertise of staff working on this, 
at both central and local levels of government. To attain the latter political input was 
necessary. On the one hand, where politicians committed political resources for 
improving the management and control systems and address the specific needs of 
administrators their input tended to be positive. Political stability and support acted 
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as positive drivers for the development of these capacities. In this sense, political 
agency could contribute towards accelerating, or hindering, administrative capacity 
developments (Surubaru 2016a). On the other hand, in both countries, the absorption 
of EU funding has become a highly politicised area. Throughout the period, national 
politicians gradually became aware of the importance of Structural Funds as tools that 
could be used to enhance political sympathy (Romanian Expert #2) or as primary 
sources of public investment, and as argued by some, the only fresh source of money 
during the financial crisis (Head of Unit of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). Given 
that EU funds attracted considerable political attention they also activated different 
vested interests. Most of the problems that emerged in terms of local and national 
implementation were influenced by political clientelism and illicit practices, in 
particular with regard to the awarding of public procurement contracts. These 
irregularities could trigger the interruption / suspension of funding from Brussels and 
represented a concrete barrier for financial absorption (Spendzharova and Vachudova 
2012; Dimulescu et al. 2013; Surubaru 2016a). Overall, political factors could act as 
either positive or negative drivers for the absorption of EU funds.  
 
The EU’s role for domestic CP delivery was also influential. This was not only given a 
‘top-down’ pressure, but in light of the technical assistance provided by EU institutions 
to national structures and actors. Moreover, the two mechanisms that Brussels could 
use, audits and interruption/suspension of funding, remained powerful tools which 
contributed to the different turning points in the management and implementation of 
the funding in the two countries. That is not to say that Brussels’ role was not 
controversial, in particular with regard to the divergent interpretations on 
procurement law or the justification for financial corrections. Often, such issues 
tended to portray a political and institutional power clash between the different levels 
involved in the implementation of Cohesion Policy, especially in a post-enlargement 
context where the EC’s leverage was reduced.   
 
All in all, in both countries, there was a strong link between administrative capacity 
elements and political factors. This was the case given the persistent and influential 
presence of the latter and their impact on domestic institutional environments, a 
characteristic of most post-communist polities. For instance, where political driven 
changes of staff were minimal a certain administrative capacity could grow with the 
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potential to influence absorption performance. The variation in performance between 
the two countries was much influenced by the presence of political stability and 
support, as positive political conditions, whilst political clientelism could act as a 
negative, disruptive factor. All in all, the degree to which political factors affected 
administrative capacity developments provides a viable explanation for some of the 
macro-level developments presented in this chapter. Further investigating the 
empirical link between the two, and their impact on SF absorption, constitutes one of 
the main lines of inquiry for the several thematic case studies examined in the 
remainder of this thesis.  
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Chapter 5: The management and 
implementation of the Operational 
Programme for Human Resources 
Development 
 
 
5. Introduction  
 
One sunny summer day in Plovdiv, several hundred people attended a symposium on 
strategies for the deinstitutionalisation of Bulgarian children. The two-day event was 
organised by the Ministry of Labour and the Social Protection Agency and was 
attended by teachers and staff working in state owned orphanages. Most of the costs 
for specialised internal and international trainers, study materials, catering, transport 
and accommodation were covered from the European Social Fund via the Bulgarian 
Operational Programme for Human Resources. During the last decade, SF were used 
to fund such educational and training events taking place over the country. The 
deinstitutionalisation of children was, for instance, highlighted as one of the most 
successful EU-funded activities facilitated by EU funding (Ivanova and Bogdanov 
2013). 
  
The Human Resources Operational Programme (OPHR) aimed to improve the areas 
of employment, education and social inclusion by seeking to strengthen human capital 
development in both countries. The OPHR programmes were medium sized OPs 
financed from the European Social Fund (ESF). Throughout the 2007-2013 
implementation period, there were strong differences in terms of financial 
performance between the Bulgarian and the Romanian OPHR programmes. The 
former was one of the most successful, reaching by June 2015, a 93 % absorption rate, 
whilst its counterpart only managed a 33 % absorption rate. Moreover, OPHR-RO has 
been interrupted and suspended several times during 2007-2014, due to concerns 
regarding an irregular use of funds (DG Employment AAR 2013). By contrast, the 
OPHR-BG only had its payments temporarily blocked in 2010. Given the similar 
architecture and approach of the Human Resources programmes, in both countries, 
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the differences in financial performance constitute a puzzling aspect which will be 
further investigated in this chapter. The evidence gathered underlined the strong 
administrative capacity differences between the institutions involved in the 
management and implementation of the two programmes. Moreover, issues of 
politicisation have considerably affected the management and implementation of the 
Romanian OPHR. In order to understand why the two programmes ended up in such 
a different state it is, thus, necessary to flesh out the specific circumstances and factors 
that influenced them. 
 
The following section examines the administrative capacity of the central and regional 
level institutions involved in the management of the Human Resources OP. It does so 
by drawing on an extensive analysis of primary sources (legislation, OP strategies, 
annual implementation reports, ex-ante and interim evaluations) and secondary 
sources (expert evaluations, studies, civil society and positions of beneficiaries, 
newspaper articles). In addition, the analysis was greatly enriched with insights from 
semi-structured interviews carried out with key participants including representatives 
of Managing Authorities, Intermediate Bodies, consultants, beneficiaries and civil 
society actors. The evidence is outlined in line with the administrative capacity and 
political factors scrutinised in this study.  
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5.1 The Bulgarian Human Resources Operational 
Programme (OPHR-BG) 
  
The Bulgarian Human Resources Development Operational Programme (OPHR-BG) 
was officially released in September 2007 and aimed to: “a) Increase the labour supply 
and the quality of the workforce; b) Increase investment in human capital through 
better and more accessible education” and c) More social capital, partnerships and 
networks and development of social economy” (OPHR-BG September 2007, 68). The 
programme was divided into eight priority axis, each with its own fields of intervention 
and objectives, as well as with a specific financial allocation (detailed in Table 13). 
During 2007-2013, OPHR-BG was the 5th largest, out of seven Bulgarian programmes 
and had a total allocation of EUR 1.2 billion. 
 
Table 13: OPHR-BG – Priority Axis and Financial Allocation (2007-2013) 
 
Priority Axis  
 
Community 
Funding  
(EUR million) 
 
National 
contribution  
(EUR 
million) 
Total 
(EUR million) 
Priority axis 1: Promotion of 
economic activity and 
development of inclusive 
labour market 
216.675.719 38.236.892 254.912.611 
Priority axis 2: Raising the 
productivity and adaptability of 
the employed persons 
185.722.045 32.774.478 218.496.523 
Priority axis 3: Improving the 
quality of education and 
training in correspondence 
with the labour market needs 
for building a knowledge-based 
economy 
206.357.828 36.416.087 242.773.915 
Priority axis 4: Improving the 
access to education and 
training  
165.086.262 29.132.870 194.219.312 
Priority axis 5: Social inclusion 
and promotion of social 
economy 
144.450.479 25.491.261 169.941.740 
Priority axis 6: Improving the 
effectiveness of labour market 
institutions and of social and 
healthcare services 
51.589.457 9.104.022 60.693.479 
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Priority axis 7: Transnational 
and interregional cooperation 
20.635.783 3.641.609 24.277.292 
Priority axis 8: Technical 
assistance 
41.271.566 7.283.217 48.554.783 
 1.031.789.139 182.080.436 1.213.869.575 
Source: OPHR-BG September 2007, 142-144. 
 
In terms of absorption performance, the OPHR-BG has been one of the most 
successful programmes in the country. At the end of 2013, OPHR-BG was the second 
best performing programme after OP Transport (58.43%) and at the end of 2014 it was 
the programme with the best financial performance (83.10%) from all Bulgarian 
programmes.  
 
Table 14: OPHR-BG evolution of financial absorption (2007-2015)  
Years Contracted 
(EUR million) 
Paid to beneficiaries 
(EUR million)  
Payments from EC  
(final absorption) 
(EUR million) 
 Nominal  Percent Nominal Percent Nominal Percent 
2007-
2009 
423.364.583 20.98% 66.218.916 3.28% 3.956.894 0.3% 
2010 488.632.137 47.36% 108.121.506 8.91% 91.903.280 8.91% 
2011 790.768.007 65.14% 195.586.525 16.20% 167.098.546 16.20% 
2012 1.036.631.619 85.4% 385.571.386 32% 222.347.667 21.55% 
2013 1.187.736.975 97.85% 734.167.296 60.48% 598.964.969 58.05% 
2014 1.275.013.355 105.04% 1.017.553.398 83.83% 857.442.256 83.10% 
2015 
(June) 
1.280.387.647 105.48% 1.098.460.006 90.49% 962.921.513 93.33% 
Source: Council of Ministers of Bulgaria, absorption rates retrieved from 
http://eufunds.bg/bg/page/766  
 
The Bulgarian Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, the Managing Authority (MA) for 
the programme gained some experience in managing PHARE funds. During 1999-
2007, as part of the pre-accession institutional framework, the Ministry acted as an 
Implementing Agency of the “Social Development” section of the PHARE programme. 
It was estimated that during this time the Ministry managed projects amounting to 
EUR 114 million (OPHR-BG September 2007, 63). By the end of 2010, the National 
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Audit Authority deemed the management and control systems for OPHR-BG as 
“working” with only some further improvements required (OPHR-BG AIR 2010, 50). 
 
5.1.1 Administrative capacity and OPHR-BG  
 
Official documents highlighted that the pre-accession experience offered a strong basis 
for the future development of the programme’s administrative capacity: “as regards 
the institutional capacity building, the PHARE programme has contributed a lot to 
strengthening the administrative capacity on central, regional and local level” (OPHR-
BG September 2007, 64). With all this, one of the main threats identified for the 
implementation of the programme was the “insufficient institutional capacity, at the 
central, regional and local levels for absorbing EU funds” (Ibid., 66). The following 
section discusses more in depth the administrative capacity of the programme and the 
factors affecting its development.  
 
Institutional capacity (ADM1) 
From an institutional point of view (ADM1), the Managing Authority of the 
programme had to “ensure that all institutions involved in the HRD OP management 
and implementation have sufficient technical and administrative capacity to ensure 
full compliance with their designated tasks” (OPHR-BG September 2007, 145-46). In 
other words, the MA was responsible for ensuring an adequate administrative capacity 
for the management of the programme.  Figure 7 outlines the structure of the MA and 
the relationship between its internal services.  
 
The MA OPHR-BG was assisted in the management process by three Intermediate 
Bodies (IBs). The IBs for OPHR-BG were three distinct public institutions, namely the:  
a) Employment Agency (managing Priority axis 1 and Priority axis 2); 
b) Ministry of Education and Science (managing Priority axis 3 and Priority axis 4); 
c) Social Assistance Agency (managing Priority axis 5). 
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Figure 7: MA structure of OPHR-BG  
 
Source: Bulgarian Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, retrieved from: 
http://ef.mlsp.government.bg/en/about.php  (accessed August 2015). 
  
The remaining priority axis 6, 7 and 8 were managed solely by the MA. In principle, 
the IBs had assigned tasks and acted mainly as 1st level of control bodies and were 
mainly in charge of “collecting and evaluating project proposals, organising the project 
selection, concluding contracts with beneficiaries, undertaking on-the-spot checks, 
preparing regular reports, collecting information on detected irregularities” (OPHR-
BG, September 2007, 146). IBs had some leverage with regard to their specific 
expertise but were coordinated extensively by the Managing Authority (Bulgarian 
Intermediate Body Representative #1). 
  
Being part of the Ministry of Labour, ensured that the MA had access to a wide 
institutional infrastructure at the local and regional level, one of the key institutional 
strengths of the programme. The Ministry had offices in all 28 Oblasti (NUTS 3) which 
acted as local antennae and could ensure the interface between central structures and 
beneficiaries on the ground. In this respect, in terms of design, the MA for OPHR-BG 
retained a traditional management oriented role, with IBs and local level offices 
carrying the bulk of the work on the ground. This might have allowed the MA to 
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concentrate on strategic issues. An ex-ante evaluation of the programme concluded 
that overall:  
“The management mechanisms for the implementation, monitoring and 
financing of the HRD OP are well defined...those mechanisms’ roles and 
responsibilities are described, as well as the cooperation between them. The 
implementation, monitoring and financing procedures are structured in a 
logical way, including all the involved actors step by step, with reference to each 
one’s role and responsibilities.” (Virtanen et. al. 2006, 5) 
 
The institutional design used did not entail an entirely smooth institutional 
coordination between the bodies involved in the management of the programme, 
despite weekly meetings between the MA and IBs (OPHR-BG AIR 2009, 67).  Several 
issues emerged. First, there were problems of cooperation between the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policy (central MA) and the Ministry of Education (Education IB). 
These were generated by differences in approach and frequent tensions between the 
two political ministers. A statement from an official, when asked about the relationship 
between the two, was revealing of the situation:  
“It’s a difficult question because there are two ministries involved. Our Ministry 
of Labour is MA and the Ministry of Education is IB. Somehow it is difficult for 
the Minister of Labour to order / control the other Minister. The Ministry of 
Education follows its policy and we as Ministry of Labour have some 
responsibilities to ensure some financial management / we have setup criteria 
that we follow. In some cases, we had intensive discussions with other 
Ministries. The Employment Agency and the Agency of Social Assistance are 
part of the system of the Ministry of Labour. The minister is responsible for the 
activities of those two agencies. In those cases, it is easier. But somehow it is 
difficult to get a political balance between the two. That is one issue.” (Deputy 
Director of a Bulgarian Managing Authority #2) 
 
 
Second, similar tensions between the central MA and Intermediate Bodies led, 
particularly in their first years of implementation, to an uncoordinated interpretation 
of procedures. This determined the MA to adopt a common procedural manual 
(OPHR-BG AIR 2010, 58). With all this, underlining institutional and political 
tensions persisted between the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Education 
(Bulgarian Auditor #1).61 
 
Finally, with regard to institutional accountability, the OPHR-BG was generally seen 
as one of the most transparent and open programmes in the country. In this respect, 
                                                             
61 A direct consequence of these tensions was the creation of the “Science and Education” Operational 
Programme that, during 2014-2020, would be managed solely by the Bulgarian Ministry of Education.  
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it was argued that the regional structures and local help desks allowed for a good 
communication with beneficiaries (Bulgarian Intermediate Body Representative #1; 
Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2). In spite of this, there were 
initial problems in developing a more customer-oriented approach towards 
beneficiaries. One of the explanations was that the authorities were initially not 
allowed to provide information to beneficiaries on an individual basis (Bulgarian 
Intermediate Body representative #1). This might have derived from the need to avoid 
conflicts of interest or favouritism towards certain beneficiaries. Equally, it reflected 
the lack of experience and the more cautious approach taken by the managing 
institutions during the first implementation period of European funding.    
 
Bureaucratic capacity (ADM2) 
OPHR-BG had to build its own legal and procedural architecture. For example, decree 
No. 180 of 27 July 2007 “Laying down detailed rules for the eligibility of expenditure 
under the Operational Programme Development of Human Resources", funded by the 
European Social Fund” was the primary legal basis for the programme at the national 
level. There were no specific problems with the legal and procedural infrastructure for 
the programme. However, as discussed above, the responsible institutional structures 
had some problems in reaching a unitary interpretation of procedures (OPHR-BG AIR 
2009, 56). 
 
The programme has arguably been one of the most coherent in terms of its procedural 
framework and received positive reviews from European representatives (EC Head of 
Unit #2; EC Head of Sector #1). In addition, it seems that it developed strong project 
management tools and methodologies for the different operational aspects of the 
absorption process. Some argued that much of the experience in terms of project 
management, particularly in terms of ensuring adequate audit trails were borrowed 
from the PHARE experience (Bulgarian Intermediate Body Representative #1). 
Moreover, the OPHR-BG was among the only Bulgarian programmes that used 
extensively, for different calls for applications, online tools and electronic procedures. 
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In 2015, it was the only programme to be fully available online for managing projects 
by administrators and beneficiaries.62  
 
In terms of monitoring and verification, some beneficiaries argued that the reporting 
procedures and the documentation required were excessive and highly burdensome 
(Bulgarian Expert #2). There was a tendency from the authorities to ask for additional 
documents, even if these were not requested at the EU level. One of the explanations 
for this was advanced by an OPHR-BG beneficiary when comparing national and 
European procedures: 
“I think that first there is a difference, for sure, even in the requirements of the 
European Commission to the Managing Authorities. The EC has much stronger 
requirements. When we report to the European Commission, of course we have 
all the documents. We report to the EC with a table of invoices. They ask us: 
“Provide us with five invoices – no. 200, 500, 600 etc”. In Bulgaria you should 
take a car and fill the entire car with copies of invoices and go to MAs. 
Sometimes the car is not big enough. Sometimes you should take a van for all 
invoices, protocols and so on. In the European Commission usually for a 
programme they have 3-4 project officers responsible for 100 projects. In 
Bulgaria this is much more different. The procedures of the EC are much 
simpler.”  (Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #3) 
 
 
Finally, the authorities sought to use technical assistance funding to develop ways 
through which they would reduce administrative burdens and simplify procedures for 
on the spot checks and payment claims verifications (OPHR-BG AIR 2010). 
Nevertheless, as will be seen in Romania’s case, problems related much more to the 
nature of the programme and the fact that the results of projects were difficult to assess 
administratively. For the latter, beneficiaries were forced to produce a wide range of 
documents attesting the use of the funds and to justify the various activities carried 
out within the projects. 63 
 
Human resources capacity (ADM3)  
The experience, continuity and capacity of the structures managing OPHR-BG was one 
of the key strengths for the programme’s success. At the time of the collection of the 
                                                             
62 Sofia Globe, 9 May 2015 “Bulgaria launches first online application system for EU funds”, available 
at: http://sofiaglobe.com/2015/05/09/bulgaria-launches-first-online-application-system-for-eu-
funds/ (accessed August 2015).  
63 Arguably, this was one of the most problematic aspects in the management of the programme in 
both countries. 
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data, in May-June 2014, approximately 380 staff worked in the structures dealing with 
the programme. 
 
Table 15: OPHR-BG distribution of staff 
Institution Approximate no. of staff 
Managing Authority - Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 120 
Intermediate Body - Employment Agency 100 
Intermediate Body - Social Assistance Agency 60 
Intermediate Body - Ministry of Education and Science 100 
Total 380 
Source: Council of Ministers 2013, Annex 7 & Bulgarian Interviewees (Deputy Director of 
Bulgarian Managing Authority #1; Bulgarian Intermediate Body Representative #1)  
 
The expertise of staff working on OPHR-BG was considered to be high, partly due to 
continuity from the pre-accession period (Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing 
Authoriy#1) and the strong professional connections among staff (Bulgarian 
Intermediate Body Representative #1). Trainings were an important way to develop 
expertise (Bulgarian Parliament report 2011, 16). Moreover, staff appreciated that 
there were “enough” opportunities in this respect, with individual training plans being 
tailored to “individual needs” (Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). 
The extensive use of technical assistance also enabled expertise-formation. By the end 
of 2013, 16.3 million EUR were used “in order to increase capacity and improve 
workflow” (OPHR-BG AIR 2010, 183-84). Financial and professional incentives were 
particularly important. During the first years of implementation, technical assistance 
was used to partially reimburse the salaries and bonuses of employees hired in these 
institutions.  
 
Two other aspects were the role of consultancies and of beneficiaries. Regarding the 
former, it was difficult to find any specific data on OPHR-BG. However, some civil 
society representatives argued that the use of consultancies crippled the ability of non-
governmental organisations to develop their own capacity to manage projects 
(Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #1; Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #3; Bulgarian 
Intermediate Body Representative #1). More widely, it was considered that 
consultancies were not suitable for human resources related interventions. 
Nevertheless, many of the latter were involved as service providers in areas such as 
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training and employment. Secondly, beneficiaries played an important role in the life 
of the programme. An analysis of the database of beneficiaries64 revealed that (apart 
from various firms, NGOs, primary and secondary schools, universities, research and 
professional institutes) most Bulgarian municipalities equally benefited from OPHR 
funds. Several claimed that the capacity of municipalities and NGOs to deal with 
external aid was particularly weak (Marinov et al. 2006; Vincellete and Vassileva 
2006). The above was confirmed by the testimonies of some interviewees who 
emphasized on the problems faced by local administrators, ranging from frequent 
changes in management teams to the low financial and technical capacity of NGOs:  
“The big problem was that beneficiaries were also building their capacity. 
Municipalities and NGO’s especially. There are good NGO’s, especially the big 
ones, but small ones have had difficulties. In Municipalities the main problems 
were the changing of teams with every election. It happens when we contract a 
project that was prepared by the former administration that the mayor said that 
„I don’t know this project. Why should I contract it?...Yes, there is 
improvement, with every call they become better. Also, in absorption, at the 
beginning they absorbed only 70% and now 90% of the funds for their projects. 
This is a good indicator that they can adapt the budget to their needs.” 
(Bulgarian Intermediate Body Representative #1) 
 
With all this, and as illustrated by the above quote, throughout the 2007-2013 period, 
some municipalities improved their ability to manage funding.65 Progresses were 
made in technical and financial management terms. The Bulgarian authorities made 
strong efforts to support beneficiaries in the development and implementation of their 
projects (OPHR-BG AIR 2013). Based on some of the evidence gathered it can be 
argued that the authorities developed a good relationship with the programme’s 
stakeholders. One of the ways this was achieved was through a large territorialized 
institutional infrastructure. 
 
 
 
                                                             
64 The data is valid for 15 July 2015 and was retrieved from: http://umispublic.government.bg/ 
(accessed August 2015). 
65 Presentation held for the Seventh Thematic Working Group for the development of an Operational 
Programme Development of Human Resources 2014-2020, 27/11/2013, available at: 
http://ophrd.government.bg/view_file.php/19432 (accessed August 2015) 
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Territorial capacity (TER) 
OPHR-BG benefited from a good local and regional infrastructure and network. The 
central structure of the Managing Authority was assisted by regional and monitoring 
and control units that had up to five employees based in each of the 28 administrative 
counties (Oblasti) of the country (Council of Ministers 2013, Annex 7). Staff working 
at the local level acted as a first level of control on all administrative, financial and 
technical verifications undertaken prior and after contracting projects. For instance, 
the Social Assistance Agency Intermediate Body had technical and financial experts at 
the Oblasti level carrying out these verifications: 
“We have regional experts that do the monitoring in these offices. We have 28 
technical experts and 28 accountants that check these claims. Also, we have 2 
ERDF infrastructure experts at the national level checking any overlap with 
ERDF and 1 public procurement expert. Our regional experts send us the 
reports and in our IB we have a person responsible for one call, which makes 
random verification checks.” (Bulgarian Intermediate Body Representative #1)  
 
Spread widely across the country, staff could potentially ensure good monitoring and 
verification of the compliance with rules and procedures for the programme. This 
provided a strong basis for the programme’s implementation support. As a 
consequence, there were no notable expertise discrepancies between central and 
regional level authorities. In fact, many of the latter had more practical and “on the 
ground” experience as compared to the former (Deputy Director of Bulgarian 
Managing Authority #1). Therefore, despite the overly-centralized Bulgarian state, its 
territorial institutional settings seem to have been functional and have worked for the 
implementation of the programme. Nevertheless, the fact that the programme had a 
wide popular appeal meant that it potentially benefited from certain political pre-
eminence, discussed in the following section.  
 
5.1.2 Political factors and OPHR-BG 
 
In a country with less than eight million inhabitants, OPHR-BG sought to target the 
educational, training and social needs of more than one million citizens. Given its 
visibility, at the societal level, OPHR-BG managed to attract considerable political 
attention. For instance, on 15 October 2012, the then prime minister Boyko Borisov, 
together with the education minister, Sergei Ignatov, attended a ceremony in which 
they signed contracts with beneficiaries under two distinct funding schemes of the 
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programme: BG051PO001-3.3.06 "Support for the development of PhD students, 
post-graduates and young scientists" and BG051PO001-4.3.04 "Development of 
electronic forms of distance learning in higher education".66 These were public events 
which sent a message to a well targeted political audience, namely to students and 
employees working in the education sector. Overall, political factors seemed to have 
played a rather positive role in the life of the programme. This section will now discuss 
the findings and the effects that political factors had on the management and 
implementation of the Bulgarian Human Resources programme.  
 
Political Stability (POL1)  
OPHR-BG benefited from moderate levels of political stability. During 2007-2013, 
there were several changes in terms of operational management and political 
leadership of the programme. There were, however, mixed interpretations on the 
impact that these changes had for the overall functionality of the institutions managing 
the programme. In general, political changes triggered legal developments or delays 
in deciding on the institutional structures responsible for the implementation (e.g. for 
the 2014-2020 period) (Deputy Director of a Bulgarian Managing Authority #2).  
 
Political interference in the appointments of managerial and executive staff in the 
Managing Authority and Intermediate Bodies of the programme was present 
throughout the period. In principle, the Deputy Minister of the Ministry in which the 
Managing Authority resided was the official political head of the programme and the 
convener of the Monitoring Committee. Administratively, the MA was headed by a 
Director and a Deputy Director. During 2007-2014, the Managing Authority had four 
different directors. According to public data, between 2012 and 2014 for instance, four 
different Deputy Ministers oversaw the management of the programme.67 Whenever 
governments were changed or suffered a reshuffle, deputy ministers seem to have been 
changed almost automatically, including during interim governments. This may have 
accentuated volatility in terms of political leadership. Nevertheless, according to a 
senior manager, whenever political changes occurred the “rule of thumb” was that 
                                                             
66 Bulgarian Managing Authority for Human Resources Development, Press Release, 15 October 2012, 
available at: http://ophrd.government.bg/view_doc.php/6048 (accessed August 2015).  
67 Data extracted from the public hearings for the Committee dealing with the preparation of the 2014-
2020, available at: http://ophrd.government.bg/view_doc.php/6030 (accessed August 2015). 
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Deputy Directors became Directors, in case the latter were dismissed. This ensured 
“continuity” in management:  
“One of our first Directors became Deputy Ministers. The position of Director 
was taken by his Deputy. Then he became again Deputy Minister responsible 
for the management of the programme, but her functions were taken by her 
deputy. There is continuity” (Deputy Director of Managing Authority #1). 
  
Confirming this practice, the actual Deputy Director interviewed became a full director 
several months after the interview. With all this, the extent to which administrative 
functions, within these structures, were allocated on a professional or on a political 
basis was unclear. From the evidence gathered, explanations were mixed and tended 
to converge towards one point: Deputy Ministers and Deputy Directors of the 
Managing Authority played a strong administrative and operational role, whereas the 
Minister and the Director of the MA fulfilled a rather more political role. According to 
an external observer, and beneficiary of the programme, high level appointments were 
made on a meritocratic basis in the MA, although there were some notable differences 
between the different political entities involved in the management of the programme:  
“In principle, the chair of the MA is the Deputy Minister. So it is a political 
figure. One of the good things is that up to now, these Deputy Ministers are 
professionals. They are not so political party oriented. It is not the same in the 
ERDF, especially in the rural areas and the rural development programme. But 
in the ESF ones, Science and Education and so on, my impression is that the 
deputy ministers are more experts than politicians. I. K. is a very good example, 
because he was in the Ministry of Labour, in the agency of employment and is 
now in the Ministry of Education. He has political links with the socialist party 
and so on, but even when GERB was in power he raised his career. The same is 
I. I. she is also a very good professional in the ministry of Labour. Before, she 
was in the Agency for Employment…My impression is that they are more 
appointed on an expert basis but of course there are cases in which they are 
appointed on a political party basis. In these cases, it’s usually the Deputy 
Minister who is doing the real job. For sure, for example now D. D. is a good 
professional. He is not linked with any of them. In the ministry of Education, I. 
M. who is Director General of Structural Funds is for sure affiliated to the 
Socialist party. Whereas the Deputy Director S. T., who is Deputy Director, is a 
very good professional and he is doing the real job. It depends.” (Bulgarian Civil 
Society Leader #3)  
 
The above also suggests that there were variations in vision and approach between 
different political ministries, between the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy and the 
Ministry of Education and Science. It equally pointed to the important role played by 
Deputy Ministers and Directors in the management of the programme. Therefore, 
there was no real evidence to suggest that the politicisation, under the form of political 
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patronage, has influenced in a negative manner the management of the programme. 
All in all, OPHR-BG benefited from a reasonable degree of internal stability and 
political interference didn’t act as a negative political factor. 
 
Political support (POL2) 
Political support was an important driver for OPHR-BG. As illustrated above, several 
politicians found politically opportune to speak about the outputs and potential impact 
of the programme. In light of the programmes’ high number of beneficiaries and 
visibility, it benefited from a reasonable level of political support. Generally, the 
Bulgarian Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, as well as the Ministry of Education 
and Science, are ministries with a strong political profile. This is particularly the case 
because they deal with widespread popular policies in the area of labour, pensions, 
and social inclusion, and, respectively, education. Following the financial crisis, funds 
typically granted from OPHR for the above areas were strongly prioritised by the 
Council of Ministers in Sofia. In this respect, it may have been that many national and 
local politicians sought to transform the outputs of these projects into political capital. 
When asked about the political support allocated to the OPHR-BG, two unrelated 
external observers stated that the programmes received support particularly due to its 
societal usefulness (Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #1; Bulgarian Civil Society Leader 
#3). 
 
The tensions between the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Education could have 
been a consequence of the increasing political capital associated with the programme. 
As a consequence, for 2014-2020, the programme was divided in two: the Education 
and Science Operational Programme politically managed by the Education ministry 
and the Human Resources managed by the Labour Ministry.68 Apart from the ongoing 
political tensions between the two ministries, there were European concerns on the 
low administrative capacity of the Education ministry, specifically because it may have 
                                                             
68 In a public statement, the European Commissioner for Regional Policy, Johannes Hahn expressed 
his “doubts about the capacity of Bulgaria’s Education Ministry to manage a separate program taking 
into account that in the ongoing programming period it risked losing a substantial amount of EU 
funding under the Human Resources Development and the Administrative Capacity Operational 
Programme”. Retrieved from Novinite.com, 23 September 2013, “Bulgaria to Get EU Funding 
Specially Allocated to Education”, Available at: 
http://www.novinite.com/articles/153884/Bulgaria+to+Get+EU+Funding+Specially+Allocated+to+
Education#sthash.Dophu6Qm.dpuf (accessed august 2015).  
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been more politicised, as compared to the Labour ministry. Nevertheless, the political 
fragmentation and the importance attributed to education related funds resulted in 
two distinct Managing Authorities. Based on the empirical analysis, there was some 
evidence to suggest that the programme did benefit from strong levels of political 
support.  
 
Political clienteles (POL3) 
Political clienteles have been specifically defined in this thesis as the political 
interference in the distribution of European funds and, more broadly, in the 
absorption process. Drawing on the documentary analysis and reports from 
interviewees no evidence was adduced of any negative political interference in the life 
of the programme. Nevertheless, some OPHR-BG affiliated interviewees stressed that 
the distribution of funds was stricto senso a political exercise:  
“The needs [in terms of human resources development] are large and you 
should set priorities. And in order for that you need to make political decisions 
in which sphere you invest more instead of the others.” (Deputy Director of 
Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). 
 
Moreover, with regard to potential political profiteering from OPHR-BG distribution, 
some administrators did not dismiss the possibility of political actors benefiting from 
the programme, particularly on training related projects (Bulgarian Intermediate 
Body Representative #1). However, a senior administrator mentioned that only 
judicial courts could establish whether or not funds are allocated in an unlawful 
manner and that political parties did not intervene, in a clientelistic fashion, in the 
distribution process and that the programme had only a few irregularities with a 
“limited financial impact”:  
“But just to say in a very open way, we are not influenced by the political parties. 
I don’t know in my work I haven’t had that. For example, political parties and 
political structures what projects we have to select, what kind of operations we 
should launch. I haven’t witnessed that.” (Deputy Director of Bulgarian of 
Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). 
 
Some of the beneficiaries and external observers interviewed confirmed that there was 
no evidence about a politicised distribution of funds and that, in fact, some of the 
administrators acted as political entrepreneurs, preventing any political interference 
in the process: “[these problems were] especially for OPAC, not for Human Resources. 
For Human Resources they have a good professional that didn’t allow this” (Bulgarian 
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Civil Society Leader #3). This corroborated with other primary sources (e.g. European 
audit reports) which did not show any evidence of negative political interference in the 
management and implementation of the programme.  
 
5.1.3 EU role and influence (EUR) 
 
EU institutions retain an important say in ensuring that EU funding is properly spent 
and in line with European strategic objectives. The technical influence of the European 
Commission (EC) was felt through most stages of OPHR-BG. In this respect, DG 
Employment and Social Affairs (DG EMPL) provided support to the Bulgarian 
authorities. Following problems with pre-accession funding, particularly for PHARE, 
DG EMPL closely monitored the situation in the country (DG EMPL AAR 2008, 35).  
 
Interviewees on the ground reported that they developed good working relationships 
with desk officers from the EC (Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). 
Moreover, assistance was provided from broad strategic issues and “even for small 
practical issues” (Bulgarian Intermediate Body Representative #1). In addition, the 
Commission was highly influential during the workings of the Monitoring Committee 
of the programme. During such meetings, the EC equally pushed, for instance, for the 
introduction of targeted calls for the Roma minorities, initially ignored by the 
authorities: 
“Especially in the field of Roma integration the Commission is our very 
important ally. They supported us very much, first when the previous 
programmes were prepared. Even at that time our main ally because the 
national institutions were against including any targeted calls for Roma. They 
were even against including the word Roma in the Operational Programmes. 
We raised suggestions and the national authorities denied and after this the 
European Commission recommended to the national authorities. Also, during 
the entire period when we asked for targeted calls, the Commission was our first 
ally. It is a very important ally and they are very supportive, especially in the 
field of Roma integration.” (Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #3) 
 
Despite the programme’s regular outlook, payments for the programme were blocked 
in 2010, following reports from EU auditors which “revealed weakness on selection of 
operations, management verifications and audit trail” (DG Employment AAR 2010, 
73). Nevertheless, the OPHR-BG was never completely interrupted or suspended by 
the European authorities and the 2010 events were seen only as a “temporary 
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blockage” (Deputy Director of a Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). Arguably, the fact 
that the programme never had its payments suspended, as compared to its Romanian 
counterpart, denoted its general degree of functionality. Brussels based interviewees 
equally pointed to the sharp discrepancies between the Bulgarian and the Romanian 
OPHR. What made such a similar programme, in Romania, face fundamentally 
different problems as compared to its Bulgarian counterpart is something that will be 
addressed more in-depth in the following section. 
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5.2 The Romania Human Resources Operational 
Programme (OPHR-RO) 
 
During 2007-2013, the Human Resources Development Operational Programme 
(OPHR-RO) was one of the most visible and most controversial Operational 
Programmes in Romania. Officially, OPHR-RO aimed to address: “the development of 
human capital and increase of competitiveness, through correlating education and 
lifelong learning with the labour market and ensuring enhanced opportunities, for 
participation on a modern, flexible and inclusive labour market, for 1.650.000 
persons” (OPHR-RO November 2007, 61). To achieve this universal objective, the 
programme was divided into seven priority axes, with total of funding of a little over 
four billion EUR, as presented in Table 16. This made it the 4th largest out of the seven 
OPs implemented in the country during 2007-2013.  
Table 16: OPHR-RO - Priority Axis and Financial Allocation (2007-2013) 
 
Priority Axis 
 
Community 
Funding  
(EUR million) 
National 
contribution  
(EUR 
million) 
Total 
(EUR million) 
Priority Axis 1: Education and 
training in support for growth 
and development of knowledge 
based society 
797.803.989 193.984.825 991.788.814 
Priority Axis 2: Linking lifelong 
learning and labour market 
911.775.778 79.621.406 991.397.184 
Priority Axis 3: Increasing 
adaptability of workers and 
enterprises 
450.189.271 69.467.140 519.656.411 
Priority Axis 4: Modernization 
of Public Employment Service 
176.656.289 58.885.430 235.541.719 
Priority Axis 5: Promoting 
active employment measures  
476.402.823 66.953.221 543.356.044 
Priority Axis 6: Promoting 
social inclusion  
540.608.927 103.399.059 644.007.986 
Priority Axis 7: Technical 
Assistance 
122.707.919 40.902.637 163.610.556 
 3.476.144.996 613.213.718 4.089.358.714 
Source: OPHR-RO November 2007, 131 
 
 
 156 
 
OPHR-RO was one of the, if not the, worst performing programmes from all seven 
Romanian OPs. At the end of 2014, it had the lowest absorption rate with only 28.75% 
of its payments being reimbursed by the Commission. The Romanian Environment 
OP followed with 39.78% and the Economic Competitiveness OP with 48.90%. After 
tripling its financial performance at the end of 2013, the programme was suspended 
by the European Commission in 2014, following an extensive verification and control 
of contracted and implemented projects (DG EMPL AAR annexes 2013, 54). 
Thereafter, the programme’s financial absorption stalled again.  
 
Table 17: OPHR-RO evolution of financial absorption (2007-2015) 
Years Contracted 
(Romanian LEI - 
million) 
Paid to beneficiaries 
(Romanian LEI – 
million) 
Payments from EC  
(final absorption) 
(EUR – million) 
 Nominal  Percent Nominal Percent Nominal Percent 
2007-
2009 
2.721.319.117 53.89% 258.575.813 6.54% 26.067.825 0.08% 
2010 13.898.199.799 74.71% 2.039.469.045 30.27% 204.655.178 13.36% 
2011 15.046.023.855 42.47% 1.968.043.297 15.88% 152.812.359 5.48% 
2012 14.978.177.484 56.25% 2.692.837.712 19.95% 172.914.330 6.77% 
2013 15.274.796.984 81.74% 8.081.347.097 47.04% 948.109.892 27.27% 
2014 22.402.904.804 121.05% 9.981.711.345 58.31% 999.452.445 28.75% 
2015 
(June) 
23.530.974.182 126.72% 11.111.356.872 64.51% 1.157.544.813 33.30% 
Source: Romanian Government, absorption rates retrieved from Annex I archives available 
at: http://www.fonduri-ue.ro/ (accessed August 2015) 
 
The slow evolution and low absorption performance of OPHR-RO, as compared to its 
Bulgarian sister programme, was highly puzzling. In order to understand what 
triggered these discrepancies, the following sections outline the main findings 
regarding the administrative capacity of the institutions managing the programme, as 
well as the wider political factors that affected the programme’s performance.  
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5.2.1 Administrative capacity and OPHR-RO 
 
During the pre-accession period, several structures which will become the main 
entities implementing OPHR-RO, benefited from European pre-accession assistance 
funds. The Romanian Ministry of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family (MMSSF) was 
involved in the process as a PHARE implementing agency. On 2 April 2007, the 
European Commission granted the Ministry of Education an Extended 
Decentralisation Implementation System (EDIS) status.69 This meant that the latter 
could continue the implementation of the remaining PHARE grants in a decentralised 
manner, without guidance or ex-ante control from the Bucharest based 
Representation of the European Commission. For example, between 2001 and 2006, 
approximately 17.8 million EUR were invested in the development of the institutional 
capacity of the Ministry of Labour and its affiliated agencies (e.g. Agency of 
Employment).70 With all this, one of the main threats identified for the 
implementation of the programme was the: “limited absorption capacity of structural 
funds/difficult adjustment to the structural fund requirements” (OPHR-RO 
November 2007, 55). Some interviewees clearly emphasized that, in early 2007, the 
Romanian authorities were not prepared to cope with the flow of European funding in 
this area: 
“There are two aspects one should keep in mind. To what extent it [the 
programme] was prepared from a policy point of view and from an institutional 
point of view. With regard to the latter, Romania was extremely underprepared. 
But they could only rely on their pre-accession experience – because 
programmes such as ESF did not exist. There were some institutions that 
managed ESF related activities, such as the Ministry of Education or the 
Employment Agency. These manage projects amounting to several million 
EUR. However, when the programmes came the stakes were much higher, 
having to manage several billions and with the previous experiences not being 
necessarily relevant. Pre-accession institutional structures were only small 
departments in the Ministries which then became much larger structures, still 
affiliated to the Ministries but with a larger degree of independence.” (EC Head 
of Sector #1) 
  
One of the main problems for OPHR-RO was the lack of relevant experience and the 
problems posed by the novelty of Structural Funds interventions. Institutional 
                                                             
69 Fonduri-Structurale.ro, 5 April 2007, [The European Commission approved the decentralized 
management of the PHARE programme by the MMSSF], available at: http://www.fonduri-
structurale.ro/detaliu.aspx?eID=620&t=Stiri (accessed August 2015). 
70 The data was compiled based on the analysis of PHARE grants issued during 2001-2006, presented 
in the Annexes of the main programming document – OPHR RO, November 2007, 177-190.  
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structures were not fit for purposes and the authorities had difficulties passing the 
compliance assessment procedures which established the management and control 
systems of the programme. In November 2008, the Romanian Audit Authority issued 
a qualified opinion on these systems which pointed to several shortcomings (OPHR-
RO AIR 2008, 20). Arguably, the development of administrative capacity at the level 
of the authorities managing the programme suffered due to such delays. The 
management and control systems were deemed “satisfactory” and approved by the 
national Audit Authority in June 2009 (OPHR-RO AIR 2009, 22). The following 
sections outline the main findings on the deficiencies affecting the programme’s 
administrative capacity.  
 
Institutional capacity (ADM1) 
In the first two years of the programme, much energy was dedicated for developing the 
institutional capacity and structures necessary for the management of the programme. 
Government Decision no. 381/2007, established that the General Directorates of the 
then Ministry of Labour, Family and Equal Opportunities would act as a Managing 
Authority for OPHR. In 2010, the central Managing Authority was divided in six 
different directorates: Contracting Directorate, Verification and Monitoring 
Directorate, Quality Management Directorate, Economic and Services Directorate, 
Programming and Evaluation Unit and Antifraud and Irregularities Unit.  
 
In addition, to the Managing Authority was assisted in its duties by several 
Intermediate Bodies namely: eight regional directorates subordinated to the Ministry 
of Labour and the National Agency for Employment, the Ministry of Education 
Research and Youth and the National Centre for Technical and Vocational Education 
Development. All these were delegated management functions over specific areas of 
the programme. 
 
Control mechanisms were developed so as to ensure that the MA has an overview over 
the situation and it had: “a) control over documents produced by IBs; b) fulfilment of 
tasks delegated through quarterly reports; c) on the spot checks of project selection, 
verification of expenditure, accounting and management of irregularities and finally 
through d) internal audit missions” (OPHR-RO November 2007, 130-131). With all 
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this, by 2010, following system audits several clarifications and a further separation of 
tasks between the MA and the Intermediate Bodies was considered necessary, 
especially due to problems that arose in the selection of projects (OPHR-RO AIR 2009, 
7). Equally, a fragmented departmental organisation in both the Managing Authority 
and Intermediate Bodies, poor flows of information between employees and 
dysfunctional management and control systems affected the overall programme (EC 
audit report 7-11 December 2009, 13-14). On the ground, despite their lack of 
experience, many regional structures (e.g. Labour Inspectorates) were transformed 
overnight into Intermediate Bodies (Romanian Expert #1). Following governmental 
attempts to further centralize the management system of EU funds, the Managing 
Authority responsible for OPHR was moved, in March 2014, to the Ministry of 
European Funds. This was a politically mandated move which aimed to improve the 
effectiveness of the programme and its highly criticised management.71  
 
Differences in capacity between the four distinct institutional entities created 
problems during the different stages of the absorption process. In short, as 
emphasized by one regional administrator, there was a lack of a cost-efficiency 
calculation in terms of staffing arrangements and in creating the best suited 
institutional structures for the programme (Head of Romanian North-East 
Intermediate Body). The fact that the Managing Authority was unprepared and that 
there were institutional discrepancies in terms of management very often meant that 
“the funds were not managed with a certain coherence” (Former Director of Romanian 
Intermediate Body #1). 
 
The above intricate institutional design triggered bottlenecks in terms of institutional 
coordination between the MA and all the other IBs (Preda et al. 2014, 22). It accounted 
for a lack of trust at the MA level and generated a further duplication of tasks (KPMG 
OPHR-RO Interim Evaluation 2011, 229). For instance, the relationship between the 
Managing Authority and the Ministry of Education Intermediate Body was a highly 
cited example of poor coordination (Former Director of Romanian Managing 
Authority #2; Romanian Civil Society Leader #1). Furthermore, many issues were 
                                                             
71 Romanian Ministry of European Funds via Fonduri-Structurale.ro, 27 February 2014, [From the 1st 
of March, MA OPHR and OPEC are moving to the Ministry of European Funds], available at:  
http://www.fonduri-structurale.ro/detaliu.aspx?eID=14617&t=Stiri (accessed August 2015). 
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generated by an inexperienced MA which did not delegate tasks appropriately to other 
bodies (KPMG OPHR-RO Interim Evaluation, 76). The workload was not well divided 
between institutions, and some Intermediate Bodies (especially the Ministry of 
Education) were overwhelmed by the amount of work they had to carry out. This 
fundamental problem was succinctly summarized by one regional administrator: 
“We didn’t organize ourselves as we have should and we did not manage 
correctly our capacity to manage these funds. We had too many projects, too 
few staff, with too low salaries and with insufficient [office] space.” (Head of 
Romanian North-East Intermediate Body) 
 
In terms of institutional accountability, the Romanian OPHR was one of the most un-
transparent and highly problematic, especially in its first years of implementation, in 
terms of the relationship between the authorities and the programme’s beneficiaries. 
As explained by a central administrator, issues in this area arose due to a frequent 
change of personnel, which meant that communication with beneficiaries was often 
disrupted (Former Director of Romanian Intermediate Body #1). Independent 
observers generally deplored the poor transparency of the managing bodies involved 
in the programme (CeRe 2010; IPP 2011). With all this, others were keen to stress that 
the authorities did improve their approach when interacting and communicating with 
beneficiaries (Romanian Civil Society Leader #1; Romanian EU funds consultant #1).  
 
Bureaucratic capacity (ADM2) 
By mid-2008, the legal and procedural systems necessary for the management of the 
programme were adopted. In general, the legislation and the rules of the programme 
were extremely dense. Moreover, a “mismatch” developed between national and 
European legislation in the areas covered by the programme (Păuţu and Dogaru, 2013, 
509). Some interviewees argued that legislation was problematic especially in relation 
to specific areas: 
“They couldn’t anticipate things, if I recall right there wasn’t the proper legal 
basis in place. This was very much the case for public procurement. There were 
no legal frameworks for instance for traineeships or for social economy 
[projects], these were measures that were never applied in Romania.” (EC Head 
of Sector #1).  
 
 
Four years after the programme’s launch, some Intermediate Bodies still lacked 
adequate procedures and did not follow any rigorous financial management system 
(Romanian AA report 2011, 402). Moreover, a certain stability and uniformity of the 
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rules governing the programme was difficult to achieve. The frequent changes to 
different rules and templates was arguably one of the most loathed aspects of the 
programme. This was in line with the much criticised “changing the rules during the 
game” principle (Romanian Civil Society Leader #1; Romanian Expert #2; Romanian 
funds beneficiary #1; Romanian funds beneficiary #2). Changes often applied 
retroactively and had strong repercussions for on the ground project implementation 
(CeRe 2010; Păuţu and Dogaru, 2013, 512). For instance, in the first few years of 
implementation, the issue of guidelines for eligibility proved to be a highly 
controversial aspect of the programme (Romanian Government memorandum on 
OPHR-RO May 2012). As explained by a few close observers, part of the problem 
derived from “payment ceilings for experts” that in several projects were raised to 
“maximum” levels (EC Head of Sector #1; Former Director of Romanian Managing 
Authority #2). When audited, beneficiaries could not justify the use of funds and the 
time spent on projects. As a consequence, the Managing Authority had to correct the 
situation, by constantly updating the rules, and to prevent situations in which 
beneficiaries sought to circumvent the rules of the programme. As stressed by an EU 
official, this was all about keeping up with the “inventiveness of people” (EC Head of 
Sector #1). By the end of 2014, approximately 102 different implementation 
instructions regulated all aspects of the programme (e.g. VAT rules, document 
templates, the role of experts and project partners, and eligibility rules on the 
maximum number of hours of work allocated for projects).72  
 
Other problems derived from a lack of coherent interpretation of procedures between 
the different managing bodies. It was argued that many Intermediate Bodies took the 
liberty, or were not offered sufficient guidance from the Managing Authority, in how 
to interpret certain rules. As a result, contradictory advice was given to project 
promoters (KMPG OPHR-RO Interim Evaluation 2011, 165). One of the examples 
given by a former director of the MA concerned the answers given to questions by IBs 
to beneficiaries via helpdesks: “the problem was that of a unity in responses, because 
the same answer had to be given by the MA and the IBs on the same issue and this was 
very hard [to achieve]” (Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2). 
                                                             
72 A complete list of OPHR-RO implementation instructions is available at: http://www.fonduri-
ue.ro/posdru/index.php/implementeaza/instructiuni-si-alte-documente-pentru-implementare##i3 
(accessed August 2015). 
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Moreover, the lack of adequate methodologies and project management tools was 
another problematic dimension of the programme (Păuţu and Dogaru, 2013, 513). One 
auditor emphasized that the programme did not use any clear “management 
techniques” (Director in Romanian Audit Authority #1), whilst, one EU official 
stressed that the “management instruments” were ill defined at the beginning of the 
programming period (EC Head of Sector #1). 
 
OPHR-RO was one of the few Romanian programmes that used an online platform 
and electronic tools. ActionWeb was the IT tool developed to facilitate project 
implementation. However, the tool had limited functionalities and was mainly used at 
the application stage of the process. It suffered from severe faults and it was reported 
that it would often shutdown when beneficiaries wanted to use it.73 Several reports 
criticised the ActionWeb was criticized for the “defective manner” in which it was 
designed (CeRe 2010, 10; Rotilă 2013, 49).   
 
Finally, burdensome verifications and reporting procedures, and what was generally 
described as “gold plating” (KPMG et al. 2011), had a strong impact on beneficiaries 
and administrators alike. Beneficiaries had to send to the authorities numerous copies 
of documents, exceeding hundreds of pages in order to justify the activities undertaken 
in their projects. This generated a strong “focus on the process rather than on results” 
approach in the management of the projects at the central level which affected the 
programme (Romanian Civil Society Leader #1; Romanian Expert #1). In turn, this 
affected the capacity of the managing bodies to verify and monitor the outcomes of 
projects: 
“At one point the MA had to perform several hundred monitoring visits in 
several months. Without it being their fault, the monitors did not have physical 
time to prepare. They didn’t have time to read about the project, the reports and 
to understand what it was about so as to formulate several questions regarding 
it. When the monitors got to the visiting site they only ticked some lists and had 
a look around their office to see if they had the laptops [purchased for the 
project]. These things lead to nothing.” (Romanian Civil Society Leader #1)  
 
The above had serious consequences on both the capacity and behaviour of the 
institutional actors involved in the process and contributed to the programme’s 
                                                             
73 Cristina Pojoga, 28 November 2014, [Caught in the spider web of OPHR: ActionWeb], available at: 
http://fonduri-structurale.ro/blog/?p=666 (accessed August 2015).  
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bureaucratised nature. However, the issues of administrative over-control and the 
focus on the process rather than on results were linked to deficiencies in terms of 
human resources. 
 
Human resources capacity (ADM3) 
Insufficient staff numbers, a lack of training and poor incentives crippled the 
development of human resources for OPHR-RO. Poorly conceived personnel 
structures and distribution of tasks overloaded many OPHR bodies, with the IB for 
Education being well-known for its understaffing (Romanian Audit Authority report 
2011, 402). Some interviewees argued that they had five to six time’s higher workloads 
than colleagues in other structures managing the programme (Project Officer in 
Romanian North-East Intermediate Body). There were also strong discrepancies 
between these structures in terms of staff expertise (KPMG et al. 2011). For instance, 
the Intermediate Body of the Ministry of Education was overwhelmed by the number 
of projects and the low number of staff. Data from September 201474, showed that the 
latter structure was severely under-staffed when compared to the other Intermediate 
Bodies of the Ministry of Labour, and in spite of the similar amount of funding being 
managed by these structures. Moreover, the Ministry of Labour acted in the past as a 
PHARE implementing agency and capitalised on a pre-accession base of expertise, the 
Ministry of Education, as well as other new managing bodies, had no experience and 
only appeared in the system starting with 2007 (Former Director of Romanian 
Managing Authority #1; Romanian Expert #1). 
  
Training and professional development could have contributed to the general process 
of expertise-formation. However, it was argued that training was not sufficient, whilst 
some stressed that administrators, from IBs, were “schooled hastily” (Romanian 
Expert #1). A former senior administrator criticised the low priority given to these 
activities stressing that “not even today [April 2014] they don’t understand how 
important it is to have properly trained human resources” (Former Director of 
Romanian Managing Authority #2). 
 
                                                             
74 HR data obtained from the Romanian Ministry of European funds revealed that the Intermediate 
Bodies dealing with Education interventions had approximately 220 staff allocated to them, whilst the 
Intermediate Bodies dealing with Labour interventions had approximately 375 staff.    
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Part of the problem related to the authorities’ poor use of technical assistance for 
incentivising and training staff. In 2010, several technical assistance projects were 
contracted due to improve the capacity of both the managing bodies and beneficiaries, 
yet, by the end of 2011 only 0.32% of technical assistance funds available to the 
programme were reimbursed (OPHR-RO AIR 2011, 130). Moreover, Intermediate 
Bodies were poorly involved in developing technical assistance projects (Romanian 
Audit Authority report 2010, 444).  
 
The lack of a uniform set of financial incentives for staff involved in the programme 
was arguably one of the main obstacles for human resources development. For 
instance, there were strong discrepancies in terms of remuneration with staff working 
in the Ministry of Education IB being paid much less than those working in the 
Ministry of Labour, as described by a local administrator:  
“Every time I went to Bucharest I told them: “You cannot judge us by the same 
standards that you judge the Labour Intermediate Bodies”. I was managing 140 
projects at one stage. An officer at the Labour Intermediate Body managed 2-3. 
The difference was colossal. The second aspect is that they were paid RON 50 
million [approx. EUR 1100] and we had RON 18 million [approx. EUR 450]. 
This was the huge difference and we did the same work.” (Head of Romanian 
North-East Intermediate Body) 
 
These differences were structural and were determined by the salary ranges enacted 
by domestic law and paid by the different Ministries. They demotivated staff and were 
a key driver for staff turnover. 
 
Finally, the external stakeholders involved in the life of OPHR-RO faced considerable 
issues in terms of their own capacity. There were mixed perceptions about the role 
played by consultants. On the one hand, there were serious consultants that genuinely 
sought to support beneficiaries in obtaining funding and in implementing projects 
(Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2). On the other hand, some 
consultancies played a negative role in the implementation of the programme. Many 
experts and consultants sought to profit from the confusions regarding the eligibility 
of rules concerning payments, and the lack of a clear definition regarding payment 
ceilings for project experts (Romanian Government memorandum on OPHR-RO May 
2012). This encouraged irregular behaviour among beneficiaries, for which various 
local consultancies were partly culpable (EC Head of Sector #1). In addition, 
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beneficiaries over-using consultancy services affected their ability to develop their very 
own capacity.  
 
During 2007-2013, no other Romanian Operational Programme was influenced by its 
beneficiaries as much as OPHR-RO. These were very diverse ranging from private 
sector firms to NGOs, consultancies, universities as well as municipalities and public 
bodies. Their diverse nature added to the specificity of problems encountered during 
implementation. A first notable aspect was that, as opposed to other OPs, most OPHR-
RO beneficiaries never benefited from any external funding (Director in Romanian 
Ministry of EU funds #1). Consequently, beneficiaries had little or no previous 
experience in implementing externally funded projects.  
 
Secondly, public beneficiaries were affected by the domestic restrictions adopted by 
the Romanian Government following the 2008 financial crisis. Law no. 284 /2010 
introduced a standardised salary rate for public sector employees. According to 
interviewees, one of the effects of the law was that it restricted the number of hours 
that public civil servants (e.g. ministries, municipalities) could dedicate to the 
implementation of EU-funded projects (Former Director of Romanian Intermediate 
Body #1; Romanian EU funds beneficiary #2).  
 
Thirdly, many private beneficiaries did not have adequate financial capacity or the 
ability to budget their projects properly (OPHR-RO AIR 2013, 58). As a result they 
over- or under-spent money or were frequently sanctioned for their inability to respect 
the objectives or indicators set to be achieved by their projects (Former Director of 
Romanian Managing Authority #1; Head of Romanian North-East Intermediate Body; 
Romanian Civil Society Leader #1).75  
 
Finally, many OPHR-RO beneficiaries tried to profit from loopholes in rules of 
eligibility for expenditure, and were often reimbursed sums of money that they were 
not entitled to (Romanian Audit Authority report 2010, 446). Following several audits, 
the European Commission found ambiguous eligibility rules, in particular with regard 
to the salaries provided to experts working on projects (OPHR-RO AIR 2012, 49). The 
                                                             
75 This was potentially the case in Bulgaria’s, although official sources or interviewees’ did not note 
this as often as they did in Romania’s case.  
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principle of “reasonableness” of costs was often broken and unrealistic number of 
hours were reported by experts in exchange for extremely high salaries (Romanian 
Audit Authority report 2012, 391; Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority 
#2; EC Head of Sector #1). These were some of the issues that that eventually led to 
the multiple interruption and suspension of payments for the programme.  
 
However, the above problems affected beneficiaries that had a genuine capacity and 
interest in implementing projects in this area. Following frequent delays in payments 
and the Managing Authority’s failure to respect contractual obligations on 
reimbursements, NGOs organized several street protests in the last trimester of 2012. 
Protesters gathered for a march for POSDRU (OPHR-RO) victims chanting slogans 
such as: “Transparency and not incompetence” or “Free POSDRU from 
incompetence”. The protest culminated in a scene where half-naked beneficiaries 
marched towards the Ministry of Finance.76 A memorandum initiated by the 
Romanian Coalition of NGOs for Structural Funds summarised the demands of 
protesters.77 These signalled the growing frustrations that governed their relationship 
with the authorities, predominantly the overly bureaucratic rules of the programme, 
the lack of transparency and the lack of respect for contractual obligations, and more 
generally its inefficient management. All in all, the human resources component of 
administrative capacity remained one of the most problematic dimensions of the 
programme’s administrative capacity.  
 
Territorial capacity (TER)  
The management of the programme was highly centralised. As emphasized above, 
there were stark differences in terms of budgeting and resources adopted by the two 
main ministerial entities involved in the process: the Ministry of Labour and the 
Ministry of Education. In fact, two parallel institutional systems were created in each 
of the eight Romanian NUTS 2 regions. The Ministry of Labour had its own structures 
on the ground. The Ministry of Education acted as a centrally based Intermediate 
                                                             
76 The Epoch Times Romania, 22 November 2012, [Approximately 30 beneficiaries of EU funds “took 
down their shirts” in front of the Ministry of Finances], available at: http://epochtimes-
romania.com/news/aproximativ-30-de-beneficiari-ai-fondurilor-europene-si-au-dat-camasa-de-pe-
ei-in-fata-ministerului-finantelor---176025 (accessed August 2015) 
77 Coalitia ONGuri pentru Fonduri Structurale, 25 October 2012, [Protest in Bucharest under the 
slogan “Free POSDRU from incompetence”], available at: http://www.ce-re.ro/new/protest-in-
bucuresti-sub (accessed August 2015). 
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Body. However, half of the staff from the latter worked at the local level using the 
infrastructure provided by Education Inspectorates, situated in the 42 counties (NUTS 
3 level). As mentioned previously, the latter were severely understaffed and under-
resourced (Romanian AA report 2010; Head of Romanian North East Intermediate 
Body). 
 
Moreover, the lack of a coherent territorial institutional design hampered the 
development of expertise at the local level, increasing the level of frustration among 
local administrators and beneficiaries, in relation to the Managing Authority. 
According to data, obtained from the Romanian Ministry of European Funds, 
approximately, 64% OPHR-RO staff positions were based at the local and regional 
level.78 Staff working on the ground amassed a great deal of knowledge and expertise 
from every-day implementation. However, the system was designed with limited 
powers for local level Intermediate Bodies representatives. As a consequence, the 
Managing Authority had to be involved directly in issues of implementation rather 
than in only managing the process (Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority 
#2). In this respect, the Interim Evaluation underlined that:  
“…the MA took upon itself an inordinate number of low-level control tasks 
(many of which were duplicating tasks already carried out down through the 
system chain). The MA then claimed to have too few staff to carry out the tasks 
that it had taken upon itself despite the fact that it had, for example, eight 
under-utilised IBs and three National IBs at its disposal. Rather than acting as 
the manager of a system, the MA got itself directly involved in tasks at every 
level resulting, inevitably, in delays in the system, policies being changed mid-
stream (e.g. the responsibilities of the IBs which have changed again more 
recently although in this instance the MA has once again devolved significant 
autonomy to the IBs), corrigenda issuing at the last moment and so on.” (KPMG 
OPHR-RO Interim Evaluation 2011, 229) 
 
On the ground, interviewees stressed that “more responsibility should be given to 
regions” (Head of Romanian North-East Intermediate Body). The reasoning was that 
this would have allowed local structures to organize their work in relation to their own 
needs and obligations. In the context of debates on the regionalisation in the country, 
the bulk of the discussion focused on other aspects than EU funding. Moreover, a 
decision on granting more autonomy to these bodies was unlikely within the 
                                                             
78 Data obtained from Ministry of European Funds in September 2014.  
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centralised Romanian system. In this respect, the discussion will now turn to the 
influence of political factors in the life of the programme.  
 
5.2.2 Political factors and OPHR-RO 
 
Many of the weaknesses of the OPHR-RO did not originate from poor administrative 
capacity. They were highly political in nature. As compared to its Bulgarian sister 
programme, political factors proved far more influential. Firstly, according to an 
external observer involved in the process the political decision on the institutional 
structure of OPHR-RO was problematic (EC Head of Sector #1). Secondly, the 
programme suffered from a relatively low level of political stability, both at the central 
and at the local level. Thirdly, similarly to Bulgaria’s case, administrators were 
embedded in two distinct political entities, namely the Ministry of Labour and the 
Ministry of Education. The political tensions between these structures did contribute 
to some of the programme’s deficiencies. Finally, there were strong indications that 
the programme was highly politicised, in particular during its first years of 
implementation. These findings are detailed in the following. 
 
Political Stability (POL1) 
Stability was not one of the core characteristics of the programme. An independent 
evaluation succinctly described some of the negative effects that political changes had 
on the programme: 
“The effect of this is to weaken ‘institutional memory’, to result in long lead-in 
periods while the new officials ‘find their feet’ and, perhaps most destructive of 
all, results in changes in direction or approach that can stifle the initiative of 
strategic thinkers to plan ahead as they know their efforts may be simply 
nullified as a result of political / administrative / managerial change.” (KPMG 
OPHR-RO Interim Evaluation 2011, 233) 
 
On the ground, many Romanian interviewees argued that political patronage and the 
appointment of staff in the managing bodies was a core issue affecting the programme 
(Former Head of Romanian Intermediate Body #1; Romanian Expert #1; Romanian 
Expert #2; Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2). Political change 
and patronage driven politicisation was found to be a problem at both the central and 
at the local level. 
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At the central level, the programme was affected by changes in senior management, 
particularly at the Director level. Some have argued that changing the heads of the 
Managing Authority and of the Intermediate Bodies triggered confusions in the 
programme’s management (Păuţu and Dogaru, 2013, 514). The Managing Authority 
had six different directors in eight years (Romanian Civil Society Leader #2; Romanian 
EU funds consultant #1; Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2). Most 
of these were appointed on a political rather than on merit or qualifications. To mask 
this, it was argued that directors are changed in line with the European principles of 
“staff rotation”.79 However, the press and civil society representatives speculated that 
the main reason for his replacement was the loss of political credentials.80 In addition, 
investigative journalists found that one Minister appointed her personal driver as an 
EU funds adviser in one of the Intermediate Bodies (Bucharest-Ilfov) despite the fact 
that he did not hold a university diploma, a minimum pre-condition to obtain such a 
position.81 Moreover, the former head of cabinet of the same Minister helped a close 
relative to become a Director in the Ministry. According to anti-corruption 
prosecutors, the same person was bribed, in order to facilitate the rigging of the exam 
required to obtain a Councillor position within the Managing Authority of the 
programme.82 Changes equally affected administrators and other executive staff 
working at the central management level, including legal representatives. The highly 
problematic situation of the Ministry of Education was often cited as evidence by 
independent evaluations (OPHR Interim Evaluation 2011).  
 
At the local level, political instability, and potential political interference, affected the 
implementation of projects. On the one hand, staff working in local municipalities 
were threatened by political changes. For instance, Education Inspectors (a highly 
politicised local public function in Romania) were changed on political grounds, as 
explained by: 
                                                             
79 Euractiv.ro, 6 March 2015, [MA OPHR, OPEC and OPENV have been changed], available at: 
http://www.euractiv.ro/prima-pagina/Directorii-AM-POSDRU-AM-POSCCE-si-MEDIU-au-fost-
schimbati-din-functii-177 (accessed 31 August 2015). 
80 Hotnews.ro, 6 March 2015, [Official news: The MA OPHR Director, Cristian Ababei was fired], 
available at: http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-eurofonduri-19563465-oficial-directorul-posdru-
cristian-ababei-dat-jos.htm (accessed August 2015). 
81 Centrul de Investigaţii Media, 2 April 2014, [The Famiglia of the Ministry of Labour under the 
mandate of Mariana Câmpeanu] available at: http://www.investigatiimedia.ro/famiglia-din-
ministerul-muncii-in-mandatul-marianei-campeanu (accessed August 2015). 
82 The Romanian National Anti-Corruption Directorate, Press Release, 17 May 2013, available at: 
http://www.pna.ro/faces/comunicat.xhtml?id=4088&jftfdi=&jffi=comunicat (accessed August 2015). 
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“Directors and project managers are often changed due to subjective political 
reasons. For example, the general education inspectors are also at the territorial 
level the most common project managers. When the Government changes they 
change as well. The problem is that education inspectors are also credit 
ordinators and, therefore, when they change the whole stake of the [OPHR] 
projects changes as well.” (Former Head of Romanian Intermediate Body #1) 
 
However, some stressed that political interference was more limited to posts found at 
the local level, especially for those with difficult or heavy workloads. These were not 
seen as appealing by potentially politically affiliated employees (Head of Romanian 
North-East Intermediate Body; Project Officer in North-East Intermediate Body #1). 
 
As a whole, there was evidence to point out that some of the staff working on the 
Romanian OPHR were politically affiliated. These were examples of how political 
officials could interfere in order to appoint employees in key strategic positions within 
the Managing Authority or Intermediate Bodies. Ultimately, such appointments could 
damage the capacity of these institutions and could weakened the management of the 
funding, and subsequently the financial performance achieved by OPHR-RO. 
 
 
Political support (POL2) 
At the end of 2012, OPHR-RO beneficiaries publicly criticised what they saw as the 
lack of responsibility from the Government to tackle the problems associated with the 
programme and accused it of shifting the blame towards beneficiaries (Romanian 
Coalition of NGOs for Structural Funds letter, 24 October 2012). The letter publicly 
criticised the governments’ failure to manage the problems of the programme. 
Specifically, one interviewee explained how the general lack of support affected EU 
funds beneficiaries: 
“I think that for a good period of time Structural Funds were not a sufficiently 
important stake at the governmental level. Discursively they were, but beyond 
discourse things were not the same. Only now when we are approaching the 
final stages of the programming period have things started to accelerate. But at 
one point we felt that this was not important enough for the Government. For 
example, there was the period with major blockages for OPHR-RO when 
beneficiaries simply did not receive their money for a few good months due to 
the simple fact that the Managing Authority did not have the money. Payments 
were blocked by the European Commission. At that point we asked the 
Government to allocate some funds, I don’t know where from, the Reserve 
Funds maybe. To allocate a sum of money for OPHR-RO so that payments can 
be made, and projects can still be implemented. This is the big problem. There 
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were projects that were standing still. Final beneficiaries, target groups who lost 
their trust in the promises made by those implementing the projects, who could 
not take forward their projects and their services. They already got to a stage 
where their headquarters were being seized, they sold their own things or 
brought money from home. They were on the brink of bankruptcy. The 
Government did not allocate this sum of money as a buffer until the 
Commission made those payments.” (Romanian Civil Society Leader #1) 
 
 
Following street protests in late 2012, the Ministry of Finance took out several loans 
in order to cover the funds necessary for beneficiaries.83 The programme was partly 
unlocked, in 2012, after several governmental memorandums were adopted, with 
support from the highest political level, in order to address the multiple problems 
affecting the programme (Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2).  
 
In general, administrators and staff working in managing institutions had mixed 
feelings on whether or not they received sufficient political support and strategic 
guidance in order to carry out their activities. As explained by a former director, 
support varied from politician to politician: 
“At the Ministry of Labour I worked with Boghicevici and Ungureanu 
[Secretaries of State] and it worked. The former worked in the system. She had 
worked on PHARE. She could understand what is going on and what needs to 
be done. If you have to go there and explain about the system and I don’t know 
what else it is pretty complicated. She was familiarized with the procedures and 
she understood. After Câmpeanu [Labour Minister] came in it was difficult for 
her to understand. It thus varies from person to person and regarding the level 
of involvement of each.” (Former Director of a Romanian Managing Authority 
#2) 
 
The above points out the need for politicians to understand the situations, and more 
technical aspects of the problems, faced by administrators. However, not all politicians 
were capable of understanding these. In addition, interviewees mentioned that often 
the ministers’ political advisers or counsellors acted as the interface between the latter 
and the administrators responsible for EU funding schemes (Director of Romanian 
Managing Authority #1). In some instances, such as in the case of the Ministry of 
                                                             
83 Romanian Ministry of European Funds, 2013, [Eugen Teodorovici: The Government approved a 
new loan of 820 million for payments to beneficiaries], available at: 
https://www.fonduri-ue.ro/despre/8-noutati/17-eugen-teodorovici-guvernul-romaniei-a-aprobat-un-
nou-imprumut-cu-o-valoare-de-820-milioane-de-lei-pentru-plata-beneficiarilor-de-fonduri-europene 
(accessed August 2015). 
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Education, “political decision-makers do not have counsellors that could explain the 
situation. It is hard to get people from the private sector. The counsellors of politicians 
need to have concrete experience in the implementation of the funds” (Former 
Director of Romanian Intermediate Body #1). In other words, if political advisers were 
not able to understand or inform high level politicians about the gravity of certain 
situations then adequate political decisions aimed at correcting problems could not be 
adopted.  
 
Overall, the lack of political support affected the programme in the first few years. 
Moreover, there were multiple strategic lacunae in its overall framework. The extent 
to which these political clienteles contributed to this will now be discussed in the 
following. 
 
Political clienteles (POL 3) 
There was strong evidence that OPHR-RO was one of the operational programmes 
affected by politicisation and clientelism. For instance, there were strong indications 
that some political ministers tried to profit from the distribution of the funding. 
Moreover, poor remuneration levels, general chaotic management and a lack of a 
clearly defined incompatibility regime and conflicts of interests have potentially 
encouraged corrupt behaviour among staff working in the programme (Surubaru 
2017). The latter could manifest itself at the local and central level of management.  
 
At the local level, there were for instance cases in which employees of Intermediate 
Bodies were prosecuted for taking bribes requested in order to help project 
beneficiaries overcome obstacles, controls or simply to obtain their payments faster. 
One such example was that of an administrator working in the South-West 
Intermediate Body and who requested bribes in order to “favourably validate the 
reimbursement forms afferent to projects which the defendant was monitoring as part 
of her duties”, mentioned by prosecutors in their indictment.84 Moreover, several 
                                                             
84 Gazeta de Sud, 13 October 2014, [Today there is the appeal trial of D. B. condemned for 3 years in 
prison for bribes from European funds], available at: http://www.gds.ro/Local/2014-10-13/astazi-se-
judeca-recursul-dalinei-bogdan,-condamnata-la-3-ani-de-inchisoare-pentru-mita-din-fondurile-
europene/ (accessed September 2015). 
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employees and managers of regional branches of the National Employment Agency 
were prosecuted for receiving bribes in order to facilitate EU-funded contracts.85 
  
At the central level, there were several suspicions of corruption, especially among the 
administrators working in the Managing Authority, based in the Ministry of Labour. 
One of the directors involved in the programme confessed that the lack of objective 
assessments of work related performances and a weak oversight of employees 
facilitated the development of clientelistic behaviour among administrators: 
“All Intermediate Bodies had problems with payments. There were no 
indicators for performance in order to evaluate and to pay them. That’s the 
reason why there were some in the system that had other interests and could 
sustain themselves and others who only lived from the salary of 1200 lei 
[approx. EUR 300]. There was a girl from Ploieşti. She ate pretzels all day, but 
she worked. There are also people like her. At OPHR-RO, I had big problems 
with them, on the basis of several disputes and suspicions, because they walked 
around with a lot of envelopes. We changed three systems as a precaution…We 
were wondering and asking how can some people dress [like this] and eat with 
[only] 1200 lei [approx. 300 EUR] per month. That’s why we asked ourselves – 
“How do they make so much money?” And then it emerged that one has a firm 
through her husband or her father in law and so on and so forth. In addition, 
beneficiaries entered there [in the Managing Authority premises] like it was 
their own home. We had gendarmes and said: “Stop”. After that they rented an 
apartment opposite to the Managing Authority and that’s where they met. A 
week before I left, they knew it and they started coming to work with some super 
Mercedes…That was the issue at the Managing Authority level. In the 
Intermediate Bodies there are still some with their “heads on their shoulders”, 
more rational and normal.” (Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority 
#2) 
 
All the above points to corruption among members of the Managing Authority which 
was one of the defining features of the programme. Such problems could originate 
from the lack of a well-defined incompatibility regime and the lack of internal rules for 
tackling conflicts of interest.86 However, starting from 2011, all staff were asked to fill 
in declarations of honesty to address this.87 Further examples of corrupt and 
                                                             
85 Romanialibera.ro, 16 October 2011, [How the Head of the Employment Agency worked with bribes], 
available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/cum-%E2%80%9Elucra--cu-spaga-
seful-fortei-de-munca-241276 (accessed September 2015). 
86 Ziarul Financiar, 4 May 2011, [The map of incompatibilities in OPHR-RO: can relatives of 
administrators and officials receive salaries from European funds for human resources?], available at: 
http://www.zf.ro/analiza/harta-incompatibilitatilor-in-posdru-pot-primi-rudele-functionarilor-si-
ale-demnitarilor-salarii-din-fondurile-europene-pentru-resurse-umane-8228944 (accessed 
September 2015).  
87 Romaniacurata.ro, 6 May 2011, [The Botiş effect: the employees of OPHR MA are obliged to 
complete declarations of interests with special provisions], available at: 
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clientelistic behaviour are discussed in the sub-chapter on the selection stage of EU 
funds. Prior to that, highlighting the role of the European Union might allow us to 
obtain a complete understanding of the programme’s evolution.  
 
5.2.3 EU role and influence (EU) 
 
The OPHR-RO has been a particularly problematic programme according to several 
EU officials. Overall, from 2007 to 2015, payments to the programme were pre-
suspended or suspended approximately six times, following grave deficiencies 
signalled by national and EU auditors. In 2009, the programme was interrupted for 
the first time given reservations on the functionality of its management and control 
systems (DG Employment AAR 2010, 63). More substantively, the European 
Commission suspended payments to the programme between February – May 2012, 
following reports from EC auditors pointing to major problems in terms of the 
selection of projects and verifications of expenditure (DG Employment AAR 2012). 
The payments towards the programme were unblocked following financial corrections 
of 10% for all payments made.88 For instance, these amounted to around 80.6 million 
EUR for 2011 related payments (DG EMPL AAR 2012, 55).  
 
Moreover, following other audits in April/May 2012, the level of errors for the 
programme was established at 6.58%, with many other irregularities being deemed 
“unquantifiable” (DG Employment AAR 2012, 58). A decision was taken to impose a 
flat rate correction of 25% for the total expenditure certified by the Commission until 
August 2012, amounting to another 93.9 million EUR. In addition, the authorities had 
to implement an action plan through which they had to prove that they can ensure a 
sound financial management of the programme, although Romanian officials stated 
that it was impossible to deal with some of the structural problems of the 
programme.89  It was estimated that 89.80% of the programme’s irregularities were 
due to ineligible expenditure (DG Employment AAR 2013 annexes, 57).  
                                                             
http://www.romaniacurata.ro/efectul-botis-angajatii-am-posdru-obligati-sa-completeze-declaratii-
de-interese-cu-prevederi-speciale/ (accessed September 2015). 
88 Ziare.com, 3 April 2012, [The EU has unblocked the funds on the OPHR programme], available at: 
http://www.ziare.com/politica/guvern/ue-ne-a-deblocat-fondurile-pe-programul-posdru-1159729 
(accessed September 2015). 
89 Mediafax.ro, 3 September 2012, [MA OPHR needs to solve deficiencies until the 6th of October in 
order to avoid the suspension of payments], available at: http://www.mediafax.ro/social/am-posdru-
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In the fall of 2012, an official letter from the Commission mentioned that auditors 
found “significant improvements in key control requirements” and ultimately the 
programme was unblocked in February 2013.90 As a result, by the end of 2013, the 
financial absorption of the programme quadrupled from 6.77% to 27.27%. However, 
in 2014, payments to the programme were again interrupted in order to verify all 
payment claims submitted to the authorities, as well as to correlate the Romanian and 
the European Commission informatics system of payments.91 As a result, in 2014, 
there was almost no increase in the overall absorption rate of the programme. In 
addition, in May 2014, the Commission had a “full reservation” over the programme 
and requested from the Romanian authorities financial corrections of approximately 
150 million EUR (DG Employment AAR 2013, 75). All the above illustrated the 
systemic problems encountered by the programme during its implementation. 
 
In general, the European Commission played an important role and provided the 
authorities with technical support, specifically on the development of procedural and 
different management instruments for the programme (EC Head of Sector #1). With 
all this, some interviewees criticised the Commission on several grounds. Firstly, some 
condemned it for relying too much on the opinion of the national Audit Authority when 
it came to the functionality of the OPHR-RO systems (Former Director of Romanian 
Authority #2). Secondly, some were keen to stress that the EC takes into account too 
much reports coming from the media on irregular projects. Local administrators 
stressed that many EC auditors or officials were susceptible to negative media 
coverage, which mistakenly purported that many projects were fraudulent (Head of 
Romanian North-East Intermediate Body). Finally, the Commission was not always 
very specific in their demands on the deliverables of projects and given the novelty of 
the interventions there were structural problems with what was expected from 
projects. With all this, the Commission uncovered most of the irregularities in the 
                                                             
trebuie-sa-remedieze-deficientele-pana-in-6-octombrie-pentru-a-evita-suspendarea-platilor-
10013790 (accessed September 2015).  
90 The EC official letter is available at: http://www.fonduri-
structurale.ro/Document_Files//Stiri/00012129/plj7k_letter-dg-empl-to-ro-authorities-hrd-op.pdf 
(accessed September 2015) 
91  Hotnews.ro, 22 September 2014, [Why aren’t we receiving money from OPHR-RO? The European 
Commission: Romania has abstained from requesting funds until it resolves one problem] 
http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-eurofonduri-18160031-nu-mai-luam-bani-posdru-romania-
abtinut-mai-ceara-fonduri-europene-pana-rezolvarea-unei-probleme.htm (accessed September 2015).  
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programme and enabled their containment, which arguably did improve its overall 
management and implementation. Moreover, the suspension and interruption of 
funding did attract much public interest and acted as pressure on governmental 
officials to adopt a more robust approach in dealing with the programme’s problems.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
The Human Resources Operational Programmes (OPHR) were among the first public 
instruments of their kind to be implemented in Bulgaria and Romania. They addressed 
the area of human resources development and dealt with education, employment and 
social assistance measures. The stark differences in terms of financial absorption 
performance between the two OPHRs was highly puzzling (especially the period 
during 2007-2014) and constituted one of the criteria for selecting the OPHR for this 
case study. Based on the empirical analysis several conclusions can be drawn, 
particularly on what affected the programme’s financial performance, but more 
specifically on the complex set of problems that emerged in Romania. At the end of 
2014, Romanian authorities had to pay financial corrections amounting to a total of 
312 million EUR from the European Social Fund (ESF) (DG Employment AAR 
annexes, 2014, 48). For the same period, Bulgaria only paid back 2.9 million EUR 
(Ibid). This was a strong indication of the structural differences between the two 
programmes. The question was then what explains these differences? 
 
The administrative capacity of the key institutions, responsible for the management of 
the Human Resources Operational Programme, varied widely between and within the 
two countries. In Romania the problematic management of the programme clearly 
correlated with its low level of absorption (Păuţu and Dogaru 2013, 514). An 
explanation for this was the slow development of administrative capacity and the wide 
discrepancies between the institutions managing the programme. Furthermore, the 
Romanian programme had from the very beginning an ill-defined management and 
control system which, according to some interviewees, was the least performing from 
all Operational Programmes (Director in Romanian Ministry of EU funds #1). The late 
establishment of the management and control systems was illustrative of the inherent 
problems which emerged in the functionality of OPHR-RO.  
 
From an early stage, the Bulgarian programme benefited from a large degree of pre-
accession experience and from a transfer of expertise to the managing bodies, as well 
as from a well-designed institutional framework and a partly unified approach towards 
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interpreting procedures.92 Based on the gathered evidence, although there were many 
similar issues affecting both programmes (e.g. institutional and procedural 
coordination between the Managing Authority and the Intermediate Bodies; excessive 
bureaucratic demands; institutional conflicts between the different ministries 
involved in programme management – Labour vs. Education), the capacity of 
Bulgarian authorities to manage this programme was much higher. For instance, the 
Bulgarian Managing Authority retained a classical management status and it verified 
and supported the activity of Intermediate Bodies. It made use of a functional network 
of territorial antennae to liaise with beneficiaries on the ground.  
 
By contrast, the OPHR-RO management system was ill-conceived from the start, with 
strong discrepancies between the capacity of the Managing Authorities and the 
different Intermediate Bodies. Moreover, the poor culture of delegation by the 
Romanian authorities, and an overly centralized Managing Authority equally 
contributed to issues of institutional capacity. Burdensome rules on reporting and 
verification did affect beneficiaries and administrators in both countries. The excessive 
bureaucratic approach affiliated to the programme generated a “focus on the process 
rather than on results” approach from the authorities. This reduced much of the 
activity of beneficiaries to completing forms and reports rather than focusing on 
project implementation. However, the higher stability of the Bulgarian management 
and control system and the positive involvement of several political figures (e.g. 
Deputy Ministers) facilitated a swifter process of bureaucratic simplification for the 
programme. Finally, the shallow use of technical assistance funding, was another 
strong indication of the poor commitment laid out by the Romanian authorities in 
addressing the administrative capacity deficit of the programme.   
 
The OPHR addressed large segments of society which made the programmes very 
appealing politically and, equally, vulnerable to political interests. The empirical 
analysis adduced evidence to suggest that political factors played a key role in the life 
of these programmes. For instance, the relatively high level of political instability in 
Romania and political interference in the appointment of executive and managerial 
staff led to serious breaches in the functioning of the programme. There were 
                                                             
92 The latter for instance was not developed a priori, but as a consequence of the need to address the 
problematic relationship between the Bulgarian Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Education.  
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consistent views about the deep scars this had on the management and control 
processes, and for the on the ground verification and monitoring of EU-funded 
projects.  
 
In addition, there was reasonable evidence of fraud and corruption at the different 
level of the Romanian structures and the presence of some political clienteles (IPP 
2012; Dimulescu et al. 2013; Surubaru 2017). Politicised projects were examples of 
some of the forces trying to meddle with the programme which often could have a 
crippling effect on the administrative capacity of the structures managing the 
programme. In particular, this could partly explain the consistent poor levels of 
transparency and the general lack of openness from the Romanian Managing 
Authority. Several officials were accused of forgery or of granting funding to relatives 
and acquaintances. The lack of an incompatibility regime and the unclear rules on 
conflicts of interest, as well as an unclear framework for expenses, did allow for such 
practices to affect the Romanian programme from a structural point of view. 
Moreover, the absence of functional monitoring and of effective anti-fraud 
departments meant that there was little institutional oversight during the first years’ 
of OPHR-RO’s implementation. Based on the gathered evidence, it is plausible to 
suggest that both administrative and political agents contributed to this.  
 
No substantial evidence of politicisation was uncovered in OPHR-BG. The programme 
benefited from the entrepreneurial work of some administrators and politicians and 
generally benefited from good levels of political support. In this respect, central level 
politicians, in particular Bulgarian Deputy Ministers did play a positive role in the 
process, facilitating the improvement of rules or procedures. The absence of any 
protests or visible financial problems was another indication of the programme’s 
relative degree of functionality. At the opposite end, several Romanian civil society 
activists condemned what they saw as the general incompetence or lack of assumed 
responsibility by the Romanian Government to tackle the programme’s difficulties 
(CeRe 2010; Preda et al. 2014).  
 
All in all, based on the empirical analysis carried out in this case study, it can be 
concluded that the Bulgarian OPHR benefited from both a high level of administrative 
capacity and positive political input which allowed it to be one of the highest 
 180 
 
performing programmes in the country. This was in contrast with the situation of 
OPHR-RO where a low administrative capacity coupled with politicisation and highly 
problematic projects equated in the weakest performing programme from all 
Romanian OPs.  
 
Table 18: Overall assessment of OPHR  
 Administrative 
Capacity 
(High / Medium / 
Low) 
Political factors 
(Positive / Neutral / 
Negative) 
Overall absorption 
performance 
(Very strong / 
Significant / Moderate / 
Weak) 
OPHR-BG High Positive   
(central management 
and local 
implementation) 
Very strong  
(93 % of EC payments 
received in June 2015)  
 
OPHR-RO Low Negative  
(central and local 
politicisation of staff 
and projects) 
Weak  
(33% of EC payments 
received in June 2015)  
Source: Author’s creation based on empirical analysis. 
 
The evidence outlined in this chapter indicates that the interplay between 
administrative capacity and political factors was vital in explaining the development 
of the programme’s capacity and absorption performance. It can be argued that the 
lack of a positive political involvement in Romania had a negative effect on the 
performance of the programme, whilst in Bulgaria more positive political intervention 
enhanced the strategic ability of the authorities, and most importantly, the 
development of a stronger administrative tools to manage the funding. The OPHR-BG 
was one of the best conceived programmes and benefited from favourable conditions 
for its management and implementation. All the elements of this case study suggest 
that the Bulgarian Operational Programme was partly more successful, or rather 
avoided structural problems, due to a combination of functional administrative 
capacity and positive political input, and the absence of negative political interference.  
 
OPHR-RO was one of the most challenging programmes, particularly in light of the 
dysfunctional institutional design, insufficient and inadequate allocation of human 
resources and the multiple, and highly complex problems generated by both corrupt 
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administrators and beneficiaries during the implementation process. In addition, the 
programme suffered from a lack of political commitment and from negative political 
interference under of form patronage driven appointments of staff and numerous 
clientelistic and politicised projects. These amplified some of OPHR-RO’s core 
problems (e.g. institutional incoherence and chaotic management, irregularities in 
terms of project implementation, suspension of payments and financial corrections) 
which, in turn, lead to a poor evolution of its financial absorption. This combination 
between administrative deficiencies and negative political factors, which affected 
considerably the Romanian programme, can explain the core differences identified 
between the two countries in this area. Similar conditions are discussed in the 
following chapter for the management and implementation of the regional 
development OPs. 
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Chapter 6: The management and 
implementation of the Operational 
Programme for Regional Development 
 
 
6. Introduction 
 
On one autumn day the mayor of a medium sized Romanian town was preparing for 
the inauguration of a newly refurbished castle. For several years, the castle had been 
in decay given a lack of investment, and the town stopped being an important tourist 
spot in the area. However, given a three-year refurbishment programme funded from 
the Regional Operational Programme, the old Hapsburg castle was ready to become 
again an important touristic spotlight of the area. Such projects benefited from EU 
funding since Romania became an EU member state. There were, however, several 
problematic aspects reported during the implementation of the above, which were in 
line with similar projects in the country. 
 
The Regional Operational Programmes (OPREG) were among the most recognizable 
EU-funded programmes. Their main objective was to address regional disparities and 
to generally improve regional and local level economic competitiveness. Funds were 
accessed primarily by local and regional public authorities and were often destined for 
modernizing physical or business-related infrastructure. As compared to the strong 
performance discrepancies between the Human Resources programmes, in both 
Bulgaria and Romania, the Regional Development Operational Programmes (OPs) 
fared similarly in terms of financial absorption. At the same time, whilst the Human 
Resources programmes seemed to be governed much more from the central level, the 
Regional Development OPs additionally bring into discussion a regional and local 
administrative and political component.  
 
The following sections will examine the administrative capacity of central and regional 
level actors to deal with the programme. They will look at the general governance of 
the programme and the extent to which administrative and political affected their 
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performance. From the outset, in comparison to the Human Resources OPs, it can be 
stressed that the structures managing OPREGs had a relatively similar degree of 
administrative capacity. Furthermore, given their visibility and importance for local 
and regional development, the programmes seem to have benefited from consistent 
levels of political support. Having said this, this second case study will now proceed 
with outlining the main similarities and differences in terms of the overall 
management and implementation of OPREGs in Bulgaria and Romania. Equally, it 
will underline the importance of the interplay between administrative capacity and 
political factors, and their impact on the evolution of the absorption performance of 
these programmes. 
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6.1 The Bulgarian Regional Development Operational 
Programme (OPREG-BG) 
 
During the 2007-2013 programming period, the Bulgarian Regional Development 
Programme (OPREG-BG) aimed to: “increase the competitiveness and attractiveness 
of the regions and municipalities and to decrease the disparities between and 
especially inside the six NUTS II level planning areas by improving the industrial, 
residential, social, environmental and cultural environment of the urban areas and 
accessibility of the rural areas to the road-, ICT- and gas-networks” (OPREG-BG  
September 2007, 81). To achieve these objectives the programme was implemented 
through five priority axes (Table 19) and received a total of EUR 1.6 billion, making it 
the 3rd largest out of the seven Bulgarian programmes.  
 
Table 19: OPREG-BG - Priority axis and financial allocations (2007-2013) 
 
Priority Axis 
 
Community 
Funding  
(EUR million) 
 
National 
contribution  
(EUR 
million) 
Total 
(EUR million) 
Priority Axis 1: Sustainable and 
Integrated Urban Development 
713.207.778 125.860.196 839.067.974 
Priority Axis 2: Regional and 
Local Accessibility 
340.270.886 60.047.803 400.318.689 
Priority Axis 3: Sustainable 
Tourism Development 
185.379.579 32.714.043 218.093.622 
Priority Axis 4: Local 
development and co-operation 
76.220.679 13.450.708 89.671.387 
Priority Axis 5: Technical 
Assistance 
46.004.623 8.118.463 54.123.086 
 1.361.083.545 240.191.214 1.601.274.759 
Source: Operational Programme Regional Development September 2007, 176. 
 
In terms of financial implementation, as compared to other Bulgarian OPs, the 
OPREG-BG was slow in terms of absorbing its allocated funding. At the end of 2014, 
it received reimbursements from the European Commission amounting to 59.04% 
from its 2007-2013 financial envelope. In terms of its final absorption rate, it ranked 
as the 6th best performing programme, at that time, out of seven, followed only by the 
Environment OP (39.40% absorption rate). 
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Table 20: OPREG-BG evolution of absorption performance (2007-2015) 
 
Years 
Contracted 
(EUR million) 
Paid to beneficiaries  
(EUR million) 
Payments from EC  
(final absorption) 
(EUR million) 
 Nominal  Percent Nominal Percent Nominal Percent 
2007-
2009 
790.787.123 29.71% 51.681.723 1.94% 97.201.661 0.02% 
2010 822.108.883 51.34% 185.430.539 11.58% 157.615.958 11.58%93 
2011 1.137.055.592 71.01% 323.246.021 20.19% 274.759.118 20.19% 
2012 1.440.367.757 89.95% 577.536.346 36% 306.654.078 22.53% 
2013 1.566.418.260 97.82% 912.059.803 56.96% 689.628.076 50.67% 
2014 1.659.292.711 103.62% 1.233.909.170 77.06% 803.622.902 59.04% 
2015 
(June) 
1.630.046.580 101.80% 1.325.985.186 82.81% 967.529.157 71.09% 
Source: Council of Ministers of Bulgaria, absorption rates retrieved from 
http://eufunds.bg/bg/page/766  (accessed August 2015). 
 
OPREG-BG was officially adopted in November 2007. According to a midterm-review, 
the programme fared well in terms of financial performance (KPMG 2011, Midterm 
Evaluation OPREG-BG). Internal observers characterised it as a good programme 
(Head of Unit in Bulgarian Central Coordination Unit #1; Director in Bulgarian 
Managing Authority #1) whilst external observers praised it for having a “good control 
system” (Former EC Head of Unit #1). As emphasized by one interviewee, OPREG-BG 
was successful due to its capacity, expertise as well as the political involvement of the 
Ministers who took specific measures to avoid funding to be lost (Deputy Director of 
Managing Authority #1). 
 
The programme benefited from a transfer of experience from the pre-accession period 
and its institutions were able to ensure significant continuity. For instance, the 
Ministry of Regional Development had been a PHARE implementing agency, 
responsible for programming and the strategic dimension behind setting up the 
programme. In 2009, the MA was divided in two as to allow one team to concentrate 
                                                             
93 Here, the nominal numbers are different between what was paid to beneficiaries and payments 
from EC. However, these are the numbers officially reported officially by the Bulgarian government.  
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on the closure of PHARE and the other to focus exclusively on OPREG (Director of 
Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). The transition towards managing Structural Funds 
seemed to be successful particularly in light of experience that staff had in managing 
PHARE funds (Head of Unit of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2). This was clearly 
emphasized by one interviewee: 
“There was a good transition because people working in this PHARE 
implementing agency were experienced in financial issues, audit issues and 
monitoring issues which was new for the other directorates. This was good for 
the elaboration of the management and control systems, even though the rules 
now are totally different from PHARE. But still, some basic principles are the 
same” (Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). 
 
No specific problems were highlighted on the establishment of the management and 
control systems of the programme, although these were officially approved, by the EC, 
in February 2010 (OPREG-BG AIR 2010, 5). A midterm evaluation underlined that 
the management and control systems of the programme were “fundamentally 
effective” (KPMG 2011, Midterm Evaluation OPREG-BG, 14). Then next section 
outlines the main findings with regard to the administrative capacity of the 
programme. 
 
6.1.1 Administrative capacity and OPREG-BG  
 
From as early as 2008, the capacity of the Managing Authority was generally rated as 
“good” (OPREG-BG Monitoring Committee minutes, November 2008). Therefore, the 
programme’s administrative capacity problems were not as stringent as in other cases. 
With all this, there were several notable factors that will be addressed in the following. 
 
Institutional capacity (ADM1) 
From an institutional point of view (ADM1), the management and implementation of 
the programme was the official responsibility of the Directorate General 
“Programming of Regional Development” within the Bulgarian Ministry of Regional 
Development and Public Works (MRDPW) (OPREG-BG October 2010, 137). The 
Managing Authority had one central office in Sofia and six other regional offices (Table 
21). Regional departments acted as Intermediate Bodies ensuring secretarial, 
verification and monitoring functions, and providing information and support to 
beneficiaries on the ground. The six regional offices acted as first levels of control in 
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relation to beneficiaries (Bulgarian Certifying Authority Representative #1; Director of 
Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). 
 
Table 21: MA structure of OPREG-BG 
MA central office 
General Director, DG “Programming of Regional Development” 
Deputy Director General, DG 
“Programming of Regional Development” 
(responsible for below) 
Deputy Director General, DG “Programming 
of Regional Development” (responsible for 
(below) 
Department “Programming and 
Evaluation”: 
Unit “Programming” 
Unit “Evaluation” 
Department ”Implementation of 
Programme Priorities” 
Department “Monitoring” Department “Financial Management 
and Control”: 
Unit “Financial Control” 
Unit “Financial Planning and Payments” 
Unit “Accounting” 
Department “Organisational 
Development, Information and 
Publicity” 
Department “Legislation, Risk 
Assessment and Irregularities” 
MA regional departments 
Department "North-west region” (Vidin) Department "North-central region” (Rousse) 
Department "North-east region” (Varna) Department "South-west region” (Sofia) 
Department "South-central region” 
(Plovdiv) 
Department "South-east region” (Bourgas) 
 Source: OPREG-BG October 2010, 138 
 
In general, the coordination between the MA and the regional departments was 
functional and “the decision to have regional bodies as part of the MA made 
communications smoother” (Director in Bulgarian Audit Authority). Nevertheless, 
during their first years of existence the capacity of regional bodies required 
considerable strengthening (Bulgarian Parliament 2011, 15). This was in light of 
several complaints about the work of regional offices (Bulgarian Expert #4; Head of 
Unit of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2). Part of the problem was that initially these 
offices acted mainly as “mail boxes” and reported problems to the main ministry in 
Sofia instead of solving them directly (Representative of the Bulgarian National 
 188 
 
Association of Municipalities). Consequently, evaluators recommended these offices 
should be provided with more responsibilities and “administrative functions” (KPMG 
2011 Midterm Evaluation OPREG-BG, 12). 
 
Finally, in terms of institutional accountability the programme suffered from several 
shortcomings. Beneficiaries were less involved and consulted in the first years of the 
programme (KPMG 2011, Midterm Evaluation OPREG-BG, 15). Moreover, especially 
at the start of the implementation some stakeholders criticised the authorities for not 
being very communicative (Representative of the Bulgarian National Association of 
Municipalities). Following such criticism, the programme improved in terms of 
transparency and beneficiaries seemed to be consulted more frequently prior to the 
development of key documents and procedures (Bulgarian EU funds coordinator for 
South-West region #1; Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2; 
Bulgarian EU funds coordinator for South-West region #1). Moreover, some 
beneficiaries highlighted that the cooperation with the MA was much more functional 
than with other similar structures (e.g. OPENV-BG) (Bulgarian Municipality EU funds 
Director #1). Overall, apart from clarifying the intra-institutional coordination 
(between the MA and the IBs) and improving transparency and openness towards 
beneficiaries, there were no other notable issues affecting the institutional capacity of 
OPREG-BG.   
 
Bureaucratic capacity (ADM2) 
The OPREG-BG programme faced more considerable challenges in terms of its 
bureaucratic capacity (ADM2). The high volume of administrative procedures and 
documents and a high level of administrative burdens characterised the programme’s 
implementation. Although its legal and procedural infrastructure seemed adequate, 
many procedures and administrative documents were frequently changed in order to 
tackle problems encountered during the implementation stage of the projects. As 
stressed by an interviewee, “rules are better now” and issues have gradually improved 
in this area, in particular with regard to applicants’ guides (Deputy Director of 
Bulgarian Managing Authority #2). 
 
Despite legislation and procedures being relatively stable and uniform across the 
programme, some issues emerged in terms of the interpretation of legislation and 
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procedures, particularly between the central Managing Authority and the regional 
Intermediate Bodies (OPREG-BG AIR 2013). Very often, “contradictory” advice was 
given to beneficiaries by central and regional level offices (Representative of the 
Bulgarian National Association of Municipalities). On the one hand, divergences in 
terms of methodology and in the interpretation of rules affected beneficiaries and 
generated many of the gaps in the programme, especially vis-à-vis public procurement 
(OPREG-BG AIR 2013, 24). On the other hand, from an administrative point of view, 
some suggested that reimbursement claims, made by OPREG-BG beneficiaries, often 
contained many errors (Bulgarian Certifying Authority Representative #1).  
 
In order to reduce administrative burdens, the simplification of checklists and of 
monitoring and control processes was suggested as a potential solution (KPMG 2011, 
Midterm Evaluation OPREG-BG, 14). Because during the 2007-2013 period, OPREG-
BG applications and documents were handled physically, a wider use of electronic 
applications and systems were seen as necessary for improving the management of the 
programme (OPREG-BG AIR 2013, 24; Bulgarian Certifying Authority Representative 
#1). On a more positive note, the programme seemed to benefit from good internal 
methodologies and project management tools (KPMG 2011 Midterm Evaluation 
OPREG-BG, 136-137). 
  
Finally, in terms of monitoring and reporting, there were considerable administrative 
burdens generated by a high number of administrative controls. The authorities 
eventually acknowledged that the high number of “on-the-spot checks” were not in 
line with the level of risk associated to projects (OPREG-BG 2014-2020, 243-245). 
There was also a tendency from the authorities to “gold-plate” particularly when it 
came to the financial management and control of projects (KPMG 2011, Midterm 
Evaluation OPREG-BG, 137). A lot of internal procedures and controls were much 
more demanding than those requested by the EU authorities, reflecting a strong 
bureaucratised approach from the authorities:  
“You are from the Ministry for Regional Development and you send a payment 
claim to the Ministry of Finance and it takes like six months, and five times the 
same document stamped by the Minister before anything moves. And that’s 
really bad. They apply the same to the beneficiaries, municipalities, schools” 
(EC policy officer for administrative capacity #1).  
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In addition, the authorities’ tended to request a considerable number of documents 
from final beneficiaries (Bulgarian Parliament 2012, 109). With all this, the legal and 
procedural infrastructure of the programme gradually improved during 2007-2013 
and some stressed that procedures were transparent (Bulgarian EU funds coordinator 
for South-West region #1). In parallel, the capacity of beneficiaries to handle 
procedural aspects also grew. In general, this illustrated the ability of different 
stakeholders to learn and adapt to the complexity of the situations faced during the 
policy cycle of the programme.  
 
Human resources capacity (ADM3) 
OPREG-BG benefited from a good human resources capacity. Table 22 portrays the 
estimated number of staff working on the programme. Apart from the staff based in 
the central Managing Authority, a typical regional office of OPREG-BG had around 
nine to eleven employees. These included engineers, financial experts, and lawyers. 
According to interview data, at the time of the interviews (May 2014), some offices 
managed around 170 projects (Bulgarian EU funds coordinator South-West region 
#1). With all this, staff numbers were sometimes deemed insufficient in relation to the 
complexity of projects managed (KPMG 2011 Midterm Evaluation OPREG-BG, 135).94 
As a consequence, the atmosphere in the Managing Authority was characterised by a 
“lot of tension particularly due to heavy workloads and high levels of stress among 
staff” (Bulgarian Expert #2).  
 
In terms of expertise and the quality of the staff, OPREG-BG was one of the only 
programmes that benefited from the transition from pre- to post-accession funds in 
terms of staff continuity. The Ministry of Regional Development retained a number of 
well-prepared staff dealing with pre-accession funding, which potentially had worked 
on the national (2000-2006) Regional Development Programme (Monastiriotis 2008, 
17). Moreover, much of the expertise of OPREG-BG staff did develop during 2004-
2006 through several capacity building schemes (OPREG-BG October 2010). Several 
interviewees did stress that the capacity and expertise of staff equally improved 
throughout the implementation period (Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing 
Authority #2; Bulgarian EU funds coordinator for South-West region #1).  
                                                             
94 This was despite an increase in staff from 133 (in August 2010) to 155 (in May 2014) (KPMG 2011 
and own data). 
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Table 22: OPREG-BG distribution of staff (2014) 
Institutions Approximate no. of staff 
Managing Authority - Ministry of Regional Development 
and Public Works 
90 
Intermediate Bodies - 6 regional offices of the Managing 
Authority  
60-66 (10-11 per office) 
 
Total 150-156 
Source: Council of Ministers 2013, Annex 7; OPREG-BG AIR 2014, 33; Deputy Director of 
Bulgarian Managing Authority #2; Bulgarian EU funds coordinator for South-West region #1 
 
With regard to training, by 2009, approximately 1500 staff and potential beneficiaries 
were trained on different aspects of the programme (KPMG 2011 Midterm Evaluation 
OPREG-BG, 40). The “system of training and qualifications” of staff working in the 
Managing Authority was considered one of the key strengths of the programme 
(OPREG-BG 2014-2020, 176). Overall, some of the programme representatives 
interviewed confirmed that they did benefit from enough training in order to carry out 
their duties (Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2; Bulgarian EU 
funds coordinator for South-West region #1). 
 
With regard to financial incentives, the salaries of employees working in the Managing 
Authority were relatively high as compared to those from other public bodies. In turn, 
this attracted a high number of professional candidates for job openings (Deputy 
Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2; Bulgarian EU funds coordinator for 
South-West region #1). In addition, positions in the MA for regional development were 
seen as highly prestigious (Bulgarian EU funds coordinator South-West region #1). 
Moreover, it was officially recommended that the approach through which employees 
were motivated via financial bonuses, and an objective assessment of their work, is 
maintained in the programmes human resources management (OPREG-BG 2014-20, 
176). 
 
If the expertise and incentives of administrators was one of the assets of the 
programme, the same cannot be said about the capacity of external stakeholders. 
Audits outlined that administrative and technical deficiencies marred the 
implementation of projects at the regional level (OPREG-BG AIR 2012, 27). Official 
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documents pointed to severe deficiencies, in terms of administrative capacity and 
technical expertise within municipalities, which were the key beneficiaries of the 
OPREG-BG (DG Regio AAR 2014, 16). For instance, from a total number of 264 
municipalities, it was estimated that only 40% had developed specialized departments 
to deal with pre-accession and Structural Funds and that these were concentrated in 
larger municipalities (OPREG-BG September 2007, 73). In addition, a crucial obstacle 
was the fact that municipalities struggled with ensuring the necessary cash flows to 
finance their EU-funded projects, (OPREG-BG AIR 2010, 17; Bulgarian EU funds 
coordinator for South-West region #1; Bulgarian Expert #1).  
 
Poor administrative capacity levels within beneficiaries were maintained due to the 
fact that staff, working in municipalities on EU-funded projects, had very low salaries. 
Some explained this in line with domestic legislation which capped levels of 
remuneration that could be received by local civil servants (Bulgarian Municipality EU 
Funds Director #2). As opposed to central level MA staff, salaries of officials working 
on EU funds in municipalities were not reimbursed from technical assistance funds 
(Bulgarian Technical Assistance MA expert #1). Despite these structural obstacles, 
along the years, beneficiaries managed to increase their ability to access projects 
(KPMG 2011, Midterm Evaluation OPREG-BG, 46). Most municipalities developed 
specialised departments with staff solely for EU-funded projects (Bulgarian 
Municipality EU funds director #1; Bulgarian coordinator for South-West region #1). 
Beneficiaries took advantage of the specialised assistance provided from central and 
regional departments of the MA (OPREG-BG AIR 2010; Council of Ministers of 
Bulgaria 2013). Lastly, the agency of different local administrators or project managers 
contributed to this:  
“Blagoevgrad is the most active municipality in the South-West. There are five 
people in the Municipality working as project managers…The issue was that 
there was little capacity in small municipalities. But now 1-2 people can produce 
very good projects” (Bulgarian EU funds coordinator for South-West region 
#1). 
 
Local consultants seemed to have played an extensive role in the life of the programme. 
On the one hand, municipalities relied on consultants in order to compensate for the 
lack of internal human resources capacity. The main argument was that small 
municipalities could not implement projects without external support, especially for 
infrastructure oriented programmes such as OPREG-BG (Deputy Director of 
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Bulgarian Managing Authority #2; Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). As 
pointed elsewhere, one of the main disadvantages was that over-reliance on 
consultants was detrimental for internal capacity-building:  
“For OPREG-BG when we have a big project the municipalities decide to involve 
consultancies but from our experience when projects are dealt with by 
municipalities themselves it’s better. Some beneficiaries hire consultants for 
project management and procurement. The big projects according to BG 
procurement law must hire consultants. They use consultants for proposals 
writing. This was an issue for beneficiaries” (Bulgarian EU funds coordinator 
for South-West region #1).  
 
 
On the other hand, the negative influence of consultancies was equally criticised. Some 
administrators considered that consultants were interested only in financial gains and 
did not assume responsibility for damages or mistakes they made in projects (Director 
of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2). Consequently, consultants contributed directly 
to problems arising in the implementation of projects, although financial corrections 
or other sanctions applied only to final beneficiaries. All in all, the evidence collected 
has shown that there were more consistent problems with the human resources 
capacity of beneficiaries, rather than that of central or local level authorities, for the 
management and implementation of OPREG-BG. This was an important finding, 
which will be addressed again in the sub-chapter focusing on public procurement.  
 
Territorial capacity (TER)  
Bulgaria is a highly centralized country with no real regional tiers of government and 
with six NUTS 2 administrative regions. The latter were, however, adopted only for 
statistical and programming purposes (Yanakiev 2010; Nikolova 2011). Different 
discussions on transferring more authority to regional levels were not matched with 
the necessary political will to advance in an effective process of decentralisation (Head 
of Unit in Bulgarian Central Coordination Unit #1; Bulgarian Expert #1). However, 
given the size of the country, many underlined that the centralized model fitted much 
better the Bulgarian context and a further regionalization of the country may not 
necessarily improve the ability of the Bulgarian administration to make use of EU 
funding (Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2; Head of Unit in 
Bulgarian Central Coordination Unit #1). In this respect, the centralized management 
model, with a central level Managing Authority coordinating the work of six regional 
departments, seems to have been functional for OPREG-BG. One of the key features 
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of the programme was that it operated well at the local and regional level. Despite early 
problems in establishing the role of regional offices, these seemed to have been 
operational: 
“At the same the regional offices were closer to the regions. These offices are 
part of the MA (directorates) but present at the local level. They have the 
function of monitoring and of 1st level of control. At the beginning, their role 
was a bit controversial. During the implementation period we controlled them 
for their work and their controls. But now our systems are simpler, and they are 
fully operational” (Head of Unit of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2).  
 
 
Regional and local administrators contributed to capacity-building activities for 
municipalities and other beneficiaries (OPREG-BG AIR 2012, 2013). Moreover, it 
seems that regional and local associative structures (e.g. National Association of 
Municipalities in the Republic of Bulgaria NAMRB, regional and economic 
development agencies, regional associations of municipalities) acted as important 
local level partners (OPREG-BG October 2010, 164). Such structures provided support 
to public municipalities and generally contributed to the local implementation 
process. Lastly, no major differences were uncovered, in terms of expertise, between 
staff working at the central and those working at the regional/local level. In fact, it was 
generally perceived that local experts working on OPREG-BG had a good level of 
expertise (Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1; Deputy Director of 
Bulgarian Managing Authority #2; Bulgarian Expert #1). Ultimately, this contributed 
to the programme’s reasonable regional and local management. 
 
6.1.2 Political factors and OPREG-BG  
 
OPREGs generally benefited from strong levels of political prioritising and support. 
This was the case with OPREG-BG. The following sub-sections outlines and discusses 
some of the main findings on how political factors affected the management and 
implementation of the programme.   
 
Political stability (POL1)  
Political stability seems to have been a key characteristic of the programme. Firstly, in 
terms of political changes, there was no evidence to suggest that governmental 
alternations affected in a negative manner the management of the programme. More 
widely, some national and municipal elections (2006, 2008 and 2009) did generate a 
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“lack of consistency in policy implementation” and led to the development of “practical 
problems in applying the Public Procurement Act and changes in sectoral strategies” 
(KPMG 2011 Midterm Evaluation OPREG-BG, 132).  
 
Given that OPREG-BG was a programme which catered for local public authorities it 
was directly affected by the performance and political movements within local 
administrations. More specifically, local elections and political changes, especially at 
the municipality level, had a strong impact on the programme’s implementation, as 
thoroughly described by an interviewee: 
“When I started to work under this programme I noticed that there is a huge 
problem during the elections because this creates a lot of problems for the 
functioning of the system. I propose that for all programmes countries should 
have a common data for elections to avoid this instability of this system. We 
have elections at different times. We had elections last year…The problem is not 
the election at the national level but at the local level. The mayors. For example, 
when there is a new mayor, I’ve sent a letter that we will apply financial 
corrections, and legal issues to recover the money. If the next day there is a new 
mayor and what he first sees is this letter for financial corrections it’s a huge 
stress for them. This causes problems and they blame the previous mayors. For 
example, we have such cases when the mayor came here and said that he doesn’t 
care about this project and that this is not a priority for the municipality” 
(Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). 
 
 
At the central level, elections and political change could affect central level ministries 
mainly due to changes in politically appointed staff (Deputy Director of Bulgarian 
Managing Authority #2; Bulgarian Expert #2). However, the evidence was mixed on 
the extent to which patronage driven appointments affected the staff working in 
structures responsible for the programme. Independent accounts stressed that 
Directors and Heads of Unit working for OPREG-BG were changed on a political basis 
(Bulgarian Expert #4; Bulgarian Expert #2). For instance, many changes were made 
after the Oresharski government was sworn into office, with some interviewees 
admitting that they were appointed on a political basis (Deputy Director of Bulgarian 
Managing Authority #2). Other evidence of potential political appointments was found 
by analysing who represented the Managing Authority in the different bi-annual 
Monitoring Committees. It was clear that following major elections (e.g. in 2009, 
2013) new heads of the Managing Authority were appointed.  
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More generally, it was stressed that changes in managerial staff were not problematic 
given that the custom was for the deputy head of the MA to replace the main director 
(Director in Bulgarian Audit Authority; Former Director of Bulgarian Managing 
Authority #2). This potentially allowed the maintenance of an adequate level of 
managerial continuity. Despite this, some accurately described the negative effects of 
political patronage on operational staff:  
“The problem with the staff is that they come and go. The people that two years 
ago I interviewed for the 2012 edition of our reports are gone. Now, almost 
everybody is different. In almost all OPs. In some cases, like OPREG-BG, you 
talk to experts after you switch off your recorder and they tell me that for a year 
now, with the switch of the government, which accompanied a huge reshuffling 
of the administration, they lost a lot of expertise”. (Bulgarian Expert #2) 
 
Overall, the evidence collected for OPREG-BG pointed first to a strong link between 
political changes at the central and local level and potential delays in the 
implementation of projects. On the other hand, political patronage mechanisms were 
in place, although they only partly affected the capacity and expertise of OPREG-BG 
structures to carry out their day-to-day tasks.   
 
Political support (POL2) 
OPREG-BG was one of the most politically visible and supported programmes in the 
country. Given its significant budget and the high political stakes attached to regional 
development projects, the programme benefited from a strong level of political capital 
and interest (Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1; Deputy Director of 
Bulgarian Managing Authority #2). A former EU official stressed that the Managing 
Authority was one of the strongest in the country and this equally had to do with the 
fact that the programme benefited the agenda of politicians such as Rosen Plevneliev 
or Liliana Pavlova95 (Former EC Head of Unit #1). As a result, the Managing Authority 
arguably benefited from an above average degree of central political support. With all 
this, at the local level, there were variations with some administrators receiving more 
support from mayors and local politicians than others.96 
 
                                                             
95 Novinite, 10 October 2011, Bulgaria's Regional Minister Assigned to Keep Eye on EU Funds, 
http://www.novinite.com/articles/132831/Bulgaria's+Regional+Minister+Assigned+to+Keep+Eye+o
n+EU+Funds#sthash.JkBgAVg3.dpuf (accessed January 2017). 
96 Some explained that variations in levels of political support given to local staff working on EU funds 
were linked to the managerial skills and interest of mayors (Former EC Head of Unit #1). 
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In terms of political vision for spending priorities, two findings are noteworthy. Firstly, 
there was guidance from the central political level on this, although it sometimes 
derived from pragmatic calculations of central level politicians’ in relation to the need 
of keeping local politicians content. Secondly, in light of the recent financial crisis and 
the lack of financial resources, OPREG-BG became one of the main sources of regional 
investment in the country (OPREG-BG AIR 20010 & 2011). In this respect, 
administrations required to act more strategically and for this, political guidance was 
necessary. Politicians had to prioritize the sectors where money should be 
concentrated and spent. Such decisions were only taken every few years. For instance, 
in the case of the OPREG-BG 2014-2020 EU funds programming stage, one frequent 
example given was on the negotiations between the European Commission and the 
central government. A certain confusion dominated initial negotiations between both 
sides. EC representatives often seemed to emphasize the need to concentrate much 
more the programme’s resources (OPREG-BG MC minutes, November 2007).  
 
Similarly, for the 2014-2020 period, EC officials suggested that in order for OPREG-
BG to have a higher impact funds should be concentrated in only six or seven urban 
areas (Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1; Representative of the Bulgarian 
National Association of Municipalities; Bulgarian Expert #1). Misunderstanding or 
disagreeing with this position, Bulgarian authorities suggested that 67 urban 
agglomerations should be eligible for financing (Bulgarian Expert #1; Director of 
Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). Overall, the Commission’s’ proposals were not 
politically acceptable, given that the central government could not justify to local 
municipalities why they would have been excluded from funding. This was a highly 
relevant example which re-emphasised the strong political dimension of the 
programme. Moreover, the rather under-developed regional policy of the country and 
the need to promote EU funding resource for basic infrastructure development 
contributed to a political prioritising of this programme. With all this, many problems 
emerged in the implementation of the programme and many were linked to local 
clientelism.  
 
Political clientelism (POL3) 
There was some consistent evidence of clientelistic related politicisation affecting 
OPREG-BG. Political clientelism in terms of political interference in the selection and 
 198 
 
distribution of funding is more thoroughly discussed in the following chapter. Some 
interviewees considered that the distribution of funds was something that politicians 
should deal with in a senso stricto (Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1; 
Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). However, commentators did 
stress that political criteria were sometimes informally used particularly with regard 
to controls and verifications:  
“For municipalities this is clear. When GERB was ruling their mayors were 
getting more, and now the Socialists and the Turks get more. You can see it from 
the data. Also, now GERB municipalities get more controls from the Socialist 
government, and previously it was GERB that made the controls for Socialist 
municipalities” (Bulgarian Expert #4).  
 
As a consequence of such practices, conflicts emerged between some “opposition” 
municipalities and central government. In this respect, some argued that GERB 
municipalities, when in opposition, tried to sabotage the absorption performance of 
EU funds, of the Oresharski Government, by not accepting payments for projects that 
were finalised (Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2). This provided 
a telling example of how the management and implementation of EU funds became 
very much ingrained in domestic political affairs and was used as political tool.    
 
Secondly, there was some evidence of potential favouritism in the implementation of 
projects. This manifested itself at the bureaucratic level of management with some 
municipalities, belonging to the ruling parties, asking more frequently for informal 
support from central ministries (Bulgarian EU funds coordinator for South-West 
region #1; Bulgarian Municipality EU funds Director #1). Moreover, a senior 
administrator bluntly recognized that: “there is some help to some municipalities that 
are closer to the government party” (Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority 
#2). Others, however, disagreed with the idea that some municipalities obtained 
favours for EU-funded projects in this area. They argued that EU funds depend on the 
ability of mayors, as entrepreneurs, to play an active role in receiving and spending 
this funding (Representative of the Bulgarian National Association of Municipalities; 
Bulgarian Mayor #1). The potentially negative dimension of political interference and 
clientelism is further discussed in the section on public procurement. 
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6.1.3 EU role and influence (EUR) 
  
The European Commission, and especially DG Regio, have monitored closely and 
provided support to the Bulgarian national authorities on the programme. Following 
audits, EU officials found several shortcomings: “shortages of administrative 
resources”, “weaknesses in management verifications” and a lack of “effective 
procedures for making financial corrections” (DG Regio AAR 2010, 56). Consequently, 
Bulgarian authorities adopted additional measures to improve and address these 
deficiencies. 
 
In 2010/2011 and in 2014/2015 the payments towards the programme were 
interrupted and pre-suspended by the European authorities. In the first instance, 
payments were interrupted due to “issues regarding management verifications” (DG 
Regio AAR 2011, 87). During the second instance, there were problems with the 1st and 
3rd priority axes of the programme, specifically with the public procurement conducted 
by several municipalities for EU-funded projects.97 One of the arguments used by the 
Commission was that the management and control systems of the programme did not 
work properly and: “the EC thought that we are maybe giving money to projects 
without control” (Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2). However, as 
a result of corrective measures and “improvements in the management and control 
systems”, the EC lifted any reservations it had on the programme (DG Regio AAR 
2014, 62). 
 
In general, on the ground, there was a favourable view of the technical support 
received from Brussels (Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2). 
However, some Bulgarian administrators were keen to criticise the pre-suspension of 
funding, stressing that many of the projects deemed “problematic” passed initial 
assessments from the Commissions’ side:  
“For this suspension of payments, the Commission was not correct because the 
Commission decided to apply and ask the country to withdraw some 
infrastructure projects because it considered that there are huge mistakes in the 
tendering procedures. But, at the same time, many of those projects have been 
                                                             
97 Novinite, 4 June 2014, “EC Suspends Payments on Regional Development Programme for 
Bulgaria”, available at: 
http://www.novinite.com/articles/161056/EC+Suspends+Payments+on+Regional+Development+Pr
ogramme+for+Bulgaria#sthash.zpwK2g3k.dpuf (accessed January 2017). 
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subject to ex-ante controls of the European Delegation. It was unfair” (Director 
in Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). 
 
Similar frustrations were voiced by local administrators who considered that “Brussels 
issues rules that are unclear” and that the “EU is too bureaucratic” (Bulgarian EU 
funds coordinator for South-West region #1). Apart from the interruption or pre-
suspension of funds, which in essence became a top political issue, the EC reported its 
contribution to towards improving the administrative capacity of the programme 
through different capacity-building schemes or by advocating a more coordinated use 
of technical assistance funds (DG Regio AAR 2011, 40). Disregarding the controversial 
aspects surrounding the interruption of EU payments, the EU seems to have been an 
active actor involved in the evolution and development of OPREG-BG. 
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6.2 The Romanian Regional Development Programme 
(OPREG-RO) 
 
The Romanian Regional Operational Programme (OPREG-RO) aimed, during the 
2007-2013 implementation period, to: “support the economic, social, territorially 
balanced and sustainable development of the Romanian regions, according to their 
specific needs and resources, focusing on urban growth poles, improving the business 
environment and basic infrastructure, in order to make the Romanian regions, 
especially the ones lagging behind, more attractive places to live, visit, invest in and 
work” (OPREG-RO 2007-2013 Version 2011, 120). To tackle this “strategic objective”, 
the programme, which was the 3rd largest SF funded programme in the country, was 
divided in six priority axes, amounting to a total of 4.3 billion EUR.  
 
Table 23: OPREG-RO - Priority Axis and financial allocation (2007-2013) 
 
Priority Axis 
Community 
Funding  
(EUR million) 
 
National 
contribution  
(EUR 
million) 
Total 
(EUR million) 
Priority Axis 1: Support to 
sustainable development of 
urban growth poles 
1.117.806.529 273.365.256 1.391.171.785 
Priority Axis 2: Improvement 
of regional and local transport 
infrastructure 
758.355.021 118.355.985 876.711.006 
Priority Axis 3: Improvement 
of social infrastructure 
558.903.260 98.629.992 657.533.252 
Priority Axis 4: Strengthening 
the regional and local business 
environment 
633.423.700 76.471.117 709.894.817 
Priority Axis 5: Sustainable 
development and promotion of 
tourism 
558.903.264 57.862.924 616.766.188 
Priority Axis 6: Technical 
assistance  
98.629.988 32.876.662 131.506.650 
 3.726.021.762 657.561.936 4.383.583.698 
Source: Regional Operational Programme 2007-2013, revised version of 2011, 162 
 
Compared to other Romanian OPs, OPREG-RO was one of the most successful 
programmes in terms of financial implementation and absorption, despite its slow 
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absorption rate until 2010-2011 (OPREG-RO Monitoring Committee November 
2010). As a result of its relatively high level of absorption performance, the programme 
received an additional 200 million EUR (in 2013) following an internal national 
decision on redistributing SF between Operational Programmes (OP).  
 
At the end of 2014, the programme had an overall absorption rate of 55.13% and was 
the 2nd best performing OP, out of seven, outperformed only by the Administrative 
Capacity OP (72.02%). Both programmes were managed by the same political and 
administrative structure, the Ministry of Regional Development and Public 
Administration, which was one of the most politically pre-eminent ministries in the 
country. OPREG-RO was, therefore, among the most visible OPs and acquired a 
certain level of prestige as compared to other Romanian programmes.  
  
Table 24: OPREG-RO evolution of financial absorption (2007-2013) 
Years 
 
Contracted 
(Romanian LEI) 
Payments to 
beneficiaries  
(Romanian LEI)  
Payments from EC  
(final absorption)  
(EUR million) 
 
 Nominal  Percent Nominal Percent Nominal Percent 
2007-
2009 
6.076.491.511 - 663.902.054 - 85.646.453 - 
2010 13.179.457.044 - 2.525.494.485 - 745.178.987 - 
2011 20.078.773.422 78.23% 4.423.470.089 24.95% 437.242.093 11.73% 
2012 24.971.297.337 92.72% 6.490.566.620 34.53% 920.343.633 24.70% 
2013 29.549.383.066 104.43% 9.178.447.145 45.94% 1.646.565.915 41.52% 
2014 32.425.867.046 114.74% 11.593.820.832 57.80% 2.186.432.883 55.13% 
2015 
(June) 
33.257.383.200 117.13% 12.635.208.404 62.56% 2.467.839.531 62.22% 
Source: Romanian Government, absorption rates retrieved from Annex I archives available 
at: http://www.fonduri-ue.ro/ (accessed August 2015). 
 
Similarly to Bulgaria’s case, one of the advantages of OPREG-RO was it benefited from 
the start from the pre-accession experience of its institutional structures (Georgescu 
2008; OPREG-RO 2011, 109; OPREG-RO Monitoring Committee May 2012, 4). In this 
respect, it inherited many previous procedures and an estimated 75% from the staff 
 203 
 
that worked in the PHARE implementing agency and in the Ministry of European 
Integration (Oprescu et al. 2004, 24). The Managing Authority for OPREG-RO was 
initially divided into two departments, with one focusing on the closure of the PHARE 
programme, and the other being responsible for the management of OPREG-RO. As 
explained by a former official the pre-accession experience offered a strong basis of 
expertise:  
“For the ministries that had pre-accession experience it was not very hard. They 
used the same personnel and implementation schemes. During PHARE we 
worked with the Regional Development Agencies. For OPREG-RO we did not 
change anything. People had the experience which was very useful, and 
although new staff came in, they were brought in for their capacity. If you look 
at OPREG-RO that is the only explanation for its success” (Former Director of 
Romanian Managing Authority #1).  
 
This continuity generated a strong institutional core which provided the programme 
with a “competitive advantage” (Representative of Romanian Certifying Authority; 
Romanian EU funds consultant #1). Moreover, the accreditation of Extended 
Decentralised Implementation System (EDIS) granted to the Ministry for the 
remaining PHARE contracts, enabled the programme to strengthen its procedural and 
institutional infrastructure (Romanian EU funds monitoring officer #1). With all this, 
there were initial delays in setting up the management and control systems of the 
programme. Accredited in 2009, these were rated as “partially functioning” and the 
Managing Authority was suggested to take further action to address weaknesses 
(OPREG-RO AIR 2009, 28). 
 
6.2.1 Administrative capacity and OPREG-RO  
 
During 2007-2013, OPREG-RO benefited from one of the highest levels of 
administrative capacity from all Romanian Operational Programmes. Despite this, the 
programme suffered from several shortcomings, as will be outlined in the following 
sections.  
 
Institutional capacity (ADM1) 
Under different names or configurations, the Ministry of Regional Development and 
Public Administration always acted as the Managing Authority for the programme. 
The institutional logic was that of centrally managed, yet regional programme which 
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had to cater for and establish a strong relationship with its beneficiaries (e.g. local 
public authorities). It was considered that the general institutional model of OPREG-
RO was partly based on blueprints adapted from Spain and Portugal (Former Director 
of Romanian Managing Authority #1).  
 
Table 25: MA structure of OPREG-RO 
MA central office  
(Directorate General of Romanian Ministry of Regional Development) 
Department for Planning and 
Management:  
Unit “Programming of Regional 
Policy” 
Unit “Management of Priority Axis”  
Unit “Technical Assistance and 
relationship with Intermediate 
Bodies” 
Department Monitoring:  
Unit “Urban Infrastructure and Transport” 
Unit “Social infrastructure, SMEs and Tourism” 
Unit “SMIS electronic platform management” 
Compartment “Monitoring Risks” 
 
Department for Public Procurement: 
Unit “OPREG-RO authorizations”  
Unit “OPREG-RO public 
procurement verifications and 
conflicts of interest”  
Department for Authorization and Payments:  
Unit “Financial Authorization” 
Unit “Payments for the programme” 
Unit “Accounting” 
Evaluation Unit 
Programme verification and management of irregularities Unit 
Intermediate Bodies  
Central level:  
National Tourism Agency  
Regional level:  
Regional Development Agencies present in eight 
development regions: North-West; Centre; North-
East; South-East; South-Muntenia; Bucharest-
Ilfov; South-West Oltenia; West 
 Source: Author’s compilation based on data accurate for 2015, retrieved from the Romanian 
Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration and the programme’s official 
website: www.inforegio.ro (accessed June 2016) 
 
The MA experienced some early problems with regard to the division of labour 
between its departments. Initially, institutional structures and procedures within the 
Managing Authority were primarily focused on contracting and selecting projects, 
which resulted in dense and overlapping levels of control (OPREG-RO Monitoring 
Committee October 2009, 32). In this context, monitoring (a crucial stage of the 
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absorption process) was neglected (Romanian EU funds monitoring officer #1). This 
potentially triggered other problems, particularly with regard to public procurement 
and led to the interruption of payments by the EC following the first wave of audits 
(DG REGIO AAR 2011, 40). As a result, there were changes to the institutional model 
with more institutional resources being transferred to monitoring and verification. 
Moreover, the MA OPREG-RO created new institutional structures that specifically 
focused on the verification of projects, public procurement and the detection and 
prevention of conflicts of interest (OPREG-RO AIR 2013, 29).  
 
In general, the MA for OPREG-RO was seen as an institutional “standard” and 
considered a model for other structures (Former Director of Romanian Managing 
Authority #1; Romanian EU funds Monitoring Officer #1). However, not all 
institutional structures managing the programme were as functional as the central 
MA. For instance, the Intermediate Body (IB) for Tourism (the National Tourism 
Agency) was considered among the least performing structures involved in the 
management of the programme. Some interviewees have stressed that this was 
potentially due to higher levels of political interference within that structure, coupled 
with a lower priority given to the tourism axis in the programme as a whole (Romanian 
EU funds Monitoring officer #1; Romanian MA Programme Evaluation Officer #2).  
 
The OPREG-RO institutional model seems to have been efficient due to a strong 
degree of coordination between its different institutional structures. For instance, both 
official evaluations and interviewees highlighted the functional cooperation between 
the central Managing Authority and Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), which 
acted as the local level Intermediate Bodies for the programme (World Bank 2013; 
Director in Romanian North-East Regional Development Agency). This successful 
cooperation could be partly explained by the fact that RDAs had a non-governmental 
status, which allowed them to be more independent and to fulfil their tasks in a flexible 
and effective manner (Director General of Romanian Ministry #1; Romanian Expert 
#1). Moreover, since their inception in 1998, RDAs acquired a strong background in 
project implementation. Finally, the latter were assessed and rewarded in light of their 
fulfilled indicators and, therefore, had strong incentives to carry out their tasks as well 
as possible (Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1). Nevertheless, 
during the first years of implementation, the Romanian Audit Authority was critical of 
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the fact that the relationship between the Managing Authority and the RDAs was not 
completely formalised (Director in Romanian Audit Authority #1; Romanian Annual 
Audit Authority Report 2008). All in all, the institutional logic of delegation functioned 
relatively well and was one of the main factors ensuring the programme’s relative 
degree of success.98 
 
Finally, there were some specific problems in the first years of implementation which 
manifested in terms of institutional accountability. For instance, the Managing 
Authority was accused of a lack of transparency and communication vis-à-vis 
beneficiaries (Romanian Civil Society Leader #1). However, the RDAs were pro-active 
in organising information days and specific trainings sessions which improved the 
general reputation of the programme (World Bank 2013, 6). As compared to other 
programmes, OPREG-RO seems to have been one of the most open and transparent 
programmes towards beneficiaries (Former Director of Romanian Managing 
Authority #1; Director General of Romanian Ministry #1). As will be argued later on, 
this openness and its higher degree of effectiveness was linked to the important 
political capital associated with local regional development projects.  
 
Bureaucratic capacity (ADM2) 
As underlined, OPREG-RO benefited inherited a healthy infrastructure of procedures. 
At the start of the programming period, the authorities managing the programme were 
relatively swift in launching the calls for proposals. The programme was, however, 
affected by specific problems in terms of its bureaucratic capacity.  First, in terms of 
legislation, there was often a mismatch between European regulations and national 
rules (OPREG-RO Version 2011, 109). The legal framework for OPREG-RO was 
frequently modified as to take into account on the ground developments (e.g. the issue 
of “advanced payments”).99 Moreover, several official instructions were adopted by the 
                                                             
98 Further evidence of this was that, in 2014, the SME axis from the Economic Competitiveness 
programme was institutionally transferred to the RDAs and for the 2014-2020 programming the SME 
axis was completely transferred to the OPREG-RO. Those witnessing this transfer argued that the 
institutional and procedural systems of the Competitiveness OP were highly deficient and very much 
in contrast with the functioning of the Regional OP (Director in Romanian North-East Regional 
Development Agency ; Romanian Expert #1). 
99 As a result of the financial crisis, advanced payments were reduced because by the time the EC 
reimbursed EU-funded projects, the Romanian state to ensure the necessary cash flows for 
beneficiaries. As explained by several interviewees, the state often found it difficult to do so given the 
general macro-economic context. (Former Director of a Romanian Managing Authority #1; Romanian 
MA Programme Evaluations Officer #2). 
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Managing Authority in order to correct the documentation used for the management 
and implementation of the programme (Former Director of Romanian Managing 
Authority #1). Additional problems appeared in terms of various internal frameworks 
(e.g. improper cadastre and an uncertain private property regime) which added 
additional burdens to both beneficiaries and public authorities (Director General of 
Romanian Ministry #1; Director in Romanian North-East Regional Development 
Agency; OPREG-RO Monitoring Committee November 2011, 14). Strong domestic 
bureaucratic procedures and the need for additional permits from local authorities, as 
well as high administrative burden associated with reimbursement claims constituted 
major problems in the life cycle of the programme (OPREG-RO Monitoring 
Committee November 2011; May 2012). 
 
Second, with regard to electronic systems and procedures, OPREG-RO did not operate 
during 2007-2013 with electronic forms and applications which created a heavy paper 
oriented administration of projects (World Bank 2013, 59). Moreover, internal 
controls from various executive and judicial bodies required several hard copies of the 
documentation affiliated to a project which added considerable burden to the 
authorities and beneficiaries (OPREG-RO Monitoring Committee November 2010, 
10). With regard to project methodologies, it was argued that OPREG-RO had 
established procedures for almost all stages of the process and, more specifically, for 
project selection (evaluation and contracting), project monitoring, payments and 
financing (Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1). In addition, 
OPREG-RO was given as a positive example given its more rigorous project 
management culture (Director in Romanian North-East Regional Development 
Agency).  
 
Third, the programme suffered from several shortcomings in terms of the monitoring 
and verification of its projects. Firstly, procedures for this were initially absent or 
inadequate. This allowed for several problems to develop, or to go undetected, at the 
beneficiaries’ level (Romanian AA Report 2010, 440). As reported by several 
interviewees, many of these issues turned out to be strategic in nature, given that 
monitoring and project verifications were not developed institutionally during the first 
years following accession (Romanian EU funds monitoring officer #1; Former Director 
of Romanian Managing Authority #2). Secondly, many irregularities were found after 
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the monitoring and verification processes were strengthened and the incoherent 
framework, in this area, could trigger corrupt behaviour100:  
“It was hard to verify and monitor because the criteria for the projects were 
changed so many times they did not know what to monitor. Many verifications 
were corrupted, and many monitors were bribed by beneficiaries in order to 
hide the fact that they have not purchased the items that were necessary to be 
purchased for the project” (Romanian EU funds consultant #1). 
 
Finally, although the verification of OPREG-RO projects was a demanding process for 
beneficiaries, it was less burdensome compared to other OPs. In essence, it was easier 
to manage OPREG-RO projects given that they were larger and had more tangible 
outputs such as physical infrastructure (Head of North-East Intermediate Body). 
Given the greater ease with which these projects could be verified constituted an 
advantage for the general assessment of the programme. 
 
Human resources capacity (ADM3) 
Human resources capabilities constituted one of the main assets of the programme. 
Staff numbers in the central Managing Authority grew from 70 (in 2007) to 
approximately 140-160 (in 2014) (Table 26). Both the MA and RDAs were only 
moderately affected by staff turnover rates (Metis 2014, 60). Nevertheless, according 
to interviewees, the insufficient number of staff did affect the possibility to shift human 
resources to areas such as monitoring and evaluation (Romanian EU funds monitoring 
Officer #1). 
 
In terms of the quality of expertise, OPREG-RO benefited from a strong institutional 
continuity with many employees having amassed a rich level of experience and 
expertise. In addition, many of the staff working in the Regional Development 
Agencies had been active since 1998, which meant that they had strong knowledge of 
local institutional and political settings. Moreover, some staff argued that pre-
accession twinning exercises provided staff with the “ABC” for interpreting documents 
and managing the funds (Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1). 
Administrators benefited from continuous training on different technical and non-
technical aspects of the programme (OPREG-RO AIR 2010, 132), and interviewees 
                                                             
100 The key question that arose on this was whether or not poorly developed monitoring systems were 
a strategic mistake, due to a lack of experience from the authorities’ side, or if these mistakes were 
deliberate. Potential evidence on this is further discussed in the sub-chapter on public procurement. 
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confirmed that they participated in trainings at least once a year (Romanian MA 
Programme Evaluation Officer #2). 
 
Table 26: OPREG-RO distribution of staff (2014) 
Institutions Approximate no. of staff 
Central Managing Authority (Ministry of Regional 
Development and Public Administration)  
140-160 
Eight regional Intermediate Bodies (Regional Development 
Agencies - RDAs) 
 
approx. 480-560  
(60-70 staff working on 
OPREG in each RDA) 
Intermediate Body – National Authority for Tourism   60-80 
Total 680-800 
Source: Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1; Director in Romanian North-East 
Regional Development Agency; Regional Development Agency Bucharest-Ilfov 
Organigramme 2013; National Authority for Tourism Organigramme 2016. 
 
OPREG-RO staff benefited from high financial incentives throughout the whole 
implementation period, one of the main ingredient of the programme’s success, which 
potentially facilitated retaining staff and expertise. This was the case given the high 
salary base of the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration 
(OPREG-RO AIR 2014, 28). Some mentioned that a Monitoring Officer working for 
the programme could earn almost three times more than his or her counterpart 
working in the Competitiveness Programme (Former Director of Romanian Managing 
Authority #1). Therefore, until 2014, when salaries were levelled, staff managing 
OPREG-RO had the highest salaries from all OPs (Director General in Romanian 
Ministry #1; Representative of Romanian Certifying Authority; Romanian EU funds 
consultant #1). 
 
External stakeholders played an important role in the life cycle of the programme. 
Unlike other Romanian programmes, where beneficiaries were completely new to 
external funding, in OPREG-RO some estimated that 80% of beneficiaries, had some 
prior experience in accessing pre-accession funding (Director in Romanian Ministry 
of EU funds #1; Romanian EU funds monitoring officer #1). With all this, and much 
similar to Bulgaria’s case, one of the major problems of OPREG-RO was the low 
administrative capacity of beneficiaries (OPREG-RO AIR 2007, 19; Director General 
of Romanian Ministry #1; Romanian EU funds monitoring Officer #1). This was 
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mainly due to “insufficient personnel and [their] weak financial remuneration” 
(OPREG-RO AIR 2008, 38; OPREG-RO AIR 2009). Specifically, the capacity of 
beneficiaries was affected by national legal restrictions on hiring new staff (World 
Bank 2013; Romanian EU funds monitoring Officer #1; Romanian MA Programme 
Evaluation Officer #2). Despite this, many beneficiaries started developing their 
capacity, partly using the assistance provided by RDAs in various stages of the project 
(Director in North-East Regional Development Agency; Director General of Romanian 
Ministry #1; Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1). Variations in 
capacity remain strong, especially at the local level, but there were signs that even 
small municipalities have in recent years developed or strengthened their EU funds 
departments.  
 
Finally, there was a variation in the quality of consultancies that worked on OPREG-
RO projects. Consultants provided support to different project applicants and final 
beneficiaries on project development or for filling in application and financing forms 
(Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1). However, many of 
consultants lacked the necessary experience to implement or monitor EU-funded 
projects and some beneficiaries were frequently misguided by them (Romanian EU 
funds monitoring officer #1; Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1). This could 
have a negative effect on the implementation of the programme. 
 
Territorial capacity (TER) 
Romania remains a highly centralized country with most political decisions taken 
centrally, in Bucharest, and with few devolved powers to regional and local authorities 
(Benedek and Horvath 2008; Dobre 2010). For instance, this structural arrangement 
inhibited the development of relevant regional development plans (Lattanzio e 
Associati Evaluation 2011, 11). By contrast, it was often argued that a regionalisation 
of the country may be beneficial for OPREG-RO implementation and that this would 
enable each region to adopt its own specific Operational Programmes (Romanian 
Advocacy Academy 2012). Some interviewees did stress that the regionalisation 
process would have been beneficial for the overall process of EU funds absorption:  
“Yes, clearly the regionalisation can lead to an improvement of the process. By 
1) regions could manage more programmes in parallel. At the same time, 
regional MAs would be closer to the needs of the region; 2) risks are local and 
would not have implications for all the country as it is now the case; 3) the 
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degree of responsibility of local and regional stakeholders would increase” 
(Director General of Romanian Ministry #1). 
 
One of the main arguments for a further regionalisation was that regions could invest 
in a specialized programme based on the needs of the regions (Former Director of 
Romanian Managing Authority #1). Nevertheless, the regionalisation process 
conceived in 2012-2013, stalled due to political and judicial reasons, in early 2014, 
compromising any chances for the development of specific regional Operational 
Programmes that could have been implemented during 2014-2020.  
 
There were two meso-level active political structures relevant for the programme. 
Firstly, County Councils acted during 2007-2013 as both beneficiaries as well as 
regional and local project coordinators. There were however issues with the quality of 
expertise and capacity of these bodies given the low level of salaries received (OPREG-
RO AIR 2008, 39; Romanian MA Programme Evaluation Officer #2). Secondly, 
Regional Development Councils (the deliberative forum of County Councils) acted as 
political bodies monitoring the activity of Regional Development Agencies, and were 
involved in political decisions on projects of regional interest. Although some argued 
that these bodies do not have sufficient decision-making power (Director in Romanian 
North-East Regional Development Agency), it seems that often political heads of 
County Councils tried to exert their influence, especially during Monitoring 
Committees, on the implementation of regional and local projects (OPREG-RO 
Monitoring Committee December 2007; October 2009). 
 
RDAs contributed towards reducing the gap of expertise between central and local 
levels. The use of evidence-based policy and a rule oriented culture of Regional 
Development Agencies transformed these structures in “islands of excellence” (SAR 
2013). Firstly, RDAs had the necessary autonomy to develop institutionally and, thus, 
have invested strongly in human resources (Director in Romanian North-East 
Regional Development Agency; Romanian Expert #1; Romanian MA Programme 
Evaluation Officer #2). Moreover, the relationship between the central MA and the 
RDAs was deemed as functional and based on partnership (World Bank 2013). Finally, 
and most importantly, RDAs maintained good communication and close contacts with 
beneficiaries (Romanian MA Programme Evaluation Officer #2; Director in Romanian 
North-East Regional Development Agency). As explained by someone working in an 
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RDA this was the case because:  
“We were preoccupied from the very beginning to keep our beneficiaries close. 
We are nothing without the beneficiaries. We cannot stay in an ivory tower and 
be experts without them. That’s why we had to teach them how to make a 
project and how to manage it.” (Director in Romanian North-East Regional 
Development Agency).  
 
Although there were some discrepancies between central and regional /local level 
expertise, as argued by most interviewees, the RDAs actively assumed the role of 
capacity-building agents at the local level (Director in Romanian North-East Regional 
Development Agency; Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority; Romanian 
Expert #2). The rather robust regional and local governance, as well as its clear priority 
axis, contributed to the programme’s relatively higher absorption performance. As will 
be discussed in the following, the strong political dimension of OPREG-RO proved 
essential in ensuring its success.  
 
6.2.2 Political factors and OPREG-RO 
 
OPREG-RO has had a strong political component attached to it. Over the years, this 
ensured that the programme obtained a consistent and strong level of political support 
on which it could develop and strengthen its administrative capacity. By contrast, 
other Romanian thematic programmes were much more neglected from a political 
point of view. In the following, several political elements are discussed in relation to 
the evidence gathered on the management and implementation of the programme. 
 
Political stability (POL1) 
Political stability was one of the main factors explaining the programmes relative 
degree of success. As argued by several interviewees, OPREG-RO has always benefited 
from an adequate level of administrative and political continuity which has ensured a 
sound basis for administrators to carry out their daily work (Director General of 
Romanian Ministry #1; Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1; Romanian EU 
funds monitoring Officer #1). In essence, this facilitated a stable institutional 
framework and contributed to the prevention of staff turnover (Director in North-East 
Regional Development Agency). Political instability manifested more pre-eminently at 
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the beneficiaries’ level, following political changes in municipalities or County 
Councils, and which would often derail the implementation of projects.  
 
Moreover, there was no specific evidence of patronage driven appointments of senior 
managers in the Managing Authority / Intermediate Bodies. OPREG-RO was a highly 
distinctive case given the continuity of its management. By 2014, the programme 
officially had only three directors and benefited from the guidance of one senior 
director who ensured a strong degree of operational stability (Romanian Expert #1; 
Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1). It must be noted, however, 
that the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration was considered 
one of the most politicised structures in the country, used by national politicians to 
strengthen their ties with local political networks through the transfer of national 
development funds (IPP 2012; Expert Forum 2014). In this respect, continuity in the 
management of EU funding might have been beneficial for the latter purpose.   
 
Finally, at the regional level, RDAs and were not subject to political interference in 
terms of staff appointments mostly given their NGO related status. They were free in 
managing their own human resources policy (Romanian Expert #1; Romanian MA 
Programme Evaluation Officer #2). RDAs could recruit well-trained and motivated 
staff, with job openings receiving many applications from all over the country 
(Director in North-East Regional Development Agency). This allowed the RDAs to 
recruit competent staff based on merit, and not on political ties, as was the case with 
many civil servants present in the central administration.  
 
Political support (POL 2) 
Similarly to Bulgaria’s case, there was evidence to suggest that OPREG-RO was a 
politically favoured Operational Programme. Early in the implementation phase, 
representatives from the Commission stressed that the programme has evolved well 
due to the high levels of political interest, in the investments generated by the 
programme, by local and regional politicians (OPREG-RO Monitoring Committee 
April 2008, 6; May 2010, 32-33). This was confirmed by one senior interviewee’:  
“There was clear political support for OPREG-RO and this stability has led to 
the creation of a strong institutional memory” (Director General of Romanian 
Ministry #1).  
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Politicians could provide specific support to the programme by first ensuring it 
benefited from the necessary cash flow (OPREG AIR 2010; Romanian EU funds 
monitoring officer #2; Romanian Programme Evaluation Officer #2). For instance, as 
opposed to other programmes, OPREG-RO seems to have been favoured in terms of 
co-financing (Lattanzio e Associati Evaluation 2011). Furthermore, the main funding 
contracts, for various projects, were often signed by ministers themselves during 
symbolic public events. In addition, by contrast to other OPs, different procedures or 
daily working documents did not require political validation (Former Director of 
Romanian Managing Authority #1). Overall, it seems that a potentially higher degree 
of trust was granted from politicians to the administrators of the programme. This had 
the potential to speed up the administrative processes regarding its management and 
implementation.  
 
With regard to political feedback and political vision, the evidence was more nuanced. 
On the one hand, many have argued that politicians did not provide any vision for the 
management of the funds (Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2; Former 
Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2; Romanian EU funds monitoring 
Officer #1). OPREG-RO had many beneficiaries, which despite lacking the adequate 
level of capacity, were still granted financing (Romanian MA Programme Evaluation 
Officer #2). On the other hand, local and central politicians have themselves learned 
from the development and implementation of OPREG-RO. The programme acted as a 
catalyst in advancing the strategic thinking of local authorities (General Director in 
Romanian Ministry #1; Director in Romanian North-East Development Agency). For 
instance, locally elected politicians had to assume responsibility for a project and 
develop the ability to finance and implement it. Moreover, in light of the negative 
experience with financial corrections, many local mayors tried to find sustainable and 
regular ways to develop and implement their projects.  
 
Lastly, it was argued that national OPs were engaged in a competition for absorption, 
and that OPREG-RO always wanted to be regarded as the best programme (Romanian 
Expert #2). The fact that OPREG-RO was mainly directed to local public authorities 
gave it an advantage and increased its levels of political support (Romanian Expert 
#1). As a result, politicians sought to use the OP as one of their main “business cards” 
in relation to the local political authorities (Romanian Expert #2). The case of the 
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former Regional Development Ministers, Elena Udrea and Liviu Dragnea illustrated 
this point entirely. For instance, the former was accused of seeking to channel OPREG 
funding to fund an international boxing match. The transaction was never funded with 
EU funds, but the minister is under investigation in a high-profile corruption case.101 
Overall, the programme “presumed a certain discretion from local authorities in 
managing these funds” and “a slight political dimension attached to it” (EC Head of 
Unit #1). This could partly explain why OPREG-RO was one of the programmes for 
which beneficiaries always received payments or financial support on time, especially 
during the peak of the financial crisis when state resources were scarce. Given it 
funded many public regional and local level projects, the programme was well placed 
politically. In this respect, EU-funded projects contributed indirectly towards 
strengthening the local political infrastructure on which the central government relied. 
The consequence for this were the multiple problems that emerged at the local level in 
terms of project implementation.  
 
Political clientelism (POL3) 
Assessing the impact of political clientelism on OPREG-RO was a difficult exercise. In 
terms of political influence in the selection and distribution of projects, some 
stakeholders stressed that for regional development programmes, such as OPREG-
RO, local political kingpins (in particular Heads of County Councils) or “local barons” 
as they are referred to sought to influence which projects were to be funded at the 
regional level (OPREG-RO Monitoring Committee May 2010). The European 
Commission has criticised the Councils discretion in selecting regionally important 
projects (OPREG-RO Monitoring Committee October 2008). The intense competition 
between County Councils to obtain funding for regional airports (e.g. Arad, Suceava, 
Bacau, Iasi) was an example of the in-fighting, that took place behind the scenes, for 
the allocation of EU funds of key regional and strategic projects (Romanian EU funds 
Consultant #1; Director of Romanian North-East Development Agency). County 
Councils could act at the level of Regional Development Councils (RDCs) where they 
sought to influence the distribution of regional development projects. After their 
technical evaluation, the final decision could be taken politically by the heads of the 
                                                             
101 Mediafax.ro, 25 February 2015, [Elena Udrea arrested preventively in the Gala Bute case. Udrea 
was taken to the capital city police]. Available at: http://www.mediafax.ro/social/elena-udrea-
arestata-preventiv-in-dosarul-gala-bute-udrea-a-fost-dusa-in-arestul-politiei-capitalei-13887966 
(accessed August 2016). 
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County Councils (Romanian Member of Parliament #1). Often these decisions were 
marred by conflicts of interest (OPREG-RO Monitoring Committee October 2008).  
 
Others, seemed to argue that it was possible for politicians to influence the distribution 
of EU funding through a politicisation of the institutional structures managing them 
(Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1). Although this was plausible 
it was also less likely given the relatively transparent procedures around the 
management of the funding (Romanian Expert #1). There was no consistent evidence 
to suggest that OPREG funding was distributed on political basis or that some political 
parties benefited more than others from OPREG-RO funds (Romanian EU funds 
monitoring officer #1; Romanian Expert #2). In general, OPREG-RO beneficiaries 
seemed to have received funding irrespective of their political affiliation.  
 
However, the important nuance was that the programme could be used in a 
discretionary manner, and funding could be channelled towards certain strategic 
projects, in light of an over-arching aim of strengthening political ties between central 
and local level authorities. In addition, there was some evidence of political 
favouritism within the programme. Certain beneficiaries might have received 
“political favours” (Romanian EU funds monitoring officer #1; Romanian Civil Society 
Leader #1; Romanian Expert #2). This manifested itself in terms of fast-track 
reimbursements, fewer controls or potentially fewer financial corrections.102 For 
instance, some administrators pointed out that some municipalities or County 
Councils were at times favoured due to their political affiliation (Romanian EU funds 
monitoring officer #1; Romanian MA Programme Evaluation Officer #2). Special 
requests from mayors were highly likely although these were not necessarily perceived 
as “favours” (Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1; Director in 
Romanian North-East Regional Development Agency). One final problem, largely 
applicable to most programmes, was that politicians were tempted to use EU funding, 
as a side payment, in order to finance political activities such as local political 
campaigns (Director in Romanian North-East Regional Development Agency). This 
revealed a structural problem with the misuse of public funding in the country which 
fuelled corrupt behaviour and increased the likelihood for political clientelism.  
                                                             
102 It is difficult to provide any hard evidence to confirm this, yet Chapter 7 provides and discusses 
several other examples. 
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Overall, based on the evidence gathered, it can be partly stressed that OPREG-RO was 
used much more as a political business card rather than its projects’ being distributed 
based on political criteria (Romanian Expert #2). Arguably, it was in this sense that 
the programme was politicised.  
 
6.2.3 EU role and influence (EU) 
 
In general, the European Commission (DG REGIO) ensured a high level of support to 
the national authorities managing OPREG-RO. Guidance was often provided at the 
formal decision-making level of Monitoring Committees (OPREG-RO Monitoring 
Committee October 2008). In general, it was perceived that the EC tried to improve 
the management and implementation of the programme (Director in Romanian 
North-East Regional Development Agency; Former Director of Romanian Managing 
Authority #1; Romanian EU funds consultant #1). Moreover, OPREG-RO benefited 
from technical assistance provided by the EC, as well as from the European Investment 
Bank and the World Bank, especially on the development of urban growth poles or on 
issues related to public procurement (OPREG-RO Monitoring Committee December 
2007; OPREG-RO Monitoring Committee November 2010). 
 
Despite the above, the EC was criticised by programme representatives on two specific 
accounts. Firstly, similarly to evidence from the Bulgarian programme, EC audits 
uncovered irregularities, especially, in the area of public procurement (DG REGIO 
AAR 2010/2011). To deal with these, the Commission suggested the enforcement of 
financial corrections of up to 25% of project value should be applied to municipalities, 
county councils and other beneficiaries (DG REGIO AAR 2011, 70). Such corrections 
often resulted from the different interpretations of legal provisions which existed at 
the national and at the EU level. These interpretations were strongly contested by 
national authorities on technical and methodological grounds: 
“Corrections came from the problem of different interpretations of 
procurement. Opinions were different also between EU level institutions. In 
addition, the anti-fraud structures could have signalled some irregularities. It’s 
not comfortable to have too many controls. People become annoyed by controls. 
Also, the Audit Authority was very strict, and they do not understand the 
phenomena. They have their issues. EC and national auditors had divergent 
opinions on the topic, with the latter being too strict and applying corrections. 
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This renders beneficiaries to contest these corrections in Court and there are 
many cases of Managing Authority versus beneficiaries and a widespread 
judicial literature on this topic” (Romanian MA Programme Evaluation Officer 
#2). 
 
Financial corrections had strong implications on the life of the programme. In 2011, 
OPREG-RO payments were blocked for more than six months and were resumed 
following the adoption of corrective measures meant to strengthen the verification of 
projects (OPREG-RO AIR 2011, 31). Flat rate financial corrections were applied to the 
programme for all its 2012 payments (DG Regio AAR 2012, 70). The payments for the 
programme were pre-suspended again in 2014, due to worries of public procurement 
abuses (Romanian EU funds monitoring officer #1). Some local officials were keen to 
stress that, in their opinion, the European Commission was often lobbied by large 
companies (particularly from Germany) who complained about the fact they didn’t win 
any local tenders and accused national authorities of allocating contracts only to 
national contractors (Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1; Former 
Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2). Such anecdotal evidence revealed that 
the European executive was often not a neutral party and could be influenced by 
diverse interest groups at the EU level. With all this, the EU’s role on the ground seems 
to have been more positive and Brussels driven controls did uncover and address many 
of the structural problems of the programme.   
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6. Conclusions 
 
If compared to the Human Resources Operational Programmes (OPHRs), where there 
were significant differences in terms of both capacity and performance, the above case 
studies have shown that the strong similarities of Regional Operational Programmes 
(OPREGs) within the two countries. If compared to other national OPs, OPREGs were 
relatively functional and well managed programmes. Nevertheless, the question that 
guided this chapter was what could explain the higher level of performance achieved 
by these programmes, what were the specific problems they faced and, how can 
administrative capacity and political factors explain them?  
 
Firstly, in terms of administrative capacity both programmes benefited from the pre-
accession experience which helped them establish strongly grounded management 
and control systems. The programmes had well trained and incentivised staff whilst 
beneficiaries tended to receive adequate levels of support from regional level offices. 
In both cases, the institutional involvement of Bulgarian regional offices / Romanian 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) contributed positively to the programme’s 
administrative capacity and to its smoother implementation on the grounded. In 
addition, there was consistent evidence to suggest that, in both cases, technical 
assistance was well used to improve the ability of the responsible authorities to 
manage the programme, train and financially motivate staff, and strengthen the 
capacity of beneficiaries to deal with projects (OPREG-BG AIR 2010, 89; OPREG-RO 
AIR 2010, 132; OPREG-RO AIR 2012, 80).  
 
With all this, in terms of administrative capacity, the Bulgarian programme had some 
problems with regard to institutional coordination, conflicting interpretation of rules 
and a high level of administrative burden. The Romanian programme faced problems, 
especially in the first few years, in establishing a functional monitoring and verification 
system and suffered from a frequent modification of primary rules and documents, 
which attracted criticism from the programmes final beneficiaries. In addition, the 
major deficiencies affecting the OPREG programmes did not emerge at the central 
level management, but more at the local implementation level. This had to do with the 
ability of beneficiaries, predominantly local authorities, to implement EU-funded 
projects. Public procurement was the key problem, in both countries, which triggered 
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criticism and sanctions from the EU institutions. Nevertheless, EC support and 
oversight proved useful for the national authorities.  
 
Secondly, the political dimension was critical not only for the programme’s absorption 
performance but also for the development of its administrative capacity. Most of those 
involved directly in the management of the programme, in the Ministries for Regional 
Development which acted as Managing Authorities, stressed they did benefit from 
good levels of political support. This illustrated the role played by political factors in 
the management and implementation of the programme. 
 
On the one hand, a strong degree of political interest in the programme translated not 
only into a high level of priority being given to OPREG projects but also into a rather 
more functional management and programme administration. In both cases, the 
Ministries for Regional Development are top political ministries which informally 
ensure an interface between local level politicians and the central political 
establishments in Sofia and Bucharest. Given the visibility of OPREG projects at the 
local level, the Managing Authority and Intermediate Bodies benefited from higher 
levels of political support which, in turn, contributed to the development of more 
functional institutional, procedural and human resources infrastructures. Based on 
the empirical analysis, it can be argued that the high level of political interest 
correlated with the programmes higher degree of administrative capacity.  
 
On the other hand, there was also some evidence of politicisation and negative political 
interference. In Bulgaria this took the particular form of political patronage which 
affected the appointments of staff in the MA. Moreover, political favouritism 
manifested in both countries and certain beneficiaries, especially municipalities 
affiliated to the political parties controlling the government, could obtain stronger 
bureaucratic support or different favours. Furthermore, senior politicians developed a 
considerable interest in the programme and sought to benefit from the programme’s 
portfolio and use it as a “business-card” in order to boost their political careers or to 
maintain a good relationship with municipalities and local political organisations.  
 
All in all, based on the empirical analysis carried out in this case study, the Bulgarian 
OPREG can be evaluated as having had a medium to high administrative capacity (see 
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Table 27), in particular given some of the institutional issues it faced. Arguably, the 
Romanian OPREG had a higher level of administrative capacity, particularly due to 
the continuity in terms of senior central management and the strong expertise 
amassed by Regional Development Agencies. For both programmes, political factors 
seemed to have acted as a positive stimulus for central level management and in a 
negative manner at the local level of implementation (e.g. the structural problems 
related to public procurement).  
 
Table 27: Overall assessment of OPREG 
 Administrative 
Capacity 
(High / Medium / 
Low) 
Political factors 
(Positive /Neutral 
/ Negative) 
 
Overall performance 
(Very strong / Significant / 
Moderate / Weak) 
 
OPREG-BG Medium to High Positive (central 
management)  
Negative (local 
implementation) 
Significant  
(71% of EC payments received 
in June 2015) 
OPREG-RO Medium to High  Positive (central 
management)  
Negative (local 
implementation) 
Significant  
(71% of EC payments received 
in June 2015) 
Source: Author based on empirical analysis. 
 
It seems that the strong and often positive interplay between political factors and 
administrative capacity elements may have ensured a higher level of performance for 
OPREGs. The general absorption performance reached by these programmes cannot 
be explained satisfactorily taking into account only the formal and technical capacity 
of central and regional level institutions engaged in the programme. Factoring in the 
role of domestic political governance in the life of the programme, it is possible to 
obtain a wider understanding of what generated its performance. Specifically, the fact 
that there was a strong political stake in the implementation of these programmes 
ensured a stronger level of political interest. In turn, politicians facilitated and 
contributed towards strengthening the capacity of the authorities managing OPREGs. 
In both countries, the main problem with OPREG was linked to its local 
implementation, and in particular, to issues surrounding public procurement. 
Consequently, a dedicated sub-chapter (7.2) will assesses these problems in more 
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depth. Examining such aspects will entail a shift from a relatively static towards a more 
dynamic narrative, which will include several other levels of analysis and a variety of 
different stakeholders engaged in the general governance of Cohesion Policy and 
Structural Funds in the two countries. 
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Chapter 7: Administrative capacity, 
political factors and the absorption policy 
process 
 
 
7. Introduction  
 
The following chapter has departed from the assumption that one cannot grasp the 
governance of external financial assistance without taking a closer look at the 
operational dimensions circumscribed to the use of EU Structural Funds. Previous 
case studies have underlined the way in which administrative capacity and politically 
related factors influenced the performance of two thematic Operational Programmes. 
This was done by outlining how these factors influenced the capabilities of the different 
official institutions involved in the management of the two programmes, focusing on 
how they influenced the attained level of financial absorption performance. As 
mentioned, this case study represents a shift in analytical focus. It looks at the SF 
absorption policy process which is in its essence more dynamic and which involves 
several other non-official actors. Since its inception and after subsequent waves of 
reforms, EU Cohesion Policy has been implemented in member states through several 
distinct formalised stages: (a) programming; (b) management; (c) project evaluation 
and selection; (d) implementation of projects; (e) financial management; (f) 
monitoring and reporting; (g) evaluation (Molle 2007; EIPA 2008; Bachtler et al. 
2013a). These break down the policy into more concrete day-to-day activities. As will 
be argued by this chapter, the overall performance of different Operational 
Programmes can be understood without taking into account developments taking 
place at least in some of the above policy stages.  
 
These stages would represent the actual street level of European Structural Funds and 
it was here that the ability and administrative capacity of the authorities was 
challenged and put to the test. Apart from the institutions officially responsible for the 
management of EU funds, a variety of other stakeholders (e.g. EU funding 
applicants/final beneficiaries/project contractors) are involved in some of these 
stages. For instance, in the implementation stage, official authorities take a step back 
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and allow the EU funds final beneficiaries to implement their contracted projects. 
Therefore, one of the specific aims of this chapter has equally been to account for the 
role of these stakeholders in order to understand some of the problems encountered 
in the different Operational Programmes analysed. As discussed in the thematic case 
studies, the evidence collected has shown that EU funds beneficiaries generated many 
of the problems faced by the different Operational Programmes. In essence, OPs 
represent the sum of the overall projects implemented in a specific area and therefore 
the problems generated by beneficiaries, alongside the structural lack of capacity from 
public institutions, could affect the absorption performance attained by each 
programme. Consequently, the distinct focus of this chapter is to examine, more in-
depth, two significant stages of the EU funds absorption policy process: the 
evaluation/selection of projects and the implementation / public procurement stage 
of the process. These stages were chosen in light of preliminary evidence on the ground 
and the multiple administrative and political issues affecting them.   
 
Subsequently, one of the major questions driving the analysis has been the extent have 
administrative capacity or related political related factors influenced the two policy 
stages. To provide a more nuanced answer to this question, the project 
evaluation/selection and procurement have produced complementary findings. 
Overall, the analysis has revealed that similar patterns of political-administrative 
interactions, found in the management and implementation of OPs, have affected the 
two stages. This strengthened the core argument made in this thesis that the interplay 
between administrative and political factors can enable a higher level of absorption 
performance. Moreover, as will be illustrated in this chapter, negative political 
interference has been behind many of the problems found in the policy processes 
behind the delivery of EU Structural Funds. The following chapter is divided into two 
main sub-chapters which will first provide a general overview of the problems and will 
continue with several specific examples relating to different national OPs.103 Whilst 
the first sub-chapter focuses on the evaluation and selection of EU-funded projects, 
the second covers the issues related to the public procurement phase of the 
implementation stage of the absorption policy process. 
                                                             
103 This chapter will not strictly follow the elements of the absorption capacity model which have 
structured the material for the thematic case studies. It presents the findings and discusses them, in a 
broader light, paying attention to the way in which administrative and political factors have interacted 
and affected the two policy stages examined.  
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7.1 Selection bias? – Problems in the evaluation and 
selection of EU-funded projects   
 
The following section provides a more detailed examination of some of the problems 
regarding the appraisal / evaluation, selection and contracting of projects funded from 
Structural Funds. The selection stage is vital given that it can have repercussions on 
the subsequent stages of the EU funds absorption process. Therefore, low quality 
projects, or projects by many irregularities, can have a negative impact on the general 
performance of an OP. The literature generally asserts that errors at this stage can be 
costly for both managing bodies and beneficiaries (Boeckhout et al. 2002; EIPA 2008; 
Bachtler et al. 2013a). In other words, if during the selection stage, projects were 
granted financing, despite their poor technical or financial quality, then problems 
would potentially arise in different other stages of the process.  
 
At the same time, the selection stage can provide opportunities for political 
interference or rent-seeking practices. Therefore, when analysing the evidence one 
specific question addressed was: were there instances of political interference in the 
selection and contracting stage of the absorption process? How did administrative and 
political actors influence this stage and was there any evidence of systemic negative 
political interference? Given frequent allegations of fraud, and in light of the numerous 
accounts of a politicised distribution of national financial resources, this sub-chapter 
scrutinizes such claims and some of the mechanisms used to potentially abuse the 
evaluation and allocation of EU funded projects. The evidence is rigorously examined 
in light of the potential administrative and political origins of these problems. This 
sub-chapter is organised in the following manner. First, it presents some official data 
regarding the selection of projects in both countries. Second, it briefly presents an 
analysis of the more general problems affecting the selection of projects. Finally, it 
presents several examples from Bulgaria and Romania, highlighting concrete 
instances of problematic project evaluation and selection. The implications of these 
findings are discussed in the concluding section of this chapter. 
  
 226 
 
 
7.1.1 Insights from the evaluation and selection of projects from 
Structural Funds (2007-2013)  
 
In general, structurally funded projects are selected in relation to the scope, size, 
budget, or capacity and interest of potential beneficiaries. Projects have to address the 
specific thematic objectives of the Operational Programmes / priority axis and have to 
fall in line with the different thematic or specifically targeted calls for proposals. Before 
presenting some of the wider problems affecting the evaluation and selection stage an 
important distinction must be made. As opposed to the implementation stage, where 
the beneficiaries of EU funds are primarily involved, the selection of projects is the 
remit of the different Managing Authorities overseeing the management of the 
Operational Programmes. The evaluation and selection of projects coincided with a 
period during which these institutions were still developing their capacity to manage 
Structural Funds. Managing Authorities went through a thorough process of 
accreditation and, prior to launching the first calls for proposals, they were still setting 
up their own internal procedures. For instance, during the first few years there was a 
great deal of confusion on procedures, with many administrators relying on their 
PHARE expertise, only to find that this was unsuitable for the general philosophy of 
Structural Funds (EC Head of Sector #1; Director of Romanian Managing Authority 
#3).  
 
Several key problems were found in both countries regarding the evaluation and 
selection stage of EU-funded projects. First of all, it took several years, to establish the 
specific criteria for the selection of projects. This task was assumed by the national 
authorities and was discussed and approved within the Monitoring Committee of each 
OP. The official minutes of such meetings note the considerable amount of time spent 
on devising the legislation, criteria for project selection and the applicants’ guides 
defining the activities eligible for funding. Specific rules and laws were adopted for 
each Operational Programme with regard to the eligibility rules for expenditure. 
However, given new or unforeseen situations many of these rules required 
considerable updates. For instance, the decree no. 180/2007 laying down the rules of 
eligibility expenditure for the Bulgarian Human Resources OP was updated in 2010 in 
order to include provisions on the participation of persons with disabilities (Bulgarian 
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Parliament 2011, 16). Moreover, many of the potential loopholes left unaddressed 
during this period would later on trigger systemic deficiencies and unreasonable or 
ineligible expenditure. For instance, the high degree of project staff related payments 
in the Romanian OPHR was the core problem of the programme (Romanian AA report 
2011; 2012). The frequent changes and use of updated criteria for evaluating projects 
led some to argue that the period during which projects were evaluated, in Romania, 
was highly “chaotic” (Romanian EU funds consultant #1).  
 
Second, during the first three years of implementation (2007-2010), evaluating, 
selecting and contracting projects were among the principal activities of 
administrators working in Managing Authorities and Intermediate Bodies. Specific 
institutional departments / units were created to carry out these tasks. The 
evaluation/selection of projects was a resource intensive stage of the absorption 
process. Given the lack of experience in many of these newly established institutions, 
and following pressure from Brussels, in order to the independence of the selection 
process, many OPs decided to externalise this task to private consultancies. This was 
done in the hope that it will “speed up the process of evaluation and its effectiveness” 
(Council of Ministers of Bulgaria 2009, 30; OPHR-RO AIR 2009). However, 
subsequent problems emerged when contracting in external consultants. On the one 
hand, there was internal resistance in certain ministries (Director of Romanian 
Managing Authority #2) or there were severe delays in launching procurement 
procedures for contracting them (Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority 
#1). On the other hand, it was difficult to find evaluators with specific expertise 
(Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #1) or with the experience and ability to evaluate the 
capacity and financial feasibility of project applications (Head of Romanian North-
East Intermediate Body). Some project applicants complained about receiving the 
exact same reviews from different evaluators (Romanian Civil Society Leader #1). This 
revealed the lack of due diligence in evaluation and the various shortcomings from 
externalising the process.  
 
Third, some specific issues affected the general evaluation and selection of projects. 
There were severe delays in the process and with some programmes requiring from 90 
to 160 days to evaluate and contract projects (OPREG-RO AIR 2009, 38; Berica 2010). 
This timeline could increase if additional documents were requested from 
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beneficiaries or if appeals were made on the initial selection decision (Bulgarian 
Intermediate Body Expert #1; Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1). 
In other more extreme situations (e.g. the Romanian Economic Competitiveness) due 
to the high number of applications and lack of internal capacity, projects were 
evaluated only two years after they were submitted (Former Director of Romanian 
Managing Authority #2). Such delays affected the timeliness of EU funds 
implementation and the financial absorption of different OPs.  
 
In addition, the relationship between the independent evaluators and the Managing 
Authority was often unclear. Some noted that the recommendations of the evaluators 
were sometimes not taken into account, especially on the eligibility of expenses or the 
potential existence of conflicts of interest between the various stakeholders involved 
in projects (Romanian Audit Authority annual report 2010; EC Head of Sector #1). In 
most OPs, except for those focusing on large scale infrastructure, the final decisions 
were taken by a Selection Committee assigned to each call for proposals (Bulgarian 
Expert #1; Romanian Project Evaluator #1). There were instances when reports from 
independent evaluators were not validated or taken into account in the final decision 
(Romanian Civil Society Leader #1). To sum up, the lack of transparency surrounding 
the final decision could have facilitated several discretionary practices in the 
evaluation and selection of projects. 
 
Lastly, another preeminent feature of the evaluation and selection of projects was 
pointed out by several of the independent experts interviewed. From a strategic point 
of view, one of the underlining narratives in the first years following accession was that 
EU funds need to be absorbed. This triggered an “absorption for all” syndrome 
characterised by an obsession to attract funding as fast as possible (Vant 2012; Damian 
2013). In turn, this reduced the quality of project applications and affected the 
strategic screening of projects and the links between projects’ outputs and the overall 
macro indicators of the different programmes (Bulgarian Expert #4; Romanian Expert 
#1). Moreover, it reflected a local mentality trait of simply absorbing the funding 
without any clear strategic outcomes. As a consequence, several private and public 
beneficiaries were interested primarily in obtaining the funding. For instance, several 
NGOs were criticised for becoming “service providers” rather than advocacy 
organisations as a result of contracting EU grants (Romanian Civil Society Leader #1; 
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Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #1; Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #3; Bulgarian Expert 
#3). All the above represented some of the main findings on what affected the process 
of evaluation and selection of projects. Moreover, in light of accounts of potential 
political interference in the distribution of funding, the question was to what extent 
were problems in the evaluation and selection of projects administrative or political in 
nature? This is specifically examined in the following sections, for each individual 
country, drawing on evidence examined from different OPs.  
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7.1.2 Project evaluation and selection in Bulgarian Operational 
Programmes   
 
By the end of July 2015, 11783 projects were contracted by the Bulgarian authorities. 
These represented 41.7% of the total number of projects applications submitted for all 
OPs. The most popular programmes were the Economic Competitiveness and Human 
Resources Development. This was due to a higher number of private beneficiaries 
competing for grants, as opposed for instance to the Transport and Environment OPs 
were projects were distributed to a limited number of central and local public 
authorities. In addition, it was officially reported that from the overall number of 
contracted projects 1135 projects were suspended whilst 118 projects were temporarily 
suspended.104 This was due to irregularities found after internal or external checks and 
audits and potential evidence of funding misuse.  
 
The problems EU funds abuse was not generally something new to the Bulgarian 
authorities. In 2008, the European Commission suspended many of the funds 
destined for Bulgaria, due to allegations of fraud regarding pre-accession funding 
(BBC 2008; EUobserver 2009). Two specific cases were highly mediatised. The first 
involved officials in the National Road Infrastructure Fund (NRIF) and potential 
conflicts of interest with regard to the award of different contracts in exchange of 
bribes given to two high ranking officials (DG Regio AAR 2009, 29). This determined 
the suspension of approximately 150 million EUR from ISPA related funds and 
blocked any new infrastructure related projects (EC 2008a, 5). The second, more 
infamous, case was the “Nikolov-Stoykov Group”, an alleged criminal network 
specialised in different illegal activities (CSD 2009; Spendzharova and Vachudova 
2012). They were involved in a widespread scandal involving purchasing second-hand 
meat processing machinery repainted and sold as new in Bulgaria. The machinery was 
bought with support of EU SAPARD funds and the group was under investigation by 
the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). The group had strong links with political and 
judicial networks in the country.105 
                                                             
104 Unified Management Information System for the EU Structural Instruments in Bulgaria. Data 
accurate for July 2016. Available at: http://umispublic.government.bg/Default.aspx (accessed August 
2016). 
105 Novinite, 16 July 2008, OLAF Reveals Political Cover-ups and Scandalous Abuses of EU Funds in 
Bulgaria, available at: http://www.novinite.com/articles/95167/OLAF+Reveals+Political+Cover-
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Table 28: Number of submitted, contracted and suspended projects with SF in Bulgaria 
(2007-2013) 
Operational 
Programmes 
Number 
of 
submitted 
projects  
Number 
of 
contracted 
projects 
  
Number of projects 
suspended and 
temporarily 
suspended 
(August 2015) 
Percentage of 
contracted projects 
(number of contracted 
projects / number of 
projects submitted) 
OP Transport 150 116 -3 suspended 77% 
OP Environment 993 528 -70 suspended 
-94 temporarily 
suspended 
53% 
OP Regional 
Development 
2037 1195 -87 suspended 
-7 temporarily 
suspended 
58% 
OP Economic 
Competitiveness 
9492 3154 -549 suspended 
 
33% 
OP Technical 
Assistance 
134 122 -7 suspended 91% 
OP Human 
Resources 
12454 5218 -378 suspended 
-17 temporarily 
suspended 
41% 
OP 
Administrative 
Capacity 
2947 1450 -41 suspended 
 
49% 
Total 28207 11783 1253 
(1135 suspended and 
118 temporarily 
suspended) 
41.7% 
Source: Unified Management Information System for the EU Structural Instruments in 
Bulgaria. Data accurate for July 2016. Available at: 
http://umispublic.government.bg/Default.aspx (accessed August 2016) 
 
As a consequence of these cases, Bulgaria was frequently under the European spotlight 
during its first years of accession. The then prime minister, Sergei Stanishev vowed to 
tackle this issue and improve the transparency and use of EU funding.106 With all this, 
                                                             
ups+and+Scandalous+Abuses+of+EU+Funds+in+Bulgaria#sthash.ATgsv5TZ.dpuf (accessed August 
2016). 
106 The statement read: “I can give guarantees that this government will do everything in its authority 
to guarantee efficiency and transparency of these funds being absorbed” quoted in European Voice, 21 
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there were persistent allegations of potential political interference in the use of EU 
grants during the Stanishev administration and in other subsequent governments.107 
In general, apart from two Operational Programmes (Administrative Capacity and 
Environment), no substantial evidence was found of a problematic evaluation and 
selection of projects in Bulgaria. Many of the initial problems were due partly to 
administrative shortcomings and the capacity of institutions to deal with this stage. 
More specific problems related to the unclear criteria used for the selection of projects 
and the eligibility of expenditure. Finally, there was some evidence of political 
interference, in the evaluation and selection process, as will be discussed in the next 
concrete case.  
 
Selection and evaluation problems in the Bulgarian Administrative 
Capacity Operational Programme (OPAC-BG) 
The Bulgarian OPAC faced considerable problems, in its first years of implementation, 
regarding the evaluation and selection of projects. Funds for the programme were 
destined primarily for the development of administrative capacity in public 
administration bodies. The programme was the most likely to be to be connected with 
“notifications for suspected fraud” as compared to other OPs in the countries (EC 
Audit Report on OPAC-BG 2014, 8). EC auditors noted several key deficiencies 
concerning the selection of projects in the programme: 
“-Insufficient evaluation criteria for adequately assessing the candidates' 
operational, administrative and financial capacities; 
-Insufficient evidence in relation to justification of hourly rates charged to 
projects under civil contracts;  
-Lack of evidence of the activities carried out; 
-Lack of audit trail concerning reconciliation of real costs incurred for projects 
in the framework of staff costs. Using arbitrarily set fees without adequate 
reconciliation with real time worked for project” (EC Audit Report on OPAC 
Bulgaria November 2010, 4) 
 
OPAC suffered from severe deficiencies in terms of the selection of operations, 
management verifications and due to a lack of adequate audit trail for projects (DG 
EMPL AAR 2011, 62). Moreover, problems derived from an insufficient level of 
                                                             
May 2008, [Don’t freeze us out, pleads Stanishev]. Available at http://www.politico.eu/article/dont-
freeze-us-out-pleads-stanishev/ (accessed August 2016). 
107 In parallel, the main opposition party at the time Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria 
(GERB) used this as a strong political tool to increase its electoral leverage and highlight the 
incompetence and corruption affiliated to the government in terms of EU funding (Bloom and Petrova 
2013; Ganev 2013).  
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guidance provided to beneficiaries, ineligible expenditure and insufficient controls of 
public tender documentation (EC Audit Report on OPAC-BG November 2010, 10). 
During the first years of its existence, many projects were rejected due to failure in 
complying with the programme’s administrative or eligibility rules (Ecorys 
Intermediate Evaluation of OPAC-BG 2011, 251). 
 
In 2010-2011, national authorities re-verified 25 project beneficiaries and 62 
contractors (OPAC-BG AIR 2011, 46). As reported by one interviewee, most of 2011 
was spent verifying the legality of projects contracted in previous years (Head of Unit 
in Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). During the same year, European authorities 
placed the programme under “reservation” and negotiated with the Bulgarian 
authorities a flat rate correction of 5% for all projects (DG EMPL AAR 2011, 61). One 
of the specific criticism of auditors was that the criteria for evaluating projects were 
“not detailed and explicative enough as to give information of proposed budgets, the 
evaluation of their soundness and the analysis of the activities proposed against the 
expenditure budgeted” (EC Audit report on OPAC-BG November 2010, 13). 
Furthermore, one independent evaluation suggested that it was not clear how the 
Selection Committees took decisions and, more exactly, how it took into account the 
recommendations of evaluators (Ecorys Intermediate Evaluation of OPAC-BG 2011, 
247).  
 
The vague evaluation criteria for project selection was a potential loophole abused 
during the first calls for proposals of the programme. For instance, the second priority 
axis of OPAC-BG (“Human Resources Management”) was dedicated to developing 
competence of public administration and judiciary staff, although “a great part of the 
projects under this priority axis have also led to strengthening the capacity of civil 
society structures for better interaction and cooperation with the public 
administration” (Bulgarian Government 2009, 16). There were strong allegations that 
several politically affiliated NGOs received funding under this priority (CSD 2009). 
Politicians lobbied for projects to be distributed to NGOs where they were members of 
the board (Spendzeharova and Vachudova 2012, 49). Several interviewees were highly 
critical of the Human Resources axis of OPAC-BG (Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #1; 
Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #3; Bulgarian Expert #3). Validating this claim, a 
former EU official illustrated one of the mechanisms used to access funding:  
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“The Socialists set up 15-20 political NGOs. I told them. They changed in the 
very last night the conditions in the tender and requested that all NGOs should 
not have any experience, although they initially requested two-three years of 
experience.” (Former EC Head of Unit #1) 
  
The claim that many funds were distributed to recently created NGOs corroborated 
with accounts of local interviewees. Some of these suggested that many of these grants 
were distributed, for instance, to newly established Roma advocacy NGOs which, in 
fact, were supported or founded informally by politicians, at the time from the socialist 
government:   
“In fact, we had the Operational Programme for Administrative Capacity but 
the money for NGOs was spent at the very beginning, and was spent, I can tell 
you honestly, in a very corrupt way. Or at least this is what many organizations 
explained. Some unknown organizations that were close to the party of that 
time received big grants. In the Roma field there was a Roma organization that 
was completely affiliated with the Roma [political] organization of that time 
that received grants for 390.000 LEV. That was an organization without any 
other activities and it was clear that this money, which was designed to support 
the development of civil society, was spent in a very unclear way.” (Bulgarian 
Civil Society Leader #3) 
 
By funding politically affiliated NGOs and by transforming other non-governmental 
organisations into “service providers” the traditional advocacy role of civil society was 
undermined (Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #1; Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #3). 
Some described these problems as instances of “civil society capture” (Bulgarian 
Expert #3). Lastly, interviewees claimed that following the OPAC episode many civil 
society organisations were disappointed and avoided EU funds.108  
 
A second example of potential political interference in OPAC-BG was one highly 
mediatised. In 2014, a scandal erupted involving Maria Divizieva, the chief of staff of 
the then Prime Minister (Plamen Oresharski). During 2005-2009, as a Deputy 
Minister for Public Administration she oversaw the implementation of OPAC-BG. 
Prosecutors accused her of contributing to an embezzlement scheme carried out in 
2009-2010 and which involved the chair of the Sofia Military Appeal Court, Petko 
Petkov, the chair of the Sofia Appeal Court, Veselin Pengezov and the deputy chair of 
the Military Appeal Court, Vladimir Dimitrov, as well as staff from the Finance 
                                                             
108 Official data shows that the calls for proposals for “civil society” were launched primarily during 
2007-2009. Funds for this area were exhausted or due to the negative reports and investigations, 
there were no further calls for proposals.  
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Ministry.109 All were accused of falsifying documents in relation to a procurement 
tender for EU-funded projects that would have supported the development of 
administrative capacity in the above Courts. The case was considered a test for the 
Bulgarian judiciary and several interviewees considered it would create a future 
deterrent (Head of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1; Bulgarian Academic #1; OLAF 
representative #1). The case reflected two things. First, it showed the potential 
influence that politicians and senior officials may have had on the administrative staff 
working in the Managing Authorities, as well as their ability to interfere in the 
evaluation and selection stage of the absorption policy process. Second, as highlighted 
by the annual reports issued by the European Commission under the mechanism for 
Cooperation and Verification (CVM) and by several interviewees (Bulgarian 
Investigative journalist; OLAF representative #1) it underlined the highly problematic 
relationship between political officials and the judiciary in the country.   
 
Despite this, the problems of OPAC-BG were equally linked to issues of administrative 
capacity. The Managing Authority was moved from the Ministry of State 
Administration and Administrative Reform to the Ministry of Finance, during the 
Stanishev government. This affected its institutional memory and staff continuity (EC 
Head of Unit #2). During the Borisov administration, the programme was redesigned 
and included specific indicators on project implementation (Head of Unit in Bulgarian 
Managing Authority #1; EC Head of Unit #2). Moreover, the Managing Authority 
benefited from the creation of a specialised structure responsible for controlling 
irregularities (Council of Ministers 2013, 44). Following these measures, and given the 
frequent scrutiny of the EC, the capacity of OPAC-BG increased. The OP gradually 
became more effective and gradually reached one of the highest absorption rates in the 
country. As will be seen, its initial problems were not as systemic as they were for the 
Romanian Human Resources OP. 
  
                                                             
109 Novinite, May 8 2014, Bulgaria PM Oresharski Downplays Chief of Staff Indictment, available at: 
http://www.novinite.com/articles/160359/Bulgaria+PM+Oresharski+Downplays+Chief+of+Staff+In
dictment (accessed August 2016). 
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7.1.3 Project evaluation and selection in Romanian Operational 
Programmes   
 
The evaluation and selection stage of the SF funded projects was a considerable 
challenge for the Romanian authorities. By the end of July 2015, 15641 projects funded 
from Structural Funds were contracted in the country. Only one third (33.3%) of 
projects were selected from the total number of project applications. Similarly to 
Bulgaria’s case, the lowest ratio of contracted projects was for the Human Resources 
and Economic Competitiveness programmes, primarily due to these attracting high 
levels of interest from private or civil society organisations.  
 
In line with the data presented in table 29, more than half of the total number of 
project applications were rejected (24985 out of 46929) and not all approved projects 
(20267) were finally contracted (15641). Most of the uncontracted ones remained on 
reserve lists, were withdrawn by applicants or were potentially disqualified. Official 
assessments, as well as some external analyses110, pointed out that many projects did 
not reach the selection phase due to their inability to fulfil administrative, technical or 
financial eligibility criteria (OPHR-RO AIR 2012).  
 
Approximately 1800 EU-funded projects, contracted during 2007-2013, were officially 
terminated. This was due to various reasons ranging from administrative problems to 
issues of ineligible expenditure or suspicions of funds misuse. The following sub-
section provides some examples of why certain projects were terminated and, more 
specifically, how problems in the selection stage contributed to the poor performance 
of the Human Resources OP in Romania.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
110 Fonduri-Structurale.ro, [Frequent errors in project applications], available at http://www.fonduri-
structurale.ro/greseli-frecvente (accessed August 2016). 
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Table 29: Number of selected, contracted and terminated projects with SF in Romania 
(2007-2013) 
Operational 
Programmes 
No. of 
applicati
ons 
No. of 
projects 
rejected 
No. of 
projects 
approved 
 
No. of 
projects 
contracted 
No. of 
terminated 
contracts 
Percentage of 
contracted 
projects 
(number of 
contracted 
projects / 
number of 
projects 
submitted) 
 
OP  
Transport 
262 65 141 119 - 45% 
OP 
Environment 
 
728 172 549 499 115 
 (September 
2013) 
68% 
OP Regional 
Development 
10056 4084 5180 4716 183 
(November 
2015) 
46% 
OP Economic 
Competitivenes
s  
  17095 8313 8360 5609 1172 
(December 
2014) 
32% 
OP Technical 
Assistance 
202 24 171 164 8 81% 
OP Human 
Resources  
17215 11540 5411   4079 322 
(December 
2015) 
23% 
OP 
Administrative 
Capacity 
1371 787 455 455 5 33% 
Total 46929 24985 20267 15641 1805 33.3% 
Source: Single Management Information System (SMIS) Romania, available at 
http://old.fonduri-ue.ro (accessed August 2016). The number of terminated contracts were 
based on public information available on websites of Romanian Managing Authorities, 
(accessed August 2016) 
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Selection and evaluation problems in the Romanian Human Resources 
Development Operational Programme (OPHR-RO) 
As discussed in Chapter 5, OPHR-RO was affected by systemic deficiencies in terms of 
administrative capacity. The empirical analysis revealed that these deficiencies equally 
manifested themselves at the evaluation and selection stage of the absorption process, 
reinforcing the overall weak performance of the programme. Moreover, as will be 
illustrated below, there was strong evidence to suggest that many the programme’s 
issues could be credited to political interference and more widely to corrupt behaviour 
among administrators and final beneficiaries. By 2011, almost half the total number of 
projects for the 2007-2013 period were contracted (Table 29). Nevertheless, the 
evaluation and selection stage was difficult to set up during the programme’s first years 
of existence. As reported in annual implementation reports and national audits several 
key problems affected the evaluation and selection of projects during this period.  
 
First and foremost, administrators from the Managing Authority and the Intermediate 
Bodies were overwhelmed by the high number of applications and documents that 
required processing with insufficient staff, poor delegation and coordination from the 
MA and a lack of standardised and accredited procedures for evaluation affecting this 
stage111 (OPHR-RO AIR 2008, 11; Romanian AA report 2011, 370; KPMG OPHR-RO 
Interim Evaluation 2011).  
 
Second, there were many delays in the evaluation process. As a result of weak internal 
capacity, it was decided, in July 2009, to externalise part of the process to independent 
evaluators (OPHR-RO AIR 2009, 23). However, the authorities failed to detect that 
many of the private evaluators lacked the specific experience needed to evaluate 
projects in this area (Romanian Civil Society Leader #1; Romanian Expert #1). In light 
of this, many projects were selected and granted financing, although, it later emerged 
that the final beneficiaries did not possess the financial or technical ability to 
implement them (Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2). 
 
                                                             
111 Equally, the Romanian Audit Authority was criticised by some for the gaps in the management and 
control systems of the programme and for not contributing to the procedures that would safeguard an 
objective assessment of projects (Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2).  
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Third, it was reported by national auditors that the opinions and recommendations of 
the independent evaluators were often not taken into account in the final decisions on 
the selection of projects (Romanian AA Report 2011, 401). Auditors warned that by 
disregarding these opinions: “there is the risk of contracting projects with 
unsubstantiated and unrealistic budgets, which comprise ineligible activities or which 
do not contribute to the objectives and indicators of the programme” (Romanian AA 
Report 2010, 444). It was precisely such risks that later led the many unjustified costs 
and to the poor financial management of projects (Former Director of Romanian 
Managing Authority #2). This became the number one problem of the programme and 
was partly explained by the desire of several stakeholders involved in the programme 
to obtain “cheap money” (Director in Romanian Audit Authority #1). Finally, the 
methodologies for the selection of projects were poorly developed and were not 
respected by the authorities (EC Head of Sector #1).  Several reports succinctly 
summarized most of the deficiencies:  
“-Deficient selection procedures: projects were approved with unsound 
budgets, disproportionate salaries and unjustified public acquisitions; 
-Deficient management verifications as regards limited volume of supporting 
documents being checked, lacking quality, reliability and depth; in sufficiently 
covered reality of the project and risk of double financing; 
-No or insufficient checks on public procurement; 
-Non-compliance with Art. 14 & 16 of Regulation 1083/2006 regarding the 
principle of sound financial management, high human resources costs not 
justified by activity reports or by supporting documentation, exaggerated HR 
costs not proportional to the activities performed; 
-Ineligible expenditure for participants outside the target group; 
-Acquisition of equipment not justified by the activities of the project.”  
(DG EMPL AAR 2012, 57-58; EC Audit Report 19-23 November 2012) 
   
In addition, there was consistent evidence to suggest that political interference was a 
constant presence in the life of the programme which affected the administrative 
capacity of the institutions responsible for the programme. Negative political 
interference might explain some of the specific problems that developed at the 
evaluation and selection stage of the absorption process. Firstly, as a result of internal 
political decisions, the OPHR-RO system was initially very flexible and extremely 
lenient towards beneficiaries (Former Romanian EU Affairs Minister). Official reports 
point to deficiencies in the management and control systems of the programme with 
clear gaps in the evaluation and selection process such as: “incoherent guidance 
provided by the authorities to beneficiaries” and “ambiguous national eligibility rules” 
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(EC audit report OPHR-RO 2-6 April 2012, 3). Moreover, following some amendments 
to the rules of the programme, during the first calls for proposals, experts working on 
projects obtained disproportionately high salaries which could not be justified in 
relation to the level of work carried out (Former Director of Romanian Managing 
Authority #2; Former Romanian EU Affairs Minister; Romanian Auditor #3).  
 
Secondly, the programme was affected during its first years by a high-level corruption 
scandal involving the former Minister of Labour, Ioan Botiş. His wife received funding 
for a project one month after he was appointed to office and the official address of the 
NGO that received funds coincided with the Ministers’ home address (Dimulescu et al. 
2013, 93). Following these allegations, the Minister resigned and the projects in which 
his relatives were involved were terminated. However, the scandal deepened after it 
was revealed that immediately before he resigned, the minister issued a decree which 
rendered secret any information regarding the financing of EU-funded projects from 
the programme. The order was repealed by the then Prime Minister, Emil Boc, 
following pressure from civil society representatives.112 However, the episode was 
telling in terms of how high level political interference affected the programme’s’ 
transparency (Romanian Civil Society Leader #1; Romanian Expert #2). Thirdly, both 
European and Romanian auditors criticised the Managing Authority for failing to 
verify that the selection of projects or the allocation of tender contracts were not 
affected by conflicts of interest (Romanian AA report 2010, 444; 2011, 405). In 2012-
2013, there were 1581 irregularities registered for OPHR-RO funded projects (OPHR-
RO AIR 2013, 30).  
 
Finally, there was consistent evidence to suggest that many of the projects that 
received funding, particularly during the first calls for proposals, were connected to 
politicians and their networks (Romanian Expert #1; Romanian Expert #2; Romanian 
Civil Society Leader #2; Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2). Such 
projects could be granted financing following the manipulation of the evaluation and 
selection stage (Romanian Project Evaluator #1; Romanian Expert #1). The final 
decisions were taken by the Head of the Managing Authority, who could be appointed 
                                                             
112 Evenimentul Zilei, 10 May 2011, [Boc repealed the order of Botiş which made secrete information 
regarding European funds], available at: http://www.evz.ro/boc-a-abrogat-ordinul-lui-botis-care-
secretiza-informatiile-privind-fondurile-europene-929699.html (accessed September 2015). 
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or was often under political pressure (Former Director of Romanian Managing 
Authority #2; Romanian Expert #1). Moreover, in an open letter, the Romanian 
Coalition of NGOs for Structural Funds denounced the incompetence and corruption 
of officials who contributed to the programme’s crisis by “developing complex 
defrauding systems for European funded projects”.113 The mechanism for interference, 
similar to that discussed on OPAC-BG, was that several organisations competing for 
funding were informally supported by politicians or officials that had some leverage 
on the work of the Managing Authority / Intermediate Bodies. Several brief examples 
are provided in the following.  
 
First, several irregular projects were found in the fifth priority axis of the programme 
destined to “Promoting active employment measures”. In 2012, prosecutors arrested 
Buturugă Iulian Marius, the representative of S.C Buturugă, Militaru & Associates, for 
illegal activities which included false statements and forgery of documents in order to 
obtain EU funding.114 According to public data, a total of 14 projects were awarded to 
the firm during 2007-2012, amounting to more than 50 million EUR, and which were 
terminated.115 Several interviewees alleged that the firm could not have obtained this 
volume of funding without political backing or without support from corrupt officials 
working in the regional Intermediate Bodies (Former Director of Romanian Managing 
Authority #2; Romanian EU funds consultant #2; Romanian Civil Society Leader #1).  
 
Second, the authorities were accused of allowing “copy-pasted” projects to be selected. 
This encouraged, for instance, the development of several firms specialised in human 
development and training courses. The Elen Association from North-West Romania 
obtained, by 2014, financing for 22 projects worth approximately 25 million EUR.116 
                                                             
113 Romanian Coalition of NGOs for Structural Funds, Open letter 15 October 2012, available at: 
http://www.ce-re.ro/upload/Scrisoare_MAEur_15oct.pdf (accessed August 2016).  
114 Romaniacurata.ro, 12 September 2012 [Iulian Buturuga, arrested and investigated by the 
Romanian Anti-Corruption Directorate for European funds embezzlement], available at: 
http://www.romaniacurata.ro/iulian-buturuga-arestat-si-cercetat-de-dna-pentru-deturnare-de-
fonduri-europene/ (accessed August 2016). 
115 OPHR-RO, list of terminated projects, available at: http://old.fonduri-
ue.ro/posdru/images/doc2016/reziliate.31.12.2015.v.pdf (accessed August 2016). 
116 7est.ro, 24 April 2014, [112 million lei seized by an anonymous NGO from OPHR-RO funds: Who is 
behind the Elen Association] available at: http://www.7est.ro/exclusiv-7est/anchete/item/15985-
exclusiv-lovitura-naucitoare-112-milioane-de-lei-castigati-la-posdru-de-un-ong-necunoscut-socul-
vine-de-la-asociatia-elen-din-alba.html; Romaniacurata.ro, 6 May 2014, [And the OPHR-RO winners 
are…the same], available at: http://www.romaniacurata.ro/iar-castigatorii-posdru-sunt-aceiasi-
update/ (accessed August 2016). 
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Media reports showed that the Association was owned by a former liberal prefect of 
the Alba-Iulia County. His spouse was a senior judge in the county, whilst their son 
was the vice-president of the association. Two of their associates were the head of the 
local child protection agency and his wife, who was the director for EU-funded projects 
in the country prefecture. This was a typical example of a firm, whose members had 
considerable knowledge and influence, and which was directed by politicians and the 
“local nomenclature”.117 The case highlighted the difficulties that the programme faced 
in terms of tackling conflicts of interests and the relationship between administrators 
and beneficiaries of EU-funded projects (EC Head of Sector #1; Former Director of 
Romanian Managing Authority #2). Finally, two other relevant examples were 
recently in the public spotlight. In 2011, the president of the Romanian Employment 
Agency was convicted to prison for having created a bribery scheme which involved 
employees of the agency working on EU-funded projects.118 In addition, in 2016, 
following inquiries it emerged that several Roma related NGOs, supported and 
coordinated by two Romanian MPs, benefited from EU funding due to forged 
documents and by falsifying reports on inexistent activities carried out for the 
project.119  
 
By December 2015, approximately 10% of the contracted projects for OPHR-RO were 
officially terminated. EU authorities sanctioned the programme with a 25% flat rate 
financial correction for all projects selected before August 2012 (DG EMPL AAR 2014, 
Annexes). The high level of sanctions and financial corrections associated to the 
programme revealed the systemic nature of its problems. Thus, in OPHR-RO’s case, 
there was clear evidence that many of its problems originated at the evaluation and 
selection stage of the process. These were generated by a mix of administrative 
shortcomings and negative political interference, with serious implications for the 
implementation of the programme and its weak absorption performance.  
                                                             
117 Bogdan Glavan, 19 December 2013, [Holidays in a clique. Has Santa Claus arrived for EU funds 
subscribers?], available at: http://adevarul.ro/economie/bani/sarbatori-cardasie-venit-mosul-
abonatii-fondurilor-europenee-1_52b2eb97c7b855ff56dabe08/index.html (accessed August 2016). 
118 Adevarul.ro, 27 August 2011, [The former president of the Employment Agency, Silviu Bian, 
requested monthly bribes of 25.000 EUR. The motivation of the sentence by which he was condemned 
to 9 years imprisonment] available at: http://adevarul.ro/locale/alba-iulia/fostul-presedinte-anofm-
silviu-bian-cerea-25000-euro-spaga-luna-motivarea-sentintei-primit-9-ani-inchisoare-
1_50aea7d17c42d5a6639ecc2b/index.html (accessed August 2016). 
119 Agerpres, 20 July 2016, [MPs Mădălin Voicu and Nicolae Păun prosecuted by the Anti-Corruption 
Department], available at: http://www.agerpres.ro/justitie/2016/07/20/alerta-dna-deputatii-
madalin-voicu-si-nicolae-paun-trimisi-in-judecata-11-40-50 (accessed August 2016). 
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7.2 Implementation and public procurement: 
administrative capacity deficiencies or politicisation? 
 
The implementation of projects was one of the, if not the most, difficult stage of the 
EU funds absorption policy cycle.120 Project implementation is carried out by final 
beneficiaries, be they public (e.g. municipalities, universities, hospitals and care 
centres) or private (e.g. firms, SMEs etc). Although it does not apply to all EU financed 
projects, one of the main areas of the implementation process was the procurement 
phase. During this phase different stakeholders have to acquire goods or services 
necessary for implementing their projects. Procurement could range from hiring an 
events and catering firm for a large training event to contracting construction firms in 
order to handle several local physical infrastructure projects. In a nutshell, public 
procurement is regularly carried out by governmental or other entities and specifically 
refers to:  
“..the process by which public authorities, such as government departments or 
local authorities, purchase work, goods or services from companies which they 
have selected for this purpose”.121 
 
Most public procurement carried out for European projects fall under the remit of EU 
legislation. Procurement is “directly relevant to the fundamental principles of the 
common market and a policy instrument in the hands of Member States” (Bovis 2012, 
1). For this, EU directives 2004/18/EC and, more recently 2014/24/EU, had to be 
transposed into national legislation. Many of the projects funded through European 
Structural Funds involved a public procurement phase. Projects with a value above a 
certain threshold implicitly have to be advertised in the Official Journal of the 
European Union. Overall, procurement had to abide to the overarching principles of: 
“equal treatment, non-discrimination, mutual recognition, proportionality and 
transparency” (Article 2, Directive 2004/18/EC). Public contracts are awarded by 
what in short are known as Contracting Authorities (CAS) to different economic 
                                                             
120 Questionnaire respondents (N=37) rated this as the second most problematic dimension of the EU 
funds cycle, after financial management (e.g. co-financing). 
121 European Commission – Public Procurement Reform factsheet, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/reform/fact-
sheets/fact-sheet-01-overview_en.pdf (accessed October 2016).  
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operators that can fulfil the services or provide the goods necessary for implementing 
projects.122  
 
Public procurement is a dynamic and resource intensive stage of the overall policy 
process. As compared to the evaluation and selection of projects which involves 
primarily central public authorities, procurement is carried out by final project 
beneficiaries. However, Managing Authorities / Intermediate Bodies are involved in 
verifying and monitoring the implementation of projects, whilst control institutions, 
such as the national Audit Authorities and Certifying and Payment Authorities, have 
official prerogatives in assessing the legality of the procurement carried out in projects.  
 
This sub-chapter examines some the main problems encountered in the procurement 
phase for EU-funded projects in Bulgaria and Romania. Procurement accounted for 
the highest level of irregularities found in EU-funded projects (Bulgarian Parliament 
2011; World Bank 2013; IPP 2015). Moreover, official reports highlight that “public 
procurement is a ‘hot spot’ for fraud and corruption” (OLAF 2014). These problems 
are generated by local beneficiaries which often seek to contract affiliated companies 
or known contractors in exchange of “kickbacks” and through “bid rigging” practices 
(PwC and Ecorys 2013). Corruption and the “particularistic” allocation of public 
contracts is considered one of the main risks for the awarding of public procurement 
tenders (Fazekas et al. 2013; Neamtu and Dragos 2014; Dimulescu et al. 2015; 
Mungiu-Pippidi 2015).   
 
Given its complexity, public procurement will be examined here in line with the 
evidence gathered and in line with several questions: What triggered the numerous 
problems affiliated to public procurement in EU-funded projects and how can 
administrative capacity or political related factors explain these developments? 
Therefore, the focus was on the extent to which technical / administrative factors and 
political factors manifested at the procurement stage. This sub-chapter is organised as 
follows. The main problems associated with EU-funded public procurement and some 
of the key empirical findings on the topic are first presented. It then continues with 
                                                             
122 Contracting Authorities are legally defined as – “the state, regional or local authorities, bodies 
governed by public law, associations formed by one or several of such authorities or one or several of 
such bodies governed by public law.” (Title 1, Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18/EC). 
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outlining insights from public procurement in Bulgaria and Romania and some of the 
specific issues associated with EU-funded Operational Programmes in the two 
countries. The wider implications of the findings are discussed in the concluding 
section of this chapter. 
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7.2.1 Public procurement and the perils of the implementation 
process  
 
Public procurement (PPE) is, according to official sources, the number one reason for 
non-fraudulent related irregularities in Cohesion Policy projects. 123 A statistical 
analysis of irregularities124  found in EU-funded projects underlined that, during 2007-
2013, the three most common types related to: a) infringements concerned with public 
procurement (N=2873); b) non-eligible expenditure (N=2100) and 3) non-eligible 
expenditure / infringements concerned with public procurement (N=739) (OLAF 
2013, 63).  
 
On the ground, PPE was perceived as a strong problem. According to Flash 
Eurobarometer 374, 58% of Bulgarian and 43% of Romanian companies which had 
taken part in a public procurement procedure considered that corruption had 
prevented them from winning a public tender or a public procurement contract in the 
past three years (EC 2014b, 23; Neamtu and Dragos 2014, 3;). Moreover, in Romania 
approximately 40% of the EU-funded projects were deemed irregular due to public 
procurement (EC 2015a, 39). In general, this is the area which generated the highest 
rate of financial corrections for problems found in EU-funded projects (IPP 2015). 
Furthermore, irregularities in this area seem to have been the main reason for the 
interruption or suspension of funding by the European Commission, at different time 
intervals and for several Operational Programmes in both countries. This evidence 
points to the systemic problems encountered in PPE.  
 
The vast majority of interviewees underlined that procurement was a highly 
problematic area which generated many unforeseen situations leading to severe delays 
which, in turn, triggered other legal, financial or technical problems with the 
implementation of EU-funded projects (EC Head of Unit #1 ; EC Policy Officer #2 ; EC 
Policy Officer for administrative capacity #1; Bulgarian Technical Assistance MA 
                                                             
123 Council Regulation 1083/2006 defines "irregularities" as: "any infringement of a provision of 
Community law resulting from an act or omission by an economic operator, which has, or would have, 
the effect of prejudicing the general budget of the Communities by charging an unjustified item of 
expenditure to the Community Budget" (Article 2.7). 
124 The same analysis points out that, during 2009-2013, projects deemed to be affected by fraudulent 
irregularities originated from: a) incorrect, missing, false or falsified supporting documents (N=268); 
b) infringement of contract provisions / rules (N=227) and c) eligibility / legitimacy of 
expenditure/measure (N=191) (OLAF 2013, 60). 
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Expert #1 ; Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1; Director in Bulgarian 
Managing Authority #1 ; Director General of Romanian Ministry #1; Director in 
Romanian Audit Authority #1). Procurement was a highly technical process which was 
contingent on many different factors. At their root, problems in this area seem to have 
been the result of a combination of weak administrative capacity, judicial related 
issues and political interference.  
 
From an administrative capacity point of view developing the institutional 
infrastructure, transposing and harmonising procurement rules with national law and 
developing a body of experts, especially in public bodies and municipalities, proved to 
be highly challenging in both countries. Firstly, from an institutional point of view, 
Public Procurement Agencies were gradually involved at the domestic level in 
overseeing tender processes and the awarding of procurement contracts from EU-
funded projects. However, the deficient communication and coordination between 
public institutions on the topic generated conflicting interpretations of procedures and 
divergent institutional positions. In turn, these led to inefficient enforcement and 
monitoring of procurement procedures (Representative of Bulgarian Public 
Procurement Agency; Head of Unit in Bulgarian Central Coordination Unit #1; 
Romanian Public Procurement Expert #1).  
 
Secondly, the shift from the pre-accession period to the post-accession period seems 
to have generate a gap in the monitoring of the regularity of procurement procedures 
carried out. Moreover, during the former period, EC delegations carried out most ex-
ante verifications of procurement procedures using PRAG125 rules (Former Director of 
Bulgarian Managing Authority #2). The transposition of the EU procurement directive 
into national law proved to be difficult and time consuming. In part, this was due to 
poor quality and interpretable legislation. As a result, national procurement laws were 
updated several times in both countries in less than seven years. This added to the 
volatility of procurement systems and had implications on tender selection 
methodologies and documentation.  
 
                                                             
125 Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EU external actions (PRAG). 
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Thirdly, human resources capacity was often problematic given the lack of financial 
and career related incentives for those managing procurement processes, specifically 
in Contracting Authorities at the local level. Procurement is a highly technical field of 
specialty which requires extensive training and investment for capacity and human 
resources development. In this sense, the internalisation of procurement rules and 
practices required time and resources that not all central and local level stakeholders 
had or were willing to invest.  
 
From a judicial point of view, the potential violations of procurement law, especially 
the unlawful allocation of tenders by some economic operators, backlashed and 
resulted in an extremely high number of appeals being lodged in specialised courts 
(Bulgarian CPC AAR 2013; Romanian CNSC AAR 2014). Litigations could effectively 
block the implementation of EU-funded projects for months or even years (EC Head 
of Unit #1; Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). Often appeals or 
complaints were submitted in order to intentionally block the awarding of contracts to 
rival companies or to put pressure on the CAS to reorganise tenders (Bulgarian EU 
funds consultant #1; Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1). 
Complaints were a wider symptom of dysfunctionalities in the procurement systems 
and potentially revealed problems of intentionality and political interference in the 
process.  
 
Third, political factors were much present in procurement processes. The financial 
resources affiliated to procurement contracts sparked a considerable level of interest 
among local and central level politicians. Changes in procurement legislation were 
initiated by Governments and often approved by Parliaments and, therefore, any 
amendments or changes that were potentially judged as politically detrimental were 
often rejected (Former EC Head of Unit #1). Secondly, public procurement was 
perceived as a public policy instrument which required political intervention and 
tender specifications were often used as unofficial electoral platforms by local mayors 
(Romanian Public Procurement Expert #1; Representative of Romanian Appeals 
Council). To this end, many local and central decision-makers engaged in clientelistic 
exchanges, which meant that they received political sponsorships and financing for 
their political activities from different firms in exchange of biased, manipulated or 
illegally allocated tender contracts (Bulgarian EU funds consultant #1; Bulgarian EU 
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funds coordinator for South-West region #1; Director in Bulgarian Audit Authority; 
Director in Romanian Audit Authority #1; Former Director of Romanian Managing 
Authority #1). Several mechanisms facilitated this in practice: a) using restrictive 
criteria and conditions in the tender documentation so as to target firms with a specific 
profile, know-how or by inserting clauses appropriate to the favoured bidder 
(Bulgarian Audit Authority 2013, 6; Romanian Audit Authority report 2010; Bulgarian 
Investigative Journalist; Romanian Public Procurement Expert #1; Romanian Expert 
#1;); b) finding administrative or technical mistakes in other offers and disqualifying 
them (Former EC Head of Unit #1); c) unclear, unlawful or subjective use of 
methodologies and awarding criteria (Bulgarian Expert #4; Director of Bulgarian 
Managing Authority #1); d) controlling the work of the tender selection committee 
responsible for awarding contracts (Former EC Head of Unit #1). Procurement 
problems were flagged as irregularities and, if audit verifications deemed these to be 
systemic, financial sanctions and corrections were imposed by national or European 
authorities. As discussed elsewhere, sanctions were subject to intense disputes 
between Contracting Authorities and Managing Authorities / Audit Authorities and 
the European Commission. All the above is now further contextualised in the following 
taking into account the public procurement systems and several specific examples 
related to Structural Funds from both countries. 
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7.2.2 Public procurement and Structural Funds in Bulgaria  
 
Public procurement (PPE) in Bulgaria accounted, in 2013, for approximately 12% of 
the countries’ GDP, reaching an estimated 4.810 million EUR (PwC 2016 - BG country 
profile, 21). Throughout the years, PPE contracts related to EU funding varied 
considerably (e.g. 8% - 2010; 9% - 2011; 14% - 2012) (Pavlova 2012). Moreover, there 
has been a considerable increase in the number of contracting authorities and 
contractors (Table 30). In recent years, it was alleged that the Bulgarian procurement 
system changed considerably, equally, as a consequence of EU accession (PwC 2016 – 
BG country profile). 
Table 30: Public procurement data Bulgaria (2010-2013) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Number of awarding entities  
(contacting authorities) 
2 585 3 217 4 662 5 302 
Number of contractors 14 700 16 347 18 257 20 490 
Total number of public 
procurement announcements 
7 404 8 194 10 129 11 939 
From this sum: above the EU 
threshold 
1 599 2 022 2 570 3 653 
From this sum: with EU 
funding 
951 1 210 2 421 3 012 
Public procurement 
announcements in 
construction works 
1 056 1 177 1 552 1 791 
Public procurement 
announcements in supplies 
3 463 4 025 4 679 5 162 
Public procurement 
announcements in services 
2 877 2 989 3 888 4 986 
Number of contracts 15 755 17 579 20 813 22 779 
 
Source: Stefanov and Karaboev 2015, 16 
Several features characterise the Bulgarian procurement system, including in relation 
to the implementation of EU funding. First, from an institutional point of view, the 
Bulgarian Public Procurement Agency (PPA) was established as an executive agency 
of the Ministry of the Economy, later moved to the Ministry of Finance (PPA AAR 
2015, 4). In essence, the PPA is responsible for the legal, methodological, ex-ante 
controls and recommendations, and for ensuring the legality of procurement 
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contracts. This includes managing the Public Procurement online portal and alerting 
other authorities in case it detects irregularities (PwC 2016 – BG country profile, 22). 
In addition, several other bodies are involved in the public procurement system: the 
National Audit Authority Office (NAO) – ex-post controls of Contracting Authorities’ 
spending; the State Financial Inspection Agency (SFIA) – ex-post control of 
Contracting Authorities’ activities; the Commission on the Protection of Competition 
(CPC) – dealing with appeals of PPE in the first instance, and finally, the Supreme 
Administrative Court (SAC) – judicial body responsible for appeals in the second 
instance (Bulgarian PPA AAR 2015, 3). Procurement was a highly volatile area due to 
institutional differences. One interviewee explained this emphasizing on the use of 
contradictory frameworks which partly empowered the Procurement Agency, on 
administrative ex-ante controls, and the Managing Authorities, on the more 
substantive selection criteria regarding tenders (Head of Unit in Bulgarian Central 
Coordination Unit #1).  
 
Second, the legal framework developed around the Public Procurement Law (PPL no 
28 / 2004) and on different pieces of secondary legislation. The frequent changes and 
updates of this legislation meant to correct the deficiencies of the PPE system, 
although this may have generated further instability and problems regarding the 
interpretation of procurement law by beneficiaries (PwC 2016 – BG country profile, 
27; Bulgarian EU funds coordinator for South-West region #1; Representative of the 
Bulgarian National Association for Municipalities). Some interviewees were highly 
critical of the reasons behind the frequent number of changes: 
“In 7 years the law for public procurement was changed 40 times126, sometimes 
at the suggestion of the EC, sometimes due to changes in the Bulgarian 
government, sometimes due to lobby, sometimes criminal lobby, or to simply 
accommodate other changes, to improve the situation, that creates an unstable 
environment for beneficiaries” (Bulgarian EU funds consultant #1). 
 
 
Given the high number of irregularities found on procurement related to EU-funded 
projects, a decision was taken in 2009 to introduce ex-ante controls that will be carried 
out by the PPA for projects above a certain threshold (4.8 million EUR for construction 
works / 511 thousand EUR for contracts on supplies and services) (Pavlova 2012). 
                                                             
126 This is the opinion of the interviewee rather than an exact figure. Bulgarian procurement legislation 
has changed several times during 2004 – 2014. The number indicated by the interviewee reveals, 
however, the perceived high number of changes and the instability of the procurement system.  
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These levels were lowered in 2012 to 1.3 million EUR for construction works / 130 – 
400 thousand EUR for contracts on supplies and services (Ibid.). Gradually, the Public 
Procurement Agency became more involved in the process assessing the 
documentation of Contracting Authorities and, after tender procedures were 
launched, by issuing opinions and recommendations on the compliance with legal 
requirements (Ibid.). As a result, the number of ex-ante assessments increased 
considerably (Bulgarian Expert #2; Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1). 
Independent reports contended that verifications on procurement had a limited 
impact in ensuring the regularity of the process (PwC 2016 – BG country profile). 
 
Third, from a human resources point of view, the Procurement Agency had 
approximately 70 employees (Bulgarian PPA AAR 2015, 6). These were considered too 
few in relation to the high number of PPE contracts that had to be verified (PwC 2016 
– BG country profile, 23). In addition, one of the main problems was not necessarily 
the capacity of central bodies, but the lack of technical expertise, on procurement, 
within municipalities and public bodies acting as Contracting Authorities. Structural 
conditions such as poor human resources policy and low levels of remuneration in 
local administrations affected the ability of municipalities to develop or retain 
expertise (OPREG-BG AIR 2008, 2009; Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing 
Authority #2; Head of Unit in Bulgarian Central Coordination Unit #1; Representative 
of the Bulgarian National Association for Municipalities). 
 
The Bulgarian procurement system is considered to be highly centralised, although, as 
reported in some evaluations, there has been an increase in the number of local 
contracting authorities which showed a tendency towards decentralisation (PwC 2016 
- BG country profile, 21). This had implications and led to an increase in the local 
politicisation of procurement. As a result, there were many “persistent irregularities 
and corruption-related issues, which impact all spheres of the procurement cycle, 
including oversight and law enforcement” (PwC 2016 - BG country profile, 21). Such 
irregularities were reflected, for instance, in the high number of appeals and 
complaints lodged by economic operators involved in procurement processes. For 
instance, the Bulgarian Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC) received, 
in 2013, 1394 appeals regarding procurement (a sharp increase from 902 in 2009) 
(Bulgarian CPC AAR 2013, 46).  
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Finally, issues regarding procurement were related to political interference in the 
process. Formal assessments carried out by the Public Financial Inspection Agency 
and by the Commission for Protection of Competition underlined some of the principal 
reasons for violations of procurement legislation: “failure to apply tender procedures 
and use of tailor-made criteria” and “discriminatory conditions for bidders, unlawful 
exclusion of candidates and arbitrary assessment of tenders and selection of 
contractors” (PwC 2016 – BG country profile, 26). These corroborated with the 
insights of interviewees on the ground: 
“With regard to public procurement, findings are more or less the same for 
Operational Programme...The problems are the unclear methodology for 
[establishing tender] winners, the ineligible expenses, the restrictive 
procedures and others” (Bulgarian Certifying Authority Representative #1). 
 
 
Procurement procedures were highly complex and had a high degree of corruption 
risks attached to them (KPMG 2011, Midterm Evaluation OPREG-BG, 137; Stefanov 
and Karaboev 2015). Independent assessments found that many procurement 
contracts were concentrated and won by only several large Bulgarian companies, 
especially on infrastructure and construction related projects (PwC 2016 – BG country 
profile, 27; Stefanov et al. 2015). Finally, officials from the Bulgarian Centre for 
Prevention and Countering Corruption and Organised Crime (BORKOR) publicly 
criticised the fact that 98% of procurement deals were entrusted to only 2% of 
companies in the country.127 Although this is difficult to verify, such figures highlight 
the systemic nature of problems affiliated to public procurement in the country. 
Several concrete examples related to EU-funded programmes are discussed in the 
following.   
 
Procurement problems in Bulgarian Operational Programmes  
During the 2007-2013 period, the Bulgarian Regional Development (OPREG-RO) and 
the Environment (OPENV-BG) OPs were among the most problematic when it came 
to project implementation. The evidence gathered showed that procurement problems 
                                                             
127 Novinite, 9 June 2013, “Bulgaria’s anti-corruption unit to Stem Public Procurement Fraud”, 
available at: http://www.novinite.com/articles/151089/Bulgaria%27s+Anti-
Corruption+Unit+to+Stem+Public+Procurement+Fraud#sthash.Ubzragjn.dpuf (accessed October 
2016). 
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were the main deficiencies uncovered in the two OPs, as well as the formal reason for 
payments being interrupted several times in both programmes.  
 
Specifically, the annual implementation reports for OPREG-BG highlight that 
procurement was often the main problem found in audited projects (e.g. 30 out of 43 
audited projects in 2010) (OPREG-BG AIR 2010, 18). Procurement seems to have also 
been the main reason for irregularities, alerts and appeals received by the Managing 
Authority.128 EU auditors signalled deficiencies and violations of procurement 
procedures for OPREG-BG. As a result of systemic weaknesses, payments for two 
priority axes of the programme were interrupted in 2014. Following the verification of 
expenditure several main findings were noted:  
“-Irregular reduction of the deadlines for submission of tenders due to 
noncompliant prior information notices (PIN's) (not all required details were 
included in the PIN's); 
-Irregular reduction of the time allowed to tenderers to obtain the tender 
documentation, by requiring tenderers to purchase the documents at least 10 
days before the deadlines; established for the submission of bids, when the 
standard time limits provided by the public procurement Directives are 
shortened; 
-Disproportionate/Discriminatory selection criteria; 
-Irregular modifications of bids during the evaluation process; 
-Irregular tender evaluation methodology, involving favouring tenders close to 
the average price of all bids; 
-Unjustified rejection of tenderers / Unequal treatment of bidders.”  
(EC audit report on OPREG-BG - 7-11 April 2014, 8-10) 
 
  
European auditors argued that these irregularities occurred despite the two existing 
levels of control and verification, which included the Bulgarian Public Procurement 
Agency and the Certifying Authority. Moreover, the report stressed substantive 
concerns regarding “collusive bidding schemes” and instances of “conflicts of interest 
between the winning bidder and one subcontractor” (Ibid, 12). These findings applied 
to different projects.  
 
For example, problems were found in an urban transport project in the city of Burgas 
which implied thirteen individual contracts. Among other things, problems on 
procurement were due to the fact that: a) the number of days for receiving tender 
                                                             
128 Most of the weaknesses found in this area were accurately reported each year. OPREG-BG AIR 
2010 (p. 18) and OPREG-BG AIR 2011 (p. 31-32) describe these problems extensively.  
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documents was lower than legally accepted; b) the initial criteria for the selection of 
the contract was modified without public notice; c) the winning bid was irregularly 
modified during the evaluation process in order to include a list of non-key experts 
initially not included in the offer; d) discriminatory selection criteria (e.g. previous 
servicing of buses in Burgas or experience in at least three projects for organising 
traffic in urban areas) (Ibid, 22-40). Another example related to the development of 
tourism in the municipality of Asenovgrad. It was found that the awarding criteria 
were unlawful, the selection criteria were disproportionate, and the mathematical 
formulas used to calculate the winning tender favoured a certain tenderer, excluding 
unwanted bidders from the process (Ibid, 50-55).  
 
The above audit findings corroborated with the views of interviewees on the ground 
who stressed that the main problem regarding procurement was that beneficiaries 
sought ways to circumvent procurement rules (Deputy Director in Bulgarian 
Managing Authority #1; Director in Bulgarian Managing Authority #2). Many asserted 
that problems often emerged because the national or local contractors who won 
tenders were affiliated in one way or another to members of the Contracting Authority, 
especially mayors or other local officials (EC Head of Sector #1; Director of Bulgarian 
Managing Authority #1). In this respect, the use of discriminatory and restrictive 
tendering criteria may have allowed the latter stakeholders to unlawfully allocate 
contracts, in essence by manipulating the work of tendering committees, disqualifying 
certain offers on the basis of subjective criteria or by falsifying documentation related 
to procurement procedures (Former EC Head of Unit #1; Director in Bulgarian 
Managing Authority #1). In addition, local newspaper reports suggested that the 
foreign bidders were often eliminated from tenders.129 Some interviewees argued that 
such practices could take place following pressure from local councillors and mayors 
to award contracts to local companies (Representative of the Bulgarian National 
Association of Municipalities; Former EC Head of Unit #1).   
 
Similar problems were identified for the Environment OP (OPENV-BG). After ex-ante 
and ex-post verifications were introduced the programme was among the most verified 
                                                             
129 Capital Weekly, 20 February 2015, “Theory and Practice of Manipulation”, available at: 
http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2015/02/20/2476819_teoriia_i_praktika_na
_manipulaciiata/ (accessed October 2016). 
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OPs in the country (Pavlova 2012). The programme’s problems originated from during 
the Stanishev administration of 2008-2009, when several final beneficiaries seemed 
to have been included on a politically pre-defined list (Former EC Head of Unit #1; 
Bulgarian Consultant #1). Reservations were officially raised on the programme due 
to breaches of procurement law (DG Regio AAR 2008, 53; EC audit report 15-19 
October 2012). Payments towards the programme were pre-suspended in 2013-2014 
due to problems with the selection criteria, quality of the documentation and unlawful 
methodologies used in the selection of tenders (Director in Bulgarian Managing 
Authority #1).  
 
The programme was for several years surrounded by controversy. For instance, some 
interviewees denounced that politically driven financial corrections, adopted by the 
Oresharski government, targeted municipalities from the GERB opposition party 
(Former EC Head of Unit #1). In parallel, the findings of EC audits carried out during 
2013/2014 were criticised, on the ground, for allegedly being politicised at the 
European Commission level (Former Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2) 
and not in line with audit standards (Director in Bulgarian Audit Authority). Lastly, a 
high concentration of tenders was won by a small number of Bulgarian companies, 
and as result, many foreign companies, interested in large environmental projects 
lodged complaints at the EU level (Bulgarian Expert #1). This was potentially due to 
negative political interference. Against this backdrop, OPENV-BG was for a long time 
one of the most problematic EU-funded programmes in Bulgaria. Unofficial accounts 
point to the fact that many of its large-scale water and waste management projects 
were affected by irregularities, generated by procurement, potentially due to potential 
political interference, from central and local municipality officials (Former EC Head 
of Unit #1; Bulgarian EU funds consultant #1). 
 
To a great extent, most problems appeared at the level of Contracting Authority 
(especially in municipalities) due to unchecked, illegal or potentially fraudulent 
procedures and tendering processes. The aim of these might have been to politicise the 
awarding of EU-funded tenders and to channel contracts to affiliated contractors, in 
exchange of favours or material goods or bribes (Former EC Head of Unit #1). Some 
claimed that bribes could amount to 30% of the value of the contracts and this affected 
the material quality of projects (Bulgarian Investigative Journalist). Where violations 
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of procurement law were established financial corrections were often enforced. For 
instance, OPREG-BG received a 10.11% financial correction for all the projects 
implemented in first priority axis of the programme (Sustainable and Integrated 
Urban Development) and 11.48% corrections for projects implemented under the third 
priority axis (Sustainable Tourism Development) (OPREG-BG AIR 2014, 28; EC audit 
report 7-11 April 2014). Moreover, many of the OPENV-BG projects audited received 
financial corrections ranging from 8.2% to 25% of the value of projects (EC audit 
report 15-19 October 2012; EC audit report 8-10 December 2014). Most of these 
problems were similar to what has been found in Romania’s case. 
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7.2.3 Public procurement and Structural Funds in Romania 
 
The Romanian procurement system has evolved in recent years, as a result of EU 
accession and of numerous legal and institutional developments. Public Procurement 
(PPE) in Romania was estimated at 11% of the countries’ GDP, in 2013, amounting to 
15.9 billion EUR (PwC 2016 – RO country profile, 180). However, only 4% of it was 
financed from EU funding. The share of EU-funded procurement contracts has varied 
along the years. In 2014, from 18.637 tender procedures launched, 1831 were 
specifically financed with Structural Funds, although their value was considerably 
higher than that of domestic procurement.130 However, the value of EU-funded 
procurement reached 47% for construction related contracts (Doroftei and Dimulescu 
2015, 15). In short, the share of EU-funded procurement tenders was significant in the 
Romanian market and individually their value was much higher than nationally 
funded tenders. This attracted strong interest from different economic operators. It 
entailed a high level of responsibility for Contracting Authorities, a great many of 
which are local public authorities such as municipalities, approximately 74% 
(according to data from Doroftei and Dimulescu 2015, 32). As found during the 
analysis, the majority of problems related to procurement for EU-funded projects 
emerged at the local level.  
 
In terms of administrative capacity, there are several key characteristics of the 
Romanian PPE system. Firstly, from an institutional point of view, the procurement 
system is highly centralised and involves several key institutions: the National 
Authority for Regulating and Monitoring Public Procurement (ANRMAP), the Unit for 
Coordination and Verification of Public Procurement (UCVAP) and the National 
Council for Solving Complaints (CNSC).131 ANRMAP was created in 2005 and was 
affiliated to the General Secretariat of the Government. Its role was to regulate, 
monitor the execution of procurement and engage in ex-ante and ex-post verifications 
of procurement procedures (ANRMAP AAR 2013, 6). The UCVAP was established in 
2006, as part of the Ministry of Finance, and its main function was to evaluate ex-ante 
                                                             
130 According to data from the Romanian National Procurement Agency (ANAP) on the Romanian 
Procurement Market in 2014, available at: http://anap.gov.ro/web/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/DIMENSIUNEA-PIEȚEI-2014_Rap-statistice.pdf  (accessed October 
2016).  
131 ANRMAP and UCVAP merged in 2015 to create the National Agency for Public Procurement 
(ANAP). 
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the procurement documentation of Contracting Authorities, equally at the local level 
through its territorial branches (UCVAP AAR 2010, 3). Finally, the CNSC acts as a first 
instance appeal body and it receives and analyses complaints from economic operators 
and acts as an institutional and judicial filter to address irregularities in public 
procurement (Romanian CNSC AAR 2014, 2). In addition, the Romanian Audit 
Authority, the Competition Council and judicial and anti-corruption bodies (e.g. 
National Directorate for Anti-Corruption) were involved with various aspects of 
procurement.  
 
One of the recurrent problems affecting the procurement system was the unclear 
distribution of functions (especially on verifications) and the complex and highly 
formalistic, and inefficient, coordination between the above institutions (Deloitte 
2011; PwC 2016 – RO country profile, 180). This lead to divergent and contradictory 
opinions being offered on the legality of tender procedures. In contrast, the Managing 
Authorities responsible for EU funds often issued opinions to beneficiaries, on tender 
procedures, which were not in line with those official interpretations provided by 
ANRMAP (Deloitte 2011, 15; Director in Romanian North-East Regional Development 
Agency; Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2). The fact that MAs often 
carried out their own checks on procurement procedures duplicated and increased the 
administrative burdens surrounding the absorption process. 
 
Secondly, from a legal point of view, the procurement system was constructed around 
the Emergency Ordinance of the Government 34 adopted in 2006 (OUG 34 / 2006). 
This was the primary piece of legislation regulating the system and transposing into 
national law the specific EU directive on procurement. Between June 2006 and July 
2013, the law was consolidated in 16 different versions and throughout the period it 
was modified through 25 different legal acts (Doroftei and Dimulescu 2015, 21). One 
interviewee argued that it took approximately five years until the law “matured” and 
was internalised in the system (Director in Romanian Audit Authority #1). In addition, 
the lack of specific secondary rules and the inability of ANRMAP to provide thorough 
guidance to Contracting Authorities added to procedural difficulties (Deloitte 2011, 7; 
EC Head of Sector #1). The complexity of rules, as well as the lack of standardised 
procedures has been a key problem for procurement in EU-funded projects. However, 
in recent years new measures have been adopted so as to standardise the 
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documentation used for procurement. In 2007, the Electronic Public Procurement 
System (SEAP) was created as a public register for procurement. The e-procurement 
system was often criticised for its poor functionality132 and for its lack of transparency 
(Deloitte 2011; IPP 2015). Recently other allegations surfaced concerning SEAP 
indicating that the software was “politicised”. 133 This potentially enabled officials and 
economic operators to rig the system (Romanian Expert #2).  
 
Thirdly, in terms of human resources, approximately 131 employees were based in 
ANRMAP (ANRMAP AAR 2013) and 102 in the UCVAP procurement bodies (UCVAP 
AAR 2010). However, given the high volume of work associated for instance with ex-
ante verifications institutions were considered under-staffed. Moreover, many of the 
staff had a low level of expertise or lacked the time necessary to sign up for training 
and professional development opportunities (PwC 2016 – RO country profile, 182). In 
parallel, the lack of capacity and incentives for procurement experts employed in local 
Contracting Authorities had clear implications for the quality and integrity of 
procedures (Deloitte 2011, 27; Romanian Public Procurement Expert #1). The lack of 
guidance from central authorities and an excessive amount of administrative 
procedures surrounding procurement added considerable strains (EC Head of Unit 
#2; Director in Romanian Audit Authority #1; Member of Romanian Parliament #1). 
In addition, Contracting Authorities were affected by frequent political changes and 
implicitly by modifications of annual procurement plans (Deloitte 2011, 26). Some 
explained that procurement plans were often used as electoral platforms by local 
politicians (Representative of Romanian Appeals Council; Romanian Public 
Procurement Expert #1). Finally, Contracting Authorities had to ensure the integrity 
and impartiality of the work carried out by these committees, but they had few legal 
and institutional mechanisms in place in order to prevent conflicts of interest (Deloitte 
2011, 29; Romanian AA report 2011, 397).  
 
Fourthly, Romania faced severe problems regarding the misuse of EU funds and 
procurements seem to be at the root of these problems. Throughout the years, a high 
                                                             
132 Revista-Achizitii.ro, May 2014, available at: http://www.revista-achizitii.ro/index.php/care-sunt-
cele-mai-mari-deficiente-ale-seap-ului-e-licitatie-ro-solutii  (accessed October 2016). 
133 Tolo.ro, 16 June 2016, available at: http://www.tolo.ro/2016/06/16/marturie-despre-cum-se-fura-
in-sistemul-electronic-de-achizitii-publice-hexi-iese-pe-locul-1-in-toate-topurile-pe-dezinfectanti/ 
(accessed October 2016). 
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number of complaints and appeals were lodged on procurement. These ranged from 
673 in 2006, peaking at 9218 in 2009, and dropping to 3753 in 2014 (CNSC AAR 2014, 
7). As can be seen from Table 31, a significant number of appeals - 38% in 2013 and 
42% in 2014 - concerned tender procedures for EU-funded projects. This indicated a 
high level of discontent and an increasing “contestation culture” among economic 
operators dissatisfied with the process of procurement (Director in Romanian 
Ministry of EU funds #1; Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1).  
 
Table 31: Romanian CNSC appeals on public procurement procedures 
 2013 2014 
Total number of appeals  5739 3753 
Appeals on documentation and procedures 2333 1294 
Appeals on results of procedures 3406 2459 
Total number of admitted appeals 3730 1351 
Total number of rejected appeals 2000 2407 
Appeals for EU-funded procedures 2207 1581 
Admitted appeals for EU-funded procedures 690 578 
Rejected appeals for EU-funded procedures 1517 1003 
Source: Author compilation based on CNSC annual activity reports 2013 and 2014. 
 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that, in Romania, 90% of all tender contracts 
were allocated based on the price criteria (the lowest price) as opposed to 62% 
contracts in Bulgaria, which awarded following this principle (PwC 2016). This had a 
strong effect not only on the quality of contracts being executed (Director in Romanian 
Audit Authority #1; Romanian Member of Parliament #1) but indirectly, in reducing 
competition (Representative of Romanian Appeals Council). It could encourage 
intentional abuses and the emergence of genuine local “public procurement mafias” 
that abused the appeals system, and which generated delays in the implementation of 
projects (Romanian Expert #1; Romanian EU funds consultant #1; Romanian EU 
funds consultant #2). 
 
Many of the problems on procurement were political in nature. For instance, political 
changes to procurement legislation (e.g. lowering thresholds for procurement 
contracts) were adopted by the Romanian Parliament with the potential aim of 
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relaxing the rules and to reduce the level of control exercised by control institutions 
such as CNSC.134 Interviewees stressed that there would always be some stakeholders 
in central level ministries that seek to allow “loopholes” or “breaches in the law” from 
which different operators could profit (Director in Romanian North-East Regional 
Development Agency; Representative of Romanian Certifying Authority). 
 
In practice, procurement was the source for many fraudulent projects (Romanian 
Anti-Fraud Department Representative, written response). The main problems 
related to: restrictive criteria (e.g. experience of the economic operator); unlawful 
qualifying criteria and technical specifications; un-transparent or subjective awarding 
criteria; breaches of equal treatment and transparency principles; and introducing 
illegal additional acts that changed the terms of the contract following the official 
awarding process (CNSC AAR 2013, 11; 2014, 19; Romanian AA report 2011, 382). 
Furthermore, Contracting Authorities imposed “excessive requirements” on “the 
participants of the bidding process” or introduced “technically targeted conditions” in 
tender specifications (Expert Forum 2015, 6). Interviewees explained that the 
procurement system was affected by political interference. On the one hand, this could 
manifest at the central level, where official institutions, particularly ANRMAP, were 
subject to political influence135 (Representative of Romanian Certifying Authority; 
Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1; Romanian Expert #2; 
Representative of Romanian Appeals Council). On the other hand, at the local level 
“tailored” and “dedicated” tender specifications targeted different politically affiliated 
businesses triggering numerous appeals from other economic operators (Romanian 
Expert #1; EC Head of Unit #1). 
  
The inability of the authorities to provide specific and unitary guidance was linked to 
political conflicts between various institutions. For instance, Order 509 of ANRMAP 
was one of the first pieces of secondary legislation adopted in order to clarify the 
                                                             
134 Romania Libera, 2 July 2013, [Why did the Parliament eliminate public procurement tenders], 
Available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/politica/institutii/de-ce-a-eliminat-parlamentul-licitatiile-
306428; Hotnews.ro, 3 July 2013, [The 17 billion EUR stake in the public procurement scandal] , 
Available at: http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-companii-15111219-miza-17-miliarde-euro-scandalul-
achizitiilor-publice-companiile-stat-scapa-orice-control-primariile-primesc-liber-contracte-directe-
institutiile-verificare-sint-amputate.htm (accessed October 2016) 
135 For instance, it was recently recommended that ways should be found as to avoid a politicised 
leadership in the newly established Public Procurement Agency (ANAP) (PwC 2016 – RO country 
profile, 187). 
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meaning of restrictive selection and awarding criteria for tenders. However, according 
to some, this specific piece of legislation added even more confusion to the system 
(Director in Romanian Ministry of EU Funds #1; Director of Romanian Managing 
Authority #2). ANRMAP played an important role and had to pronounce itself on the 
legality of tender procedures. The structure was considered by some as susceptible to 
political influence and was, for instance, at the centre of intense political fighting 
between different members of the Boc and Ponta governments.136 Consequently, 
institutional disagreements on procurement developed between ANRMAP and the 
Managing Authorities / the Audit Authority (Romanian Expert #2; Representative of 
Romanian Certifying Authority).  
 
Last but not least, the level of financial corrections received by the final beneficiaries 
of EU funds as a result of infringements of procurement procedures was particularly 
high. Contracting Authorities were sanctioned with financial corrections due to the use 
of restrictive and discriminatory criteria in procurement procedures, a situation 
occurring in 73% of all cases, according to an independent study (IPP 2015, 20). At the 
request of the European Commission, Managing Authorities sought to control the 
situation regarding EU funds by imposing financial corrections as to limit the 
problems found in audited projects. Nevertheless, not all stakeholders agreed with the 
financial corrections imposed due to irregularities on public procurement. For 
instance, several local and regional politicians (mayors, heads of County Councils) 
complained of what they perceived to be unjust sanctions derived from an incoherent 
legal framework and conflicting interpretations of rules by all central bodies 
(ANRMAP, UCVAP, CNSC and Managing Authorities) (OPREG-RO Monitoring 
Committee 2010, 6). Many Contracting Authorities contested in court the application 
of financial sanctions due to procurement procedures.137 This revealed that the 
                                                             
136 Gandul.info, 18 October 2012, [Flame war between the PM, the current head of ANRMAP and C.T.] 
Available at: http://www.gandul.info/financiar/schimb-dur-de-replici-intre-premier-actualul-sef-
anrmap-si-cristina-traila-ponta-arunca-fumigene-pentru-ca-nu-stie-ce-are-de-facut-la-guvern-
10241432 ; DC news.ro, 11 February 2015, [Eugen Teodorovici - Cristina Traila. The minister of EU 
funds accuses the former head of ANRMAP of damages amounting to 1 billion EUR]. Available at: 
http://www.dcnews.ro/eugen-teodorovici-cristina-traila-acuza-ii-grave-lansate-de-ministrul-
fondurilor-europene-la-adresa-fostei-pre-edinte-a-anrmap_467232.html (accessed October 2016). 
137 According to an independent review of EU funds court cases carried out by the legal firm Ţuca, 
Zbârcea and Associates (together with the Institute for Public Policy and the Romanian Association of 
Municipalities), as many as 41% of litigations between EU funds beneficiaries and Managing 
Authorities were due to disagreements on the application of financial corrections for violations of 
procurement legislation. In many cases, Courts granted favorable decisions to beneficiaries. This 
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institutional and political disagreements between the different Managing Authorities, 
Audit Authority and the ANRMAP (on the interpretation of criteria used for tender 
procedures on EU-funded projects) was one of the main deficiencies of the Romanian 
procurement system (ANRMAP AAR 2011; Romanian Expert #2; Former Director of 
Romanian Managing Authority #1; Romanian MA Programme Evaluation Officer #2). 
Several specific examples are discussed in relation to EU-funded OPs. 
 
 
Procurement problems in Romanian Operational Programmes 
The Romanian Regional Operational Programme (OPREG-RO) had one of the highest 
number of projects from all EU-funded programmes in the country. OPREG-RO also 
had one of the highest rates of notifications concerning irregularities (IPP 2015, 37). 
The programme was implemented mainly by municipalities and other local and 
regional authorities. The 2010-2011 EC audits uncovered several problems with regard 
to the implementation of EU-funded projects (DG Regio AAR 2010; DG Regio AAR 
2011). For instance, shortcomings were found in the organisation and 
operationalisation of verifications for procurement procedures (OPREG-RO AIR 2012, 
20). Other recurring problems related to: 
“-inserting in the tender documentation specific restrictive criteria for 
qualification and selection; 
-interchangeable use of qualification and evaluation criteria;  
-modifying selection criteria for tenders without public notice;   
-failure of the winning bid to fulfil the minimum criteria of qualification for 
the tender;  
-lack of compliance on the advertisement and transparency of public 
procurement procedures;  
-signing additional acts through the negotiated procedure without prior 
publication of a contract notice, and with additional work not being carried 
out due to exceptional circumstances;  
-breach of the principle of equal treatment, with the Contracting Authority 
modifying the obligatory contractual clauses in the tender documentation; 
-using the “expert experience criteria” as an evaluation criteria for offers, 
contrary to provisions of the Directive 20014/18/EC and HG 925 / 2006”  
(Romanian AA report 2011, 398; OPREG-RO AIR 2012, 20).  
   
                                                             
potentially confirmed the institutional and legal disagreement in the interpretation of procurement 
law by public authorities. Available at: http://www.juridice.ro/253765/tuca-zbarcea-asociatii-publica-
prima-culegere-de-spete-din-romania-in-domeniul-corectiilor-financiare-privind-proiectele-derulate-
cu-fonduri-europene.html (accessed October 2016). 
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For example, several irregularities were found in EU-funded projects implemented by 
the County Councils of Buzău, Teleorman and Ilfov. These related to the use of 
discriminatory eligibility criteria, ineligible expenditure and an unjustified accelerated 
procedure for procurement (EC audit report on OPREG-RO 27 June 2012, 1-2). For 
example, in one project concerned with the rehabilitation of a road in the county of 
Teleorman, the Contracting Authority requested a detailed list of specific equipment 
that should be owned by the contractor (e.g. cold recycling equipment) without any 
actual need for such equipment (Ibid, 10). In light of this, from six offers received only 
one was deemed eligible and was awarded the contract. This finding was accepted by 
the Romanian authorities and a 25% financial correction was applied to the project. 
As a result of similar problems, in 2011-2012, payments towards two priority axes of 
OPREG-RO were interrupted (KPMG 2014, 235). One interviewee explained the 
institutional discrepancies in interpreting procurement rules pointing to issues of 
politicisation and detailing the nature of restrictive criteria affecting the programme:  
“The problem was that there were zero regulations at the national level and that 
no one thought of restrictive conditions and criteria [on procurement]. No one 
took into account the COCOF guide in which the European Commission clearly 
said what the latter mean. Our problem was that on procurement the ANRMAP, 
being a politicised institution, has “whitened” [unlawfully declared innocent] 
many beneficiaries. Where we noticed that the tender procedure was restrictive 
and that restrictive criteria were imposed, we wanted to apply financial 
corrections. However, the beneficiaries went to ANRMAP because they knew 
someone there and they received a letter that everything was alright. From a 
legal point of view, it was the ANRMAP that had to pronounce on this. And we 
were then told [by the beneficiaries]: “Who are you? You are the Managing 
Authority. Do you have more authority than the ANRMAP? No. Therefore you 
cannot give me a financial correction”…In 2010, the European Commission 
came and verified the projects for the second priority axis on roads and from 
over 80 contracts they noticed that around 60 were hit by restrictive criteria. 
For example, the planner said: “for a road leading to the airport you need 18 
months and a minimum number of machinery for a daily yield”. Many 
beneficiaries thought: “Let’s multiply this by six”. Instead of requesting from 
the bidder six pieces of machinery they requested 36. Instead of ten workers 
they requested 60. This could create an advantage for big companies or for local 
firms that had the required resources. This is what the Commission deemed to 
be irregular and requested financial corrections” (Former Director of 
Romanian Managing Authority #1). 
 
Others stressed that local politicians were much tempted to profit from projects on 
local infrastructure and often introduced restrictive criteria in technical specifications, 
such as “bulldozers with a green rooftop”, which clearly favoured some companies 
(Director in Romanian North-East Regional Development Agency; Romanian EU 
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funds consultant #1). Overall, the evidence gathered on OPREG-RO portrayed that 
whilst most projects were selected in a regular manner, procurement was, in fact, the 
most problematic area of the programme. Overall, local politicisation and the specific 
manipulation of tender contracts created considerable instability and affected the 
programme’s implementation and progress.   
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7. Conclusions  
 
The above chapter has examined two main stages of the EU funds absorption process, 
namely the evaluation/selection and the implementation/procurement phase of EU-
funded projects. In contrast to the previous case studies, which focused extensively on 
the capacity of the authorities to manage two Operational Programmes (Human 
Resources and Regional Development), this chapter examined two dynamic stages of 
SF absorption policy cycle. The chapter has illustrated how problems in these areas 
have been affected by a similar pattern of administrative capacity shortcomings and 
political interference. 
 
Based on the analysis several points can be made. First, the evaluation and selection 
of projects funded from Structural Funds was a resource intensive stage of the 
absorption policy cycle. The evaluation and selection of projects coincided with a 
period in which most central institutions were in their incipient stage of administrative 
development. There were considerable delays in the evaluation and contracting of 
projects and most Managing Authorities were overwhelmed by the task of handling 
the flow of project applications. In some OPs it was decided to contract external 
evaluators, arguably to ensure a more independent evaluation of projects. However, 
external evaluators did often contribute to problems arising in this area. Overall, 
Managing Authorities had little experience in evaluating EU funded projects and they 
required long periods of time until they developed the knowledge and procedures to 
handle this stage.  
 
One of the main questions driving the inquiry of this sub-chapter was whether or not 
there was any evidence of a biased or politicised evaluation/selection of EU-funded 
projects? Specific evidence was examined in relation to the Bulgarian Administrative 
Capacity OP and the Romanian Human Resources OP. Both programmes encountered 
considerable problems at this stage. Official reports outlined that unreliable selection 
criteria and poor or loose definition of eligibility of costs were at the origin of some of 
these problems. Moreover, in both cases, Selection Committees were criticised for 
opaque and unclear decision-making, as well as for not taking into account the 
recommendations issued by external evaluators. Yet, there was clear evidence to 
suggest that that political interference affected the evaluation and selection of several 
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projects in the two programmes. Two mechanisms that facilitated this interference 
were identified. First, there was evidence of a politicised management of the 
Operational Programmes which could have enabled intrusion in the work of the 
Selection Committees. Second, there was evidence to suggest that politically affiliated 
firms or NGOs accessed EU funding from dedicated calls for proposals.  
 
Problems arising at the evaluation and selection stage have had a later impact for 
project implementation. This was well illustrated by the case of the Romanian Human 
Resources OP where highly problematic projects and final beneficiaries, coupled with 
administrative capacity deficiencies and constant politicisation affected deeply the 
performance of the programme. Moreover, these laid the basis for the programme’s 
frequent interruption and suspension of payments. By contrast, after dealing with the 
outcome of several politicised calls for proposals, the Bulgarian Administrative 
Capacity programme strengthened its institutional and human resources capacity and 
became one of the most successful EU-funded programmes, at least in terms of 
financial absorption.  
 
Second, the case of public procurement was much more complex. This is one of the 
key phases of the implementation stage of EU-funded projects. This phase entails the 
allocation of public tender contracts to various economic operators (contractors) by 
the different EU funds final beneficiaries (Contracting Authorities) in order to obtain 
goods or services related to the activities of their projects. It was one of the few stages 
which involved primarily EU funds beneficiaries and other external stakeholders 
rather than the official institutions managing EU funds. Nevertheless, several other 
specialised institutions (e.g. Public Procurement Agencies) oversaw the different 
stages of procurement (e.g. ex-ante and ex-post verifications of the legality of tenders).  
 
The empirical analysis on public procurement showed that bottlenecks found in the 
implementation process were due to a mix of administrative and politically related 
factors. On the one hand, legislation was modified several times and many 
institutional conflicts arose from its interpretation and the methodologies used to 
enforce procurement law. This was the case for both countries. At the same time, many 
of the final beneficiaries acting as Contracting Authorities lacked the necessary 
experience, human resources and technical capacity to deal with complex tender 
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documentation and procedures. On the other hand, there were significant weaknesses 
in the verification and monitoring of procurement contracts, in both countries, 
particularly in the first years of implementation. Moreover, there were poor 
mechanisms in place to detect conflicts of interest or to ensure the integrity of the 
tender processes (CSD 2009; Neamtu and Dragos 2014; Stefanov and Karaboev 2015; 
Doroftei and Dimulescu 2015; Tănăsoiu 2015). As a result, the irregularities found by 
EU and national auditors derived to a great extent from a lack of compliance with 
procurement rules from the beneficiaries’ side. In this respect, the question of 
intentionality seemed extremely important given the frequent abuses of EU-funded 
processes (OLAF representative #2). Thus, there was a strong corroboration between 
primary sources (annual implementation reports, audit reports, interview data) and 
secondary sources (policy evaluations, civil society positions, journalistic reports) to 
claim here that many of the procurement processes and awards were politicised, 
particularly at the local implementation level.   
  
Several mechanisms could explain how political interference affected procurement. 
First, many representatives of Contracting Authorities were themselves political 
agents (e.g. local officials / mayors). As a result, public procurement was a highly 
politicised process given the potential material and political capital embedded in 
tenders. The “ill will” of several Contracting Authorities translated in recurring 
situations in which tender processes were manipulated as to potentially distribute 
tenders to favoured bidders, specifically by using restrictive and discriminative 
selection and awarding criteria, disqualifying other competitors for minor errors or 
accelerating/amending procedures without any justification or prior information sent 
to all interested parties. Second, several institutions were potentially politicised and 
had few internal incentives for, or were restricted in, carrying out adequate ex-ante 
verifications of procurement related tenders. This was specifically the case of the 
Romanian Procurement Agency. Politicisation, in the latter institution, led to 
confusions in the procurement system and to politically biased ex-ante verifications. 
Therefore, political interference inhibited the development of functional levels of 
control within these institutions. In both countries, the pattern of procurement related 
to irregularities manifested in particular to infrastructure or construction related 
projects. This was in line with established practices in the country where national 
procurement is subject to intense politicisation and where networks of politically 
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affiliated businesses tend to be favoured in the allocation of procurement contracts 
(Doroftei and Dimulescu 2015; Stefanov et al. 2015; Gherghina and Volintiru 2017). 
 
Consequently, procurement related problems required not only technical solutions 
and the strengthening of administrative capacity per se, but equally, the political will 
to address these issues. This was often difficult to produce given the strong commercial 
and political interests vested in procurement contracts. The constant audit findings on 
the use of restrictive criteria and the preferential allocation of procurement showed 
that there were few political incentives to correct this. Problems in the area of 
procurement were partly addressed through financial corrections. In most cases these 
ranged from 5% to 25% of the overall value of contracts. These punitive measures 
altered and corrected the behaviour of some Contracting Authorities. Nevertheless, 
the use and applicability of financial corrections was a highly controversial and often 
contested issue by final beneficiaries, often successfully in public courts of law. This 
was the case given the more structural problems with interpreting procurement law by 
the different authorities involved in the process. This strengthens the point that 
deficiencies in this area were both administrative and political in nature. 
 
All in all, the analysis of these two stages of the absorption policy process have shown 
that deficiencies were generated by a mix of structural administrative weaknesses and 
negative political interference. Although there was more evidence of the latter in the 
case of public procurement, both stages seemed to have been affected by this 
interaction, and cannot be explained by only one set of factors. The implications of this 
dynamic is discussed more widely in the following concluding section of this thesis.  
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Chapter 8: Discussion of findings, 
implications and final conclusions 
 
 
8.1 Summary and discussion of the main empirical findings  
 
This thesis departed from a key theoretical assumption, namely that administrative 
and political factors may shape the ability and performance of member states to absorb 
European Structural Funds. Its aim has been to understand and explain how these 
factors interacted and how they might account for the evolution and the variation in 
absorption performance between and within Bulgaria and Romania, and whether or 
not this can say something about the delivery of EU aid in the region as a whole. This 
sub-section summarizes and discusses the main findings addressing the first and main 
research question that has driven this study, namely: What explains the variation in 
absorption performance between and within Bulgaria and Romania during 2007-
2013? In addition, section 8.1.3 discusses the importance of the factors in line with the 
initial working assumptions/hypotheses. 
 
One of the aims of this thesis has been to assess how formal and informal patterns of 
governance might affect the management and implementation of European Cohesion 
Policy in Central and Eastern European countries, pre-eminently on the macro level 
case studies of Bulgaria and Romania. To examine these questions several techniques 
have been employed and the evidence has been scrutinised in the framework of four 
specific case studies: the first two (Chapter 5 and 6) focused on the management of 
two distinct Operational Programmes (Human Resources and Regional 
Development). The other two (Chapter 7) examined two dynamic dimensions of the 
absorption policy cycle: the evaluation and selection of projects and the public 
procurement phase related to the implementation of EU-funded projects. Before 
discussing this thesis final claims in relation to the literature (section 8.2), the 
following section summarizes and qualifies the main findings from the empirical case 
study chapters.  
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8.1.1 Insights from the management of Operational 
Programmes: what might explain differences in capacity and 
performance?  
 
The thematic case studies examined (Human Resources and Regional Development 
OPs) have underlined some crucial differences in terms of absorption performance 
across the two countries. On the one hand, the strong discrepancies between the 
Human Resources programmes were puzzling. Whilst the Romanian OPHR has been 
one of the most problematic programmes, its Bulgarian counterpart seems to have 
been one of the best performing. On the other hand, the Regional Development 
programmes did face similar conditions and reached similar levels of performance. 
Drawing on these case studies, and the general examination of the two countries, it is 
argued here that the way in which administrative and political factors interacted has 
influenced, in a significant manner, these programme’s performance. In addition, in 
order to understand these programmes distinct evolution, we need to take account 
their specificities. The main findings are reiterated and discussed below. 
 
The Bulgarian Human Resources Programme (OPHR-BG) was one of the highest 
performing SF-funded programmes. It benefited from some pre-accession 
institutional transfer of experience, and there were no considerable problems in 
establishing its management and control systems. First, from an institutional capacity 
point of view, its management structures were relatively stable and functional, 
although inter-institutional conflicts were sometimes reported between the Ministry 
of Labour (the main Managing Authority) and the Ministry of Education (Intermediate 
Body for education related interventions). Second, in terms of bureaucratic capacity, 
its legal and procedural systems were relatively functional, though they did require 
considerable amendments and updates. There was some evidence of administrative 
burdens affecting beneficiaries particularly during the monitoring stage of the policy 
cycle. Third, human resources were one of the strengths of the programme and there 
was no evidence to suggest that administrators lacked professional and financial 
incentives, as compared to its Romanian sister programme. The territorial capacity of 
the programme was boosted by local presence in all 28 Bulgarian Oblasti (NUTS 3 
level). This contributed to a reasonable local level implementation. Finally, no 
evidence was found of any negative political interference in the life of the programme. 
On the contrary, it seems that the political agency, exerted by several Deputy Ministers 
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or senior administrative managers, contributed to the smooth running of the 
programme or at least prevented any disruptive interferences. Furthermore, the EU’s 
influence contributed to consolidating the capacity of the programme and, when 
necessary, in strategically amending its focus (e.g. Roma related targets). Against this 
backdrop, the programme seems to have been well managed and did not face any 
major problems during implementation, which was reflected by its high absorption 
performance and very low level of financial corrections.  
  
By contrast, the Romanian Human Resources Development Programme (OPHR-RO) 
was one of the most deficient Operational Programmes. It could become a textbook 
case highlighting how structural administrative capacity deficiencies and negative 
political interference affected the overall management and implementation of this 
programme. Political factors have had a resoundingly negative effect on the capacity-
building of the institutions running the programme. Firstly, until 2013/2014, the 
programme had a fragmented institutional structure, with a poor delegation culture 
and low levels of transparency from the Managing Authority’s side. Its Intermediate 
Bodies (e.g. particularly those related to the Ministry of Education) were weak and 
often overwhelmed by tasks. Second, the programme’s legislative and procedural 
infrastructure proved to be highly problematic and has changed several times 
throughout the years. Many final beneficiaries often criticised such changes and the 
administrative burdens associated with the programme. Specifically, a problematic 
definition of “eligibility costs” meant that many of the programme’s initial lax rules 
were abused by beneficiaries seeking to maximise profits from the implementation of 
projects. This led to many of the programme’s implementation problems. Thirdly, the 
programme had a weak human resources capacity and many of its final beneficiaries 
were highly problematic. With regard to political factors, the programme was highly 
unstable and very much affected by political changes. There was evidence of political 
patronage and politicised appointments of senior management (e.g. Directors) as well 
as of operational staff. Moreover, several programme administrators and politicians 
seemed to have been involved in corruption schemes aiming to fraudulently use 
funding from the programme, particularly by abusing the programme’s initial unclear 
rules on conflicts of interest and, more specifically, through developing networks of 
firms or NGOs that would tap into funding. By contrast to the Bulgarian programme, 
there was no positive political support identified for OPHR-RO, at least in its first five 
 274 
 
years of implementation. Programme beneficiaries organised street protests and 
accused the government of a lack of commitment in addressing the programme’s 
dysfunctionalities. Finally, Brussels has often raised concerns on the substantive 
problems affecting the programme. Payments were interrupted and/or suspended 
several times throughout its implementation period. Furthermore, the high level of 
financial corrections (approx. 300 million EUR in 2014 reaching a total of 400 million 
in 2016) was further evidence of the programme’s problematic implementation. 
Overall, the programme was one of the most ill designed and deficient OPs. As argued, 
this was due to a mix of extremely weak administrative capacity and negative political 
interference.   
 
As compared to the Human Resources programmes, there were no significant 
differences in terms of performance between the Regional Development Programmes. 
The latter programmes tended to have a similar design and architecture and were very 
much shaped by local and regional stakeholders. That was the case because these 
programmes catered directly to the development needs of local public municipalities 
which were among the main beneficiaries. In both countries, the management 
structures dealing with OPREG benefited extensively from a transfer of competent 
staff that worked on pre-accession PHARE projects. This allowed a strong basis of 
expertise, particularly in Romania’s case, which could partly explain the programme’s 
higher degree of capacity when compared to other national OPs.  
 
The Bulgarian Regional Operational Programme (OPREG-BG) faced some specific 
problems, during its first years of management, in terms of administrative capacity 
and its political governance. First, there were several problems of coordination 
between the central Managing Authority and its regional offices. This resulted from 
contradictory advice and guidance provided to potential and to final beneficiaries. 
Second, there was some evidence of political patronage in the appointments of staff 
within the Managing Authority, although this didn’t seem to affect the managerial 
continuity of the programme. Third, there were multiple issues associated with public 
procurement, making this one of the most problematic aspects of the programme’s 
implementation. In essence, these had to do with local authorities and potential 
attempts at politicising the distribution of contracts. As a result, the European 
Commission interrupted payments for the programme in two different instances. With 
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all this, the programme functioned particularly well due to a consistent and increasing 
level of administrative capacity. The programme had reasonably well functioning 
management and control systems. Moreover, its legal and procedural infrastructure 
gradually improved and staff working in the Managing Authority developed a good 
level of expertise and seemed to be incentivised in carrying out their daily activities. 
Furthermore, the programme benefited from a functional territorial arrangement in 
which regional offices (NUTS 2) contributed to the local implementation process and 
in assisting beneficiaries at the local level. Finally, given that OPHR-BG catered to the 
needs of public municipalities it was highly visible at the local level. Consequently, it 
benefited from a strong degree of political support. This must be understood in the 
wider context in which Bulgaria is seen as a “country of mayors” (Bulgarian Expert #1), 
and where the relationship between central government and local officials is often 
prioritised by the former.  
 
Similarly, the Romanian Regional Operational Programme (OPREG-RO) was one of 
the most efficiently run programmes in the country. This was the case if we are to 
compare it with other problematic national OPs (Human Resources, Economic 
Competitiveness). The programme did, however, face some considerable difficulties 
throughout the implementation period. First, its internal control systems were 
underdeveloped in its first few years, due to insufficient institutional resources being 
allocated to areas such as monitoring. These systems were strengthened, particularly 
after 2010/2011, when the first wave of problematic projects paralysed the 
programme’s implementation. Second, and closely linked to the latter, public 
procurement was a highly problematic aspect of the programme’s implementation. In 
addition, rules and procedures were often changed, whilst specific bottlenecks at the 
local level (e.g. cadastre, construction permits) added to the complex set of issues 
affecting the programme. Third, public procurement was one of the, if not the, most 
problematic aspect for the programme. Issues in this area contributed to the 
interruption and/or suspension of payments, in two instances, by the European 
authorities. Finally, there was some evidence of political favours being granted to 
certain beneficiaries and of some projects being politicised at the regional level. By 
contrast to other Romanian OPs, there was no evidence to suggest that political 
patronage affected the management of the programme. This could be partly explained 
by the fact that the programme’ was highly appealing, from a political point of view, 
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and by the fact that politicians sought to use it as a personal “business card”. In turn, 
politicians granted a reasonable degree of support to the programme’s’ administrators 
which in turn facilitated its daily management.  
 
Several other specific developments might explain the programme’s capacity and 
performance. First, OPREG-RO benefited greatly from an institutional transfer of 
experience from the pre-accession period and also from, an above average, level of 
expertise and financial incentives, in the Ministry of Regional Development where the 
Managing Authority was based. Second, the programme benefited from management 
continuity and administrative stability given that several tenured and senior managers 
were not changed by the different governments controlling the ministry. In this sense, 
there was some evidence of political and administrative cooperation, with some senior 
politicians and employees working together towards improving the mechanisms used 
for managing the programme. Third, the network of Regional Development Agencies, 
situated at the NUTS 2 level, enabled the programme’s well running at the local level 
and a strong interface in relation to many final beneficiaries. All these, contributed to 
the programmes consistent management and, above average, performance.   
 
In light of the above, absorption capacity and performance must be understood taking 
into account the specificities and differences between different Operational 
Programmes. It is fair to stress that the Regional Development programmes benefited 
from more political visibility and were favoured or granted more support than the 
Human Resources programmes. The latter addressed the training, educational or the 
needs of vulnerable citizens. Moreover, the fact that both Bulgaria and Romania had 
little experience in managing human resources interventions affected the 
programmes’ implementation. By contrast, the Regional Development OPs were 
significantly easier to account for, primarily because they implied dealing with 
physical infrastructure or construction related projects at the local level. From a 
strategic point of view, human resources programmes were more difficult to assess 
and as a consequence a high level of administrative burdens developed affecting the 
programme’s beneficiaries and overwhelming administrators. Therefore, the 
structural strategic differences and nature of the programmes do matter, if we are to 
understand more profoundly what determined their financial absorption.  
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Based on a final assessment, what can be noted is that the level of administrative 
capacity was high in OPHR-BG and medium to high in OPRE-BG / OPREG-RO, whilst 
it was very low in OPHR-RO. The latter was affected by strong levels of negative 
political interference which damaged the programme’s administrative capacity. 
Primarily, political interference affected the development of human resources and it 
limited the programme’s capacity to provide solutions or to simplify its dense and 
highly bureaucratic infrastructure. Moreover, a lack of positive political support meant 
that the structural discrepancies between the different institutional structures 
involved in the programme’s management were left unaddressed for several years.  
 
Table 32: Final assessment of thematic case studies - Operational Programmes 
OPs / Core 
factors 
Administrative 
capacity  
Political factors  
 
Overall 
absorption 
performance 
(absorption rates) 
OPHR-BG High (no major 
deficiencies)  
Some evidence of positive 
political support at the central 
level / no evidence of negative 
interference local level  
Very strong  
(93 % of EC 
payments received in 
June 2015)  
 
OPHR-RO Low (extremely high 
level of deficiencies)  
High levels of politicisation at 
the central management level 
and clientelism at the 
implementation level 
Weak  
(33% of EC payments 
received in June 
2015)  
OPREG-BG Medium to High 
(some specific issues)  
Positive political input at the 
central level / Negative 
political interference in local 
implementation 
Significant  
(71% of EC payments 
received in June 
2015) 
OPREG-RO Medium to High 
(some specific issues)  
Positive political input at the 
central level / Negative 
political interference in local 
implementation  
Significant  
(71% of EC payments 
received in June 
2015) 
Source: Author’s creation. 
 
As was noted in the thematic case studies, a certain degree of positive political input 
was crucial for improving any of the management and implementation issues faced by 
the above programmes. The presence of political support was a key finding which 
distinguished the two Human Resources programmes examined. The Bulgarian 
programme seems to have benefited from a higher degree of positive political positive 
agency which was used to address management and implementation bottlenecks. This 
was absent in the Romanian OPHR which prolonged many of its deficiencies. OPHR-
RO only started to improve in 2013-2014 after the consolidation of the Managing 
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Authority (and its further centralisation within the Ministry of European Funds) as 
well as after the standardisation of salaries for staff and the further clarification of the 
programme’s procedures. Finally, the authorities started to cultivate a more open and 
transparent relationship with the programme’s final beneficiaries. With all this, many 
of its OPHR-RO’s problems tended to persist. Due to its mismanagement, it was one 
of the OPs which faced one of the highest levels of financial sanctions from the 
European Commission. Overall, a combination of weak administrative capacity, the 
negative level of political interference and some of its problematic final beneficiaries, 
often politically affiliated, affected the general absorption performance of OPHR-RO. 
In this respect, political factors can account for some of the programme’s 
administrative and strategic deficiencies and, ultimately, for its low level of absorption. 
 
As compared to the above, the Regional Development OPs presented some advantages. 
First and foremost, it benefited from the political nature of its beneficiaries and the 
fact that, in both countries, central level governments sought to maintain strong 
relationships with local networks of politicians. This could partly be explained by the 
fact that the former rely on the political infrastructure provided by the latter at the 
local level. However, this relationship had a specific cost attached to it. It implied 
multiple problems in terms of public procurement which affected the programme’s 
implementation. This will now be more thoroughly discussed in the next section, 
which summarizes and discusses the final set of case studies. Equally, it underlies the 
strong interaction between administrative capacity and political factors and how these 
shaped two stages of the absorption policy process.   
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8.1.2 Insights from the absorption policy stages: administrative 
capacity and political factors reloaded 
 
The empirical analysis revealed that the relationship between administrative and 
political factors equally manifested at a more dynamic operational level, namely in 
several stages of the absorption policy process. Two stages were examined more in-
depth in this thesis in order to trace the factors affecting them. First, the evaluation 
and selection of projects is a vital stage. If problematic projects are selected, then these 
are likely to have strong repercussions. For instance, this was one of the reasons for 
the low performance of the OPHR-RO. Second, through the procurement phase of the 
implementation stage, final beneficiaries acquired different goods or services to 
implement projects. This was one of the most problematic areas for EU project 
implementation and in particular for infrastructure oriented programmes. Apart from 
the role played by the authorities, an additional set of actors, in particular project 
applicants and/or final beneficiaries, were involved in these stages. The interaction 
between all these actors affected the level of CP performance achieved in the two 
countries in several ways. The main findings from the two policy stages examined are 
now outlined below.  
 
First, with regard to the evaluation, selection and contracting of projects (in short, the 
selection stage), the analysis has shown that problems were equally of an 
administrative and political nature. Several more general issues require emphasis. 
Firstly, it must be stressed that each Operational Programme faced its own thematic 
and specific problems. Therefore, regional development programmes which were 
tailored for the needs of local public municipalities, or Transport/Environment 
programmes addressing large infrastructure projects, would be different from 
programmes such as Human Resources/Economic Competitiveness that catered to a 
wide number of private beneficiaries.138 Secondly, approximately 10% from the 
contracted EU-funded projects were terminated or suspended in both countries. 
Although it is difficult to draw any conclusions on this data alone, the authorities have 
suspended many projects due to irregularities, mismanagement or the overall lack of 
technical and financial capacity of beneficiaries to implement their initially contracted 
projects. The latter revealed that there were frequent gaps in the evaluation and 
                                                             
138 The different type of applicants targeted by OPHRs/OPECs meant that, in both countries, there 
was a higher degree of competition for accessing funding from these programmes. 
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selection of projects, given the authorities (or the independent evaluators employed by 
some programmes) could not assess the financial or technical feasibility of these 
projects.  
 
From an administrative capacity point of view, the selection stage coincided with a 
period in which institutional, bureaucratic and human resources capacities were still 
under development. Moreover, the different procedures and selection criteria 
developed under the responsibility of the Monitoring Committees overseeing the 
programmes. Second, the experience of public authorities was limited and, in order to 
ensure the integrity of the process, some Operational Programmes decided to use 
external independent evaluators. However, there were delays in contracting firms and 
some independent evaluators had poor qualifications. All these had strong 
implications for the general evaluation and selection of projects.  
 
Two different Operational Programmes (funded from the European Social Fund) had 
similar problems in this area.139 The Bulgarian Administrative Capacity Operational 
Programme (OPAC-BG) and the Romanian Human Resources Development 
Operational Programme (OPHR-RO) faced similar problems, in terms of selection and 
evaluation, during the first years of the 2007-2013 implementation period. For both 
programmes, there was evidence of political interference at the selection stage. This 
manifested itself in two distinct ways. Firstly, there was some evidence of politicised 
senior management and of potential high level political interference, from Ministers / 
State Secretaries with the scope of loosely enforcing selection related rules. The case 
of the Romanian OPHR, where a former minister interfered with the programme’s 
rules and transparency clauses after it was alleged that his wife benefited fraudulently 
from projects, was a telling example. Secondly, there was evidence that several 
politically affiliated firms, NGOs or foundations received funding, despite their lack of 
experience. The case of the Bulgarian OPAC, showing that several political foundations 
benefited from funding, was highly relevant (CSD 2009; Spendzharova and 
Vachudova 2012).  
                                                             
139 These programmes were selected in light of the similar patterns of problems affecting their 
selection stage. Initially, the Human Resources Programmes were evaluated for this, however, there 
was no evidence of any political interference in the Bulgarian OPHR. This prompted the need to 
examine a similar programme as to compare and contrast it to the Romanian OPHR. For this aim, the 
Bulgarian OPAC was chosen given that the similarity of problems affecting it.  
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All in all, there were common patterns of problems which affected the selection stage 
in both Operational Programmes. These were partly linked to administrative capacity 
deficiencies, but more notably, had to do with issues of political interference. 
Nevertheless, there were also some notable differences regarding the evolution of 
these programmes. The administrative capacity of the Bulgarian OPAC improved 
dramatically after the programme was reorganised and moved to the Ministry of 
Finance starting with 2011 (EC Head of Unit #2). By contrast, the multiple issues that 
affected the Romanian OPHR persisted for several years. Given their systemic nature 
these could not be easily addressed. In essence, the interaction between administrative 
capacity weaknesses and negative political interference allowed for severe bottlenecks 
to develop at the evaluation and selection stage of the absorption policy process, which 
triggered some of the main problems of OPHR-RO.  
 
The second policy stage evaluated focused on the public procurement phase of the 
implementation process. The analysis looked specifically at evidence from OPs 
implemented from two Structural Funds (European Regional Development Fund and 
Cohesion Fund). For the implementation of most ERDF/CF projects, public 
procurement is an important phase of the implementation stage. As frequently 
outlined in different primary and secondary sources, public procurement was one of 
the most problematic stages in general and accounted for the highest level of 
irregularities found in EU-funded projects (OLAF 2013; Dimulescu et al. 2013; 
Stefanov and Karaboev 2015; IPP 2015; Tănăsoiu 2015). Irregularities in public 
procurement resulted from a mix of administrative and political factors which 
manifested themselves at the central management level and at the local level of 
implementation.  
 
In terms of administrative capacity, the public procurement systems of both countries 
were, at least in the first years after accession, highly deficient and unable to comply 
with EU procurement law. There were considerable problems in terms of 
administrative capacity for both central level authorities (e.g. Managing Authorities / 
Procurement Agencies) and local Contracting Authorities (e.g. Municipalities, 
Regional/County Councils). On the one hand, the legislative basis for procurement 
was highly problematic with legislation being updated several times in both countries 
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and requiring an extensive accommodation period in order for it to be internalised by 
domestic actors. On the other hand, the relationship between Managing Authorities – 
Contracting Authorities – Contractors and Procurement Agencies / Control bodies 
(e.g. Audit Authority) was specifically problematic when it came to public 
procurement. At the institutional level, this meant that there were often conflicting 
interpretations of legislation and divergent official opinions were issued, by the 
different institutions, to final beneficiaries on how to adequately conduct procurement 
procedures.  
 
Procurement was a highly politicised dimension of the implementation process. This 
was partly because procurement was the main tool for public policy interventions, at 
the local level and often a primary source for rent-seeking and institutional, corporate 
or personal enrichment. Moreover, procurement was frequently used by local and 
central politicians in order to advance their political agendas. Findings from both 
countries revealed that many of the problems in procurement resulted from the 
violations of tender processes by using discriminatory and restrictive selection and 
awarding criteria for tenders, disqualifying competitors for minor errors or by 
accelerating / amending tender procedures without any real justification. Therefore, 
there was strong qualitative evidence for allegations that administrative and political 
officials, mostly at the local level, sought to allocate procurement contracts in a 
preferential manner through collusive bidding schemes. This was often done in 
exchange for material gains, such as bribes or payments, which would be used for 
personal or for political party financing. Such practices affected the implementation in 
the different Operational Programmes examined (Regional Development / 
Environment). Finally, the high number of complaints and appeals lodged by different 
economic operators, along with regular “bidding wars” between contractors, were a 
symptom of the highly divisive economic and political atmosphere surrounding 
procurement. When systemic evidence of procurement irregularities was uncovered, 
EU institutions often requested punitive sanctions in the form of financial corrections. 
Despite these sanctions being controversial140, they partly managed to curb 
irregularities and to reduce potential corrupt behaviour on procurement. Finally, it 
                                                             
140 Many local authorities where often successful in contesting financial corrections in national courts 
of law. 
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was more difficult to underline specific procurement related differences between the 
two cases.  
 
Table 33: Final assessment of case studies – absorption process stages 
Absorption policy 
process stages  
(including OPs 
assessed) 
Administrative 
capacity  
 
Political factors  
 
Overall analysis  
(based on qualitative evidence) 
 
 
Selection-BG  
 
(Administrative 
Capacity OP, OPAC-
BG) 
 
Low  
(in OPAC-BG 
Managing 
Authority during 
2007-2011) 
 
Negative  
in OPAC-BG 
(especially during 
2007-2011) 
Problematic, but overridden 
when administrative capacity 
improved and positive when 
negative political interference 
was removed.  
Selection-RO 
 
(Human Resources 
OP, OPHR-RO)  
Low  
(in OPHR-RO 
Managing 
Authority)  
 
Negative in OPHR-
RO  
(especially during 
2007-2011) 
Problematic and highly 
persistent in light of limited 
administrative capacity 
improvements and persistent 
politicisation.  
 
Procurement-BG 
 
(Regional 
Development OP, 
OPREG-BG  
& Environment OP, 
OPENV-BG) 
 
 
Medium  
(in central OPREG-
BG and OPENV-
BG) 
& 
Low  
(in local 
Contracting 
Authorities) 
Positive  
(strong coordination 
role of Bulgarian 
Procurement Agency) 
& 
Negative  
(in local procurement 
for OPENV-BG and 
OPREG-BG) 
Procurement visibly affected the 
performance of the Environment 
and Regional Development OP 
and was the primary source for 
irregularities and reason for 
funding interruption / 
suspension in both programmes.  
 
Procurement-RO 
 
(Regional 
Development OP, 
OPREG-RO) 
 
Medium  
(in central OPREG-
RO) 
&  
Low  
(in local 
Contracting 
Authorities) 
 
 
Negative  
(at central level – 
politicised opinions 
from Procurement 
Agency) 
& 
Negative  
(in local procurement 
tenders among 
OPREG-RO 
beneficiaries) 
 
Procurement visibly affected the 
performance of the Regional 
Development OP in Romania 
and was the primary source for 
irregularities and main reason 
for funding interruption / 
suspension.  
 
 
 
Source: Author’s creation.  
 
One point, however, can be made on the dysfunctionalities of the Romanian 
procurement system. There were persistent disagreements between central and local 
level authorities on the rules and methodologies to assess procurement or 
irregularities. Moreover, the potential politicisation of the Romanian Procurement 
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Agency (ANRMAP) had considerable consequences for the functioning of the domestic 
public procurement system.  
 
Many of the issues regarding the selection of and procurement for EU-funded projects 
mirrored those encountered by the Bulgarian and Romanian managing and control 
institutions when managing EU funding more generally. First, one can note 
administrative capacity deficiencies in terms of institutional, bureaucratic and human 
resources capacity (e.g. the poor levels of expertise in Contracting Authorities to deal 
with the highly legal and technical area of procurement). Second, different degrees of 
political interference affected these stages such as distributing projects to politically 
affiliated firms or NGOs or awarding procurement criteria to politically favoured 
bidders. Such practices, brought to light the often highly politicised dimension of 
public spending in both countries. This does not apply solely to EU funds but, more 
generally, to public funding schemes. However, the levels of control for EU and 
national funding functioned according to different logics which made the former 
subject to stronger control mechanisms. As a result, many of the identified 
irregularities subsequently had to be addressed through financial sanctions. Overall, 
it was the interplay between administrative capacity deficiencies and negative political 
interference that could explain the main problems which emerged in the two examined 
stages of the absorption policy process.  
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8.1.3 Overall assessment of administrative capacity and 
political factors  
 
The following section summarizes and discusses the main findings with regard to the 
core independent factors used in the analytical model of this thesis. It does so in a 
comparative manner drawing on the analysis within and between the main in-depth 
case studies, as well as on the results of the qualitative software analysis (Annex C). 
The section discusses how the general interaction between administrative and political 
factors might explain issues of capacity and performance and the governance of EU 
funding in the two countries. It outlines some of the empirical inter-relationships 
between the factors analysed and contrasts them to the initial working assumptions / 
hypotheses. This is followed by a more theoretical discussion of the findings in section 
8.2.  
 
Before scrutinising each factor individually, three wider contextual findings must be 
outlined and discussed. Administrative and political embeddedness (Surubaru 2016b) 
can be defined as the anchoring of institutions responsible for EU-funding within 
domestic public administrations. This was the background, and chosen institutional 
setup, in which structures responsible for EU funding had to function. In other words, 
the institutional environments in which Managing Authorities / Intermediate Bodies 
activated in had a deep effect on their capacity and performance. In addition to this, 
the pre-accession period has had an important contextual significance on the ability of 
institutions to deal with the flow of EU funding following the accession period. These 
factors manifested themselves in several ways.  
 
First, administrative embeddedness can be understood as the bureaucratic 
(procedural) and human resources dependence on host institutional structures. The 
functionality of these managing institutions cannot be detached from the overall 
framework of partially reformed post-communist public administrations. Many of the 
latter favour strong politically driven central level ministries and are characterised by 
a “culture of control and not of cooperation” (Romanian Public Manager #1). Given 
that Managing Authorities and Intermediate Bodies were Directorates in the different 
line ministries they often lacked a certain level of operational independence and had 
to abide to the internal formal and informal rules of these institutions. Moreover, they 
often had to make use of their hosts’ infrastructure for a variety of situations (e.g. legal, 
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administrative, human resources related). There were strong correlations between the 
levels of supportiveness within different ministerial hosts and the administrative 
capacity of different Managing Authorities / Intermediate Bodies. Two examples from 
Romania were highly telling in this regard. On the one hand, there was often weak 
support found in the Ministry of Labour and Education for the structures dealing with 
the Romanian Human Resources OP which affected their functionality. On the other 
hand, and by contrast, the quality of internal support provided by the Romanian 
Ministry of Regional Development for OPREG-RO and OPAC-RO had a positive 
impact on the programmes performance (Director General in Romanian Ministry #1; 
Director of Romanian Managing Authority #2). Administrative embeddedness entails 
a certain level of inter-dependence between regular civil servants and those 
administrators working specifically on EU funding. The latter had to frequently rely 
on the support of the former but, given discrepancies in status and financial 
remuneration, there were often tensions and animosities between the two categories 
of civil servants. One concrete example, in this sense, was the Bulgarian Central 
Coordination Unit, which was included in the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, and had 
to rely on the latter’s’ civil servants for its day-to-day activities related to the national 
coordination of EU funding (Head of Unit in Bulgarian Central Coordination Unit #1).  
 
Second, political embeddedness can be seen as the dependency of EU funding 
administrators on national and local political representatives. This could have been for 
a variety of different reasons. Very often, in both Bulgaria and Romania, 
administrators lacked judicial personality and most decisions, even minor 
administrative ones, required approval from political representatives. On the one 
hand, this increased the dependency of administrators on politicians and slowed down 
the absorption process. On the other hand, it pointed out that very often 
administrative dysfunctionalities had a strong political origin. It confirmed the 
importance played by the political element for the overall governance of the funding.  
 
Third, the experience accumulated by the different institutions involved in this 
process, during the pre-accession period, was a good predictor of their future 
performance. The pre-accession period offered an initial setting of training and 
development for the different institutional actors later involved in SF management. 
Therefore, those institutions that accumulated experience in the management of pre-
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accession funding seemed to have an advantage when it came to developing their 
ability to handle the procedures related to SF. This was the case given that some 
institutions (e.g. Bulgaria and Romanian Regional Development Ministries) had 
managed to ensure continuity in terms of institutional structures and staff between 
the pre- and post-accession period. Prior experience proved beneficial for those 
Managing Authorities that incorporated various departments or staff that have dealt 
with PHARE or ISPA funding. In essence, this allowed a process of already developed 
expertise to be transferred and retained in new institutional settings. By contrast, 
institutions which had no prior experience with coordinating and using EU funding 
were much weaker, following accession, in terms of dealing with the pressures of SF 
absorption. This enables the argument that the pre-accession period represents an 
important contextual factor. Despite the multiple differences between the types of 
funding specific to each period (pre- and post), having acquired prior experience 
meant that some institutions, and some of their key members, became more familiar 
with the general exigencies of EU funds management and internalised various 
frameworks and principles, which were not often used in domestic funding schemes. 
Therefore, the pre-accession factor has had a positive influence on the administrative 
capacity of several of the institutions. More globally, this meant that prior contact, 
between national and EU stakeholders, was beneficial to the former in terms of 
developing a basis of knowledge and acquiring experience relevant for administrative 
capacity development.  Nevertheless, as will be discussed in the following sections, 
post-accession evolutions proved more relevant in this respect.  
 
Based on the main insights derived from the empirical analysis, the main factors and 
indicators, used to collect and analyse the evidence in this study, are now discussed in 
relation to the initial working assumptions (Chapter 2.4, Table 2). Administrative 
capacity related factors were a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for explaining 
overall issues of absorption capacity and performance. Administrative capacity does 
represent a sine qua non condition which countries cannot eschew if they seek to 
effectively use external financial assistance.  
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The role of administrative capacity for SF absorption  
 
First, with respect to institutional capacity (ADM1), the question was whether or not 
the countries had set up the right institutional arrangements to manage the flow of EU 
funding. Indeed, a functional institutional design (ADM1a) might facilitate the use of 
internal resources to manage EU funding. For instance, the OPREG programmes were 
optimal examples in this respect and benefited from a functional interaction between 
central Managing Authorities / regional Intermediate Bodies. By contrast, the 
Romanian OPHR was highly dysfunctional, specifically due its inadequate 
institutional structures and the poor formal division of labour between them. In terms 
of institutional coordination (ADM1b), problems of cooperation and coordination are 
very specific to most post-communist public administrations. However, it seems that 
a more centralised institutional model, in which Central Coordination Units play an 
active role could add value to the EU funds coordination process. Finally, with regard 
to institutional accountability (ADM1c), poor levels of transparency and 
communication with beneficiaries did affect the relationship between Managing 
Authorities and other stakeholders. The lack of transparency and responsiveness from 
several Managing Authorities examined (OPHR-RO, OPEC-RO, OPAC-BG) was an 
indication of a dysfunctional institutional capacity and provided further evidence of 
the specific problems administrative and political constraints faced by some of the 
bodies, with a direct effect on their performance. Nevertheless, as institutions 
increasingly gained experience with SF they tended to be more open and confident in 
their approach towards EU funds beneficiaries. One could argue that this implied a 
process of institutional learning and development which, indeed, required several 
years to establish.141   
                                                             
141 The level of responsiveness was potentially a more valid indication of the capacity of these institutions 
to be accountable for their work, in relation to the beneficiaries and the general public. Transparency 
levels increased in the context in which many of the Managing Authorities and Intermediate Bodies 
were under pressure to make more transparent information of public interest on the execution of 
different Operational Programmes, primarily in order to defuse suspicions on irregularities or conflicts 
of interests. On the one hand, although levels of transparency increased throughout the implementation 
period examined (2007-2013) in several institutions this doesn’t directly imply that their overall 
institutional ability to manage the funding has improved. On the other hand, in some isolated cases, a 
higher level of transparency, although beneficial for beneficiaries and the general public, translated in 
more problematic situations or additional workloads for some Managing Authorities (e.g. OPHR-RO) 
which would in turn affect the implementation of their Operational Programmes. As discussed further 
in this chapter many deficiencies in terms of institutional capacity reflected defective politico-
administrative relations and the way in which political structures did not adhere to various principles, 
such as accountability.  
 289 
 
 
Equally, political factors did affect the development of these institutional capacity 
components. Firstly, the decision to include Managing Authorities and Intermediate 
Bodies in line ministries was political. Officially, the aim was to politically hold to 
account these institutions. However, based on some of the evidence gathered, it can be 
argued that a certain level of political discretion was built into the different Managing 
Authorities. Hosting a Managing Authority was highly desirable for the different 
ministries because of the financial and political capital that came with managing EU 
funding. Secondly, there was sufficient evidence to argue that political conflicts 
generated processes of institutional mis-coordination. The collision between the 
Bulgarian ministry of Labour and the ministry of Education managing different parts 
of the Human Resources OP was an illustrative example in this sense. Moreover, the 
fact that institutions were unwilling to open up towards external actors in the first few 
years reflected other structural problems, especially in terms of political and 
administrative transparency, within the public administration of the two states. 
Overall, based on the empirical analysis, there was sufficient evidence to partly 
validate the initial theoretical claim regarding institutional capacity (H1: Institutional 
mis-coordination and non-accountability have a negative impact on administrative 
capacity and on absorption performance). Indeed, poor levels of institutional 
coordination and accountability affected the overall administrative capacity of these 
countries to manage EU funding. As stated, the main difference between the two 
countries related to the central coordination of the EU funding process. To achieve 
this, the Bulgarian institutional model seemed fit for purpose. This was also due to a 
stronger political mandate conferred on the political minister coordinating SF. Such a 
move was replicated by the Romanian authorities with strong delays. One could argue 
that the political centralisation of EU funds management matched the structural and 
operational nature of post-communist administrations in the two countries and 
constituted a reasonable option for the management of EU funding.  
 
Second, bureaucratic capacity (ADM2) is an essential component of administrative 
capacity. The question was whether or not states have had the necessary legal and 
procedural infrastructure to manage EU funding. This dimension included some other 
indicators such as the use of electronic management systems, management 
methodologies or the extent to which selection and monitoring procedures were 
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burdensome for those operating with (administrators) or being affected by them (final 
beneficiaries). Several findings indicated that the attainment of a functional 
bureaucratic capacity was particularly problematic. Firstly, there was initially little 
alignment between EU and national legislation on different accounts ranging from 
eligibility of expenditure for EU-funded projects to public procurement. In both 
countries, it took several years (and constant updates of legislation, rules and 
procedures) in order to reach a level of legal and procedural harmonisation and 
maturity which would ensure a functional system for EU funds use. With all this, legal 
and procedural simplification seem to have been initiated much earlier on in Bulgaria. 
By contrast, the Romanian authorities were confronted with constant changes which 
sparked strong contestation and criticism, on the ground, from different EU funds 
stakeholders. Secondly, there was evidence to suggest that the electronic management 
systems and internal management procedures functioned better in Bulgaria than in 
Romania. Finally, there was a strong tendency, in both countries, to engage in “gold-
plating” practices (KPMG et al. 2011). The authorities imposed a significant number 
of additional controls which prompted an excessive wave of verifications and checks 
on final beneficiaries. Very often, such verifications consumed important institutional 
and human resources and affected the different stakeholders involved in the 
absorption process.  
 
The reasons for adopting such excessive control mechanisms were multiple. In 
essence, in light of the emerging problems with the implementation of EU-funded 
projects, national authorities sought to demonstrate to policy-makers in Brussels that 
they have the situation under control. Moreover, additional controls reflected the 
administrative culture of bureaucratic “rubber-stamping” which was representative of 
the wider workings of the public administration in the two countries. These revealed a 
lack of confidence and capacity from the administrators’ side to deal with situations 
arising from the management of EU funds and in interaction with external actors. In 
light of the empirical analysis, the initial working assumption on bureaucratic capacity 
was found to be irrelevant (H2: The higher the number of administrative and 
legislative procedures a country has the lower the administrative capacity of a 
country will be). The Romanian case provided some evidence to suggest that a high 
number of legal and administrative procedures (e.g. high number of implementation 
instructions issued by different Managing Authorities) revealed a gap in the 
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management of EU-funded projects. However, the number of administrative and 
legislative acts is not relevant, as long as it is clear for all stakeholders what the rules 
and procedures are and if they function in practice. Again, one potentially significant 
difference between the two countries was that the Bulgarian authorities adopted a 
timelier decision to simplify the different procedures used for EU funds and to 
introduce a more uniform set of administrative documents. Political agents played an 
important role in addressing the often chaotic legal and procedural infrastructure used 
for EU funds during the first years of implementation. For instance, the differences 
between the Bulgarian OPHR and the Romanian OPHR were partly explained by the 
fact that politicians did not do more to simplify the extremely bureaucratic procedures 
affiliated of the latter. All in all, in both countries, the legal, procedural and 
bureaucratic procedures and tools used constituted a very relevant, and often highly 
problematic, dimension of administrative capacity.  
 
Third, human resources capacity (ADM3) was one of the, if not the most, important 
dimension of administrative capacity. This was reflected within the case studies and 
also in the wider qualitative software analysis carried out (see Annex C). Firstly, the 
numbers, expertise and incentives of staff employed in MAs/IBs and the other 
institutions involved in the management, control and implementation of EU funds 
were crucial. Unsurprisingly, institutions, where staff had a good level of experience 
and expertise, benefited from training and professional development, and who 
received a competitive remuneration, tended to have a higher capacity. By contrast, 
where structural differences existed, specifically in terms of financial incentives, as 
well as limited training opportunities, staff did not develop the ability or the 
willingness to deal with complex problems related to EU funds management. This was 
well illustrated by the problematic case of the Romanian Human Resources OP where 
financial and workload discrepancies affected the morale of administrators. Moreover, 
an important difference between the two countries related to the use of technical 
assistance funding to incentivise and develop the capacity of staff working in managing 
and control institutions. Again, political agency played an important role, with 
Bulgarian authorities being faster in using TA funding to achieve this (Surubaru 
2016a).  
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Secondly, the role of external stakeholders proved to be highly significant. There were 
mixed interpretations concerning the role of consultancies for EU funds 
implementation. Some consultants did contribute and supported EU funds applicants 
and final beneficiaries whilst others added to the numerous problems identified in this 
area. However, the role of final beneficiaries and the way in which they facilitated, or 
hampered the implementation process was even more relevant. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, time and again, final beneficiaries were behind some of the serious 
deficiencies found in different Operational Programmes. This proves that it is 
insufficient to examine only the capacity of state institutions, but equally that of final 
beneficiaries and their role in the absorption policy process and for the countries’ 
absorption performance. The highly challenging implementation of human resources 
projects (in Romania) or dealing with public procurement by local level municipalities 
were a testament of the disruptive force that beneficiaries could have on the overall 
absorption, and indirectly on the performance, of these countries. There was, 
therefore, sufficient evidence gathered to validate the initial working assumption 
regarding human resources capacity (H3: There is a positive link between the 
expertise and incentives of administrators to manage Structural Funds. The higher 
the two are the higher the absorption performance of a country will be.) Indeed, there 
is a strong link between expertise and incentives (equally highlighted in Annex C, given 
the strong correlation between human resources capacity and incentives). A low 
degree of incentives (e.g. financial / professional) influenced staff turnover and 
affected administrative capacity development. Furthermore, the fact that national 
legislation often capped the remuneration for EU funding staff was a core shortcoming 
for the development and retention of human resources in the institutions managing 
and in the public bodies implementing SF. Lastly, it must be noted that positive 
political interference could strengthen the development of human resources capacity 
within both countries. 
 
Fourth, territorial capacity (TER) proved to be an extremely pertinent intervening 
factor. TER meant capturing the way in which the capacity functioned at the regional 
and/or local level and the extent to which the diverse territorial configurations and 
settings might affect the overall management and implementation of EU Structural 
Funds in the two countries. Several interesting findings were uncovered from the 
empirical analysis. Firstly, contrary to what was initially expected, a high level of 
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decentralisation may not have necessarily yielded positive results for EU funds 
management and implementation in the two countries. In both countries central 
governments retained most prerogatives for the management of SF. Yet, the general 
evidence seemed to suggest that a centralised approach tended to be more functional 
in both Bulgaria’s and Romania’s case. 142 Consequently, there was no evidence found 
to support the claim H4a: A higher level of decentralisation has a positive impact on 
the absorption capacity and performance of a country. The highly centralised 
political systems of both countries and the enshrined practices of the public 
administrations might have fitted the management of SF. Interestingly, in Bulgaria’s 
case, the centralised systems translated into a more effective institutional system 
where many local Intermediate Bodies acted as local branches of the different MAs. 
This enabled a stronger coordination with Sofia (as was the case for the Human 
Resources and Regional Development OPs). In Romania, the most functional 
institutional relationship was that between the Managing Authority for the Regional 
Development OP and the Regional Development Agencies, which acted as the 
programmes’ main Intermediate Bodies (World Bank 2013). Other OPs operated using 
their own regionally based Intermediate Bodies. The high number of these institutions 
and the shallow coordination from Bucharest resulted in severe management 
problems (Zaman and Georgescu 2009; Patenaude 2014). Overall, it is not clear 
whether or not a decentralisation/regionalisation process would contribute towards 
improving the management of EU funding, in light of the lack of such a scenario being 
possible in the next few years in the two countries.   
 
Secondly, the territorial tiers involved in the implementation process seem to matter. 
Again, in Bulgaria’s case there were fewer administrative and political tiers (Central – 
Municipal / Local) involved in the EU absorption process as compared to Romania 
(Central – County/Regional – Municipal/Local). The meso County Council 
administrative and political level often added to the complexity of the implementation 
process in Romania. As final beneficiaries and regional administrators, County 
Councils could influence politically the absorption process. By contrast, the Oblasti 
                                                             
142 Some Romanian interviewees did argue that a further decentralisation of the system, by adopting 
regional Operational Programmes, could improve the absorption performance record of the country. 
However, many Bulgarian interviewees’ for instance argued that such a setup may not have a positive 
impact in Bulgaria simply because it’s highly centralised institutional modus operandi. 
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level in Bulgaria were not involved, allowing a more direct interaction between central 
authorities and municipalities.  
 
Finally, the question of potential discrepancies between central and local levels of 
expertise among staff and beneficiaries remains highly pertinent. Nevertheless, the 
evidence gathered contradicted the initial expectation (H4b: A country with low 
amounts of expertise at the local and regional level of management would have a 
lower absorption capacity and performance). In other words, and with some 
exceptions, many local and regional level stakeholders had a reasonable level of 
expertise and considerable experience with SF. Despite this fact, the main issue was 
that staff working in local or regional IBs lacked the formal prerogatives, given that 
most decisions were legally the remit of MAs in Sofia and Bucharest. All in all, 
territorial configurations and settings are relevant and could improve the overall 
administrative capacity of the two countries examined. For this, the coordination 
between different political and administrative layers would ensure a more functional 
management and implementation process.   
 
The role of political factors for SF absorption  
 
Political factors did play a significant role for administrative capacity development and 
for the absorption performance achieved within and between the two countries. 
Insights from the individual factors are outlined in the following. 
 
Political stability (POL1) was a core pre-requisite for both administrative-capacity 
development and absorption performance. The adverse effects of political instability 
were reflected, throughout 2007-2013, in the management and implementation of SF. 
Since the fall of communism, political changes have been a recurrent development 
affecting both countries. Firstly, political stability was conceptualised as changes of 
Government and throughout the examined period Bulgaria and Romania had several 
different governments. Central governmental alteration did have an impact on the 
management and use of funding given the strong levels of institutional changes that 
are triggered by political changes. Moreover, local political changes equally had an 
impact on the implementation of SF. Changes at the municipal level (e.g. new mayors) 
and different local feuds affected the micro-level implementation of Operational 
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Programmes. Governmental continuity, at both the central and at the local level, was 
an essential pre-condition for a more robust approach for managing the institutional 
resources required for the management of EU funding and for avoiding unnecessary 
changes that would affect project implementation.   
 
Secondly, political stability was examined in relation to potential political interference 
in the appointment of staff working in Managing and Control institutions. This meant 
tracing evidence of political patronage, as developed in the different literatures 
examining post-communist public administrations (for a recent overview see Kopecký 
et al. 2012). Whilst political change in general can be regarded as a neutral structural 
political development, the politicisation of staff appointments or dismissals (especially 
of senior and mid-level management in MAs/IBs) did have a strong negative impact 
on the management of EU funding in both countries. Patronage related politicisation 
varied from one institution to another and from programme to programme.143 
Moreover, it must be noted that ideological differences between governments did not 
seem to matter when it came to patronage related practices.  
 
Political patronage had a significant impact for the management of EU funds. It could 
indirectly affect levels of staff turnover, given accounts that many managers and 
administrators chose to leave or were dismissed following governmental changes. In 
addition, appointing politicised senior staff to head MAs/IBs did affect the managerial 
performance and the independence of these institutions. All these influenced the levels 
of administrative capacity that could be attained within several institutions equally 
reflected by their slow or poor absorption performance. The Romanian OPHR (as well 
as other Romanian OPs) was a relevant case study in this regard, because they 
illustrated the impact that political patronage had on management continuity and on 
the programmes day-to-day operations. Instances of political patronage seem to have 
been more moderate for Regional Development OPs. Lastly, as shown by the 
procurement case study, political changes at the level of Contracting Authorities (CAS) 
had strong consequences for procurement processes and generated considerable 
delays or problems in this area. Overall, there was sufficient evidence to validate the 
claim initially put forward on political stability (H5: The higher the level of political 
                                                             
143 Audit Authorities and Certifying Authorities were less affected by political interference given the 
more independent and highly technical status of these institutions. 
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instability and patronage the more likely these countries will have a weak capacity 
for managing EU funds). High levels of political instability and political interference 
in appointments or dismissals of staff working in specialised institutions dealing with 
EU funding damaged the development of administrative capacity and affected the 
overall governance of CP in the two cases examined.  
 
The empirical analysis has shown that political support (POL2) was an extremely 
versatile and relevant factor. This was is a key empirical and theoretical insight of this 
study. Political support could contribute to enhancing the different administrative 
capacity components and the other processes necessary for the management and 
implementation of EU funds. Firstly, political support (under the form of guidance or 
leadership) was a necessary condition for a smoother functioning of the institutions 
managing external assistance. From a contextual point of view, this can be understood 
given that the public administration in these countries’ lack a specific level of 
independence and their work is dependent on political instructions. Most of the 
administrators managing EU funding required support from political representatives 
to carry out their activities and, more specifically, to solve the daily problems emerging 
from the absorption policy process. This was visible at different levels. In those 
institutions where there was a functional cooperation between political and 
administrative agents, it was more likely for administrative capacity to develop, at least 
at a faster rate. For instance, the differences in capacity and performance between the 
Bulgarian and the Romanian Human Resources OP could be partly explained by this. 
In the former, the positive input of administrative (Directors) and political agents 
(Deputy Ministers) could have contributed to the programme’s performance. 
Arguably, in Romania’s case, the absence of positive political input kept the capacity 
of the OPHR institutions in an under-developed state.  
 
Secondly, political support in terms of politically prioritisation of the use of EU 
funding at the highest level of Government was another important condition for an 
overall absorption capacity and performance. Making SF absorption a top political 
priority helped administrators to address important shortcomings in the management 
and implementation of Operational Programmes. Public scrutiny or an increased 
public awareness of SF could also put pressure on officials to potentially improve the 
management of SF. More concretely, at the central level, putting the issue of EU funds 
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absorption on the political forefront and establishing a political figurehead and 
ministry / portfolio for EU funds yielded positive results in both countries. Again, a 
core difference between them was in terms of timing. Bulgaria was much swifter in 
addressing this, partly because the GERB party pledged a stronger use of EU funds 
during its parliamentary elections of 2009 (Spendzharova and Vachudova 2012). 
Similarly, starting from 2011, at the insistence of the EU authorities and given its low 
performance in the area, the Boc/Ungureanu/Ponta governments gradually realised 
the need for a stronger political mandate for the management of EU funds. The 
creation of an EU affairs, and later on EU funds, ministerial portfolio had positive 
consequence for this.144 Moreover, an increased political awareness on EU funds 
meant that key bottlenecks (e.g. co-financing, public procurement) started to be 
addressed at the highest political level. Regional Development OPs provided visible 
infrastructure projects which in turn generated a high level of political interest among 
local and central politicians. Often, this would translate in more political support from 
the central level in order to manage these programmes and address the needs of local 
political stakeholders. Overall, there was a strong link between politicians’ levels of 
interest and the management and implementation of EU funding, in both countries, 
validating the initial claim put forward in this thesis (H6: The higher the level of 
support from politicians to funds administrators the more likely a country will have 
a higher absorption performance and a more strategic approach towards the 
management of the funds). It can be asserted that a higher level of political support 
and commitment from central governments contributed to improvements in the 
management and partly to a more strategic use of SF. 
 
Third, the analysis of political clientelism (POL3) meant to scrutinise the question of 
negative political interference in the selection and implementation of EU-funded 
projects. In essence, this related to potential issues of corruption and how they could 
affect the management and implementation of EU funds. Apart from discussing this 
                                                             
144 The fact that political ministries were established for EU funding was seen by many interviewees in 
both countries as a key development. This was in light of the fact that previous structures coordinating 
the use of EU funds had no real political say or weight when it came to discussing these issues in the 
Bulgarian Council of Ministers or in Romanian Government official meetings. Moreover, the presence 
of different political agents Plugchieva / Donchev and Orban / Teodorovici with a relatively good 
understanding of EU funding environments and requirements did contribute towards tackling some 
of the difficulties found in terms of management and implementation. Therefore, the governance of 
the funding was strengthened after the establishment of EU funds ministers and, paradoxically, after 
the further political centralisation of the process.  
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for each OP case study, chapter 7 scrutinised more thoroughly such links. Political 
clientelism affected and manifested itself not only in official institutional 
environments, but equally, at the level of EU funds applicants and final beneficiaries, 
as well as through a variety of different other stakeholders (e.g. local consultancies). 
The empirical analysis revealed that political clientelism did have a negative impact on 
different Operational Programmes. 
 
Firstly, the differences in performance between the Human Resources OPs could be 
explained by the fact that in the Romanian case a politicised and highly problematic 
selection of EU-funded projects contributed to many of the programme’s future 
deficiencies. This was absent in the Bulgarian Human Resources OP (or undetected by 
both Bulgarian and EU authorities which is unlikely). However, a similar pattern of 
politicised projects was uncovered for the Bulgarian Administrative Capacity OP.  
 
Secondly, political clientelism did also manifest in programmes with a higher than 
average degree of administrative capacity. The Regional Development programmes 
were much affected by public procurement issues. These partly derived from the 
presence of local level clienteles seeking to benefit from the allocation of tender 
contracts. Overall, the issue of public procurement generated the highest levels of 
project implementation irregularities in both countries (Bulgarian Parliament 2011; 
World Bank 2013; IPP 2015). However, as argued in Chapter 7, many of the problems 
regarding procurement were not attributable only to local political interference or 
corruption in the use of EU SF. They were linked with the lack of administrative 
capacity of central level Managing Authorities (e.g. during the first waves of evaluation 
and selection of EU-funded projects) or at the level of local Contracting Authorities 
(e.g. the ability of municipalities to deal with tender contracts). Nevertheless, the 
politicisation of procurement was partly detected by the different levels of control and 
audits. In addition, many Bulgarian and Romanian municipalities were sanctioned 
with financial corrections for violations of procurement legislation.  
 
Having noted the above, there was sufficient evidence to validate the initial working 
assumption on political clientelism (H7: The higher the presence of political clienteles 
and “interest cartels” involved in the distribution and management of EU funds the 
more likely these countries will have a weak capacity and overall absorption 
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performance). Political clientelism manifested itself primarily at the selection and 
implementation stages of the absorption policy process and it revealed the willingness 
of different stakeholders (politicians, administrators, municipalities, private firms 
etc.) to seek illegal profits from the distribution of EU funding. With all this, it is no 
way claimed in this study that political clientelism, or domestic levels of corruption, 
are the single most important factors explaining deficiencies in EU funds absorption 
performance.145  
 
The role and relevance of the EU factor 
 
The European Union (EU) factor proved extremely relevant. On the one hand, this is 
because Brussels is directly involved through the principle of “shared management”, 
enshrined in EU regulations, in the governance of Cohesion Policy in its member 
states. On the other hand, Brussels exerts considerable technical and political leverage 
on the governance of the funding. Therefore, the way in which the relationship 
between Brussels and Sofia / Bucharest unfolds could have a considerable mark for 
the on the ground delivery of the aid. There were several concrete ways in which 
Brussels interacted with the two countries. Firstly, given its role as Cohesion Policy 
primary architect and designer of its interventions, Brussels indirectly has 
considerable influence on the on design of national implementation structures. More 
concretely, the different Directorate General (DGs) from the European Commission, 
in particular DG Regio and DG Employment, were directly involved in providing 
technical assistance to the Bulgarian/Romanian institutions responsible for the 
management of SF. Most interviewees highlighted that the technical support received 
on a daily basis from EU policy-makers was beneficial, especially given the lack of 
experience during the early years of implementation.  
 
Secondly, the EU, in particular the European Commission, seeks to ensure a fair and 
regular use of the funding and is the final authorising agency for payments. Apart from 
                                                             
145 Other measurements of corruption and political clientelism in relation to EU-funded procurement 
have been recently undertaken using quantitative methodologies (Fazekas et al. 2013; Stefanov and 
Karaboev 2015; Dimulescu and Doroftei 2015). The insights of these studies correspond to a large 
extent with the findings of this thesis and account for the presence of strong political vested interests 
surrounding public procurement contracts. However, this thesis sought to refine the understanding of 
clientelism/corruption and its impact on the use of SF by pointing out that poor administrative 
capacity has equally allowed for such interferences to take place.  
 300 
 
coordinating with the national Audit Authority and Certifying and Payment Authority 
on the control of the funding, it conducts its own audits into how SF are used. It was 
following extensive audits in 2010-2011 that many of the problems concerning 
management verifications and dysfunctional control systems of the different 
Romanian OPs surfaced. Following such audits, the EC was able to interrupt or 
suspend payments to national authorities. These decisions acted as a strong incentive 
for national authorities to start addressing shortcomings. Thus, they potentially had a 
positive impact on institutional and administrative related developments. When the 
level of irregularities identified by the EU authorities were systemic, the latter could 
apply financial sanctions to national authorities mainly under the form of financial 
corrections. Equally, these acted as a strong incentive for improving the use of EU 
funds. However, both the results of audits and the application of financial corrections 
were more controversial aspects governing the relationship between member states 
and the EU. As seen in the case of different national Operational Programmes, 
financial sanctions have a significant impact on the overall level of financial 
absorption, primarily because it entails that member states had to pay back funding 
which was already paid to several beneficiaries. Financial corrections were frequently 
contested by national authorities and the different EU methodologies for corrections 
and for interpreting irregularities (e.g. on public procurement) were often criticised by 
national stakeholders. Although they did have a deterrent effect, this was arguably 
limited. 
 
Finally, the relationship between the EU and national authorities (concerning the use 
of EU funding) was highly political at times. The controversies sparked by the 
interruption of payments or financial corrections could easily become politicised, 
given that they received considerable coverage in the press and were subject to public 
scrutiny. As a result, political measures were adopted by both the EU and national 
authorities, in order to address this at the highest possible political level 
(Commissioners/Prime-Ministers/Ministers). On the ground, several interviewees 
perceived that the EU adopted a harsher approach or attitude towards the Bulgarian 
and Romanian authorities, as opposed to older member states were similar problems 
still tended to occur (e.g. Italy, Greece). All in all, there was some evidence to at least 
partially validate the working assumption on the EU factor (H8: The more the EU 
intervenes in the absorption process of a country and it imposes financial sanctions 
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it is the more likely that a country reaches a poor level of performance). However, it 
is not the frequency of interventions from the EU that matters but its magnitude and 
the extent to which interruptions or suspensions of payments reveal systemic 
problems on the ground (e.g. OPHR-RO).  
 
Last but not least, macro-economic considerations need to be taken into account when 
detailing the relationship between the EU and national authorities, as well when 
seeking to understand issues of financial absorption of funding. The recent financial 
crisis, which unfolded in 2008, coincided with a drastic reduction in Bulgaria’s and 
Romania’s GDP and public spending. Austerity measures taken in both countries, and 
especially in Romania, affected employees’ in the public sector and, most importantly, 
reduced the financial capacity of the state and that of public beneficiaries to co-finance 
EU-funded projects. The same issues applied within the private sector were banks 
were less willing to provide co-financing, guarantees or different loans to potential 
beneficiaries (CeRe 2010; Expert Evaluation Network Bulgaria 2012). Moreover, the 
EU’s economic governance principles, in particular the excessive deficit procedure 
clause of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which states that budget deficits must 
not exceed 3% of GDP might have had an adverse effect on the co-financing 
capabilities of both Bulgaria and Romania. This could have consequences for the 
overall financial absorption attained by the two countries and prompted national 
governments to seek alternative ways to boost cash-flows and co-finance large 
infrastructure projects funded from Structural Funds.  
 
Although not uncontroversial, the EU, and in particular the Commission, has a strong 
influence on national domestic absorption processes. Its role, often unaddressed 
directly in analyses on the topic, has important consequences for the development of 
internal administrative capacity. Politically, it can exert its pressure on national 
governments to improve the management and control of EU funding. Finally, from a 
financial point of view, the limits imposed by the excessive deficit procedure could 
have adverse consequences for the ability of these countries’ to actually absorb their 
allocated Structural Funds. In this respect, the EU’s merits or faults require closer 
scrutiny in studies that deal with the governance and delivery of SF at the national, 
regional and local level.   
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8.2 Theoretical implications of findings  
  
From a theoretical point of view, this study contributes to the increasingly specialised 
literature on the effectiveness of the delivery systems for European policy 
implementation, in particular on Cohesion Policy and Structural Funds. Several of its 
findings connect well with those from similar studies, which focus on the governance 
of CP in Central and Eastern Europe (Sumpikova et al. 2003; Horvat 2004; Baun and 
Marek 2008; Zaman and Georgescu 2009; Scherpereel 2010; Dabrowski 2012; Ferry 
and McMaster 2013; Bachtler et al. 2013a). In seeking to comprehend issues of 
domestic capacity and performance in the financial absorption of EU funding, this 
study has employed a novel analytical framework which combines and assess 
administrative capacity and political related factors.  
 
Although the importance of analyses driven by Europeanisation and multi-level 
governance has been acknowledged as an important avenue to study CP, this thesis 
used different theoretical lenses, drawing much more on insights related to 
administrative capacity and partly on the quality of governance/government debates. 
In addition, and by contrast to previous operationalisations of administrative capacity 
(e.g. Milio 2007), this study chose to focus more in-depth on the institutional elements 
that affect the implementation of the policy, separating them from the specific 
absorption policy cycle stages. Therefore, the conceptualisation of administrative 
capacity related only in a minimal way to different policy process stages. As argued 
elsewhere (see Surubaru 2016a) this might enable a better theoretical differentiation 
between the capability of the institutions involved in delivering the funding and the 
day-to-day processes behind EU funds absorption. As a result, this study focused in 
particular on the domestic factors that inhibited, or facilitated, the development of 
administrative capacity. The latter was loosely defined as the institutional, 
bureaucratic and human resources capacity of member states to manage Cohesion 
Policy. 
 
Furthermore, studies concerned with explaining degrees of success in managing CP 
frequently examine either the role or influence of administrative capacity or that of 
governance and the importance of informal institutions. However, there are fewer 
studies which point in a specific manner the link between formal and informal 
 303 
 
administrative and political conditions and their impact on the delivery of the policy 
(Leonardi 2005; Milio 2007a). One of the main theoretical contributions of this thesis 
was to bridge the two sets of factors in order to create a robust analytical framework 
for the analysing the empirical evidence collected. As demonstrated in this thesis, 
apart from the importance of these states’ administrative capacity, the influence of 
political factors was substantial and cannot be taken for granted when assessing the 
delivery of the policy and the use of SF. The implications of these theoretical claims, 
partly discussed in section 8.1.3, are briefly addressed in relation to the second 
research question of this thesis: How can administrative capacity and political factors 
explain this variation in absorption capacity and performance? When answering this 
question other important contributions to the specific debate on CP and SF are taken 
into account. Finally, section 8.2.3 discusses these points in relation to wider 
European Studies related debates and other relevant theoretical discussions. 
 
8.2.1 How relevant is administrative capacity for the 
governance of Cohesion Policy?  
 
Recent studies have been much interested in the role of state, governmental or 
administrative capacity, and its influence on the ability of countries to use or spend 
Structural Funds (Milio 2007b; Bachtler et al. 2013; Tosun 2014; Smeriglio et al. 
2015). This research has confirmed the overarching importance of administrative 
capacity related factors. In line with what others have argued, administrative capacity 
remains a sine qua non condition for states to manage CP and their SF (Milio 2007b; 
Molle 2007; Dabrowski 2012; Bachtler et al. 2013). Nevertheless, it is argued here that 
administrative capacity is a necessary, yet not sufficient, condition for explaining 
differences in absorption capacity and performance variation across countries and 
across time. Several points on administrative capacity require further emphasis. 
 
European Union institutions have strongly emphasized administrative or institutional 
capacity building during the negotiations with candidate countries’ (Dimitrova 2002; 
Hughes et al. 2004; Leonardi 2005). It was hoped that institutional changes would 
help countries deal with the pressures of aligning to EU policies and legislation. 
Although a large degree of PHARE pre-accession funds were destined to institution-
building exercises, the capacity of the institutions responsible for Structural Funds 
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varied considerably at the start of the implementation period. Moreover, the lack of a 
coherent conceptualisation of administrative capacity, from Brussels’ side, might have 
hampered the development of such a capacity at the national and local level (Dimitrova 
2002). As recently acknowledged by EU auditors, when Bulgaria and Romania became 
member states, the responsible institutions were not prepared to deal with the 
complexity of CP and the flow of SF.146  
 
First, the problem of institutional coordination and highly centralised political 
ministries was a strong memory of the not so distant past and a consequence of 
unfinished public administration reforms (Verheijen 2001; Kalman 2002; Bachtler 
and McMaster 2008). Closely related, human resources policies were dysfunctional 
and many of the institutions involved with EU funding suffered from staff turnover 
and the lack of institutional and political stability (Marek and Baun 2002; Scherpereel 
2010; Bachtler et al. 2013a; Surubaru 2016a).  
 
Second, administrative capacity and performance in implementing Structural Funds 
were much influenced by administrative hardships and a considerable degree of 
unnecessary bureaucratic procedures and burdens, which were found in other 
countries from the area (Bachtler et al. 2013a). The complexity and problems related 
to public procurement rules for EU funds implementation have been noted by other 
studies, also for other countries in the area (Nikolova 2008; Zaman and Cristea 2011; 
Bachtler et al. 2013a).  
 
Third, administrative capacity development seems to remain a centrally driven 
process. In this respect, and in line with some of the arguments from the literature 
(Benz and Eberlein 1999; Bailey and De Propris 2004; Baun and Marek 2006; Bache 
et al. 2011b), evidence was found to suggest that the implementation of SF has 
empowered central rather than regional governments. Furthermore, the lack of fiscal 
independence of local authorities and their dependence on state transfers has affected 
the implementation process also in light of the weak administrative capacity and co-
financing abilities of the latter (Benedek and Horvath 2008; Yanakiev 2010; Marin 
                                                             
146 Euractiv.com, 13 September 2016, “Romania and Bulgaria were not ready for accession, EU 
auditors confess”, Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/auditors-
romania-and-bulgaria-were-not-ready-for-accession/ (accessed March 2017). 
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2014). With all this, contrary to what others would argue, the centralised management 
of EU funds fitted the specific profile of the two countries, and might be a suitable 
option for implementing the policy in the two countries, in the absence of foreseeable 
regional structures. As opposed to Poland or even Slovakia, which allegedly had in 
place more functional regional level structures (O’Dwyer 2006; Scherpereel 2010), 
Bulgaria and Romania gave a minor role to its regional bodies. Lastly, the “multi-level 
governance” regime and the subsidiarity principles promoted by the policy (Marks 
1993; Hooghe et al. 1996) was deficient, both in Sofia and in Bucharest, given the 
centralised nature of government and the weak culture of cooperation and dialogue 
between central and local authorities and societal stakeholders.  
 
Overall, administrative capacity developments presumed a long and difficult process 
of learning which spanned several years, and which has not yet finished in either 
countries. Similar conditions were widely discussed in the case of Spain and Italy 
(Batterbury 2002; Milio 2007a) and more widely in the CEECs as a whole 
(Paraskavepolous and Leonardi 2004; Dabrowski 2012; Pálné Kovács 2016). 
However, this learning process had important domestic costs and was hindered by 
constellations of domestic political and administrative forces. One of the specific 
contributions of this thesis was to specifically highlight how domestic political factors 
could often slow down or advance processes of capacity-building in the two countries 
examined. It did so by evaluating more thoroughly the interaction between 
administrative and political factors. Consequently, one of the main claims put forward 
here is that the ability of countries to absorb EU funding is not determined only by 
structural and institutional conditions but, equally, by the political dynamics behind 
their management in the relevant institutions and for the implementation of the 
various Operational Programmes.  
 
8.2.2 How relevant are political factors for the governance of 
Cohesion Policy?  
  
A growing area of the literature has verified theoretical assumptions on the impact of 
the quality of governance/government and the ability of domestic institutions and 
practices to mediate management and investments carried out by CP on the ground 
(Ederveen et al. 2006; Charron et al. 2014; Rodriguez-Pose and Garcillazo 2015; 
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Smeriglio et al. 2015). However, it is not clear from this research how exactly the 
“quality of governance” manifests itself in practice and how domestic political and 
governance arrangements inhibit or facilitate CP actions and policies. Drawing on the 
above in-depth qualitative empirical case studies, this thesis argues that we must 
understand how the interplay between administrative and political conditions could 
generate a certain outcome with regard to the financial absorption of Structural Funds. 
In other words, it is the domestic interplay between administrative capacity and 
domestic political factors, which determine how the policy is governed and 
implemented at the national level. Similarly to what others have stressed, there was 
strong evidence to suggest that political factors are conducive to the general 
development of domestic administrative capacity and for the formal institutions 
managing the funding (Milio 2007a, 248). Political factors are conducive in the sense 
that political actors or processes contribute towards weakening or strengthening the 
specific institutional environment and the wide domestic arrangements necessary for 
managing the policy (Smyrl 1997; Batterbury 2002; Milio 2008; Bachtler and 
McMaster 2008). As a result, one of the major theoretical contributions of this thesis 
was to qualify and assess some of the mechanisms of political interference in CP 
delivery in new member states, such as Bulgaria and Romania.  
 
Firstly, politicisation under the form of party patronage tends to affect the 
development of expertise and processes of professionalization in the specific 
institutions responsible for the funding and is indeed one of the main determinants of 
staff turnover and instability. This was fairly similar to what other studies have 
reported in the case of Italy (Milio 2007a), Greece (Chardas 2012) and Spain 
(Batterbury 2002; Dudek 2005), or more recently for Poland (Bachtler and McMaster 
2008; Dabrowski 2012) and Croatia (Antonopoulos 2013).  
 
Secondly, there was some evidence of political clientelism in the processes behind the 
allocation and use of funding at the central and local level (Scherpereel 2010; 
Dabrowski 2012; Vant 2012). The largely qualitative data gathered in this thesis tends 
to confirm some practices of “pork barrel” politics with regard to the distribution of 
the funding (Bloom and Petrova 2013). At least some of the EU funding was 
distributed using political criteria and there were clear instances of government 
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favouritism towards certain municipalities.147 The case studies on the 
evaluation/selection, and more pre-eminently on public procurement tended to show 
that some the funding was destined to clientelistic networks affiliated to different 
centres of political power, especially around parties in government. With all this, it is 
argued here that political clientelism and/or corruption cannot fully explain the 
problems and evolution of these countries’ absorption performance, and provide a 
simplistic and incomplete explanation for their weaknesses. 
 
Thirdly, the absorption of EU funding has become a political tool used for domestic 
political scoring and campaigning as equally noted by others (Spendzharova and 
Vachudova 2012; Haughton 2014). On the one hand, this has potentially raised public 
awareness on the issue, bringing the issue of EU funds into spotlight. On the other 
hand, the politicisation of EU funds spending, and the high level of political interests’ 
around regional or local projects was bound to affect the strategic and the long-term 
impact of these instruments on the ground (Ferry and McMaster 2013a, 1500). 
 
Despite the above, one of the key theoretical contributions of this study is to argue that 
political factors can also have a positive effect for SF absorption. The strong political 
commitment assumed by the Bulgarian government (Spendzharova and Vachudova 
2012; Paliova and Lybek 2014) enabled the mobilisation of necessary resources for 
administrative capacity development (Surubaru 2016a). Without positive 
commitment and input from the highest political level, the institutions managing the 
EU funding could not address their deficiencies. Political actors could use their agency 
and decision-making powers to facilitate technical, or often political, solutions for 
funding administrators. This study confirms that political agency or 
“entrepreneurship” may help alleviate several of the complex processes and 
bureaucratic procedures surrounding the absorption of EU funding (Smyrl 1997; Milio 
2007a). If the absorption of European funds was a priority on the governments’ 
political agenda, then capacity and performance in delivering CP tended to be higher. 
This is a highly intuitive relationship which is backed up by the evidence gathered for 
this study and which can at least partly explain some of the variation between the two 
countries. This argument falls in line with what is stressed in other studies, namely 
                                                             
147 However, the exact extent cannot be easily measured through qualitative methods and more 
quantitative methods are required to scrutinise more robustly such correlations. 
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that the relationship between EU funds administrators and politicians matters to a 
great extent for internal development processes and, in this case, for the management 
and implementation of CP (Smyrl 1997; Milio 2007a; Charron 2016). Without a certain 
“virtuous interaction” (Smyrl and Piattoni 2003; Milio 2007a) and a functional 
cooperation between the administrative and the political sphere most of the problems 
regarding the management of the funding could not be addressed. This was especially 
the case in countries where the political tends to exert control over the administrative 
branch of government.  
 
Figure 8: Overall relationship between factors  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s creation. 
In essence, the above relationship between administrators and politicians could 
provide a qualitative illustration of the importance of the quality of 
governance/government arguments and, more widely, on how political factors shape 
EU CP delivery. In instances where domestic politicians assumed responsibility or 
developed an important political or economic stake in the use of EU funds it was more 
likely for the government as a whole to mobilise and adopt the necessary legal or policy 
related changes required for their implementation. This mechanism could function the 
other way around. A high level of political control or political indifference could stall 
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more so, if administrative or political representatives sought to profit from the 
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aid decreases. The dynamics between administrative and political stakeholders from 
the two countries was fundamental for ensuring a potentially higher financial 
absorption and implementation of EU funding. It is in this sense that the central thesis 
adopted here is that political factors mediate both administrative capacity 
development and can also influence the processes surrounding the absorption of EU 
funding (illustrated in Figure 8). Therefore, it is the complex interplay between formal 
administrative conditions (institutional setup, legal and procedural infrastructure, 
human resources, territorial settings) and the influence domestic political factors 
(patronage/support/ clientelism) over the latter, and on several stages of the 
absorption policy process, that may explain variations in the overall absorption 
performance achieved for CP and SF implementation.  
 
8.2.3 Wider theoretical implications  
 
Before discussing what the above findings would entail in practice for policy-makers 
at the European and national level, this thesis’ findings can be linked to several debates 
in political science and European Union Studies. The contribution made to these 
debates is tangential and secondary in nature, compared to the primary contribution 
which is to the studies of CP and SF delivery. 
 
First and foremost, this study’s findings have implications for debates on the literature 
on post-communist institutional developments. More specifically, the case of SF funds 
management and implementation reveals the persistent institutional and state 
capacity gaps that potentially affect countries from the area. As widely theorised and 
discussed by different authors, the shift from a highly centralised to a Western 
“Weberian” type of meritocratic bureaucracy has been marred by specific challenges 
(Verheijen 1999; Goetz and Wollman 2001; Dimitrov et al. 2006). Moreover, the 
conditionality-driven reforms of the public administration promoted in the run-up to 
accession (Grabbe 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Dimitrova 2005) 
have been only partly effective in relation to developing the institutions managing EU 
funding. Indeed, this was potentially affected by the fact that following EU 
enlargement, politicians have tried to scale reforms that were carried out in the public 
administration prior to accession (Meyer-Sahling 2011; Tănăsoiu 2012; Ganev 2013). 
In this respect, the management and implementation of EU funds could reveal the still 
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fragile status of the civil service and the wider public administration in the two 
countries, or potentially in the area as a whole. This is especially the case if we are to 
consider the relations between civil servants and political masters and the extensive 
processes of politicisation still unfolding in public administrations. In this respect, 
domestic political actors could further challenge processes of institutionalisation of 
EU driven rules (Dimitrova 2010; Sedelmeier 2011; Ganev 2013). 
 
Second, and in close connection with the final point above, this thesis’ findings could 
contribute to the wide discussions on the relevance of politico-administrative relations 
and the impact that politicisation has on the functioning of public administrations. 
Firstly, as theorised by several other authors, these relations have an important 
bearing on civil trajectories for public administration reforms (Verheijen 2001; Pollit 
and Bouckaert 2004). This study confirms that the relationship between politicians 
and civil servants is not only fundamental for public policy design but equally for the 
implementation of domestic and for EU developed policies. An insightful stream of the 
literature on comparative politics, specifically on party patronage, has examined how 
political agents seek to control the appointments of bureaucrats (Verheijen 1999; 
Peters and Pierre 2004; Meyer-Sahling 2004; Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova 2012). 
Although patronage related appointments of staff varied in the different institutions 
handling EU funding, these had a largely negative impact on the functioning of these 
institutions. The management of EU funds and the institutional eco-system 
surrounding the implementation of EU funding has provided new opportunities for 
patronage related practices and could provide an additional case study for those 
interested in examining politico-administrative relations (Surubaru 2017). Thirdly, 
and as stressed throughout this thesis, there was often a component of political 
clientelism and corruption, which affected the management and distribution of EU 
funding. Nevertheless, this study does show that political clientelism affected the 
evolution and implementation of certain Operational Programmes. Equally, these 
findings might be useful for theoretical discussions on state capture (Hellman 2000; 
Barnes 2007; Ganev 2008). In addition, they link well to several recent empirical 
studies which point to the clientelistic exchanges and their strong effects, for instance, 
on the allocation of public procurement (Fazekas et al. 2013; Dimulescu et al. 2013; 
Stefanov et al. 2015; Mungiu-Pipiddi 2015; Ghergina and Volintiru 2017). 
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Last but not least, there are clear parallels between some of this study’s findings and 
the extensive debates on the factors affecting compliance with EU law (Treib 2014). 
Firstly, there are strong links with the argument that administrative capabilities and 
the general administrative capacity of governments can influence the transposition 
and enforcement of EU directives into national law (Hille and Knill 2006; Börzel et al. 
2010). More specifically, the importance of coordination mechanisms at the 
governmental level has potentially increased the ability of countries to transpose EU 
directives (Zubek 2005; Dimitrova and Toshkov 2007) whilst, indeed, insufficient 
personnel could affect the capacity to comply with EU law (Falkner et al. 2004). These 
were some of the same factors affecting the institutional and human resources systems 
used by national governments for EU funds delivery.  
 
Secondly, the importance of domestic political factors and politics has been equally 
acknowledged as important for the transposition of EU directives (Mastenbrook 2005; 
Dimitrova and Toshkov 2009). This is in line with the general argument made in this 
thesis that domestic politics must be taken into account more thoroughly in order to 
understand variation across and within cases on EU funds implementation. Finally, 
several researchers have shown that the records of compliance with EU law have been 
relatively high in new member states (Sedelmeier 2008; Toshkov 2008). Similarly, 
there was no evidence in this thesis to lend support to the argument that CEECs as a 
whole are more problematic than older member states in EU funds absorption 
variation, which is in line with other recent studies (Bachtler, Mendez, and Oraže 2013; 
Tosun 2014; Mendez and Bachtler 2016). Overall, it might be relevant to assess 
comparatively what “practical problems” (Toshkov 2009) the “world of politics” 
(Dimitrova and Toshkov 2009) pose for both national patterns of compliance with EU 
law and for absorption of EU funds. In this respect, both debates would benefit from 
scrutinising more in-depth the link between formal governmental/administrative 
capacities and informal domestic political governance and dynamics present in 
different member states (Surubaru 2016a).  
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8.3 Normative and policy implications of findings 
 
Having discussed the theoretical implications of the findings, this sub-section 
continues by addressing more practical and policy related discussions. In doing so, the 
section provides an answer to the third and fourth research questions: What does the 
capacity and performance of Bulgaria and Romania to manage Structural Funds say 
about their overall ability to integrate in the European Union? Moreover, what do the 
findings imply about the governance of Cohesion Policy and Structural Funds in 
Central and Eastern Europe? In addition, it discusses potential solutions and proposes 
some recommendations for policy-makers in the two countries and from the area. 
Apart from these, the final sub-section deals with potential implications for the way in 
which the policy is designed in Brussels and some of the lessons that could be learned, 
by EU policy-makers, from the on the ground management and implementation 
process of CP and SF.  
 
8.3.1 Bulgaria’s and Romania’s CP governance and their EU 
integration 
 
When Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union more than one decade ago 
they were perceived as “outliers” or “laggards” when compared to their regional peers 
(Pridham 2007; Noutcheva and Bechev 2008; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2008). 
The decision to allow the two countries to join the EU bloc was mainly political. For its 
part, Brussels, however, instituted an unprecedented post-accession conditionality 
mechanism entitled the Mechanism for Cooperation and Effectiveness (CVM) which 
sought to deal with remaining gaps in judiciary and anti-corruption reforms in the two 
countries.148 All this meant that EU officials were rather concerned with the state of 
internal reforms at the time of accession. This was particularly in the general context 
of an “unfinished transition” which characterised both countries when they became 
EU member states (Andreev 2009; Dimitrov and Dimitrova 2016). Two other points 
need to be stressed. 
 
                                                             
148 Some argued that EU funds also implied a conditionality-like effect (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010; 
Spendzharova and Vachudova 2012). 
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First, an interesting parallel can be drawn between this study and those seeking to 
understand the evolution of the CVM in the two countries and why it was, allegedly, 
more successful in Romania than in Bulgaria (Spendzharova and Vachudova 2012; 
Sedelmeier and Lacatus 2016).149 In short, the reform of the judiciary and anti-
corruption measures gained much more ground politically in Romania, starting with 
2004-2005, which allowed for considerable processes of institution-building that 
strengthened the infrastructure of the judiciary (Mendelski 2012; Sedelmeier and 
Lacatus 2016). Interestingly, as demonstrated in this thesis, the same mechanism 
applied to the management and implementation of EU funding. However, in this case, 
it was Bulgaria that was more apt from an administrative point of view to manage 
SF.150 Partly, this was because the issue received considerable political attention and 
was placed on the top political agenda (Spendzharova and Vachudova 2012; Paliova 
and Lybek 2014). This ensured an overall functional background via a process of 
institutional consolidation, procedural standardisation and incentivising human 
resources (Surubaru 2016a). Therefore, it could be argued that institutions which 
received higher political support were better equipped, at least from an administrative 
point of view, to advance the anti-corruption agenda in Romania or EU funds delivery 
in Bulgaria. Despite the above, important empirical puzzles remain with regard to the 
two areas. First, the Romanian judiciary and anti-corruption drive has been criticised 
for the lack of substantive reforms (Mendelski 2012). There is no doubt, however, that 
at least from a quantitative point of view high-level corruption was addressed much 
more in Bucharest than by Sofia.151  
 
Second, a strong question mark still remains on the use and impact of EU funds in the 
two countries. As expected by some (Dimitrova 2010; Ganev 2013), SF have been 
subject to politicisation and local political and economic vested interests (Surubaru 
2017). Nevertheless, the Borisov and Ponta governments did adopt important 
measures to facilitate the absorption of EU funding. One potential explanation could 
be that as compared to predecessor governments, the latter two amassed strong 
political power during their mandates and had the potential to mobilise the 
                                                             
149 Several authors would disagree with this point (Gateva 2013; Ganev 2013). However, it goes 
beyond the scope of this study to discuss these nuances here.  
150 This is not the same with the impact that Structural Funds have had on socio-economic 
developments in the two countries. This will require a separate analysis. 
151 One important caveat is that this has led to an increasing polarization and in-fighting between 
several Romanian political institutions and the judiciary branch. 
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administration to achieve this end. They also pledged to use EU funds better and used 
absorption as a political weapon against their opponents. Moreover, this did not mean 
that politicians from their own ranks, or from all other political parties and the 
different cartels or networks affiliated to them, were not interested in the potential 
distribution of this funding.152 However, the evidence gathered in this study simply 
revealed that the scale of inefficiency and abuse was much higher in Romania. In part, 
this could be because more funds were allocated to Romania than Bulgaria. More 
substantially, the explanation offered in this thesis related to the strong delays in 
Bucharest developing the administrative capacity required to implement these funds. 
Moreover, it could be that SF abuses were hidden within the Bulgarian administration, 
although no evidence was found to lend any support to this idea. 
 
Finally, the two countries have been net beneficiaries from the EU budget in terms of 
the transfers that they received from Brussels. Following accession, a certain sense of 
entitlement characterised political and administrative elites in the two countries. In 
this respect, SF and other aid was largely perceived by some politicians as a reward for 
the efforts of joining the community bloc. This potentially had two direct 
consequences. Firstly, this meant that there was a rush towards “absorption” from 
these countries governments, ignoring the need to understand the main principles 
behind SF and to increase the capacity required to implement them. Secondly, SF 
revealed, in fact, some of the main problems affecting the distribution of public 
resources in the two countries. For instance, the structural problems with public 
procurement reflected the overall lack of transparency and accountability in these 
systems and the consistent tendencies to misuse public money by different political 
networks. Moreover, deficiencies in administrative capacity have brought to light the 
state of the civil service, affected by low financial incentives and poor skills, the daily 
challenges raised by politicisation, as well as the poor strategic and planning abilities 
of both administrative and political stakeholders.  
 
Several recommendations can be sketched for policy-makers in Bulgaria and 
Romania. A wider set of recommendations can be outlined first. All future 
governments should politically commit to acknowledging the vital role of EU 
                                                             
152 OLAF investigators have revealed in personal interviews that the misuse and abuse of SF spread 
across all political spectrums. 
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investment funds for national and local development. Second, in terms of 
administrative capacity, strengthening the ability of the institutions involved in the 
process by ensuring them with the necessary resources and stability should be a 
constant priority for the two governments. This could mean ensuring that all posts in 
Managing Authorities / Intermediate Bodies are filled, a better use of technical 
assistance funding and a wider simplification and standardisation of the national rules 
and bureaucratic standards is undertaken. Third, the political stability of these 
institutions should be safeguarded against political interference in the appointments 
of staff working in MAs/IBs and other relevant bodies (e.g. procurement agencies). 
Moreover, clear criteria could be developed in order to improve the evaluation and 
selection of EU funded projects, as well as the allocation of public procurement, in 
order to strengthen transparency and accountability in the use of these funds. Such 
criteria should equally apply to national funding and local and regional development 
schemes, which remain vulnerable to political manipulation. Last but not least, 
stronger mechanisms of interaction are needed between politicians, funds 
administrators and final beneficiaries. This includes more regular dialogue with 
funding applicants and final beneficiaries by using civil society platforms (e.g. the 
Coalitions for Structural Funds) and, more widely, by including academics to 
independently assess developments in this area.  
 
Bulgarian authorities could try to maintain the coordination abilities of the Central 
Coordination Unit, avoid the further fragmentation of Managing Authorities in 
different line ministries, and use technical assistance at the same level as during 2007-
2013. Equally, they should ensure that the regional level offices of Managing 
Authorities continue to function properly and keep experienced experts and staff in 
place following governmental changes. Finally, a wider operational audit could be 
carried out to assess the regularity of spending in the different Operational 
Programmes (2007-2013) and to confirm whether or not the funding, including public 
procurement, is distributed and used in an accountable and transparent manner.  
 
Romanian authorities should first commit to guaranteeing the stability of the 
management and control systems and avoid any other radical changes to the 
institutional system. Second, the Regional Development Agencies should be used 
much more extensively in the regional and local management of the funding, in light 
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of their independence and robust capacity. Third, more efforts should be made to 
ensure that standardised procedures and templates are used, and that legislation and 
additional rules are interpreted in a standard manner by all institutions and final 
beneficiaries. This includes improving relations between the Audit Authority, which 
should avoid excessive demands from its auditees’, and the Managing Authorities. 
Finally, the Romanian authorities have to improve standards of transparency if it 
wants to counteract the current mis-perception that most EU funds equal corruption 
which could have long-term consequences. 
 
All in all, the management and implementation of Structural Funds were a case in 
point which revealed that Bulgaria and Romania were partly prepared for EU 
obligations and policy implementation at the start of 2007. Nevertheless, as was 
argued throughout this thesis, the ability of politicians and administrators to 
cooperate, assume and commit towards certain policy goals could increase this ability 
and the integration of these countries in the EU. Moreover, creating a new domestic 
political consensus, in line with civil society demands and visions, could strengthen 
these countries’ position as member states in Brussels, particularly in the context of 
the multiple crises affecting the continent. 
 
8.3.2 Cohesion Policy and Structural Funds governance in 
CEECs  
 
Having discussed some of this research for Bulgaria and Romania, the final question 
raised in this thesis is what do these findings imply for the governance of Cohesion 
Policy in the area as a whole? First and foremost, it must be emphasized that there are 
clear differences in terms of capacity and the performance between countries from the 
area with countries such as Estonia, Lithuania and Poland being some of the highest 
performers in absorbing EU funding during 2004-2007 and 2007-2013 (Bachtler et 
al. 2013a; Tosun 2014). The latter cross-national analyses have not taken into account 
empirical evidence from Bulgaria and Romania, which is where this study seeks to 
make an important empirical contribution. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that it 
might be misleading to treat the whole area as a block given the important differences 
between countries. In addition, it must be stressed that not all of the findings on 
Bulgaria and Romania are relevant for countries in the area. With these caveats in 
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mind, several points can be made on what some of the findings could imply about the 
governance of CP in the area. 
 
First, it is clear from the research and wider literature review that are many common 
problems affecting CEECs in terms of administrative capacity. CP implementation has 
been subject to institutional instability and problems, excessive bureaucratic 
procedures or poor and untrained human resources. Although, administrative 
capacity-building for EU funds implementation is a challenge for both old and new 
European member states alike (Paraskevopoulos and Leonardi 2004; Baun and Marek 
2008; Bachtler et al. 2013a), deficiencies in this area will persist if governments are 
not willing to commit more resources for strengthening the institutional, bureaucratic 
and human resources capacities or to address specific problems such as the divergent 
interpretations of rules by different institutions or violations of public procurement 
law. 
 
Second, political disagreements and “deadlocks” are still some of the key challenges 
facing countries from CEECs (Baun and Marek 2008; Bache et al. 2011; Patenaude 
2014; Surubaru 2016a). The impact of political factors largely remains unaccounted in 
the area. These range from the general impact of domestic politics and contestation on 
CP (Baun and Marek 2008) to using “absorption” as a political tool (Scherpeerel 2010; 
Haughton 2014) or to a lack of strategic vision from political representatives 
(Dabrowski 2008; Zaman and Cristea 2011; Bachtler et al. 2013a). Likewise, the 
politicisation of staff appointments or interferences in the distribution of EU funded 
projects and tender contracts (Fazekas et al. 2013; Dimulescu et al. 2013; Surubaru 
2017).  The above constitute some of the key distinctive features of the region and has 
attracted considerable criticism from EU officials (Surubaru 2016a). In the upcoming 
negotiations for CP 2021+ arguments regarding the politicisation of funding could be 
used against CEECs members by the EC and by the net contributors to the EU budget. 
This is especially the case given perceived fears from Brussels on the rise of 
“illiberalism” in the area and equally due to resentments on the opposition to EU 
designed quotas adopted after the migrant crises of 2015/2016.    
 
Third, it is not clear whether a further decentralisation and a thorough application of 
the “multi-level governance” regime and the partnership principle promoted by CP can 
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improve the implementation of EU funding, especially in Bulgaria and Romania, or in 
some of the highly centralised countries from the region. CP implementation does raise 
further questions on regional governance and processes of regionalisation in the area 
(Bachtler et al. 2000; Baun and Marek 2006; Ferry and McMaster 2006; Scherpereel 
2010). However, EU funds might be used in order to strengthen domestic political 
agendas rather than lead to a transformation of regional development processes (Palne 
Kovacs 2004 quoted in Bachtler and McMaster 2008; Ferry and McMaster 2013a). It 
remains to be seen to what extent regional development processes may advance after 
2020, in light of macro-political and economic developments affecting the continent 
and the potential core-periphery discrepancies that could affect the future of EU 
integration project.   
 
Finally, one of the implications deriving from the rush towards the “absorption” 
behaviour found in Bulgaria and Romania, and the extensive level of irregularities 
uncovered in the latter, brings into discussion the risk of irregular, problematic or even  
useless EU funded projects (Horvat and Maier 2004; Damian 2013). Moreover, as 
pointed by others, there is sometimes a trade-off between the ability of countries from 
the area to manage CP and the actual impact that SF have on the ground (Ferry and 
McMaster 2013a). Therefore, countries from the area still need to carefully balance an 
effective institutional management of CP with the socio-economic impact of thousands 
of SF funded projects, especially in light of the fact that these funds have become the 
primary source for domestic investments in the area (Palne Kovacs 2016, 306). 
 
In line with the above, several brief recommendations can be made to policy-makers 
from CEECs. Firstly, the administrative capacity of states in managing Cohesion Policy 
and other EU funding should be a priority for governments in the area. In order to 
achieve this, capacity-building measures and exercises need to be developed also using 
more academic evidence of what potentially works in the different countries and in 
stronger consultation with the relevant non-governmental stakeholders (e.g. final 
beneficiaries / civil society representatives). This objective would mean finding a 
viable compromise between strengthening management and control systems, 
including dealing with fraud and irregularities, and the bureaucratic pressure that 
comes from audits and verifications. Second, political elites from the area have to 
commit towards using these resources as best as possible and to strengthen or simply 
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allow the institutions that administer them to function free of any negative political 
interference. Last but not least, the absorption of EU funds is not an end in itself but 
the means for local and national development. If Structural and Investment Funds are 
not used to achieve this then it is likely that inter-regional disparities will deepen, 
particularly in a region which is already deeply affected by migration and demographic 
decline. 
 
8.3.3 Cohesion Policy governance at the EU level 
 
European Cohesion Policy, and the investment Structural Funds affiliated to it, are 
among the most evaluated and academically debated EU policies. CP is subject to 
divergent and thriving theoretical debates. Most of these are structured around the 
impact and added value that the policy has on socio-economic development. However, 
a growing literature evaluates the factors affecting the effectiveness of its delivery at 
the national level. This thesis has concentrated much more on delivery side of the 
debate, examining the effects of domestic administrative capacity and political 
governance might have on these processes. This sub-section will briefly discuss the 
relevance and implications of the findings for the design and governance of EU CP as 
a whole, outlining several policy recommendations.  
 
The EU enlargement process towards CEECs has undoubtedly challenged the 
budgetary and institutional dimension of CP (Baun and Marek 2008; Bachtler, 
Mendez and Wishlade 2013). From a budgetary point of view, new member states such 
as Poland have been among the highest recipients of SF from all EU-28 members, 
allegedly, at the expense of older members such as Greece or Portugal. From an 
institutional point of view, the accession of CEECs has brought new challenges for the 
policy, in light of the difference in public administration functionality and the varied 
practices affecting public policy implementation in the area. Since the early 2000s, 
problems of administrative capacity have often been highlighted by EU officials in 
relation to countries from the area.153 Several policy evaluations have been tried to 
                                                             
153 EC Rapid Press Release, 6 July 2003, "Fonds structurels et Fonds de cohésion: les pays adherents 
doivent encore renforcer leur capacité administrative" Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/1031&format=DOC&aged=1&langu
age=FR&guiLanguage=en (accessed March 2017). 
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explain some of the deficiencies in the area (Boeckhout et al. 2002; OIR 2003). In 
parallel, a growing academic literature has started to unpack the concept of 
administrative capacity and CP governance more generally (Sumpikova et al. 2003; 
Horvat and Maier 2004; Bachtler and McMaster 2008; Bachtler et al. 2013a; 
Smeriglio et al. 2015; Surubaru 2016a). Based on the research carried out for this 
thesis, several points can be raised on the governance and delivery of CP and SF.   
 
First, there is a tension between the CP governance model designed in Brussels and 
the national and local implementation conditions. On the one hand, CP is developed 
using a technocratic approach to institution-building which sometimes ignores local 
political and governance related conditions (Batterbury 2002; Lang 2003). However, 
in recent years, place based narratives have become a dominant part of the discourse 
on Cohesion Policy reforms (Barca 2009; Mendez 2013). These assert the need for 
locally targeted investments and for taking into account the local economic and 
institutional contexts in which the policy is being implemented. There is now a 
stronger emphasis on monitoring and evaluation, and a shift towards effectiveness 
which would partly be dealt with by governance and institutional reforms (Farole et 
al. 2011; McCann and Ortega Argiles 2012). With all this, the problems related to 
governance and delivery raise further questions on the mismatch between the macro-
design of the policy and its micro-level implementation. 
 
Second, there is a considerable power-play between EU and national authorities with 
regard to CP implementation, especially on the issues of irregularities and financial 
corrections for SF projects. The legitimacy of the latter sanctions are highly contested 
at the national level revealing tensions between the different stakeholders involved in 
the delivery of CP. However, the EC has to guarantee the regularity of CP spending and 
the “shared management” principle entitles it to adopt such measures. As noted there 
is a clash between the technocratic dimension of policy-design and its domestic 
implementation, which is often subject to domestic political processes and vested 
interests. The EU’s ability or tools to counteract the domestic politicisation of CP in 
CEECs are limited given that members from the area would arguably oppose, when 
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negotiating the general regulations, any strong EU-level instruments aimed at 
counteracting SF mismanagement (Surubaru 2017). 
 
Finally, as seen in the case of Bulgaria and Romania, the complex and highly 
bureaucratic nature of the policy has posed particular problems in terms of policy 
implementation. In addition to this, the tendency of national actors to add other rules 
or the excessive audit and verification activities affiliated to CP (Mendez and Bachtler 
2011) have had considerable constraining effects on the capacity of all the actors 
involved in the area. If CP is underpinned by an excessive bureaucratic exercise its 
potential impact on the ground might be limited. 
 
In light of the above, several concrete recommendations can be made to policy-makers 
in Brussels. Firstly, the technocratic design of the policy blueprinted by the European 
Commission should give more consideration to national public administration 
traditions and developments. As noted by Barca et al., CP has to increasingly take into 
account the institutional, legal, geographical and political heterogeneity (2012, 144) of 
member states. Although a “differentiated approach” could be taken into account for 
future CP frameworks post-2020, this should not be done along the lines of a core-
periphery logic. More concretely, CP regulations could emphasize much more on the 
importance of administrative capacity development and more resources could be 
invested in this area and the EC could develop more capacity-building exercises. For 
instance, the current Task Force for Better Implementation setup in the EC’s DG Regio 
should be extended to DG Employment and should report transparently on the 
measures adopted by member states. Moreover, EU institutions should avoid the 
fallacies of “best practices” (Addison 2009) and one size fits all evaluations and 
indexes. Instead, EU policy-makers could take into account more tailored assessments 
and more critical input from academic research. 
 
Secondly, EU policy-makers need to take into account the political realities that stem 
from the implementation of the policy. As argued in this thesis, and by Milio (2007a), 
the delivery of the policy has to balance out political and administrative elements. 
Moreover, CP might be ingrained in a democratic paradox where in order to increase 
its legitimacy the policy would need to be actually be positively politicised at the local 
level (Olsson 2003). In this respect, the policy cannot be implemented without the 
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input of domestic political elites. The pressure exercised by Brussels at the political 
level (from the Head of the EC or the Regional Policy Commissioner) have yielded 
some positive results for CP delivery. However, political pressure, punitive measures 
or monitoring instruments should only be used as measures of last resort from the 
EU’s side. Instead, more effective cooperation and dialogue must be cultivated 
between the different EC, national and local political and administrative stakeholders, 
especially outside CP Monitoring Committees. This dialogue could be conceptualised 
in newly formulated principles for “shared management” and “partnership”.  
 
Lastly, if the policy needs to achieve a certain level of impact it requires further 
simplification or at least a reduction of the complex measures and mechanisms behind 
it. Simplification could make the policy more politically accountable and potentially 
more widely known locally through an increased publicity. During negotiations for the 
future of EU investment funds, strategic frameworks should seek to accommodate 
much more local political preferences and local development needs and visions. On a 
long-term basis, an increased awareness and legitimacy of the policy could improve 
the quality of the spending. This would ensure that “Cohesion” remains one of the 
main drivers of the EU in a post-Brexit era. 
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8.4 Final conclusions, thesis limitations and further 
research avenues  
  
This thesis has examined the effectiveness of Cohesion Policy and Structural Funds 
delivery in Central and Eastern European countries. More specifically, it has evaluated 
the influence of administrative capacity and political factors on the absorption of SF 
in Bulgaria and Romania, during 2007-2013. Drawing on a review of the literature, on 
several primary and secondary sources and on original empirical data, the main thesis 
advanced has been the following: in order to understand how the policy has been 
governed at the national level, and in particular the level of SF absorption 
performance, we must account for the domestic interplay between administrative 
capacity and political factors. Put differently, the way in which administrative and 
political factors have interacted has shaped the capacity of the two countries to govern 
CP and influenced the level of SF financial absorption attained by the two at a given 
point in time. Several broad conclusions can be further outlined.  
 
Firstly, administrative capacity is sine qua non condition for states in order to reach 
an adequate level of absorption. The institutional setup (including at the territorial / 
sub-national level), the bureaucratic tools and procedures and the number and quality 
of the human resources involved in the absorption process matter for the absorption 
of EU financial assistance. Moreover, political factors are conducive to the general 
development of these formal administrative capacities (Milio 2007a, 255-256). More 
concretely, political factors such as stability (absence of political patronage in 
managing institutions) and support (commitment and support for technical 
implementation) could strengthen the specific institutional environments and 
domestic administrative capacity arrangements required for CP delivery.  
 
Secondly, this thesis has shown that the multiple problems faced in the 
implementation of CP and SF by countries like Bulgaria, and especially Romania, were 
political rather than only administrative in nature. The shallow distinction between 
the administrative and the political sphere is still a pervasive characteristic of 
countries from the area. Structural Funds are designed as public policy instruments 
which seem to be designed and dealt with by a functional, professional or even de-
politicised administration. However, the instable political nature of public 
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administrations functioning in CEECs and the impact of political interference cannot 
be ignored. In addition, the general political governance of the policy at the domestic 
level, or the way in which political stakeholders provide an impetus for policy 
implementation / SF absorption can make a considerable difference. Given this, it can 
be concluded that it was the politics of SF management and implementation was 
dysfunctional. Political dysfunctionalities could partly explain the structural and 
administrative of institutions administering EU aid or some of the key bottlenecks 
arising in the absorption policy process.  
  
Against this background, one of the key challenges for CP governance would be to 
maintain a positive level of domestic political input (which could also increase the 
legitimacy of the policy) in order to strengthen the administrative capacity of 
specialised institutions. This might be difficult to achieve in practice given the vested 
interests around the use of public investment funds and the degrees of political 
clientelism and corruption still generating irregularities. Nevertheless, the presence of 
EU funds in local political competitions and discourses and the increasing awareness, 
of their utility for domestic development, including media attention and pressure from 
civil society actors, could contribute to a more accountable and effective use of these 
resources.  
 
Thirdly, the external governance dimension of CP implies denser levels of control and 
accountability and a closer scrutiny from EU institutions for the domestic 
implementation of the policy. In line with Europeanisation driven analyses of CP, it 
could simply be argued that there was an incompatibility between the design and 
principles used for SF and the capacity and practices of domestic institutional 
environments. Moreover, following the accession of Bulgaria and Romania into the EU 
in 2007, there were lower incentives for continuing reforms and the public 
administration faced new waves of re-politicisation. It could be speculated that some 
administrative and political elites have indeed tried to profit from the distribution of 
EU funding (Dimitrova 2010; Ganev 2013). Nevertheless, given the strong levels of 
oversight built in CP this was not possible or at least not at the same scale this tends 
to affect domestic funding schemes. Domestic political elites realised this after several 
technical and political clashes with EU institutions. Moreover, Brussels was also in a 
position of power towards the two countries given the political oversight of the CVM 
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and the lack of experience of these countries in managing SF. Although the pressure 
of EU policy-makers was largely positive, more could be done in providing assistance 
to these countries, and switching from a logic of control to one of enhanced 
cooperation. This includes discussions on the future framework of CP and the use of 
SF in the area.  
 
One of the specific accomplishments of this thesis was to highlight the need to 
acknowledge how domestic political factors mediate the absorption of SF at the 
national level. If future reforms do not address the issue of administrative capacity and 
political governance, including the problems generated by politicisation, then the 
narratives of CP’s added value will be further challenged in the area (Surubaru 2017). 
That is not to say that the influence of political stakeholders should be limited. On the 
contrary, more efforts are required to engage national and local politicians and 
administrative elites on this subject. In this respect, a more practical debate is needed 
on the ways in which the relationship between politicians and administrators can be 
strengthened in order to achieve CPs real aim of reducing socio-economic disparities 
between the regions of Europe. 
 
When carrying the research several limitations have been encountered. Firstly, it 
became clear at several stages during the research that the complexity of CP 
management and implementation cannot be easily conceptualised and captured. SF 
absorption is contingent not only on the capacity of responsible institutions and the 
political dynamics in a given country but also on several uncontrollable factors 
affecting the absorption policy cycle. For instance, the impact of the economic and 
financial crisis generated problems of national co-financing and limited the ability of 
national stakeholders to profit from the flow of funding. In addition, it can be argued 
that each Operational Programme or individual SF funded projects faced its own 
specific problems. Secondly, the absorption rate of a country evolves constantly and 
reaches a final level only after the financial closure of its programmes. This means that 
the issue of timing, and the temporal evolution of absorption, might be essential. As a 
result, a comparison of several multi-annual financial frameworks might provide more 
robust evidence on the factors assessed. Finally, several indicators of the absorption 
capacity model proposed in this thesis might be potentially difficult to operationalise 
and use in other empirical settings. However, as argued in the methodological section, 
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this thesis strived for findings valid for the main cases reviewed. These did corroborate 
with many of the studies focusing on CP in CEECs and the EU as a whole. Therefore, 
the absorption capacity model did provide a viable framework for examining this 
thesis’ main research questions. It did so by detailing how individual political and 
administrative elements factors, and their interaction, could explain some of the key 
patterns in the evidence. Nevertheless, other measurements of administrative capacity 
and of political governance could be devised and tested against empirical evidence 
from the national, OP/thematic or regional/local levels. 
 
Cohesion Policy remains one of the most academically scrutinised public policies to 
date. Despite this, several future research avenues might be beneficial for both 
theoretical investigation and practical knowledge with a view for improving its 
governance and general delivery. First, this thesis advocates that, in order to obtain a 
wider understanding of the phenomenon of SF absorption, the interplay between 
formal administrative capacity conditions and informal political domestic 
arrangements needs to be taken into account more thoroughly. This could be done in 
order to understand the impact of political process and their effects on SF delivery in 
countries from South and Central and Eastern Europe. For instance, more mixed 
methods research designs could be adopted in order to understand how certain 
variables such as quality of government have a concrete impact on CP delivery.  
 
Second, the socio-economic impact of CP is still difficult to establish (Bachtler, Mendez 
and Wishlade 2013, 140). A potential avenue for inquiry would be to examine the 
relationship between delivery mechanisms (and factors such as administrative 
capacity) and whether or not these affect the quality of the spending national or 
regional/local level. To this aim, insights from the wider literature on development 
aid, from developing and non-European countries could be taken much more into 
account.  
 
Third, the input of the various stakeholders engaged in the absorption policy process 
has to be examined more in-depth. It is not only the capacity of state institutions which 
is relevant for SF absorption but equally that of EU funds beneficiaries or even private 
consultancies. This thesis showed that there is an interesting symmetry between 
deficiencies found at the macro and micro levels of CP management and the 
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implementation, in which both state and non-state actors are involved. In essence this 
buttresses the argument that deficiencies were related to the interplay between 
structural administrative and informal political conditions.  
 
Finally, although it has not been the specific focus of this thesis, more research is 
needed to understand the potential spill-over effects that CP might have on national 
and regional institutions. As argued by some the implementation of Cohesion Policy 
and Structural Funds might trigger reforms in the public administration of countries 
from the area (Bafoil and Lhomel 2003) or have a spill-over effect and improve the 
quality of governance in different regions (Nakrošis 2008; EPRC and Metis 2009). 
Such claims must be further scrutinised in relation to evidence from the 2007-2013 
and 2014-2020 implementation periods. Studies could take into account whether or 
not the governance of external cohesion aid has produced any concrete effects on the 
workings and procedures of national and local institutions or on the principles and 
practices used for spending domestic public resources. If such a link is conceivable 
then the management and implementation of CP could have long-term consequences 
for national and regional development. 
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Romania, Bulgaria, Malta – EC Head of Unit #2, 16 October 2013 
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-Policy Officer – Bulgaria – DG Regio – Unit E1 – Competence Centre for Administrative 
Capacity Building – EC Policy Officer for administrative capacity #1 , 17 October 2013 
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-Former Head of Bulgarian Unit, DG Regio, Unit E3 – Bulgaria, Former EC Head of Unit 
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-Head of Unit, OLAF, Investigations, OLAF representative #1, 9 October 2014 
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Bulgaria 
-Head of Unit “Programming of EU funds” in Central Coordination Unit, Head of Unit in 
Bulgarian Central Coordination Unit #1, 24 April 2014 
-Policy Officer, Former Bulgarian Certifying Authority employee, Policy Officer in 
Bulgarian Central Coordination Unit #2, 24 April 2014 
-Consultant, Intel Advisers, Bulgarian EU funds consultant #1, 29 April 2014  
-Consultant, Intel Advisers, Bulgarian EU funds consultant #2, 29 April 2014 
-Consultant, Intel Advisers, Bulgarian EU funds consultant #3, 29 April 2014 
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-Deputy Director of the Bulgarian Managing Authority for the Human Resources Development 
Operational Programme, Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #1, 30 
April 2014 
-Director of Directorate Territorial Cooperation Management, Manager of Cross-Border 
Cooperation programmes, Bulgarian Ministry of Regional Development, Director of 
Bulgarian Managing Authority #1, 30 April 2014 
-Head of Monitoring, Evaluation and Programming of the Territorial Cooperation 
Management Programmes, Bulgarian Ministry of Regional Development, Bulgarian Cross-
Border Cooperation Programme #1, 30 April 2014 
-Bulgarian Academic, Bulgarian academic #1, 02 May 2014 (informal interview) 
-Head of Unit Programming in the Bulgarian Managing Authority for the Administrative 
Capacity Operational Programme, Head of Unit in Bulgarian Managing Authority #1, 
7 May 2014 
-Expert, Member of the Bulgarian Coalition of Sustainable Use of EU funds, Former state 
official working on EU funds (1998-2008), Bulgarian Expert #1, 8 May 2014 
-Bulgarian Certifying Authority Representative, Operational Programme Regional 
Development Department, Bulgarian Certifying Authority Representative #1, 13 May 
2014 
-Bulgarian Certifying Authority Representative, Operational Programme Human Resources 
Development Department, Bulgarian Certifying Authority Representative #2, 13 May 
2014 
-Head of Unit “Programming and Evaluation”, Bulgarian Managing Authority for the 
Operational Programme Regional Development, Head of Unit of Bulgarian Managing 
Authority #2, 14 May 2014 
-Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority for the Operational Programme Regional 
Development, Deputy Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2, 14 May 2014 
-Former Director of Managing Authority for Operational Programme Environment (2009-
2013), Former Director of Bulgarian Managing Authority #2, 16 May 2014 
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former Director of the Bulgarian Operational Programme for Regional Development, 
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beneficiary, Bulgarian Civil Society Leader #1, 21 May 2014 
-Programme Manager, Open Society Institute Sofia, EU funded projects beneficiary, 
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Resources Development, Ministry of Labour, Bulgarian Intermediate Body 
representative #1, 22 May 2014 
-Bulgarian Academic, Consultant at KPMG, Bulgarian Expert #4, 22 May 2014 
-Consultant at KPMG, Former Employee of the Bulgarian Certifying Authority, Bulgarian 
EU Funds consultant #4, 22 May 2014 
-Head of South-West Department in the Managing Authority for Operational Programme 
Regional Development, Bulgarian EU funds coordinator for South-West region #1, 
26 May 2014 
-Chief Expert, Methodology and Legislation Analysis Unit, Public Procurement Agency, 
Representative of Bulgarian Public Procurement Agency, 29 May 2014 
-Deputy Director, Bulgarian Audit Authority, Director in Bulgarian Audit Authority, 31 
May 2014 
-Auditor, Bulgarian Audit Authority, Bulgarian Auditor #1, 31 May 2014 
-Head of European programmes and projects Directorate of Sofia Municipality, Bulgarian 
Municipality EU funds Director #1, 4 June 2014 
-Chief Expert in European programmes and projects Directorate of Sofia Municipality, Sofia 
Municipality EU funds Expert #1, 4 June 2014 
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of Ministers, Bulgarian Technical Assistance MA expert #1, 4 June 2014 
-State Expert, Managing Authority for Operational Programme Technical Assistance, Council 
of Ministers, Bulgarian Technical Assistance MA expert #2, 4 June 2014 
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Civil Society Leader #3, 5 June 2014 
-Mayor of Gabrovo Municipality, Former Head of Cabinet of EU funds Minister (2010-2013), 
Bulgarian Mayor #1, 5 June 2014 
-Director of Euro-integration, funds and programming Directorate at Veliko Tarnovo 
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Romania 
-Director General of European programmes Department of the Ministry of Regional 
Development and Public Administration, Director General of Romanian Ministry #1, 6 
March 2014 
-Executive Director, Managing Authority for Operational Programme Regional Development, 
Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1, 6 March 2014 
-Director Managing Authority for Operational Programme Administrative Capacity, Director 
of Romanian Managing Authority #2, 7 March 2014 
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Administrative Capacity, Romanian MA Programme Evaluation Officer #1, 12 March 
2014 
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Development, Romanian MA Programme Evaluation Officer #2, 12 March 2014 
-Romanian Member of Parliament (elected in 2012), Chamber of Deputies, Neamţ County, 
Romanian Member of Parliament #1, 17 March 2014 
-Public Administration Expert, Former Deputy Head of the General Secretariat of the 
Romanian Government, Romanian Expert #1, 18 March 2014 
-Deputy Secretary General of Ministry of Education, Deputy Secretary General of 
Romanian Ministry, 19 March 2014 
-Director for the European funded projects Unit of the Romanian Ministry of Education, 
Romanian EU funds beneficiary #1, 19 March 2014 
-Counsellor – European funded projects Unit of the Romanian Ministry of Education, 
Romanian EU funds beneficiary #2, 19 March 2014 
-EU funds project manager in the Romanian Ministry of Education, former Head of the 
Intermediate Body for Human Resource Development of the Ministry of Education, Former 
Director of Romanian Intermediate Body #1, 19 March 2014 
-Public Manager in the Romanian Ministry of Education, Romanian Public Manager #1, 
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-Vice-president of the Romanian Association of Consultants for Accessing European Funds 
(ACRAFE) and Consultant for TDP Partners, Romanian EU funds consultant #1, 19 
March 2014 
-Director in the Romanian Ministry for European Funds, Director in Romanian Ministry 
of EU funds #1, 21 March 2014 
-Former Director of the Romanian Managing Authority for the Operational Programme 
Regional Development, Former Director of Romanian Managing Authority #1, 21 
March 2014 
-Deputy Director Monitoring Department of the Managing Authority for the Operational 
Programme Regional Development, Romanian EU funds Monitoring officer #1, 26 
March 2014 
-Former Romanian Minister for European Affairs, Former Romanian EU Affairs 
Minister, 27 March 2014 
-Deputy Director Romanian Certifying Authority in the Ministry of Public Finances, 
Representative of Romanian Certifying Authority, 27 March 2014  
-Mayor of Victoria Commune, Iaşi County, Romanian Mayor #1, 4 April 2014 (informal 
interview) 
-Policy Officers, The Regional Office for Cross-Border Cooperation EU funded Programmes 
Romania-Ukraine and Romania-Moldova, Suceava County, Romanian Cross-Border 
Cooperation Programme #1, 4 April 2014 (informal interview) 
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Civil Society Leader #1, 9 April 2014 
-State Secretary, Ministry of European Funds, State Secretary in Romanian Ministry of 
EU Funds, 9 April 2014 
-Counsellor in European Affairs Department, Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Counsellor in Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 April 2014 (informal 
interview) 
-Romanian Institute for Public Policy, Programme’s Director, Romanian Expert #2, 11 
April 2014 
-Coordinator for the Evaluation Department for Operational Programme Transport, 
Romanian MA Programme Evaluation Officer #3, 11 April 2014 
-Director of Managing Authority for Cross-Border Cooperation Programme Romania-
Bulgaria, Director of Romanian Managing Authority #3, 14 April 2014 
 
-Head of Section in the Managing Authority for Cross-Border Cooperation Programme 
Romania-Bulgaria, Romanian Cross-Border Cooperation Programme #2, 14 April 
2014 
 
-Director for European Regional Development Funds Directorate in the Romanian Audit 
Authority, Director in Romanian Audit Authority #1, 14 April 2014 
 
-Auditor Regional Operational Programme, Romanian Audit Authority, Romanian Auditor 
#1, 14 April 2014 
 
-Auditor Regional Operational Programme, Romanian Audit Authority, Romanian Auditor 
#2, 14 April 2014 
 
-Former Director of the Romanian Managing Authority for the Human Resources 
Development Operational Programme, Former Director of Romanian Managing 
Authority #2, 15 April 2014 
 
-Head of North-East Intermediate Body for the Human Resources Development Operational 
Programme, Head of Romanian North-East Intermediate Body, 17 April 2014 
 
-Projects Officer for the North-East Intermediate Body for the Human Resources 
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-Director North-East Regional Development Agency, Director in Romanian North-East 
Regional Development Agency, 17 April 2014 
 
-Former EU funds consultant, Romanian EU funds consultant #2, 17 April 2014 
(informal interview) 
 
-Public Auditor, European Social Fund Directorate, Romanian Auditor #3, 16 July 2015 
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-Expert evaluator, Engineer and Lecturer at the Technical University of Civil Engineering, 
Romanian Project Evaluator #1, 16 July 2015 
 
-Expert in public procurement, Former official in the Romanian Unit for Coordination and 
Verification of Public Procurement part of the Ministry of Finance (UCVAP - Unitatea pentru 
Coordonarea şi Verificarea Achiziţiilor Publice), Romanian Public Procurement Expert 
#1, 16 July 2015 
 
-Member of the College and Senior Expert, Romanian Appeals Council (CNSC – Consiliul 
Naţional de Soluţionare a Contestaţiilor), Representative of Romanian Appeals 
Council, 17 July 2015 
 
-European funds anti-fraud Councillor, The Department for Anti-Fraud Fight (DLAF), 
Romanian Government, Romanian Anti-Fraud Department Representative, 24 July 
2015 (written response) 
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Annex B – Questionnaire / Interview Guide 
 
A. Introduction 
B. Questions  
-Including questionnaire version with multiple choice options: Yes, No, Partially Yes, 
Partially No, Don’t know / Don’t answer. 
 
I Pre-Accession period 
Q_PRE1: During the pre-accession period, did Bulgaria/Romania develop a capacity to 
manage EU funds?  
Q_PRE2: In your opinion, was the transition from pre-accession funds to post-accession 
Structural Funds a difficult one?  
 
II Administrative capacity - Institutional 
Q_INS1: In your opinion, was the institutional architecture/logic for managing Structural 
Funds, during 2007-2013, functional?  
Q_INS2: In your opinion, were Managing Authorities / Intermediate Bodies efficient as 
institutions managing these funds?  
Q_INS4a: During 2007-2013, was there in your opinion an efficient coordination / 
cooperation between your institution and (other) Managing Authorities?  
Q_INS4b: During 2007-2013, was there in your opinion an efficient coordination / 
cooperation between your institution and (other) Intermediate Bodies? 
Q_INS4d: During 2007-2013, was there in your opinion an efficient coordination / 
cooperation between your institution and the Audit Authority? 
Q_INSe: During 2007-2013, was there in your opinion an efficient coordination / 
cooperation between your institution and Certification and Payment Authority? 
Q_INSf: During 2007-2013, was there in your opinion an efficient coordination / 
cooperation between your institution and Host Ministry / Institution? 
Q_INSg: During 2007-2013, was there in your opinion an efficient coordination / 
cooperation between your institution and Central Coordination Unit / Ministry of EU funds? 
Q_INS5: Do you believe you / Managing Institutions have had the necessary independence / 
leadership to manage the absorption process for their Operational Programme? 
Q_INS6: Was your institution / were Managing institutions transparent in their activities 
and were they / you open to answering queries and communicating with applicants and 
funds beneficiaries? 
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III Administrative capacity – Bureaucratic / Procedures 
Q_ADM1a: From an administrative point of view, were there problems / did you have any 
problems in managing / implementing EU funds with – Legislation (Primary/Secondary) 
Q_ADM1b: From an administrative point of view, were there problems / did you have any 
problems in managing / implementing EU funds with - General administrative documents 
(applications’ forms, reimbursement forms etc.)? 
Q_ADM1c: From an administrative point of view, were there problems / did you have any 
problems in managing / implementing EU funds with - Applicant’s guides? 
Q_ADM2: Were there any problems with the stability or uniformity of procedures and rules 
for your Operational Programme / project? 
Q_ADM3: Were there any problems relating to Public Procurement within your Operational 
Programme / priority axis / project? 
Q_ADM4: To what extent did you / Managing institutions use electronic systems to manage 
/ send your application for EU funded projects or for managing these projects internally? 
Q_ADM5a: Did you as a Managing Institution / Project beneficiary use a specific 
methodology for project management?  
Q_ADM6a: Do you think the following procedures were extremely complicated and 
bureaucratic for beneficiaries / for you as a beneficiary - procedures for selecting, evaluating 
and contracting funds? 
Q_ADM6b: Do you think the following procedures were extremely complicated and 
bureaucratic for beneficiaries / for you as a beneficiary - procedures for verifying (including 
auditing/certification of payments) and monitoring the implementation of contracted 
projects? 
 
IV Administrative capacity – Human Resource 
Q_HUM1: Did your institution / managing institutions have sufficient staff to manage its 
tasks regarding EU funds management / implementation? 
Q_HUM2: How would you evaluate the expertize of your staff / staff working in Managing 
Institutions? 
Q_HUM3: Do you think you or your staff / Managing Institutions staff received a sufficient 
amount of professional training in order to carry out your/ their duties / implement an EU 
funded project? 
Q_HUM4: Do you think your staff has had a great volume of work during this period? 
Q_HUM5a: Do you think your staff was sufficiently motivated from – a financial point of 
view - to carry out their duties (relating to EU funds management / projects)? 
Q_HUM5b: Do you think your staff was sufficiently motivated from – a professional point of 
view - to carry out their duties (relating to EU funds management / projects)? 
Q_HUM6 (TER): There are many studies pointing to a strong discrepancy and to big 
differences between the expertise of staff working at the central level and staff working at the 
local level. How would you evaluate the expertise of civil servants managing or working with 
EU funds at the local/regional level? 
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Q_HUM7 (TER): In your opinion, if regions would obtain more autonomy and would be 
more decentralized – would they be more successful in attracting EU funds? 
Q_HUM8a: Did consultancy firms influence in any way the absorption process, in general or 
with regards to your Operational Programme? 
Q_HUM8b: If yes, did these firms play a more positive or a more negative role with regard to 
the absorption process? 
Q_HUM9a: Did beneficiaries influence in any way the absorption process, in general or with 
regards to your Operational Programme? 
Q_HUM9b: If yes, did beneficiaries play a more positive or a more negative role with regard 
to the absorption process? 
 
V Political elements 
Q_POL1: Do you think political stability is important for the absorption process for SF? 
Q_POL2: Did governmental changes or changes at the level of your organization affect your 
everyday activity? 
Q_POL3: During 2007-2013, were there many changes at the management level of your 
institution / Managing Institutions? 
Q_POL4: Do you feel you / Managing Institutions have cooperated well with political 
representatives during 2007-2013? 
Q_POL5: Do you feel you have received or that Managing Institutions have been given 
sufficient strategic feedback from political representatives and has this helped you / them in 
managing the funds? 
Q_POL6: Overall, do you feel that your institution / Managing Institutions received enough 
political support in order to carry out its duties? 
Q_POL7: Do you feel that there have been any influences or political directions with regard 
to the distribution of EU Structural Funds? 
Q_POL8: Do you agree with the idea that certain political actors, especially at the local level, 
have tried to or have benefited more than others from the absorption of EU funds? 
 
VI Relations with EU institutions 
Q_EU1: Do you think you have a good professional relation with Brussels regarding the 
management and implementation of SF? Have you received sufficient technical assistance or 
advice from EU institutions in order to improve the absorption process? 
Q_EU2: Why were payments to some / your OP interrupted /pre-suspended / suspended? 
What were the main irregularities and motivation of the Commission to take this action? 
 
VII Absorption Process and Operational Programmes 
Q_OP1: From all the dimensions of the management cycle for EU funded programmes and 
project what was in your opinion the most difficult? 
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a) Programming of EU funds / Planning EU projects 
b) Selection, evaluation and contracting projects 
c) Implementation of projects 
d) Project monitoring and verification 
e) Financial management 
f) Evaluation 
Q_OP2: What characterizes and distinguishes your Operational Programme as compared to 
others?  Departing from the idea that each priority axis has its own problems, what were the 
most and the least problematic operational axis in your programme?  Or what may explain 
the poor or the successful performance of the OP work for / have experience with?  
Q_OP3: Do you think that the institution you represent / the institutions in general have 
improved their approach towards managing Structural Funds in the last seven years? 
 
VIII Impact and Capacity 
Q_IMP1: How would you evaluate at the moment the quality of your / your OP’s contracted 
or implemented projects? 
Q_IMP2: Have the implemented projects managed to achieve their indicators and objectives 
or how would you assess their sustainability? 
Q_CAP1: If you are to choose one word / factor – what do you think is still a pressing 
problem and needs attention in order to improve the EU funds absorption of the country? 
Q_CAP2A/B: Do you think Bulgaria has managed a better performance than Romania (and 
if so why) in managing EU Structural Funds during the 2007-2013 period? 
 
C. Conclusions  
 
D. Interview Details  
-Date; time and duration; name; function; other remarks. 
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Annex C – Qualitative software analysis 
 
The main aim of the qualitative software analysis has been to analyse the interview 
data using a systematic method of analysis. This was done in order to examine the 
relationship between the different factors analysed in this thesis, in particular the 
relationship between administrative and political factors. The analysis below 
highlights the main patterns of association between the nodes (qualitative codes) and 
outlines how certain factors might be correlated to one another, as they emerged from 
the coding of the interview data. Interviews were included in three separate NVIVO 
datasets consisting in a total of 66 selected interviewees for the overall analysis (chosen 
in line with the relevance and completeness of the interview), 38 cases for the 
Bulgarian dataset and 39 for the Romanian one. A total of 290 codes were generated 
in the analysis including 14 master codes, 30 formal codes (in line with the main 
indicators of the analytical framework). The remaining codes were either descriptive 
codes used to summarize the interview data (e.g. discouraged beneficiaries / over-
reliance on consultancies) or explanatory codes that attempted to explain different 
problems (e.g. administrative embeddedness / political favours). Finally, following the 
coding process the qualitative software analysis was carried out separately for the 
three datasets using mainly the cluster analysis tools of NVIVO 10. This clusters the 
nodes together in terms of coding similarity by using a Pearson correlation coefficient 
similarity metric. This allowed a quantification of the codes and an exploration of the 
potential inter-relationships between several selected variables and specific 
indicators. 
Several caveats must be stressed. First, the correlations below do not say anything 
about the type or the quality of relationships among the factors examined. These 
cannot equate to statistical analyses which allow for a clear testing of relationships 
between dependent and independent variables. In this case, NVIVO allowed only 
examining relationships between the latter category. Therefore a cautious 
interpretation of the results has been undertaken. Second, the correlations are the 
result of a subjective qualitative coding process. The reliability and validity of the 
coding process could be enhanced much more in collective research projects. Despite 
these caveats, examining the interview data in a more systematic manner using NVIVO 
has strengthened the analytical potential of this thesis and some significant patterns 
of association between the factors have been found. These were used to complement 
the main qualitative analysis and the insights of the case studies.  
In the following, the results of the cluster analyses are presented and briefly discussed 
in line with the different levels of analysis undertaken in the software (number of 
variables included in the computation). The graphic displays are not the same with the 
correlation coefficients present in the tables below them. The latter outline the most 
similar codes as they emerged from the coding process (presenting Pearson correlation 
co-efficient above 0.4 or 0.5).   
Table A 
Table A (next pages) presents the results of the cluster analysis based on the eight main 
factors included in the analytical framework. These could be interpreted in the 
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following manner. First, with regard to the overall results, there seem to be strong 
correlations between institutional and bureaucratic capacity, as well as between 
political stability and the EU factor, political stability and human resources, and finally 
between political clientelism and political support. Unexpectedly, the least similar 
were the correlations between human resources capacity and bureaucratic capacity.    
Second, there are several differences between the two countries. In Bulgaria there was 
a strong association between institutional capacity (ADM1) and bureaucratic capacity 
(ADM2), whilst in Romania there was one between institutional capacity and human 
resources capacity (ADM3). Moreover, in Bulgaria there was a stronger association 
between political support and territorial capacity (TER) and political clientelism 
(POL3), whilst in Romania these were stronger for political clientelism and political 
stability (POL1), as well as between political clientelism and the EU factor (EU). The 
latter may be explained given the denser discussions by Romanian interviewees on EU 
funds interruptions or suspensions.  
Finally, in all cases, political variables seem to be highly present and associated with 
other coding clusters. As mentioned, there is a strong association between political 
stability (POL1) and human resources (ADM3), and between territorial capacity (TER) 
and political support (POL2).  
Table B 
Several things could be interpreted from Table B (next pages) which examines the first 
level of analysis in all three settings (at the general level and separately for both 
Bulgaria and Romania).  
Firstly, there seemed to be a strong thematic correlation between the EU code and the 
absorption policy process (ABS_PROCESS). This could be interpreted in several ways. 
Most likely, there has been an automatic correlation made between the codes 
pertaining to the absorption policy process (ABS_PROCESS) and the EU as a 
consequence of strong alignment between the interview data relevant to these codes. 
Secondly, Brussels played an important role when it comes to the different stages of 
the absorption process (programming, selection, implementation, monitoring and 
reporting, financial management and programme evaluation). This does not 
contradict the idea that the EU may have an influence over domestic administrative 
capacity development, but it does raise some question on the limits of the EU for 
domestic administrative capacity-building processes. At the same time, the EU has 
been frequently associated with political stability in Bulgaria and with political 
clientelism in Romania. These are in line with the general analysis, where the relatively 
higher political stability of Bulgaria has been an advantage, whilst issues of clientelism 
in Romania, have been more pre-eminent and affected the implementation of several 
Operational Programmes (e.g. via interruptions or suspension of payments).  
Secondly, political factors (POL 1_Stability, POL2_Support and POL3_Clientelism) 
seem to be correlated, more widely than expected, with other themes. One explanation 
would be that there was an automatic association between political nodes and other 
nodes. For instance, the strong correlation coefficient in Bulgaria between 
POL1_STABILITY and Impact (coefficient 0.742818) may only reflect a strong 
association between these two themes as reported in only a few interviewees. With all 
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this, there are other frequent correlations between political factors and absorption 
process stages. In fact, this may reveal that political factors are more relevant not for 
administrative capacity building stage, but for the day-to-day processes and stages 
behind the overall absorption of EU funded projects. In this respect, political stability 
is strongly associated with the overall absorption policy process.  
Finally, with regard to some of the differences between the two countries, the cluster 
analysis points out that in Bulgaria there were stronger associations between 
institutional capacity (ADM1) and bureaucratic capacity (ADM2), whereas in Romania 
institutional capacity was much more linked to the “Pre_Accession” and “Strategic” 
issues. For Bulgaria, an interesting correlation is that between political support 
(POL2) and territorial capacity (TER). In Romania this is much weaker (although 
these appears displayed in Table B). This was confirmed by interview data and was one 
of the main differences between the two cases examined, with Bulgaria benefiting from 
a stronger territorial network of centrally controlled institutions, which characterised 
the country’s centralized model of EU funds management.  
Tables C 
Tables C provides a more in-depth level of analysis of the different coding themes 
based on the indicators of the absorption capacity model (Table 3, Chapter 2.4). These 
inter-relationships could suggest several things.  
First, in both countries, there was a strong association between the numbers of staff 
HUM_NO (e.g. issues of staff turnover or under-staffing) and human incentives 
HUM_Incentives (e.g. issues of payment, workload, or status of administrators), both 
dimensions of human resources capacity. This was the strongest association in both 
Bulgaria and Romania. Furthermore, there was a strong association between 
institutional accountability (INS_ACCOUNT) and human beneficiaries 
(HUM_BENEF). This was most probably the case given that discussions on the 
transparency and openness of managing institutions overlapped with those regarding 
EU funds beneficiaries. An unexpected association was that between human numbers 
and the technical influence of Brussels. Two other strong associations (>0.534) were 
those between beneficiaries (HUM_BENEF) and human capacity incentives 
(HUM_Incentives) and administrative procedures (ADM_Procedures). These reveal 
the potential importance of these themes for interviewees and, more generally, the 
significance of human resources capacity (ADM3). Other, slightly weaker associations 
pointed to several intuitive relationships. There was for instance an association 
between institutional design and institutional functioning and administrative - 
legislation (0.499), between institutional accountability and human incentives 
(0.488) and between human expertise and administrative procedures (0.481). These 
are telling of the pre-eminence of administrative capacity indicators, such as 
institutional design, legislation and administrative procedures, as reflected in the 
interview data and in the overall analysis carried out in this thesis.  
Second, specifically for the two countries, there were more differences than similarities 
in terms of the cluster analysis at the second level of analysis. For Bulgaria, there was 
for instance a strong association between institutional design and function 
(INS_DESIGN_FUNCTION) and human resources expertise (HUM_EXP). This is a 
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very interesting connection which might suggest that the design of institutions can 
have an effect on the quality of expertise of staff working in them. In other words, the 
way in which the institutions are organised could have an impact on the way in which 
staff develop their expertise. The same may apply to the high correlation (0.609) found 
between institutional design and legislation (ADM_LEG). Another interesting 
association was that between institutional accountability (INS_ACCOUNT) and 
human incentives (HUM_INCENTIVES) (0.603). Allegedly, this would suggest a 
potential link between the openness of these institutions and the incentives of staff 
working in them. Finally, there were several associations between political and 
administrative capacity factors. The first was that between political guidance and 
feedback (POL_STRATEGIC_FEEDBACK) and legislation (ADM_LEG) at 0.538. The 
second was between local level expertise (TER_LOC_EXP) and political support 
(POL_MANGEMENT_SUPPORT) at 0.535. The third was that between political 
stability and changes (POL_CHANGE) and the stability and uniformity of procedures 
(ADM_STA_UNIF) at 0.508. Lastly, there were two other associations, with 
coefficients below 0.5 (0.467), between political support 
(POL_STRATEGIC_FEEDBACK) and two core human resources indicators, numbers 
(HUM_NO) and incentives (HUM_INCENTIVES). These might suggest a fairly 
significant association between political and administrative factors which resonate 
with the general findings of the in depth qualitative analysis. In other words, in 
Bulgaria’s case, political stability and political support had positive effects on the 
quality of legislation, stability of administrative procedures and the development of 
expertise and staffing arrangements for managing EU funds at the central and local 
level.  
For Romania, territorial decentralization (TER_DECENTRAL) and territorial settings 
(TER_SETTINGS) correlated at 0.626, whilst territorial decentralization and local 
level expertise (TER_LOC_EXP) correlated at 0.608. In essence, this may only signal 
highly correlated interviews. Secondly, there was a strong correlation between 
institutional design and institutional coordination (0.603). This is reflected in the in-
depth qualitative analysis of the thesis which showed that institutional coordination 
was much more difficult to achieve in Romania’s case. Moreover, it points to a strong 
relationship between institutional design and institutional coordination. Problems in 
the first area may further generate issues in the second. Thirdly, there was a notable 
correlation between human expertise (HUM_EXP) and administrative procedures 
(ADM_PROCEDURES) (0.585). Fourthly, there was a link (0.547) between 
institutional accountability (INS_ACCOUNT) and human incentives 
(HUM_Incentives) is worth highlighting. With regard to the influence of political 
factors, there were two strong associations between political support 
(POL_MANGEMENT_SUPPORT) and institutional design (INS_DESIGN_FUNCT) 
at 0.585 and political support and legislation (ADM_LEG) at 0.548. This might 
suggest that political support could have an impact on institutional design and on the 
quality, as well as on legislation. By far the most pervasive political factor in Romania 
was that of political interference (patronage) in managing institutions 
(POL_MI_INTERF). This was linked with several other codes namely human 
resources numbers (HUM_NO) (0.576), human expertise (HUM_EXP) (0.528), 
administrative procedures (ADM_PROCEDURES) (0.516), institutional design 
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(INS_DESIGN_FUNCTION) (0.516) and institutional coordination 
(INS_COORD_ROLE) (0.511). These are telling of the negative influence that political 
interference had for the administrative capacity of institutions managing EU funding 
in the country. Last but not least, there were significant associations (0.566) between 
political influences in the distribution of funds (POL_INFL_DISTRIBUT) and 
political clientelism at the central level (POL_CLIENT_CENTRAL) and between 
territorial local expertise (TER_LOC_EXP) at and local political clientelism 
(POL_CLIENT_LOCAL) (0.563). These could potentially suggest that discussions on 
political clienteles were predominantly linked to the idea of a politicised distribution 
of EU funds. It could also suggest that the development of local expertise for SF 
implementation might have been affected by local political clientelism.  
 
Conclusions 
By exploring the coded interview data, at the different levels of coding, several 
potentially relevant conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, there were a few strong and 
relevant correlations for administrative capacity factors. Second, political factors seem 
to be overall strongly associated with the absorption process stages, rather than only 
with administrative capacity factors. However, there are several strong associations (> 
0.5) between individual political factors and administrative capacity elements. In 
Bulgaria’s case, two political variables (change and support) were strongly associated 
with legislation, uniformity and stability of procedures, human resources numbers and 
incentives, including local expertise. This is equally mirrored in the general qualitative 
analysis of this thesis. In Romania, the analysis showed that political variables (e.g. 
political patronage and political clientelism) were correlated with problems of staff 
turnover, the quality of human expertise and the absence of simplified administrative 
procedures, including the way in which the specialised institutions were designed. 
These issues were confirmed and more widely discussed in the case studies.    
To conclude, political factors seemed to be more significant when additional variables 
were introduced in the computation (e.g. Absorption process, Operational 
Programmes, Pre-accession, Impact). In other words, the importance of political 
factors seems to increase in relation to the operational aspects surrounding the use of 
EU funding. Therefore, the importance of political governance may increase in relation 
to the policy processes surrounding the implementation of different Operational 
Programmes. As argued in the thesis this shows that the influence of political factors 
may go beyond administrative capacity development and can affect the day-to-day 
aspects linked to the delivery of Cohesion Policy. 
 366 
 
Table A: Core level of analysis - 8 main factors (>0.4) 
Overall (n = 66 / 290 codes) Bulgaria (n = 38 / 265 codes) Romania (n = 39 / 265 codes) 
   
Coding similarity > 0.4 
Node A Node B 
Pearson 
correlation 
coefficient 
POL\POL1_STABILITY EU 0.5332 
POL\POL3_CLIENTELIS
M 
POL\POL1_STABIL
ITY 
0.52551 
ADM2_Bureaucratic 
capacity 
ADM1_Institutional 
capacity 
0.488141 
POL\POL1_STABILITY ADM3_Human 
resources capacity 
0.47427 
POL\POL3_CLIENTELIS
M 
POL\POL2_SUPPO
RT 
0.452862 
POL\POL3_CLIENTELIS
M 
EU 0.423065 
EU  ADM3_Human 
resources capacity 
0.403577 
 
Coding similarity > 0.4 
Node A Node B 
Pearson 
correlation 
coefficient 
POL\POL1_STABILITY EU 0.614004 
POL\POL3_CLIENTEL
ISM POL\POL2_SUPPORT 0.580264 
TER_Territorial 
capacity POL\POL2_SUPPORT 0.580264 
POL\POL1_STABILITY 
ADM3_Human 
resources capacity 0.54238 
POL\POL3_CLIENTEL
ISM POL\POL1_STABILITY 0.522093 
TER_Territorial 
capacity POL\POL1_STABILITY 0.522093 
TER_Territorial 
capacity 
ADM3_Human 
resources capacity 0.497009 
ADM2_Bureaucratic 
capacity 
ADM1_Institutional 
capacity 0.480885 
POL\POL1_STABILITY 
ADM1_Institutional 
capacity 0.421398 
POL\POL3_CLIENTEL
ISM EU 0.407608 
 
Coding similarity > 0.4  
Node A Node B 
Pearson 
correlation 
coefficient 
POL\POL3_CLIENT
ELISM 
POL\POL1_STABILITY 0.643459 
POL\POL3_CLIENT
ELISM 
EU 0.617213 
POL\POL1_STABILI
TY 
ADM3_Human 
resources capacity 
0.575698 
EU ADM2_Bureaucratic 
capacity 
0.561951 
EU ADM3_Human 
resources capacity 
0.536745 
POL\POL1_STABILI
TY 
EU 0.491596 
ADM2_Bureaucratic 
capacity 
ADM1_Institutional 
capacity 
0.479857 
ADM3_Human 
resources capacity 
ADM1_Institutional 
capacity 
0.442857 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s creation using the interview database in NVIVO 10. 
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Table B: First level of analysis - 14 core nodes (> 0.5) 
Overall (n = 66) Bulgaria (n = 38)  Romania (n = 39)  
 
  
Coding similarity > 0.5  
Node A Node B 
Pearson 
correlation 
coefficient 
EU ABS_PROCESS 0.705774 
POL\POL3_CLIENTELISM ABS_PROCESS 0.639602 
POL\POL1_STABILITY ABS_PROCESS 0.606676 
Impact ABS_PROCESS 0.550973 
Strategic Pre_Accession 0.541083 
POL\POL1_STABILITY EU 0.5332 
POL\POL3_CLIENTELISM POL\POL1_STAB
ILITY 
0.52551 
POL\POL1_STABILITY Impact 0.522354 
 
 
Coding similarity > 0.5  
Node A Node B 
Pearson 
correlation  
coefficient 
POL\POL1_STABILITY Impact 0.742818 
POL\POL1_STABILITY ABS_PROCESS 0.702728 
EU ABS_PROCESS 0.689222 
POL\POL3_CLIENTELIS
M 
ABS_PROCESS 0.656167 
Impact ABS_PROCESS 0.615457 
POL\POL1_STABILITY EU 0.614004 
Strategic Pre_Accession 0.602055 
TER_Territorial capacity Pre_Accession 0.59352 
POL\POL3_CLIENTELIS
M 
POL\POL2_SUPPORT 0.580264 
TER_Territorial capacity POL\POL2_SUPPORT 0.580264 
Coding similarity > 0.5  
Node A Node B 
Pearson 
correlation 
coefficient 
EU ABS_PROCESS 0.853913 
POL\POL3_CLIENTELI
SM 
ABS_PROCESS 0.722806 
POL\POL3_CLIENTELI
SM 
POL\POL1_STABILI
TY 
0.643459 
OPs EU 0.617213 
POL\POL3_CLIENTELI
SM 
EU 0.617213 
POL\POL1_STABILITY Impact 0.596552 
Impact ABS_PROCESS 0.575698 
Impact ADM3_Human 
resources capacity 
0.575698 
POL\POL1_STABILITY ABS_PROCESS 0.575698 
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Coding dissimilarity (> -0.) 
  
TER_Territorial 
capacity 
OPs -0.004345 
ADM3_Human 
resources capacity 
ADM2_Bureaucratic 
capacity 
-0.043426 
Pre_Accession Capacity_Performance -0.044262 
 
Strategic Impact 0.57356 
POL\POL3_CLIENTELIS
M 
Impact 0.553395 
TER_Territorial capacity Impact 0.553395 
POL\POL1_STABILITY ADM3_Human 
resources capacity 
0.54238 
Pre_Accession Impact 0.531215 
TER_Territorial capacity Strategic 0.527571 
POL\POL3_CLIENTELIS
M 
POL\POL1_STABILIT
Y 
0.522093 
TER_Territorial capacity POL\POL1_STABILIT
Y 
0.522093 
Strategic ADM3_Human 
resources capacity 
0.512905 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
POL\POL1_STABILITY ADM3_Human 
resources capacity 
0.575698 
Strategic Pre_Accession 0.569803 
EU ADM2_Bureaucratic 
capacity 
0.561951 
Pre_Accession Impact 0.545398 
Pre_Accession POL\POL1_STABILI
TY 
0.545398 
Pre_Accession ABS_PROCESS 0.53936 
Pre_Accession ADM1_Institutional 
capacity 
0.53936 
Pre_Accession ADM3_Human 
resources capacity 
0.53936 
EU ADM3_Human 
resources capacity 
0.536745 
Strategic ADM1_Institutional 
capacity 
0.507093 
Strategic ADM3_Human 
resources capacity 
0.507093 
OPs ABS_PROCESS 0.502576 
OPs ADM3_Human 
resources capacity 
0.502576 
 
Source: Author’s creation using interview database in NVIVO 10 
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Table C1: Second level of analysis – inter-relationship between indicators of absorption capacity model (> 0.5) 
 
            
Coding similarity (>0.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Node A Node B 
Pearson 
correlation 
coefficient 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_NO 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_INCENTIVES 
0.640142 
ADM1_Institutional 
capacity\INS_ACCOUNT 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_BENEF 
0.575688 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_NO 
EU\EU_INFL_TECH 0.559647 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_INCENTIVES 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_BENEF 
0.542709 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_BENEF 
ADM2_Bureaucratic 
capacity\ADM_PROCEDURE
S 
0.534682 
EU\EU_INFL_TECH ADM2_Bureaucratic 
capacity\ADM_LEG 
0.511921 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_TRAINING 
ABS_PROCESS\ADM_MONI
T_REPORT 
0.507576 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_CONSULT 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_BENEF 
0.504919 
Source: Author’s creation using interview database in NVIVO 10 
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Table C2: Second level of analysis - Bulgaria - inter-relationship between indicators of absorption capacity model (> 0.5)  
 
           Coding similarity (>0.55) 
 
Node A Node B 
Pearson 
correlation 
coefficient 
ADM3_Human resources capacity\HUM_NO ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_INCENTIVES 
0.702899 
ADM1_Institutional 
capacity\INS_DESIGN_FUNCTION 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_EXP 
0.664321 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_BENEF 
ADM2_Bureaucratic 
capacity\ADM_PROCEDURES 
0.627273 
TER_Territorial capacity\TER_LOC_EXP ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_BENEF 
0.627273 
ADM1_Institutional 
capacity\INS_DESIGN_FUNCTION 
ADM2_Bureaucratic 
capacity\ADM_LEG 
0.609524 
TER_Territorial capacity\TER_LOC_EXP EU\EU_INFL_TECH 0.608745 
ADM3_Human resources capacity\HUM_NO EU\EU_INFL_TECH 0.606688 
ADM1_Institutional capacity\INS_ACCOUNT ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_INCENTIVES 
0.603865 
TER_Territorial capacity\TER_CENTRAL POL\POL2_SUPPORT\POL_ST
RATEGIC_FEEDBACK 
0.575876 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_INCENTIVES 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_BENEF 
0.57356 
ADM1_Institutional capacity\INS_ACCOUNT ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_BENEF 
0.57356 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_TRAINING 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_NO 
0.56836 
 
            
Source: Author’s creation using interview database in NVIVO 10 
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Table C3: Second level of analysis – Romania - inter-relationship between indicators of absorption capacity model (> 0.5) 
 
           Coding similarity (>0.55) 
 
Node A Node B 
Pearson 
correlation 
coefficient 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_NO 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_INCENTIVES 
0.691751 
TER_Territorial capacity\TER_SETTINGS TER_Territorial 
capacity\TER_DECENTRAL 
0.626368 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_INCENTIVES 
EU\EU_OP_SUSP 0.608641 
TER_Territorial capacity\TER_LOC_EXP TER_Territorial 
capacity\TER_DECENTRAL 
0.608641 
ADM1_Institutional 
capacity\INS_DESIGN_FUNCTION 
ADM1_Institutional 
capacity\INS_COORD_ROLE 
0.603023 
ADM1_Institutional 
capacity\INS_DESIGN_FUNCTION 
EU\EU_INFL_TECH 0.589256 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_EXP 
ADM2_Bureaucratic 
capacity\ADM_PROCEDURES 
0.585018 
POL\POL2_SUPPORT\POL_MANAGEME
NT_SUPPORT 
ADM1_Institutional 
capacity\INS_DESIGN_FUNCTION 
0.583717 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_TRAINING 
ABS_PROCESS\ADM_MONIT_REPORT 0.580487 
ADM1_Institutional 
capacity\INS_ACCOUNT 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_BENEF 
0.580288 
POL\POL1_STABILITY\POL_MI_INTERF ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_NO 
0.576087 
POL\POL3_CLIENTELISM\POL_INFL_DI
STRIBUT 
POL\POL3_CLIENTELISM\POL_CLIEN
T_CENTRAL 
0.566667 
TER_Territorial capacity\TER_LOC_EXP POL\POL3_CLIENTELISM\POL_CLIEN
T_LOCAL 
0.563053 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_INCENTIVES 
ADM3_Human resources 
capacity\HUM_BENEF 
0.562704 
TER_Territorial 
capacity\TER_DECENTRAL 
POL\POL3_CLIENTELISM\POL_CLIEN
T_LOCAL 
0.556038 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s creation using interview database in NVIVO 10 
